Deep Brain Stimulation, Continuity over Time, and the True Self

Subject and Family Perspectives from the Central Thalamic Deep Brain Stimulation Trial for Traumatic Brain Injury: Part II

This is the second paper in a two-part series describing subject and family perspectives from the CENTURY-S (CENtral Thalamic Deep Brain Stimulation for the Treatment of Traumatic Brain InjURY-Safety) first-in-human invasive neurological device trial to achieve cognitive restoration in moderate to severe traumatic brain injury (msTBI). To participate, subjects were independently assessed to formally establish decision-making capacity to provide voluntary informed consent. Here, we report on post-operative interviews conducted after a successful trial of thalamic stimulation. All five msTBI subjects met a pre-selected primary endpoint of at least a 10% improvement in completion time on Trail-Making-Test Part B, a marker of executive function. We describe narrative responses of subjects and family members, refracted against that success. Interviews following surgery and the stimulation trial revealed the challenge of adaptation to improvements in cognitive function and emotional regulation as well as altered (and restored) relationships and family dynamics. These improvements exposed barriers to social reintegration made relevant by recoveries once thought inconceivable. The study's success sparked concerns about post-trial access to implanted devices, financing of device maintenance, battery replacement, and on-going care. Most subjects and families identified the need for supportive counseling to adapt to the new trajectory of their lives.

Withering Minds: towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia

A prominent view on personal identity over time, Jeff McMahan's 'Embodied Mind Account' (2002) holds that we cease to exist only once our brains can no longer sustain the basic capacity to uphold consciousness. One of the many implications of this view on identity persistence is that we continue to exist throughout even the most severe cases of dementia, until our consciousness irreversibly shuts down. In this paper, I argue that, while the most convincing of prominent accounts of personal identity over time, McMahan's account faces serious challenges in explanatory power of dementias and related neurodegenerative conditions. Particularly, this becomes visible in the face of emerging methods for neural tissue regeneration, and the possibility of 're-emerging patients'. I argue that medical professionals' neglecting qualitative aspects of identity risks resulting in grave misunderstandings in decision-making processes, and ethically objectionable outcomes in future practices. Finally, I propose revisions which could potentially salvage the great benefits that Embodied Mind Theory still can bring to the field of dementia care in terms of understanding life, death, and identity across the lifespan.

Researcher Views on Changes in Personality, Mood, and Behavior in Next-Generation Deep Brain Stimulation

The literature on deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive DBS (aDBS) raises concerns that these technologies may affect personality, mood, and behavior. We conducted semi-structured interviews with researchers (n = 23) involved in developing next-generation DBS systems, exploring their perspectives on ethics and policy topics including whether DBS/aDBS can cause such changes. The majority of researchers reported being aware of personality, mood, or behavioral (PMB) changes in recipients of DBS/aDBS. Researchers offered varying estimates of the frequency of PMB changes. A smaller majority reported changes in personality specifically. Some expressed reservations about the scientific status of the term 'personality,' while others used it freely. Most researchers discussed negative PMB changes, but a majority said that DBS/aDBS can also result in positive changes. Several researchers viewed positive PMB changes as part of the therapeutic goal in psychiatric applications of DBS/aDBS. Finally, several discussed potential causes of PMB changes other than the device itself.

The Ethics of Memory Modification: Personal Narratives, Relational Selves and Autonomy

For nearly two decades, ethicists have expressed concerns that the further development and use of memory modification technologies (MMTs)—techniques allowing to intentionally and selectively alter memories—may threaten the very foundations of who we are, our personal identity, and thus pose a threat to our well-being, or even undermine our “humaneness.” This paper examines the potential ramifications of memory-modifying interventions such as changing the valence of targeted memories and selective deactivation of a particular memory as these interventions appear to be at the same time potentially both most promising clinically as well as menacing to identity. However, unlike previous works discussing the potential consequences of MMTs, this article analyzes them in the context of the narrative relational approach to personal identity and potential issues related to autonomy. I argue that such a perspective brings to light the ethical aspects and moral issues arising from the use of MMTs that have been hidden from previously adopted approaches. In particular, this perspective demonstrates how important the social context in which an individual lives is for the ethical evaluation of a given memory-modifying intervention. I conclude by suggesting that undertaking memory modifications without taking into account the social dimension of a person’s life creates the risk that she will not be able to meet one of the basic human needs—the autonomous construction and maintenance of personal identity. Based on this conclusion, I offer some reflections on the permissibility and advisability of MMTs and what these considerations suggest for the future.

Personal identity, possible worlds, and medical ethics

Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which intuiting across conceptually incongruent worlds constitutes ‘invalid intuition-inferences’—i.e., carrying over intuitions gathered from facts about possible worlds that are at odds with facts about the actual world, for the purpose of making claims about real-life persons and their identity, leads to conceptual incongruences. Such a methodological fallout precludes accurate, informative judgments about personal identity in the actual world, calling into question the adequacy of thought experimental considerations for potential real-world applications in medical ethics.

Memory Modification and Authenticity: A Narrative Approach

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity.

Eine Bedrohung für den Sinn? Human Enhancement und das sinnvolle Leben

Das allgemeine Thema des Artikels besteht darin, zwei Diskussionskreise miteinander zu verbinden, die in Isolation betrachtet gut erforscht sind, aber selten zusammengebracht werden: die Diskussion um das sogenannte Human Enhancement und die Debatte um das sinnvolle Leben. Hierbei wird insbesondere die Behauptung ins Blickfeld gerückt, dass Techniken des Human Enhancement einen negativen Einfluss auf den Sinn haben könnten. Ist diese These plausibel? In diesem Artikel wird die These verteidigt, dass diese Frage verneint werden muss. Methodisch werden hierfür drei Varianten untersucht, in denen die Behauptung des negativen Einflusses vorgetragen werden können. Dabei wird aufgezeigt, dass entweder die Annahme eines negativen Einflusses aus empirischen Gründen wenig wahrscheinlich ist oder dass sie durch Modifikationen der Enhancement Techniken abgeschwächt werden können.

Attitudes toward use and timing of deep brain stimulation: a patient's with DBS perspective

OBJECTIVE

To guide responsive policy and better understand factors that might shape patients' decisions to have DBS earlier, we explore perspectives and attitudes toward earlier deep brain stimulation (DBS) of Parkinson disease (PD) patients with DBS.

INTRODUCTION

Before the US Food and Drug Administration released its change of indication for the use of DBS for PD, several groups had performed DBS earlier in disease course.

METHODS

We designed an online survey comprising Likert-type, multiple choice, and rank-order questions and distributed it to PD patients. We analyzed patient considerations for having chosen DBS and for choosing or rejecting to have DBS earlier, as well as factors potentially shaping perspectives around DBS and its timing. Data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics.

RESULTS

Among the 160 participants in the sample, the most important consideration for choosing DBS was the possibility of better symptomatic control compared to medication alone. The most important consideration for delaying DBS was possible ineffectiveness. 41.3 % (n = 66) of respondents supported earlier DBS use, 38.8 % (n = 62) did not, and the remainder (n = 30) were uncertain. Patients who supported earlier DBS use cited the possibility of better symptomatic control than with medication alone, while those who did not support earlier use felt that medication options should be exhausted first.

CONCLUSION

Our results suggest that there are multiple factors shaping patient perceptions around earlier DBS implantation. Future work should compare perceptions before and after DBS implantation, as well as pair perceptions with clinical outcomes.

Personality and Authenticity in Light of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics

There has been a growing interest in research concerning memory modification technologies (MMTs) in recent years. Neuroscientists and psychologists are beginning to explore the prospect of controllable and intentional modification of human memory. One of the technologies with the greatest potential to this end is optogenetics-an invasive neuromodulation technique involving the use of light to control the activity of individual brain cells. It has recently shown the potential to modify specific long-term memories in animal models in ways not yet possible with other MMTs. As the therapeutic potential of optogenetics has already prompted approval of the first human trials, it is especially important and timely to consider the opportunities and dangers this technology may entail. In this article, we focus on possible consequences of optogenetics as an MMT by analyzing fundamental threats potentially associated with memory modifications: the potential disruption of personality and authenticity.

Clarifying the Normative Significance of 'Personality Changes' Following Deep Brain Stimulation

There is evidence to suggest that some patients who undergo Deep Brain Stimulation can experience changes to dispositional, emotional and behavioural states that play a central role in conceptions of personality, identity, autonomy, authenticity, agency and/or self (PIAAAS). For example, some patients undergoing DBS for Parkinson's Disease have developed hypersexuality, and some have reported increased apathy. Moreover, experimental psychiatric applications of DBS may intentionally seek to elicit changes to the patient's dispositional, emotional and behavioural states, in so far as dysfunctions in these states may undergird the targeted disorder. Such changes following DBS have been of considerable interest to ethicists, but there is a considerable degree of conflict amongst different parties to this debate about whether DBS really does change PIAAAS, and whether this matters. This paper explores these conflicting views and suggests that we may be able to mediate this conflict by attending more closely to what parties to the debate mean when they invoke the concepts lumped together under the acronym PIAAAS. Drawing on empirical work on patient attitudes, this paper outlines how these different understandings of the concepts incorporated into PIAAAS have been understood in this debate, and how they may relate to other fundamental concepts in medical ethics such as well-being and autonomy. The paper clarifies some key areas of disagreement in this context, and develops proposals for how ethicists might fruitfully contribute to future empirical assessments of apparent changes to PIAAAS following DBS treatment.

Deep brain stimulation and revising the Mental Health Act: the case for intervention-specific safeguards

Under the current Mental Health Act of England and Wales, it is lawful to perform deep brain stimulation in the absence of consent and independent approval. We argue against the Care Quality Commission's preferred strategy of addressing this problematic issue, and offer recommendations for deep brain stimulation-specific provisions in a revised Mental Health Act.Declaration of interestT.A. is a paid consultant for Boston Scientific, Medtronic and St. Jude Medical. He has received honoraria from Abbott, Boston and Medtronics and served as consultant to all three.

Comparison of philosophical concerns between professionals and the public regarding two psychiatric treatments

BACKGROUND

Psychiatric interventions are a contested area in medicine, not only because of their history of abuses, but also because their therapeutic goal is to affect emotions, thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors that are regarded as pathological. Because psychiatric interventions affect characteristics that seem central to who we are, they raise issues regarding identity, autonomy, and personal responsibility for one's own well-being. Our study addresses two questions: (1) Do the public and academic researchers understand the philosophical stakes of these technologies in the same way? Following from this, (2) to what extent does the specific type of psychiatric technology affect the issues these two groups raise? This study compares how ethical issues regarding neurosurgical and pharmaceutical psychiatric interventions are discussed among the public and in the professional community of academic medicine and bioethics.

METHODS

We analyzed (1) online public comments and (2) the medical and bioethics literature, comparing the discussions of pharmacological and neurosurgical interventions in psychiatry in each source.

RESULTS

Overall, the public discussed philosophical issues less frequently than academics. For the two types of psychiatric interventions, we found differences between the academic literature and public comments among all themes, except for personal responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings reveal some of the similarities and discrepancies in how philosophical issues associated with psychiatric treatments are discussed in professional circles and among the public. Further research into what causes these discrepancies is crucial.

Deep Brain Stimulation in Psychiatry: Mechanisms, Models, and Next-Generation Therapies

Deep brain stimulation has preliminary evidence of clinical efficacy, but has been difficult to develop into a robust therapy, in part because its mechanisms are incompletely understood. We review evidence from movement and psychiatric disorder studies, with an emphasis on how deep brain stimulation changes brain networks. From this, we argue for a network-oriented approach to future deep brain stimulation studies. That network approach requires methods for identifying patients with specific circuit/network deficits. We describe how dimensional approaches to diagnoses may aid that identification. We discuss the use of network/circuit biomarkers to develop self-adjusting "closed loop" systems.

Deep brain stimulation for people with Alzheimer's disease: Anticipating potential effects on the tripartite self

Memory dysfunction and cognitive impairments due to Alzheimer’s disease can affect the selfhood and identity of afflicted individuals, causing distress to both people with Alzheimer’s disease and their caregivers. Recently, a number of case studies and clinical trials have been conducted to determine the potential of deep brain stimulation as a therapeutic modality for people with Alzheimer’s disease. Some of these studies have shown that deep brain stimulation could induce flashbacks and stabilize or even improve memory. However, deep brain stimulation itself has also been attributed as a potential threat to identity and selfhood, especially when procedure-related adverse events arise. We anticipate potential effects of deep brain stimulation for people with Alzheimer’s disease on selfhood, reconciling information from medical reports, psychological, and sociological investigations on the impacts of deep brain stimulation or Alzheimer’s disease on selfhood. A tripartite model of the self that extends the scope of Rom Harré’s and Steve Sabat’s social constructionist framework was used. In this model, potential effects of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease on Self 1 or singularity through use of first-person indexicals, and gestures of self-reference, attribution, and recognition; Self 2 or past and present attributes, knowledge of these characteristics, and continuity of narrative identity; and Self 3 or the relational and social self are explored. The ethical implications of potential effects of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease on the tripartite self are then highlighted, focusing on adapting informed consent procedures and care provided throughout the trial to account for both positive and negative plausible effects on Self 1, Self 2, and Self 3.

Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value

Deep brain stimulation has been of considerable interest to bioethicists, in large part because of the effects that the intervention can occasionally have on central features of the recipient's personality. These effects raise questions regarding the philosophical concept of authenticity. In this article, we expand on our earlier work on the concept of authenticity in the context of deep brain stimulation by developing a diachronic, value-based account of authenticity. Our account draws on both existentialist and essentialist approaches to authenticity, and Laura Waddell Ekstrom's coherentist approach to personal autonomy. In developing our account, we respond to Sven Nyholm and Elizabeth O'Neill's synchronic approach to authenticity, and explain how the diachronic approach we defend can have practical utility, contrary to Alexandre Erler and Tony Hope's criticism of autonomy-based approaches to authenticity. Having drawn a distinction between the authenticity of an individual's traits and the authenticity of that person's values, we consider how our conception of authenticity applies to the context of anorexia nervosa in comparison to other prominent accounts of authenticity. We conclude with some reflections on the prudential value of authenticity, and by highlighting how the language of authenticity can be invoked to justify covert forms of paternalism that run contrary to the value of individuality that seems to be at the heart of authenticity.

Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value

In this article, we engage in dialogue with Jonathan Pugh, Hannah Maslen, and Julian Savulescu about how to best interpret the potential impacts of deep brain stimulation on the self. We consider whether ordinary peoples’ convictions about the true self should be interpreted in essentialist or existentialist ways. Like Pugh, Maslen, and Savulescu, we argue that it is useful to understand the notion of the true self as having both essentialist and existentialist components. We also consider two ideas from existentialist philosophy—Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas about “bad faith” and “ambiguity”—to argue that there can be value to patients in regarding themselves as having a certain amount of freedom to choose what aspects of themselves should be considered representative of their true selves. Lastly, we consider the case of an anorexia nervosa patient who shifts between conflicting mind-sets. We argue that mind-sets in which it is easier for the patient and his or her family to share values can plausibly be considered to be more representative of the patient’s true self, if this promotes a well-functioning relationship between the patient and the family. However, we also argue that families are well advised to give patients room to determine what such shared values mean to them, as it can be alienating for patients if they feel that others try to impose values on them from the outside.

The True Self: A Psychological Concept Distinct From the Self

A long tradition of psychological research has explored the distinction between characteristics that are part of the self and those that lie outside of it. Recently, a surge of research has begun examining a further distinction. Even among characteristics that are internal to the self, people pick out a subset as belonging to the true self. These factors are judged as making people who they really are, deep down. In this paper, we introduce the concept of the true self and identify features that distinguish people’s understanding of the true self from their understanding of the self more generally. In particular, we consider recent findings that the true self is perceived as positive and moral and that this tendency is actor-observer invariant and cross-culturally stable. We then explore possible explanations for these findings and discuss their implications for a variety of issues in psychology.

Is the Personal Identity Debate a "Threat" to Neurosurgical Patients? A Reply to Müller et al

In their article in this journal, Sabine Müller, Merlin Bittlinger, and Henrik Walter launch a sweeping attack against what they call the "personal identity debate" as it relates to patients treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). In this critique offered by Müller et al., the personal identity debate is said to: (a) be metaphysical in a problematic way, (b) constitute a threat to patients, and (c) use "vague" and "contradictory" statements from patients and their families as direct evidence for metaphysical theories. In this response, I critically evaluate Müller et al.'s argument, with a special focus on these three just-mentioned aspects of their discussion. My conclusion is that Müller et al.'s overall argument is problematic. It overgeneralizes criticisms that may apply to some, but certainly not to all, contributions to what they call the personal identity-debate. Moreover, it rests on a problematic conception of what much of this debate is about. Nor is Müller et al.'s overall argument fair in its assessment of the methodology used by most participants in the debate. For these reasons, we should be skeptical of Müller et al.'s claim that the "personal identity debate" is a "threat to neurosurgical patients".