Delusions beyond beliefs: a critical overview of diagnostic, aetiological, and therapeutic schizophrenia research from a clinical-phenomenological perspective

Let's fail better: Using philosophical tools to improve neuroscientific research in psychiatry

Despite predictions that neuroscientific discoveries would revolutionize psychiatry, decades of research have not yet led to clinically significant advances in psychiatric care. For this reason, an increasing number of researchers are recognizing the limitations of a purely biomedical approach in psychiatric research. These researchers call for reevaluating the conceptualization of mental disorders and argue for a non-reductionist approach to mental health. The aim of this paper is to discuss philosophical assumptions that underly neuroscientific research in psychiatry and offer practical tools to researchers for overcoming potential conceptual problems that are derived from those assumptions. Specifically, we will discuss: the analogy problem, questioning whether mental health problems are equivalent to brain disorders, the normativity problem, addressing the value-laden nature of psychiatric categories and the priority problem, which describes the level of analysis (e.g., biological, psychological, social, etc.) that should be prioritized when studying psychiatric conditions. In addition, we will explore potential strategies to mitigate practical problems that might arise due to these implicit assumptions. Overall, the aim of this paper is to suggest philosophical tools of practical use for neuroscientists, demonstrating the benefits of a closer collaboration between neuroscience and philosophy.

Consistency of Delusion Themes Across First and Subsequent Episodes of Psychosis

Importance

Despite growing interest in the phenomenology of delusions in psychosis, at present little is known about their content and evolution over time, including whether delusion themes are consistent across episodes.

Objective

To examine the course of delusions and thematic delusion content across relapse episodes in patients presenting to an early intervention service for psychosis.

Design, Setting, and Participants

This longitudinal, observational study used clinical data systematically collected from January 2003 to March 2018 from a cohort of consenting patients with affective or nonaffective first-episode psychosis, followed up naturalistically for up to 2 years in an early intervention service for psychosis in Montréal, Quebec, Canada. Data included the thematic content and severity of delusions (scores ≥3 using the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms) and associated psychotic and nonpsychotic symptoms, both across an initial episode and, in the event of remission, a potential relapse. Data were analyzed from September 2021 to February 2023.

Exposure

An early intervention service for psychosis, organized around intensive case management and a multidisciplinary team approach, which observed each patient for up to 2 years of care.

Main Outcomes and Measures

The primary outcome was positive symptom relapse and remission, including the presence and content of delusions, which was coded per the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms and accepted definitions. The main statistical measures included repeated paired-sample t tests and binary logistic regression analyses.

Results

Of 636 consenting patients, mean (SD) age was 23.8 (4.75) years; 191 patients were female, 444 were male, and 1 patient was nonbinary. Remission rates were high, and relapse rates were relatively low: 591 individuals had baseline delusions, of which 558 (94.4%) achieved remission. Of these 558 patients, only 182 (32.6%) had a subsequent relapse to a second or later episode of psychosis. Of the 182 patients who did relapse, however, a large proportion (115 [63.2%]) reported threshold-level delusions. Of these 115, 104 patients (90.4%) had thematic delusion content consistent with that reported during the index (first) episode. Those who relapsed with delusions had fewer delusion themes present during subsequent episodes of psychosis compared with the index episode and lower levels of other psychotic and nonpsychotic symptoms.

Conclusions and Relevance

Specialized early intervention services for psychosis can achieve high rates of sustained remission. However, in this study, the minority of individuals with delusions who later relapsed experienced similar delusion themes during subsequent episodes. These findings raise important considerations for the conceptualization of delusions and have clinical implications for trajectories of illness and care.

Meeting the multidimensional self: fostering selfhood at the interface of Creative Arts Therapies and neuroscience

Intriguing explorations at the intersection of the fields of neuroscience and psychology are driven by the quest to understand the neural underpinnings of "the self" and their psychotherapeutic implications. These translational efforts pertain to the unique Creative Arts Therapies (CATs) and the attributes and value of the self-related processes they offer. The self is considered as a multi-layered complex construct, comprising bodily and mental constituents, subjective-objective perspectives, spatial and temporal dimensions. Neuroscience research, mostly functional brain imaging, has proposed cogent models of the constitution, development and experience of the self, elucidating how the multiple dimensions of the self are supported by integrated hierarchical brain processes. The psychotherapeutic use of the art-forms, generating aesthetic experiences and creative processes, touch upon and connect the various layers of self-experience, nurturing the sense of self. The present conceptual analysis will describe and interweave the neural mechanisms and neural network configuration suggested to lie at the core of the ongoing self-experience, its deviations in psychopathology, and implications regarding the psychotherapeutic use of the arts. The well-established, parsimonious and neurobiologically plausible predictive processing account of brain-function will be discussed with regard to selfhood and consciousness. The epistemic affordance of the experiential CATs will further be portrayed, enabling and facilitating the creation of updated self-models of the body in the world. The neuropsychological impact of the relational therapeutic encounter will be delineated, acknowledging the intersubjective brain synchronization through communicative verbal and non-verbal means and aesthetic experiences. The recognition and assimilation of neuroscientific, phenomenological and clinical perspectives concerning the nested dimensionality of the self, ground the relational therapeutic process and the neuroplastic modulations that CATs have to offer on the premise of fostering, shaping and integrating selfhood.

Predictors of clinical insight in first-episode psychosis: Different patterns in men and women

BACKGROUND

We aimed to explore gender-related differences in the associations of insight impairment with clinical symptoms, metacognition, and social cognition in psychosis.

METHODS

Regression analysis of several clinical insight dimensions was conducted on the data from 116 men and 56 women with first-episode psychosis. Various clinical symptoms and measures of metacognition and social cognition were entered as predictors.

RESULTS

In both men and women, delusions emerged as a strong predictor of all insight dimensions, and verbal hallucinations as a strong predictor of symptom relabelling. In men, certain negative symptoms as well as self-certainty, lack of self-reflectiveness, impaired theory of mind, attributional biases, and a jumping-to-conclusions bias were additional predictors of poor insight, while good insight was associated with depression, anxiety, avolition, blunted affect, and impaired emotional recognition. In women, poor insight was associated with a self-serving/externalising bias, impaired emotional recognition, and attention disorders.

CONCLUSIONS

Poor insight in first-episode psychosis is strongly linked to deficits in metacognition and social cognition, with marked differences between men and women with respect to the specific skills involved in the impairment. Meanwhile, good insight is linked to a variety of affective manifestations in men. These findings suggest new avenues for more targeted cognitive interventions to improve clinical insight in psychosis.

Service User Representation in Qualitative Research on Cognitive Health and Related Interventions for Psychosis: A Scoping Review

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Cognitive health in schizophrenia spectrum psychosis has received substantial empirical attention in recent decades, coinciding with the development and implementation of interventions including cognitive remediation. Subjective experience in psychosis, including qualitative explorations of service user perspectives, has also proliferated; however, there is no available synthesis of service user representation in the psychosis cognitive health literature. This scoping review investigated prevalence and characteristics of qualitative research reporting service user perspectives across the extant research on cognitive health and related interventions in psychosis.

STUDY DESIGN

We conducted a literature search on qualitative methods in cognitive health and/or related interventions across PubMed, Web of Science, and PsycInfo databases. The review followed the PRISMA-ScR guidelines for scoping reviews and identified 23 papers. Data extraction included study design and sample characteristics, qualitative methodology, and reporting.

STUDY RESULTS

Of 23 articles, 18 reported on user experiences of interventions, most often in the context of feasibility/acceptability for otherwise quantitative trials. Five studies described service user experiences of cognitive health separately from interventions. Only 3 included any service user involvement or participatory methods. Twenty articles reported any demographic characteristics, and fewer than half (11) reported any racial or ethnic sample characteristics. There was substantial variability in qualitative methodology and reporting across studies.

CONCLUSIONS

Qualitative methodology is lacking in its representation and rigor across the cognitive health literature for schizophrenia spectrum psychosis. Additional inclusion of service user lived experience is critical for future research to better characterize cognitive health and inform interventions to promote recovery.

From diagnosis to dialogue - reconsidering the DSM as a conversation piece in mental health care: a hypothesis and theory

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, abbreviated as the DSM, is one of mental health care's most commonly used classification systems. While the DSM has been successful in establishing a shared language for researching and communicating about mental distress, it has its limitations as an empirical compass. In the transformation of mental health care towards a system that is centered around shared decision-making, person-centered care, and personal recovery, the DSM is problematic as it promotes the disengagement of people with mental distress and is primarily a tool developed for professionals to communicate about patients instead of with patients. However, the mental health care system is set up in such a way that we cannot do without the DSM for the time being. In this paper, we aimed to describe the position and role the DSM may have in a mental health care system that is evolving from a medical paradigm to a more self-contained profession in which there is increased accommodation of other perspectives. First, our analysis highlights the DSM's potential as a boundary object in clinical practice, that could support a shared language between patients and professionals. Using the DSM as a conversation piece, a language accommodating diverse perspectives can be co-created. Second, we delve into why people with lived experience should be involved in co-designing spectra of distress. We propose an iterative design and test approach for designing DSM spectra of distress in co-creation with people with lived experience to prevent the development of 'average solutions' for 'ordinary people'. We conclude that transforming mental health care by reconsidering the DSM as a boundary object and conversation piece between activity systems could be a step in the right direction, shifting the power balance towards shared ownership in a participation era that fosters dialogue instead of diagnosis.

Making Sense of Spiritual, Metaphysical, and Eschatological Elements in Delusions: A Qualitative Study Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

BACKGROUND

Spiritual, metaphysical, or eschatological elements in delusions (SMEDs) are frequent and often subjectively regarded as profound transformational experiences, similar to mystical experiences. This study aimed (1) to explore how SMEDs are experienced and in which aspects they are similar to mystical experiences and (2) to investigate how individuals make sense of SMED.

METHODS

Seven participants were interviewed, and their expressions were analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis.

RESULTS

We found that SMEDs were similar to mystical experiences with regard to alterations in perception of space, time, and unity. Furthermore, SMEDs were accompanied by a sense of enlightenment that however remained ineffable. SMEDs were interpreted from different viewpoints, i.e., as a source of ontological insight, as a mental health issue, as an inspiration for a new orientation in the world, and, for some participants, as an example of the limits of knowledge. Making sense of SMED appeared to follow a lively internal dialogue in which various, sometimes contradictory positions were reflected upon. Participants usually struggled to align the ostensible ontological significance of SMED to the dominating illness explanation.

CONCLUSION

SMEDs have similarities to mystical experiences, but integrating SMED into one's own life is challenging. We propose a philosophical, non-pathological interpretation of SMED derived from a novel perspective on mystical experience which may also have some therapeutic utility.

Delusions in postpartum psychosis: Implications for cognitive theories

Postpartum psychosis is a rare but serious condition that can affect women after childbirth. We present a case study of an individual with no comorbidities or psychiatric history who developed postpartum psychosis characterised by prominent misidentification delusions whilst admitted to hospital. The woman recovered quickly with medication and showed no evidence of relapse over the following three years. Whilst still symptomatic and after recovery, the patient was able to provide a detailed description of her experiences. Contemporaneous interviews and observations during her hospital admission and a subsequent detailed retrospective account provide a unique, comprehensive window into her experience of these time-limited delusions. Her case reveals important insights including the triggers for her misidentification delusions, the role of social and contextual influences on delusional beliefs, and her recall of active involvement in evaluating and discarding delusional hypotheses. These insights highlight the complexity of delusional beliefs, challenge existing theories of delusions, and help inform broader theories of belief formation.

The Nested States Model: A Phenomenologically-Grounded Model of the Mind

BACKGROUND

Subjective experience is central to the nature of mental illness, yet it has not played a central role in most empirical approaches to psychopathology. While phenomenological perspectives in psychiatry have seen a recent resurgence, there remains a need for more detailed models of psychopathological processes based on explicit phenomenological and enactive foundations.

SUMMARY

We present a framework derived from the Nested States Model (NSM) through which such phenomenologically-grounded models might be constructed. The NSM describes the dynamic structure of subjective experience as a system of nested states that reciprocally influence one another across hierarchical layers. Here, we show how the NSM provides a scheme for characterizing patterns of experience that comprise various psychopathological processes. We demonstrate the utility of this scheme both for clinical practice and for building our knowledge of psychopathological processes more broadly.

KEY MESSAGES

The NSM can advance three aims that we see as critical for the lasting integration of phenomenological approaches to psychopathology within psychiatry. First, we show that the NSM provides a means for constructing clinical formulations and treatment considerations that center squarely on an individual's subjective experiences. Second, the NSM supplies a framework for organizing findings from clinical-phenomenological research that can guide the construction of broader phenomenologically-grounded models of psychopathological processes. Lastly, the NSM aligns our perspective on subjective experience with emerging perspectives on brain dynamics, helping to bridge phenomenological work with ongoing neurophysiological research.

Social identification and paranoia

Paranoia is associated with variation in social behaviour, such as lower inclination to trust others or to behave generously in economic game settings. Such variation may stem, in part, from a reduced tendency to socially identify with others, although previous studies have reported mixed results. We tested whether paranoia involves altered social identification in a pre-registered online study investigating the relationship between a measure of social identification, paranoia, and social behaviours in economic games. We successfully manipulated social identification, but paranoia was associated with slightly increased social identification overall. Neither paranoia nor social identification predicted behaviour in the economic games, and there was no interaction between paranoia and social identification regarding trusting and cooperative behaviours. Our results converge with recent work suggesting that more paranoid individuals may harbour a higher tendency to perceive themselves as having similar beliefs to others. We discuss some key areas for future research to progress understanding in this area.

Schizophrenia, the very idea: On self-disorder, hyperreflexivity, and the diagnostic concept

The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia-the very idea-from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience. First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization-in general and regarding "schizophrenia" in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity-a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience. Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated "self-presence" that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.

A new predictive coding model for a more comprehensive account of delusions

Attempts to understand psychosis-the experience of profoundly altered perceptions and beliefs-raise questions about how the brain models the world. Standard predictive coding approaches suggest that it does so by minimising mismatches between incoming sensory evidence and predictions. By adjusting predictions, we converge iteratively on a best guess of the nature of the reality. Recent arguments have shown that a modified version of this framework-hybrid predictive coding-provides a better model of how healthy agents make inferences about external reality. We suggest that this more comprehensive model gives us a richer understanding of psychosis compared with standard predictive coding accounts. In this Personal View, we briefly describe the hybrid predictive coding model and show how it offers a more comprehensive account of the phenomenology of delusions, thereby providing a potentially powerful new framework for computational psychiatric approaches to psychosis. We also make suggestions for future work that could be important in formalising this novel perspective.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (1. Comprehensive Review-Dualities of Self- and World-Experience)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. The following 2 articles aim to provide further clarification of the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by offering a comprehensive review (article 1) and theoretical revision (article 2) of the currently most influential model of altered selfhood in schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). This article presents a state-of-the-art overview of the current self-disturbance model and critically assesses its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical variability and heterogeneity of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. Special attention is paid to experiences of exaggerated basic self, increased "grip" or "hold" on the world, and paradoxical combinations. The next article proposes a theoretical revision of the self-disturbance model by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the phenomenologically heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline the implications of our revised model for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

'Are these my thoughts?': A 20-year prospective study of thought insertion, thought withdrawal, thought broadcasting, and their relationship to auditory verbal hallucinations

The co-occurrence of delusions and other symptoms at the onset of psychosis is a challenge for theories about the aetiology of psychosis. This paper explores the relatedness of delusions about the experience of thinking (thought insertion, thought withdrawal, and thought broadcasting) and auditory verbal hallucinations by describing their trajectories over a 20-year period in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, affective and other psychosis, and unipolar depression nonpsychosis. The sample consisted of 407 participants who were recruited at index hospitalization and evaluated over six follow-ups over 20 years. The symptom structure associated with thought insertion included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusions of control, delusion of self-depreciation, depersonalization and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought withdrawal included somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought dissemination, delusions of control, sexual delusions, depersonalization, negative symptoms, depression, and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought broadcasting included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusion of self-depreciation, fantastic delusions, sexual delusions, and depersonalization. Auditory verbal hallucinations and delusions of self-depreciation were significantly associated with both thought insertion and thought broadcasting. Thought insertion and thought withdrawal were significantly associated with other hallucinations, delusions of control, and anxiety; thought withdrawal and thought broadcasting were significantly related to sexual delusions. We hypothesize that specific symptom constellations over time might be explained as the product of pseudo-coherent realities created to give meaning to the experience of the world and the self of individuals in psychosis based on both prior top-down and ongoing bottom-up elements.

Anomalies of imagination and development of psychosis: A phenomenological account

In 20th century psychiatry, various disturbances of imagination were discussed in the context of schizophrenia. Today, these notions have almost completely vanished from mainstream psychopathology. However, recent work has suggested that specific phenomena within this area have a relevance for differential diagnosis and early detection of psychosis. This paper first provides an overview of 20th century psychopathological literature, as well as more recent neurocognitive studies, addressing disturbances of imagination and their role for symptom formation in schizophrenia. It then discusses recent empirical investigations of subjective anomalies of imagination in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and suggests a clinical-phenomenological account of their role in the development of psychotic symptoms. Empirically and conceptually, these subjective anomalies are linked with disturbances of basic self. Patients' descriptions of the development of their anomalous experiences and symptoms indicate that increased spatial (object-like) articulation and instability of the first-personal manifestation of imaginative experience can be involved in the emergence of delusions and hallucinatory phenomena. Finally, a potential link between subjective anomalies of imagination and the neurocognitive construct of source monitoring deficits is discussed.

Cross-sectional association between metabolic parameters and psychotic-like experiences in a population-based sample of middle-aged and elderly individuals

BACKGROUND

Metabolic alterations are often found in patients with clinical psychosis early in the course of the disorder. Psychotic-like experiences are observed in the general population, but it is unclear whether these are associated with markers of metabolism.

METHODS

A population-based cohort of 1890 individuals (mean age 58.0 years; 56.3% women) was included. Metabolic parameters were measured by body-mass index (BMI), concentrations of low-density and high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C and HDL-C), total cholesterol, triglycerides, and fasting glucose and insulin in blood. Frequency and distress ratings of psychotic-like experiences from the positive symptom dimension of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experience questionnaire were assessed. Cross-sectional associations were analysed using linear regression analyses.

RESULTS

Higher BMI was associated with higher frequency of psychotic-like experiences (adjusted mean difference: 0.04, 95% CI 0.02-0.06) and more distress (adjusted mean difference: 0.02, 95% CI 0.01-0.03). Lower LDL-C was associated with more psychotic-like experiences (adjusted mean difference: -0.23, 95% CI -0.40 to -0.06). When restricting the sample to those not using lipid-lowering medication, the results of BMI and LDL-C remained and an association between lower HDL-C and higher frequency of psychotic-like experiences was found (adjusted mean difference: -0.37, 95% CI -0.69 to -0.05). We observed no significant associations between cholesterol, triglycerides, glucose, insulin or homeostatic model assessment and psychotic-like experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

In a population-based sample of middle-aged and elderly individuals, higher BMI and lower LDL-C were associated with psychotic-like experiences. This suggests that metabolic markers are associated with psychotic-like experiences across the vulnerability spectrum.

Overcoming the translational crisis of contemporary psychiatry - converging phenomenological and spatiotemporal psychopathology

Despite all neurobiological/neurocomputational progress in psychiatric research, recent authors speak about a 'crisis of contemporary psychiatry'. Some argue that we do not yet know the computational mechanisms underlying the psychopathological symptoms ('crisis of mechanism') while others diagnose a neglect of subjectivity, namely first-person experience ('crisis of subjectivity'). In this perspective, we propose that Phenomenological Psychopathology, due to its focus on first-person experience of space and time, is in an ideal position to address the crisis of subjectivity and, if extended to the brain's spatiotemporal topographic-dynamic structure as key focus of Spatiotemporal Psychopathology, the crisis of mechanism. We demonstrate how the first-person experiences of space and time differ between schizophrenia, mood disorders and anxiety disorders allowing for their differential-diagnosis - this addresses the crisis of subjectivity. Presupposing space and time as shared features of brain, experience, and symptoms as their "common currency", the structure of abnormal space and time experience may also serve as template for the structure of the brain's spatiotemporal neuro-computational mechanisms - this may address the crisis of mechanism. Preliminary scientific evidence in our examples of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and depression support such clinically relevant spatiotemporal determination of both first-person experience (crisis of subjectivity) and the brain's neuro-computational structure (crisis of mechanism). In conclusion, converging Phenomenological Psychopathology with Spatiotemporal Psychopathology might help to overcome the translational crisis in psychiatry by delineating more fine-grained neuro computational and -phenomenal mechanisms; this offers novel candidate biomarkers for diagnosis and therapy including both pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatment.

Excessive teleological thinking is driven by aberrant associations and not by failure of reasoning

Teleological thought - the tendency to ascribe purpose to objects and events - is useful in some cases (encouraging explanation-seeking), but harmful in others (fueling delusions and conspiracy theories). What drives excessive and maladaptive teleological thinking? In causal learning, there is a fundamental distinction between associative learning versus learning via propositional mechanisms. Here, we propose that directly contrasting the contributions of these two pathways can elucidate the roots of excess teleology. We modified a causal learning task such that we could encourage associative versus propositional mechanisms in different instances. Across three experiments (total N = 600), teleological tendencies were correlated with delusion-like ideas and uniquely explained by aberrant associative learning, but not by learning via propositional rules. Computational modeling suggested that the relationship between associative learning and teleological thinking can be explained by excessive prediction errors that imbue random events with more significance - providing a new understanding for how humans make meaning of lived events.

Artificial intelligence in psychiatry research, diagnosis, and therapy

Psychiatric disorders are now responsible for the largest proportion of the global burden of disease, and even more challenges have been seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Artificial intelligence (AI) is commonly used to facilitate the early detection of disease, understand disease progression, and discover new treatments in the fields of both physical and mental health. The present review provides a broad overview of AI methodology and its applications in data acquisition and processing, feature extraction and characterization, psychiatric disorder classification, potential biomarker detection, real-time monitoring, and interventions in psychiatric disorders. We also comprehensively summarize AI applications with regard to the early warning, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of specific psychiatric disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, addiction, sleep disorders, and Alzheimer's disease. The advantages and disadvantages of AI in psychiatry are clarified. We foresee a new wave of research opportunities to facilitate and improve AI technology and its long-term implications in psychiatry during and after the COVID-19 era.

Delusions and the dilemmas of life: A systematic review and meta-analyses of the global literature on the prevalence of delusional themes in clinical groups

We investigated the prevalence of persecutory, grandiose, reference, control, and religious delusions in adult clinical populations worldwide and whether they differed according to country characteristics or age, gender, or year of publication. 123 studies met inclusion criteria, across 30 countries; 102 (115 samples, n = 20,979) were included in the main random-effects meta-analysis of studies measuring multiple delusional themes (21 in a separate analysis of studies in recording a single theme). Persecutory delusions were most common (pooled point estimate: 64.5%, CI = 60.6-68.3, k = 106, followed by reference (39.7%, CI 34.5-45.3, k = 65), grandiose (28.2, CI 24.8-31.9, k = 100), control 21.6%, CI 17.8-26.0, k = 53), and religious delusions 18.3%, CI 15.4-21.6, k = 50). Data from studies recording one theme were broadly consistent with these findings. There were no effects for study quality or publication date. Prevalences were higher in samples exclusively with psychotic patients but did not differ between developed and developing countries, or by country individualism, power distance, or prevalence of atheism. Religious and control delusions were more prevalent in countries with higher income inequality. We hypothesize that these delusional themes reflect universal human dilemmas and existential challenges.

Using dimensionality-reduction techniques to understand the organization of psychotic symptoms in persistent psychotic illness and first episode psychosis

Psychotic disorders are highly heterogeneous. Understanding relationships between symptoms will be relevant to their underlying pathophysiology. We apply dimensionality-reduction methods across two unique samples to characterize the patterns of symptom organization. We analyzed publicly-available data from 153 participants diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (fBIRN Data Repository and the Consortium for Neuropsychiatric Phenomics), as well as 636 first-episode psychosis (FEP) participants from the Prevention and Early Intervention Program for Psychosis (PEPP-Montreal). In all participants, the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS) and Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) were collected. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) combined with cluster analysis was applied to SAPS and SANS scores across these two groups of participants. MDS revealed relationships between items of SAPS and SANS. Our application of cluster analysis to these results identified: 1 cluster of disorganization symptoms, 2 clusters of hallucinations/delusions, and 2 SANS clusters (asocial and apathy, speech and affect). Those reality distortion items which were furthest from auditory hallucinations had very weak to no relationship with hallucination severity. Despite being at an earlier stage of illness, symptoms in FEP presentations were similarly organized. While hallucinations and delusions commonly co-occur, we found that their specific themes and content sometimes travel together and sometimes do not. This has important implications, not only for treatment, but also for research-particularly efforts to understand the neurocomputational and pathophysiological mechanism underlying delusions and hallucinations.

Sensed Presence, Attenuated Psychosis, and Transliminality: At the Threshold of Consciousness

INTRODUCTION

The experience of "sensed presence" or "felt presence" in the absence of "other" has been described as a complex multimodal experience to which meaning is given. Sensed presence (SenP) is a transdiagnostic experience that exists along a continuum that can appear during isolation, spirit quests, exposure to extreme elements, bereavement, anxiety, and psychosis. Given the prevalence and vast heterogeneity of SenP, in addition to a surprising lack of targeted research into this phenomenon, this research examined the interrelationship of SenP, attenuated psychosis symptoms (APS), and transliminality. Transliminality is composed of absorption, fantasy proneness, paranormal belief, mystical experiences, increased creativity, and hyperaesthesia.

METHODS

A completely anonymous online survey of unusual experiences and mental health was distributed via social media (i.e., Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and mass emailing lists) to recruit participants. Demographic data were analyzed using χ2 tests and one-way ANOVAs. A two-step cluster analysis was conducted to identify distinct sub-categories of transliminality followed by ANOVAs with bootstrapping at 1,000 iterations to compare SenP, increased APS, and transliminality. Pearson's bivariate correlations were conducted to determine the association between SenP, APS, and transliminality.

RESULTS

Together with descriptive findings, we show distinct characteristics between clusters. T1 cluster consisted of individuals with few SenP experiences, low APS, and low transliminality. T2 consisted of individuals with a moderate prevalence of SenP, low APS, moderate transliminality, and increased overall feeling of closeness to G-d. There was no significant difference in APS between T1 and T2 or in the level of distress associated with APS. T3 individuals showed a significantly higher prevalence of SenP in all domains (frequency, distress, vividness, and total score), higher APS, and higher transliminality, compared to T1 and T2. The T3 cluster met criteria for high risk to develop psychosis.

CONCLUSION

Thus, our findings demonstrate a strong association and entanglement of these experiences which suggests that the interrelatedness of transliminality/absorption and APS may serve as a potentially provocative underlying structure in the phenomenology of SenP.

Aberrant memory and delusional ideation: A pernicious partnership?

Delusions can be conceptualized as beliefs that are both at odds with consensus reality and espoused with high conviction. While delusions represent a cardinal symptom of schizophrenia, delusion-like beliefs can be found in the general population. Do similar cognitive mechanisms support delusionality across this spectrum? If so, what are they? Here, we examine evidence for a mechanistic role of the (associative) memory system in the formation and maintenance of delusions and delusion-like beliefs. While general neurocognitive metrics do not tend to associate with delusionality, our scoping review of the clinical and subclinical literature reveals several subdomains of memory function that do. These include a propensity to commit errors of commission (i.e., false alarms and intrusions), source memory biases, and metamemory impairment. We discuss how several of these effects may stem from aberrant associative memory function and offer recommendations for future research. Further, we propose a state/trait interaction model in which underlying traits (i.e., impaired associative and metamemory function) may become coupled with delusionality during states of acute psychosis, when memory function is particularly challenged by aberrant salience attribution and noisy perceptual input. According to this model, delusions may arise as explanations to high-salience (but low-source) mnemonic content that is endorsed with high confidence.

"The more things change…"? Stability of delusional themes across 12 years of presentations to an early intervention service for psychosis

PURPOSE

While the prevalence of delusional themes appears to be consistent across geographic contexts, little is known about the relative prevalence of such themes within a given setting over periods of time. We therefore investigated delusional themes across 12 years of presentation to a catchment-based early intervention service for first episode psychosis (FEP).

METHODS

Systematically collected data from 500 patients at an early intervention service for FEP were analyzed. Four cohorts of 3 years each, from 2006 to 2017, were used to compare the frequency of delusion themes across cohorts. We also integrated into the analysis baseline sociodemographic factors such as gender, age, and highest level of education and clinical factors such as anxiety, depression, suicidality, hallucinations, and primary diagnosis (affective or non-affective psychosis).

RESULTS

Sex and education level were stable across cohorts, while patient age varied (p = 0.047). Clinical anxiety, depression, and suicidality at entry were also stable. Across cohorts, the proportion of patients with affective versus non-affective diagnosis differed (p = 0.050), with no differences in global rating of delusion severity or theme prevalence except for delusions of guilt or sin (p = 0.001). This single theme difference was not correlated with age or diagnosis.

CONCLUSION

Our study suggests relatively stable prevalence of delusion themes across cohorts of individuals experiencing FEP. This demonstrates the potential utility of studying thematic content both for understanding delusions in clinical populations and in research. Future explorations of the relationships between delusion themes and across individual patient episodes should be conducted.

Taking subjectivity seriously: towards a unification of phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience

Nearly all psychiatric diseases involve alterations in subjective, lived experience. The scientific study of the biological basis of mental illness has generally focused on objective measures and observable behaviors, limiting the potential for our understanding of brain mechanisms of disease states and possible treatments. However, applying methods designed principally to interpret objective behavioral measures to the measurement and extrapolation of subjective states presents a number of challenges. In order to help bridge this gap, we draw on the tradition of phenomenology, a philosophical movement concerned with elucidating the structure of lived experience, which emerged in the early 20th century and influenced philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychiatry. A number of early phenomenologically-oriented psychiatrists made influential contributions to the field, but this approach retreated to the background as psychiatry moved towards more operationalized disease classifications. Recently, clinical-phenomenological research and viewpoints have re-emerged in the field. We argue that the potential for phenomenological research and methods to generate productive hypotheses about the neurobiological basis of psychiatric diseases has thus far been underappreciated. Using specific examples drawing on the subjective experience of mania and psychosis, we demonstrate that phenomenologically-oriented clinical studies can generate novel and fruitful propositions for neuroscientific investigation. Additionally, we outline a proposal for more rigorously integrating phenomenological investigations of subjective experience with the methods of modern neuroscience research, advocating a cross-species approach with a key role for human subjects research. Collaborative interaction between phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience has the potential to move these fields towards a unified understanding of the biological basis of mental illness.

"Your mind doesn't have room for anything else": a qualitative study of perceptions of cognitive functioning during and after recovery from anorexia nervosa

BACKGROUND

Past research has indicated the presence of cognitive difficulties in individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN), although it is unclear how these are experienced in real life. Moreover, it is unclear how and whether the experience of cognitive difficulties changes in nature and intensity over the course of the illness and following recovery.

METHODS

Twenty-one female participants (AN = 11; recovered AN = 10) participated in online semi-structured interviews, utilising open-ended questions and exploring topics relating to their experiences of their cognitive function, changes over time and their perspectives on the future. Reflexive thematic analysis was conducted on the resulting transcripts.

RESULTS

Six themes were identified, centred around the effects of the illness on mental and physical function, cognition, adaptation to living with the illness, similarities between AN and other psychopathology, tentative optimism for the future and recovery as a representation of liberation. Whilst respondents with AN appeared to perform remarkably well in their professional and educational lives, the cognitive difficulties were described as significantly impacting their ability to engage in life, particularly in the context of leisure and socialising. Respondents recovered from AN noted the importance of developing a non-AN identity as well as better emotion-regulation skills as central to recovery.

CONCLUSIONS

Whilst people with AN may be able to adapt their lives to the demands of the illness, they report significant cognitive difficulties that interfere with their engagement in many aspects of daily life. This should be considered by professionals working in the clinical management of AN. Treatments focused on ameliorating cognitive difficulties, and promoting emotional regulation and identity in AN are warranted.

Pseudoneurotic symptoms in the schizophrenia spectrum: An empirical study

BACKGROUND

Nonpsychotic symptoms (depression, anxiety, obsessions etc.) are frequent in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Twentieth century foundational psychopathological literature claimed that certain nonpsychotic symptoms (here termed pseudoneurotic symptoms) are relatively closely linked with the schizophrenia-spectrum, despite descriptive overlap with symptoms of other diagnoses. In this study, we investigated the association of pseudoneurotic and other nonpsychotic symptoms with the schizophrenia-spectrum as well as a hypothesis about an association of pseudoneurotic symptoms with disorder of basic self.

METHODS

The sample (N = 226) comprised patients with non-affective psychosis (N = 119), schizotypal personality disorder (N = 51) and other mental illness (N = 56), who were examined with a comprehensive assessment of lifetime psychopathology. Informed by the literature, we constructed scales targeting pseudoneurotic symptoms and other, more general, nonpsychotic symptoms.

RESULTS

Pseudoneurotic symptoms aggregated significantly in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders with an Area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.84 (SE 0.03) for classifying patients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders versus other mental illness. Patients with non-affective psychosis scored slightly, but significantly, higher on the scale targeting general nonpsychotic symptomatology than the other groups. In multiple regression analysis, pseudoneurotic symptoms were predicted by general nonpsychotic symptoms, disorders of basic self, and negative symptoms but not positive symptoms.

CONCLUSION

The study supports that certain neurotic-like symptoms with specific descriptive features (pseudoneurotic symptoms) are associated with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. It suggests that pseudoneurotic symptoms are linked with temporally stable schizophrenia psychopathology (disorder of basic self and negative symptoms).

'Feeling' or 'sensing' the future? Testing for anomalous cognitions in clinical versus healthy populations

In the study and treatment of psychosis, emotional intelligence (EI) and thinking styles are important patient characteristics for successful outcomes in clinical intervention. Anticipation of unpredictable stimuli (AUS) may be understood as an anomalous perception and anomalous cognition in which an individual supposedly senses and recognizes future stimuli in an unexpected way, also referred to as “hunches or premonitions.” This examined the roles of EI and thinking styles in AUSs in convenience samples of healthy participants (n = 237) versus patients diagnosed with psychosis (n = 118). We adjusted several quadratic and exponential regression models according to the obtained functions. Group means were also compared to examine differences in EI scores for participants with psychosis compared to healthy participants. In the healthy group, EI predicted AUSs with a weight between 42% and 58%. Thinking styles were not correlated with AUSs. However, EI was not correlated with AUSs in the clinical group. Patients with psychosis tended to score higher on AUSs and lower on EI and thinking styles compared to participants in the healthy group. We discuss EI as a variable that can contextualize some anomalous perceptions which are otherwise difficult to classify or measure within the classic psychosis continuum model.

Clinical insight in first-episode psychosis: Clinical, neurocognitive and metacognitive predictors

OBJECTIVE

Poor insight is a major problem in psychosis, being detrimental for treatment compliance and recovery. Previous studies have identified various correlates of insight impairment, mostly in chronic samples. The current study aimed to determine clinical, neurocognitive, metacognitive, and socio-cognitive predictors of insight in first-episode psychosis.

METHODS

Regression analyses of different insight dimensions were conducted in 190 patients with first-episode psychosis. Measures of clinical symptoms, neurocognition, metacognition, social cognition, and 'jumping to conclusions' bias were entered as predictors.

RESULTS

Delusions, disorganisation, and certain negative symptoms were associated with unawareness in various domains, while depression was associated with greater awareness of illness. Deficit in theory of mind and self-reflective processes, as well as a 'jumping to conclusions' bias, contributed to poor insight. Several neuropsychological scores also contributed to this but their contribution was no longer observed in regression analyses that included all the previously identified clinical and cognitive predictors. A measure of perseverative errors was still associated with unawareness and misattribution of symptoms.

CONCLUSION

In models that account for 28 % to 50 % of the variance, poor insight in first-episode psychosis is mainly associated with delusions and certain negative symptoms. At the cognitive level it does not appear to result from neuropsychological impairment but rather from altered reasoning bias and dysfunction in metacognitive processes. Therapeutic strategies specifically directed at these mechanisms could help improve the evolution of insight in first episode psychosis.

More phenomenology in psychiatry? Applied ontology as a method towards integration

There have been renewed calls to use phenomenology in psychiatry to improve knowledge about causation, diagnostics, and treatment of mental health conditions. A phenomenological approach aims to elucidate the subjective experiences of mental health, which its advocates claim have been largely neglected by current diagnostic frameworks in psychiatry (eg, DSM-5). The consequence of neglecting rich phenomenological information is a comparatively more constrained approach to theory development, empirical research, and care programmes. Although calls for more phenomenology in psychiatry have been met with enthusiasm, there is still relatively little information on how to practically facilitate this integration. In this Personal View, we argue that phenomenological approaches need a shared semantic framework to drive their innovative potential, thus enabling consistent data capture, exchange, and interoperability with current mental health data and informatics approaches (eg, the Research Domain Criteria project). We show how an applied ontology of phenomenological psychopathology offers a suitable method to address these challenges.

Thinking style and psychosis proneness do not predict false insights

The FIAT paradigm (Grimmer et al., 2021) is a novel method of eliciting 'Aha' moments for incorrect solutions to anagrams in the laboratory, i.e. false insights. There exist many documented reports of psychotic symptoms accompanying strong feelings of 'Aha!' (Feyaerts, Henriksen, Vanheule, Myin-Germeys, & Sass, 2021; Mishara, 2010; Tulver, Kaup, Laukkonen, & Aru, 2021), suggesting that the newly developed FIAT could reveal whether people who have more false insights are more prone to psychosis and delusional belief. To test this possibility, we recruited 200 participants to take an adapted version of the FIAT and complete measures of thinking style and psychosis proneness. We found no association between experimentally induced false insights and measures of Schizotypy, Need for Cognition, Jumping to Conclusions, Aberrant Salience, Faith in Intuition, or the Cognitive Reflection Task. We conclude that experiencing false insights might not be constrained to any particular type of person, but rather, may arise for anyone under the right circumstances.

'An experience of meaning': A 20-year prospective analysis of delusional realities in schizophrenia and affective psychoses

Delusions are transdiagnostic and heterogeneous phenomena with varying degrees of intensity, stability, and dimensional attributes where the boundaries between everyday beliefs and delusional beliefs can be experienced as clearly demarcated, fuzzy, or indistinguishable. This highlights the difficulty in defining delusional realities. All individuals in the current study were evaluated at index and at least one of six subsequential follow-ups over 20 years in the Chicago Longitudinal Study. We assessed 16 distinct delusions categorized as thought or thematic delusions. We also examined the probability of recurrence and the relationships between delusions and hallucinations, depression, anxiety, and negative symptoms. The sample consisted of 262 individuals with schizophrenia vs. affective psychosis. Thought delusions were significantly different between groups at all follow-up evaluations except the 20-year timepoint. Thematic delusions were more common than thought delusions and show a significant decreasing pattern. In general, delusional content varied over time. Referential, persecutory, and thought dissemination delusions show the highest probability of recurrence. Hallucinations were the strongest indicator for thought, thematic, and overall delusions. The formation and maintenance of delusions were conceptualized as a multimodal construct consisting of sensory, perceptual, emotional, social, and somatic embodiment of an "experience of meanings". Given the significant associations between delusions and hallucinations, future work incorporating participatory research is needed to better define and align subjective and objective perspectives. Our research also points to the need for future clinical interventions that specifically evaluate and target the coexistence and entanglement of delusions and hallucinations.

The psychometric properties of the Nepean Belief Scale as a tool for assessing delusions in schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders

OBJECTIVES

To examine the psychometric characteristics of the Nepean Belief Scale (NBS) in psychiatric inpatients with delusions. The NBS is a five-item, clinician-administered scale that assesses the characteristics of beliefs, i.e. conviction, fixity, fluctuation, resistance and awareness that the belief is unreasonable.

METHODS

Fifty-five patients were interviewed by two clinicians, within three days of admission to an acute psychiatric unit and were assessed using the NBS, the Brown Assessment of Belief Scale (BABS), the MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) and the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale 21-Item Version (DASS-21). The NBS was administered after two weeks to available participants, to assess test-retest reliability.

RESULTS

Results demonstrated excellent inter-rater reliability of 0.93, Cronbach's alpha coefficient for internal consistency was 0.77. The NBS was found to have good convergent validity with the BABS and good discriminant validity with the DASS. Two-week test-retest reliability suggests that the NBS is sensitive to therapeutic change.

CONCLUSIONS

Advantages of the NBS include its brevity, its ability to assess belief-related insight, its clear instructions and its definitions of belief characteristics. Thus, the NBS has the potential to greatly improve our ability to more objectively assess delusional beliefs.

SlowMo therapy, a new digital blended therapy for fear of harm from others: An account of therapy personalisation within a targeted intervention

OBJECTIVES

SlowMo therapy is a pioneering blended digital therapy for paranoia, augmenting face-to-face therapy with an interactive 'webapp' and a mobile app. A recent large-scale trial demonstrated small-moderate effects on paranoia alongside improvements in self-esteem, worry, well-being and quality of life. This paper provides a comprehensive account of therapy personalisation within this targeted approach.

DESIGN

Case examples illustrate therapy delivery and descriptive data are presented on personalised thought content.

METHOD

Thought content was extracted from the webapp (n = 140 participants) and coded using newly devised categories: Worries: (1) Persecutory, (2) Negative social evaluation, (3) Negative self-concept, (4) Loss/life stresses, (5) Sensory-perceptual experiences and (6) Health anxieties. Safer thoughts: (1) Safer alternative (specific alternatives to worries), (2) Second-wave (generalised) coping, (3) Positive self-concept, (4) Positive activities and (5) Third-wave (mindfulness-based) coping. Data on therapy fidelity are also presented.

RESULTS

Worries: 'Persecutory' (92.9% of people) and 'Negative social evaluation' (74.3%) were most common. 'General worries/ life stresses' (31.4%) and 'Negative self-concept' (22.1%) were present in a significant minority; 'Health anxieties' (10%) and 'Sensory-perceptual' (10%) were less common. Safer thoughts: 'Second-wave (general) coping' (85%), 'Safer alternatives' (76.4%), 'Positive self-concept' (65.7%) and 'Positive activities' (64.3%) were common with 'Third-wave' (mindfulness) coping observed for 30%. Fidelity: Only three therapy withdrawals were therapy related. Session adherence was excellent (mean = 15.2/16; SD = 0.9). Behavioural work was conducted with 71% of people (119/168).

CONCLUSION

SlowMo therapy delivers a targeted yet personalised approach. Potential mechanisms of action extend beyond reasoning. Implications for cognitive models of paranoia and causal interventionist approaches are discussed.

Subjective experience and meaning of delusions in psychosis: a systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis

BACKGROUND

Delusions are a common transdiagnostic feature of psychotic disorders, and their treatment remains suboptimal. Despite the pressing need to better understand the nature, meaning, and course of these symptoms, research into the lived experience of delusional phenomena in psychosis is scarce. Thus, we aimed to explore the lived experience and subjective apprehension of delusions in help-seeking individuals with psychosis, regardless of diagnosis and thematic content of the delusion.

METHODS

In our systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis, we searched MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, and Web of Science for qualitative studies published in English from database inception, with the last search on Sept 9, 2021. Grey literature search and hand-searching of relevant journals were also done. Studies were eligible if they provided an analysis of lived experience of delusions or predelusional phenomena presented from the perspective of individuals (age 14-65 years) who had developed a clinical high-risk stage of psychosis, or a diagnosable affective or non-affective psychotic disorder (as clinically defined, self-reported, or assessed within the primary study). Studies with only a subset of relevant participants were eligible only if data for the population of interest were reported separately. Studies that did not discriminate between the experience of delusion and other positive symptoms (eg, hallucinations) were included only if data for delusions were reported separately or could be extracted. First-person accounts (and author interpretations) discussing changes in the sense of self, lived world, and meaning in relation to delusions were extracted and synthesised using a novel thematic synthesis approach informed by a critical realist stance and a phenomenological theoretical framework. Analytic themes were developed into a new overarching framework for understanding the emergence of delusional phenomena. The study was registered with PROSPERO, CRD42020222104.

FINDINGS

Of the 3265 records screened, 2115 were identified after duplicate removal. Of these, 1982 were excluded after title and abstract screening and 106 after full-text eligibility assessment. Of the 27 studies entering quality assessment, 24 eligible studies were included in the qualitative evidence synthesis, representing the perspectives of 373 help-seeking individuals with lived experience of delusions in the context of psychosis. Gender was reported as male (n=210), female (n=110), transgender (n=1), or not reported (n=52). Only 13 studies reported ethnicity, with White being predominant. The age of most participants ranged from 15 to 65 years. We found no eligible studies investigating subclinical or predelusional experiences in at-risk mental state populations through qualitative methods. Most studies were undertaken in western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and most included participants had received or self-reported a diagnosis within the schizophrenia spectrum. Studies differed in relation to whether they focused on one kind or theme of delusion or delusional phenomena more generally as a unified category. Three superordinate themes relating to experiential changes and meanings in delusion were identified: (1) a radical rearrangement of the lived world dominated by intense emotions; (2) doubting, losing, and finding oneself again within delusional realities; and (3) searching for meaning, belonging, and coherence beyond mere dysfunction. Based on the review findings and thematic synthesis, we propose the Emergence Model of Delusion to advance understanding of delusional phenomena in psychosis.

INTERPRETATION

Delusions are best understood as strongly individualised and inherently complex phenomena emerging from a dynamic interplay between interdependent subpersonal, personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes. Integrative approaches to research on delusion, which consider their potential adaptiveness and favour explanatory pluralism, might be advantageous. Effective clinical care for individuals with psychosis might need adapting to match more closely, and take account of, the subjective experience and meaning of delusions as they are lived through, which might also help redress power imbalances and enduring epistemic injustices in mental health.

FUNDING

Priestley Scholars, Wellcome Trust.

Aberrant Salience and Disorganized Symptoms as Mediators of Psychosis

Introduction

Ideas of reference (IR) are frequent in psychopathology, mainly in psychotic disorders. The frequency of IR and preoccupation about them are related to the psychotic dimension, and to a lesser extent, to negative or emotional disorganized dimensions. Aberrant salience (AS), has been proposed as an indicator of the onset of psychosis, particularly of schizophrenia. This study analyzed the mediating role of AS, disorganized symptoms and preoccupation about IR in the relationship between IR and the psychotic dimension.

Method

The sample consisted of 330 participants (116 university students and 214 clinically active patients), 62.4% of whom were women aged 18-79. The Referential Thinking Scale, the Aberrant Salience Inventory, and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale were administered.

Results

Evidence of a partial mediation model showed that the relationships between IR and the psychotic dimension were mediated jointly by AS and the disorganized dimension, and preoccupation about IR no longer had a role. This relationship was significantly influenced by participant age. The variables in the model explained 54.16% of the variance.

Conclusion

The model proposed enabled a set of vulnerabilities (unusual thought content) to be predicted that could lead to a high-risk general pathological state and proneness to psychosis in particular. These findings are discussed with regard to early detection and prevention of psychosis.

What is obsession? Differentiating obsessive-compulsive disorder and the schizophrenia spectrum

Obsessive-compulsive symptoms are frequent in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and often cause differential diagnostic challenges, especially in first-contact patients. Drawing upon phenomenology of cognition, we critically review classic and contemporary psychopathological notions of obsessive-compulsive phenomena and discuss their relevance for differential diagnosis between obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. The classic psychopathological literature defines true obsession as intrusions with intact resistance and insight and regards these features as essential to the diagnosis of OCD. In schizophrenia, the classic literature describes pseudo-obsessive-compulsive phenomena characterized by lack of resistance and an affinity with other symptoms such as thought disorder and catatonia. By contrast, the notions of obsession and compulsion are broader and conceptually vague in current diagnostic systems and research instruments. Here, these phenomena overlap with delusions as well as various subjective and behavioral anomalies, which we discuss in detail. Furthermore, we examine a link between obsessive-compulsive phenomena and disturbances of basic structures of experience in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders addressed in contemporary psychopathological research. We suggest that these experiential alterations have relevance for differential diagnosis and early detection in this complex symptom domain.

The profile of unusual beliefs associated with metacognitive thinking and attributional styles

Cognitive interpretations of daily events may differ in people from the general population who hold unusual beliefs. It is also important to understand whether different belief profiles exist to appreciate which patterns of beliefs are less psychologically healthy. Cluster analysis was used to form unusual belief profiles in a general population sample (n = 578; M_age = 22 years, SD = 6.98; 80% female) across paranoid, paranormal, and magical ideation beliefs, and we assessed whether they differed in attribution style and metacognitive beliefs about worry. Four clusters were formed: low on all measures (low all); high on all measures (high all); comparably higher on paranormal beliefs (paranormal group); and comparably higher on paranoid beliefs (paranoid group). For total Metacognitions Questionnaire‐30, the high all and high paranoid clusters did not differ, and both clusters scored higher than the high paranormal group, who all scored higher than the low all cluster. For attributional styles (Attributional Styles Questionnaire), lower scores on internal positive attribution were found for the high all and high paranoid clusters compared to the low all and high paranormal clusters. The high paranormal cluster had higher scores than the high paranoid cluster on self‐serving bias. Differences in attributional style appeared to be driven by mental health diagnosis. Our results suggest different profiles of unusual beliefs are detectable in the general population that differ in their metacognitive beliefs and perceived causation of events in their environment. Future studies investigating delusional proneness need to consider multiple unusual beliefs as well as assessing mood state and distress.

Delusional Perception Revisited

Delusional perception designates a sudden, idiosyncratic, and often self-referential delusion triggered by a neutral perceptual content. In classical psychopathology, delusional perception was considered almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. Since delusional perception has been erased from ICD-11 and always been absent in DSM, it risks slipping out of clinical awareness. In this article, we explore the clinical roots of delusional perception, elucidate the psychopathological phenomenon, and discuss its two predominant conceptualizations, i.e., Schneider's well-known two-link model and Matussek's lesser known one-link model. The two-link model posits that delusional perception amounts to an abnormal interpretation of an intact perception, whereas the one-link model posits that the delusional meaning is contained within a changed perception. Despite their differences, both models stress that delusional perception is a primary delusion that takes place within an altered experiential framework that is characteristic of the psychopathological Gestalt of schizophrenia. We discuss the role of delusional perception in future psychopathological and diagnostic assessment and argue that such assessments must be conducted in comprehensive manner, eliciting the psychopathological context within which symptoms and signs are embedded. Finally, we discuss the compatibility of the two models of delusional perception with contemporary cognitive models on delusion and cognitive psychotherapeutic approaches.

Psychosis in transgender and gender non-conforming individuals: A review of the literature and a call for more research

Epidemiological studies have described higher rates of psychotic disorder diagnoses in transgender, as compared to cisgender, individuals. With the exception of this work and a small number of published case studies, however, there has been little consideration of gender diversity in psychosis research or clinical care. In this paper, we will review and critically evaluate the limited literature on gender diversity and clinical psychosis and articulate the critical need for more work in this field, more specifically on the following areas and how they bear on clinical care: 1) diagnostic biases; 2) how chronic non-affirmation and bias, gender dysphoria, and other gender minority stressors may operate as trauma and can contribute to clinically significant psychotic symptoms; 3) the potential impact of gender-affirming care, such as hormone therapies, on mental health and barriers for receiving such care in transgender and nonbinary individuals; and 4) culturally-sensitive and gender-affirming approaches for addressing psychosis. Finally, we consider ways in which researchers may engage in ethical, gender-affirming, and accurate approaches to better address gender identity in psychosis research. We hope that such research will aid in the creation of clinical guidelines for understanding, diagnosing, and treating psychosis in gender diverse individuals.