Moving Beyond System 1 and System 2

Applying Implicit Propositional Measures to Detect Faking in Personality-Related Scales: Reliability, Discriminating Power, and Classification Accuracy

Two implicit propositional measures designed to detect faking in personality-related scales were tested across four experimental studies. Study 1 (n = 116) included the Deception Relational Responding Task and Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire as the faking-detector and target scale, respectively. Respondents were randomly assigned to faking or no-faking conditions. Faking respondents were instructed to appear opposite to their narcissistic profile, while no-faking had to respond honestly. In Study 2 (n = 133), the faking-detector was the Deception Implicit Association Test (Dec-aIAT), while the target scale and faking/no-faking instructions remained the same. In Studies 3 (n = 74) and 4 (n = 111), the faking-detector was again the Dec-aIAT, while the target scale was the Big Five Questionnaire-2. Faking respondents had to adhere to a desirable target profile (Study 3; faking-good) or its opposite (Study 4; faking-bad) while no-faking should respond honestly. Overall, the implicit measures showed adequate-to-excellent reliability, discriminating power, and classification accuracy.

The Willpower Paradox: Possible and Impossible Conceptions of Self-Control

Self-control denotes the ability to override current desires to render behavior consistent with long-term goals. A key assumption is that self-control is required when short-term desires are transiently stronger (more preferred) than long-term goals and people would yield to temptation without exerting self-control. We argue that this widely shared conception of self-control raises a fundamental yet rarely discussed conceptual paradox: How is it possible that a person most strongly desires to perform a behavior (e.g., eat chocolate) and at the same time desires to recruit self-control to prevent themselves from doing it? A detailed analysis reveals that three common assumptions about self-control cannot be true simultaneously. To avoid the paradox, any coherent theory of self-control must abandon either the assumption (a) that recruitment of self-control is an intentional process, or (b) that humans are unitary agents, or (c) that self-control consists in overriding the currently strongest desire. We propose a taxonomy of different kinds of self-control processes that helps organize current theories according to which of these assumptions they abandon. We conclude by outlining unresolved questions and future research perspectives raised by different conceptions of self-control and discuss implications for the question of whether self-control can be considered rational.

Putting relating at the core of language-of-thought

Propositional representations are units of information with a relational content. Their relational nature allows for the six distinctive properties of language-of-thought representations. Putting relating at the core of language-of-thought also fits well with the idea that thinking and reasoning are instances of relational behavior. These propositional and behavioral perspectives can be combined within a functional-cognitive framework.

Reasons to Remain Critical About the Literature on Habits: A Commentary on Wood et al. (2022)

Wood et al. (2022) reviewed arguments in support of the idea that much of human behavior is habitual. In this commentary, we first point at ambiguities in the way Wood et al. referred to habits. This allows us to clarify the question that lies at the core of the debate on habits: To what extent is habitual behavior mediated by stimulus-response associations or by goal representations? We then argue that Wood et al. dismissed goal-directed explanations of habitual behavior too easily. Finally, we point out that Wood et al.'s reanalysis of our data is misleading in that a more fine-grained analysis supports rather than questions goal-directed accounts.

Constructing Explicit Prejudice: Evidence From Large Sample Datasets

How does implicit bias contribute to explicit prejudice? Prior experiments show that concept knowledge about fear versus sympathy determines whether negative affect (captured as implicit bias) predicts antisocial outcomes (Lee et al.). Concept knowledge (i.e., beliefs) about groups may similarly moderate the link between implicitly measured negative affect (implicit negative affect) and explicit prejudice. We tested this hypothesis using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study (Study 1) and Project Implicit (Study 2). In both studies, participants high in implicit negative affect reported more explicit prejudice if they possessed negative beliefs about Black Americans. Yet, participants high in implicit negative affect reported less explicit prejudice if they possessed fewer negative beliefs about Black Americans. The results are consistent with psychological constructionist and dynamic models of evaluation and offer a more ecologically valid extension of our past laboratory work.

The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences

Mental representations remain the central posits of psychology after many decades of scrutiny. However, there is no consensus about the representational format(s) of biological cognition. This paper provides a survey of evidence from computational cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and social psychology, and concludes that one type of format that routinely crops up is the language-of-thought (LoT). We outline six core properties of LoTs: (i) discrete constituents; (ii) role-filler independence; (iii) predicate-argument structure; (iv) logical operators; (v) inferential promiscuity; and (vi) abstract content. These properties cluster together throughout cognitive science. Bayesian computational modeling, compositional features of object perception, complex infant and animal reasoning, and automatic, intuitive cognition in adults all implicate LoT-like structures. Instead of regarding LoT as a relic of the previous century, researchers in cognitive science and philosophy-of-mind must take seriously the explanatory breadth of LoT-based architectures. We grant that the mind may harbor many formats and architectures, including iconic and associative structures as well as deep-neural-network-like architectures. However, as computational/representational approaches to the mind continue to advance, classical compositional symbolic structures - that is, LoTs - only prove more flexible and well-supported over time.

Problems and Mysteries of the Many Languages of Thought

"What is the structure of thought?" is as central a question as any in cognitive science. A classic answer to this question has appealed to a Language of Thought (LoT). We point to emerging research from disparate branches of the field that supports the LoT hypothesis, but also uncovers diversity in LoTs across cognitive systems, stages of development, and species. Our letter formulates open research questions for cognitive science concerning the varieties of rules and representations that underwrite various LoT-based systems and how these variations can help researchers taxonomize cognitive systems.

Neurosymbolic Systems of Perception and Cognition: The Role of Attention

A cognitive architecture aimed at cumulative learning must provide the necessary information and control structures to allow agents to learn incrementally and autonomously from their experience. This involves managing an agent's goals as well as continuously relating sensory information to these in its perception-cognition information processing stack. The more varied the environment of a learning agent is, the more general and flexible must be these mechanisms to handle a wider variety of relevant patterns, tasks, and goal structures. While many researchers agree that information at different levels of abstraction likely differs in its makeup and structure and processing mechanisms, agreement on the particulars of such differences is not generally shared in the research community. A dual processing architecture (often referred to as System-1 and System-2) has been proposed as a model of cognitive processing, and they are often considered as responsible for low- and high-level information, respectively. We posit that cognition is not binary in this way and that knowledge at any level of abstraction involves what we refer to as neurosymbolic information, meaning that data at both high and low levels must contain both symbolic and subsymbolic information. Further, we argue that the main differentiating factor between the processing of high and low levels of data abstraction can be largely attributed to the nature of the involved attention mechanisms. We describe the key arguments behind this view and review relevant evidence from the literature.

Associations do not energize behavior: on the forgotten legacy of Kurt Lewin

Hundred years ago, Kurt Lewin published a series of articles in which he vehemently argued against the idea that associations between stimuli and responses motivate behavior. This article reviews his empirical work and theory and the cogency of Lewin's conclusion according to modern standards. We conclude that Lewin's criticism of the contiguity principle of associationism is still valid, and is now supported by a broad range of theories on learning, motivation, and action control. Implications for modern dual-system theory and modern theories on motivated action and (instructed) task sets are discussed.

The role of electronic versus written order sets in inappropriate laboratory testing among hospitalized medical patients

IMPORTANCE

Reducing inappropriate blood tests has been highlighted by Choosing Wisely as a key area of focus. Computer physician order entry is one modifiable contributor, but little is known about how computer ordering compares to paper methods when it comes to low-value laboratory testing.

OBJECTIVE

To determine which method of order entry is associated with a greater amount of appropriate lab testing. Furthermore, to identify ordering patterns for more targeted interventions in future.

DESIGN

We conducted a retrospective observational cohort study of inpatients discharged at two hospitals (one site uses paper order sets, while the other uses electronic order sets).

SETTING

General internal medicine wards at two Canadian teaching hospitals.

PARTICIPANTS

At site 1 (electronic orders), all general internal medicine discharges from May 2015 and February 2016. At site 2 (paper orders), all general internal medicine discharges from April 15, 2015 to May 26, 2015.

MAIN OUTCOME(S) AND MEASURE(S)

Main outcome was the percentage of inpatient discharges at each site with orders for daily laboratory tests for three days on admission. Secondary measures include proportion of tests with appropriate indications and rates of discontinuation of daily laboratory tests.

RESULTS

We reviewed 395 discharges with a mean patient age of 69.5 ± 18.9 years and mean length of stay of 12.1 days. Daily laboratory tests were more common with paper orders (site 2) compared to electronic order sets (site 1) for complete blood count (CBC) (90.8% vs. 68.5%, p < 0.001), electrolytes (93.8% vs 71.5%, p < 0.001), and creatinine (93.8% vs 70.0%, p < 0.001) testing. However, paper orders for daily laboratory tests were more often appropriate, both in CBC (76.3% vs. 38.9%, p < 0.001) and electrolyte/creatinine (80.3% vs 44.2%, p < 0.001) testing. Discontinuation of daily labs occurred more often with paper orders (35.4% vs. 6.7%, p < 0.001).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Compared to written orders, daily laboratory testing using electronic ordering was associated with higher rates of inappropriate indications and lower rates of discontinuation. Our results support interventions aimed at ensuring electronic order sets incorporate appropriate indications and a mechanism for discontinuation of daily lab orders. Further studies aimed at understanding how the process of completing paper or electronic orders influence appropriateness of daily laboratory orders are needed to further minimize inappropriate testing.

On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

Rule-based generalization of threat without similarity

Threat generalization to novel instances is central to adaptive behavior. Most previous work has investigated threat generalization based on the perceptual similarity between past and novel stimuli. Few studies have explored generalization based on abstract, non-perceptual relations despite their importance for cognitive flexibility. In order to measure such rule-based generalization of threat without perceptual similarity, we developed a novel paradigm that prevents perceptual features from gaining predictive value. Our results demonstrate that participants responded according to the correct abstract rule and used it to successfully generalize their anticipatory behavioral threat responses (expectancy ratings, sudomotor nerve activity, and heart rate responses). Our results further show that participants flexibly adapted their responses to an unsignaled mid-session contingency reversal. We interpret our results in the context of other rule-based generalization tasks and argue that variations of our paradigm make possible a wide range of investigations into the conceptual aspects of threat generalization.

Mechanisms Underlying Unconscious Processing and Their Alterations in Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: Neuroimaging of Zero Monetary Outcomes Contextually Framed as "No Losses" vs. "No Gains"

Although unconscious processing is a key element of mental operation, its neural correlates have not been established. Also, clinical observations suggest that unconscious processing may be involved in the pathophysiology of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but the neurobiological mechanisms underlying such impairments remain unknown. The purpose of the present study was to examine putative mechanisms underlying unconscious processing by healthy participants and to determine whether these mechanisms may be altered in PTSD patients. Twenty patients with PTSD and 27 healthy individuals were administered a validated wheel of fortune-type gambling task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Unconscious processing was elicited using unconscious contextual framing of the zero monetary outcomes as "no loss," "no gain" or as "neutral." Brief passive visual processing of the "no loss" vs. "no gain" contrast by healthy participants yielded bilateral frontal-, temporal- and insular cortices and striatal activations. Between-group comparison revealed smaller activity in the left anterior prefrontal-, left dorsolateral prefrontal-, right temporal- and right insular cortices and in bilateral striatum in PTSD patients with the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity been more pronounced in those with greater PTSD severity. These observations implicate frontal-, temporal-, and insular cortices along with the striatum in the putative mechanisms underlying unconscious processing of the monetary outcomes. Additionally, our results support the hypothesis that PTSD is associated with primary cortical and subcortical alterations involved in the above processes and that these alterations may be related to some aspects of PTSD symptomatology.

Conditioning is More Than Association Formation: On the Different Ways in Which Conditioning Research is Valuable for Clinical Psychology

Cognitively-oriented clinical psychologists sometimes think of conditioning as the formation of associations in memory. From this perspective, conditioning research is important because it reveals the conditions under which potentially pathogenic associations are formed and can be changed. In this paper, I point out that it is also possible and useful to think of conditioning in ways that do not refer to associations. First, based on the idea that conditioning effects are due to the formation of propositional beliefs, it is possible to appreciate that conditioning research informs us about one way of forming or revising beliefs: via the experience of events. Second, conditioning research reveals the environmental causes of behavior and behavior change and thus has merit regardless of ideas about the cognitive processes and representations that mediate conditioning. By discussing these different perspectives on conditioning as well as the way in which they are related, I hope to provide the reader with a wider appreciation of the merits of conditioning research for clinical psychology.

On How Definitions of Habits Can Complicate Habit Research

The core message of this paper is that many of the challenges of habit research can be traced back to the presence of causal elements within the definition of habits. For instance, the idea that habits are stimulus-driven implies that habitual behavior is not causally mediated by goal-representations. The presence of these causal elements in the definition of habits leads to difficulties in establishing empirically whether behavior is habitual. Some of these elements can also impoverish theoretical thinking about the mechanisms underlying habitual behavior. I argue that habit research would benefit from eliminating any reference to specific S-R association formation theories from the definition of habits. Which causal elements are retained in the definition of habits depends on the goals of researchers. However, regardless of the definition that is selected, it is good to be aware of the implications of the definition of habits for empirical and theoretical research on habits.