Tracking the displacement of objects: a series of tasks with great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) and young children (Homo sapiens)

Evidence of object permanence, short-term spatial memory, causality, understanding of object properties and gravity across five different ungulate species

In their natural environment, animals face a variety of ecological and social challenges, which might be linked to the emergence of different cognitive skills. To assess inter-specific variation in cognitive skills, we used ungulates as a study model, testing a total of 26 captive individuals across 5 different species (i.e., dwarf goats, Capra aegagrus hircus, llamas, Lama glama, guanacos, Lama guanicoe, zebras, Equus grevyi, and rhinos, Diceros bicornis michaeli). Across species, we used the same well-established experimental procedures to test individuals' performance in naïve physics tasks, i.e. object permanence, short-term spatial memory, causality, understanding of object properties, and gravity. Our results revealed that study subjects showed object permanence, were able to remember the position of hidden food after up to 60 s, and inferred the position of hidden food from the sound produced or not produced when shaking containers. Moreover, they showed an understanding of basic object properties, being able to locate objects hidden behind occluders based on their size and inclination, and could reliably follow the trajectory of falling objects across different conditions. Finally, inter-specific differences were limited to the understanding of object properties, and suggest that domesticated species as goats might perform better than non-domesticated ones in tasks requiring these skills. These results provide new information on the cognitive skills of a still understudied taxon and confirm ungulates as a promising taxon for the comparative study of cognitive evolution.

Talking About the Absent and the Abstract: Referential Communication in Language and Gesture

Human language permits us to call to mind objects, events, and ideas that we cannot witness directly, either because they are absent or because they have no physical form (e.g., people we have not met, concepts like justice). What enables language to transmit such knowledge? We propose that a referential link between words, referents, and mental representations of those referents is key. This link enables us to form, access, and modify mental representations even when the referents themselves are absent ("absent reference"). In this review we consider the developmental and evolutionary origins of absent reference, integrating previously disparate literatures on absent reference in language and gesture in very young humans and gesture in nonhuman primates. We first evaluate when and how infants acquire absent reference during the process of language acquisition. With this as a foundation, we consider the evidence for absent reference in gesture in infants and in nonhuman primates. Finally, having woven these literatures together, we highlight new lines of research that promise to sharpen our understanding of the development of reference and its role in learning about the absent and the abstract.

The origins of cognitive flexibility in chimpanzees

Cognitive flexibility is a core component of executive function, a suite of cognitive capacities that enables individuals to update their behavior in dynamic environments. Human executive functions are proposed to be enhanced compared to other species, but this inference is based primarily on neuroanatomical studies. To address this, we examined the nature and origins of cognitive flexibility in chimpanzees, our closest living relatives. Across three studies, we examined different components of cognitive flexibility using reversal learning tasks where individuals first learned one contingency and then had to shift responses when contingencies flipped. In Study 1, we tested n = 82 chimpanzees ranging from juvenility to adulthood on a spatial reversal task, to characterize the development of basic shifting skills. In Study 2, we tested how n = 24 chimpanzees use spatial versus arbitrary perceptual information to shift, a proposed difference between human and nonhuman cognition. In Study 3, we tested n = 40 chimpanzees on a probabilistic reversal task. We found an extended developmental trajectory for basic shifting and shifting in response to probabilistic feedback-chimpanzees did not reach mature performance until late in ontogeny. Additionally, females were faster to shift than males were. We also found that chimpanzees were much more successful when using spatial versus perceptual cues, and highly perseverative when faced with probabilistic versus consistent outcomes. These results identify both core features of chimpanzee cognitive flexibility that are shared with humans, as well as constraints on chimpanzee cognitive flexibility that may represent evolutionary changes in human cognitive development.

Orangutan strategies for solving a visuospatial memory task

The popular game known as Concentration (also commonly referred to as Memory), in which players search for matching pairs among a grid of face-down cards, provides a robust platform for examining visuospatial memory in a simple and nonverbal way. Five orangutans (Pongo ssp.) at the Indianapolis Zoo were given a modified version of the Concentration Game in which three cards were shown face-down on a computer screen, two of which matched each other while the third was a foil. Subjects overturned two cards at a time by touching them, with trials terminating in a food reward if the overturned cards matched, or reverting to their face-down position if they did not. A constraint was experimentally imposed on the game whereby the first two cards touched would never match, resulting in an optimal strategy composed of touching the first two cards, followed by the third, followed by the card among the first two cards that matched the third. We aimed to measure the extent to which orangutans would memorize and utilize visuospatial cues to solve the task in the optimal manner. Findings showed that three of five subjects utilized an optimal strategy more often than would be expected by chance, but also over utilized specific patterns of choices instead of adjusting their strategies to minimize the overall number of card flips. Visuospatial recall played a role in several of the participants' strategies for completing the task, but not to an extent that was necessary to achieve optimal gameplay.

Socio-spatial cognition in cats: Mentally mapping owner's location from voice

Many animals probably hold mental representations about the whereabouts of others; this is a form of socio-spatial cognition. We tested whether cats mentally map the spatial position of their owner or a familiar cat to the source of the owner's or familiar cat's vocalization. In Experiment 1, we placed one speaker outside a familiar room (speaker 1) and another (speaker 2) inside the room, as far as possible from speaker 1, then we left the subject alone in the room. In the habituation phase, the cat heard its owner's voice calling its name five times from speaker 1. In the test phase, shortly after the 5th habituation phase vocalization, one of the two speakers played either the owner's voice or a stranger's voice calling the cat's name once. There were four test combinations of speaker location and sound: SamesoundSamelocation, SamesoundDifflocation, DiffsoundSamelocation, DiffsoundDifflocation. In line with our prediction, cats showed most surprise in the SamesoundDifflocation condition, where the owner suddenly seemed to be in a new place. This reaction disappeared when we used cat vocalizations (Experiment 2) or non-vocal sounds (Experiment 3) as the auditory stimuli. Our results suggest that cats have mental representations about their out-of-sight owner linked to hearing the owner's voice, indicating a previously unidentified socio-spatial cognitive ability.

Comparative cognition in three understudied ungulate species: European bison, forest buffalos and giraffes

Background

Comparative cognition has historically focused on a few taxa such as primates, birds or rodents. However, a broader perspective is essential to understand how different selective pressures affect cognition in different taxa, as more recently shown in several studies. Here we present the same battery of cognitive tasks to two understudied ungulate species with different socio-ecological characteristics, European bison (Bison bonasus) and forest buffalos (Syncerus caffer nanus), and we compare their performance to previous findings in giraffes (Giraffa camelopardalis). We presented subjects with an Object permanence task, Memory tasks with 30 and 60 s delays, two inference tasks based on acoustic cues (i.e. Acoustic inference tasks) and a control task to check for the use of olfactory cues (i.e. Olfactory task).

Results

Overall, giraffes outperformed bison and buffalos, and bison outperformed buffalos (that performed at chance level). All species performed better in the Object permanence task than in the Memory tasks and one of the Acoustic inference tasks (which they likely solved by relying on stimulus enhancement). Giraffes performed better than buffalos in the Shake full Acoustic inference task, but worse than bison and buffalos in the Shake empty Acoustic inference task.

Conclusions

In sum, our results are in line with the hypothesis that specific socio-ecological characteristics played a crucial role in the evolution of cognition, and that higher fission-fusion levels and larger dietary breadth are linked to higher cognitive skills. This study shows that ungulates may be an excellent model to test evolutionary hypotheses on the emergence of cognition.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12983-021-00417-w.

Non-human primates use combined rules when deciding under ambiguity

Decision outcomes in unpredictable environments may not have exact known probabilities. Yet the predictability level of outcomes matters in decisions, and animals, including humans, generally avoid ambiguous options. Managing ambiguity may be more challenging and requires stronger cognitive skills than decision-making under risk, where decisions involve known probabilities. Here we compare decision-making in capuchins, macaques, orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos in risky and ambiguous contexts. Subjects were shown lotteries (a tray of potential rewards, some large, some small) and could gamble a medium-sized food item to obtain one of the displayed rewards. The odds of winning and losing varied and were accessible in the risky context (all rewards were visible) or partially available in the ambiguous context (some rewards were covered). In the latter case, the level of information varied from fully ambiguous (individuals could not guess what was under the covers) to predictable (individuals could guess). None of the species avoided gambling in ambiguous lotteries and gambling rates were high if at least two large rewards were visible. Capuchins and bonobos ignored the covered items and gorillas and macaques took the presence of potential rewards into account, but only chimpanzees and orangutans could consistently build correct expectations about the size of the covered rewards. Chimpanzees and orangutans combined decision rules according to the number of large visible rewards and the level of predictability, a process resembling conditional probabilities assessment in humans. Despite a low sample size, this is the first evidence in non-human primates that a combination of several rules can underlie choices made in an unpredictable environment. Our finding that non-human primates can deal with the uncertainty of an outcome when exchanging one food item for another is a key element to the understanding of the evolutionary origins of economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

The Cognitive Philosophy of Communication

Numerous species use different forms of communication in order to successfully interact in their respective environment. This article seeks to elucidate limitations of the classical conduit metaphor by investigating communication from the perspectives of biology and artificial neural networks. First, communication is a biological natural phenomenon, found to be fruitfully grounded in an organism’s embodied structures and memory system, where specific abilities are tied to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory as well as to working memory. Second, the account explicates differences between non-verbal and verbal communication and shows how artificial neural networks can communicate by means of ontologically non-committal modelling. This approach enables new perspectives of communication to emerge regarding both sender and receiver. It is further shown that communication features gradient properties that are plausibly divided into a reflexive and a reflective form, parallel to knowledge and reflection.

Comparative performance of orangutans (Pongo spp.), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and drills (Mandrillus leucophaeus), in an ephemeral foraging task

A goal of the comparative approach is to test a variety of species on the same task. Here, we examined whether the factors that helped capuchin monkeys improve their performance in a dichotomous choice task would generalize to three other primate species: orangutans, gorillas, and drill monkeys. In this task, subjects have access to two options, each resulting in an identical food, but one (the ephemeral option) is only available if it is chosen first, whereas the other one (the permanent option) is always available. Therefore, the food-maximizing solution is to choose the ephemeral option first, followed by the permanent option for an additional reward. On the original version (plate task), the options were discriminated by the color and pattern of the plates holding the food, while on two subsequent versions we used altered cues that we predicted would improve performance: (1) the color of the foods themselves (color task), which we hypothesized was relevant to primates, who choose foods rather than substrates on which foods are found when foraging, and (2) patterned cups covering the foods (cup task), which we hypothesized would help primates avoid the prepotent response associated with visible food. Like capuchins, all three species initially failed to solve the plate task. However, while orangutans improved their performance from the plate to the color task, they did not for the cup task, and only a few gorillas and no drills succeeded in either task. Unfortunately, our ability to interpret these data was obscured by differences in the subjects' level of experience with cognitive testing and practical constraints that precluded the use of completely identical procedures across species. Nonetheless, we consider what these results can tell us, and discuss the value of conducting studies across multiple sites despite unavoidable differences.

Horses Solve Visible but Not Invisible Displacement Tasks in an Object Permanence Paradigm

A key question in the field of animal cognition is how animals comprehend their physical world. Object permanence is one of the fundamental features of physical cognition. It is the ability to reason about hidden objects and to mentally reconstruct their invisible displacements. This cognitive skill has been studied in a wide range of species but never directly in the horse (Equus caballus). In this study, we therefore assessed the understanding of visible and invisible displacements in adult Welsh mares in two complementary experiments, using different horses. In experiment 1, visible displacement was investigated using two tasks adapted from the Uzgiris and Hunt scale 1. Invisible displacement was assessed using a transposition task, in which food was first hidden in one of two containers and the location of the containers was then switched. In experiment 2, we further investigated horses’ understanding of visible and invisible displacements using an easier procedure designed to avoid potentially confounding factors. In both experiments, horses successfully completed the tasks involving visible displacement with two or three possible hiding places. However, in both experiments, horses failed the transposition tasks, suggesting that they may not be able to track the displacement of an object that is not directly perceived (i.e., invisible displacement). These results bring new insights into object permanence in horses and how they represent their physical world.

Children Devise and Selectively Use Tools to Offload Cognition

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

Macphail's Null Hypothesis of Vertebrate Intelligence: Insights From Avian Cognition

Macphail famously criticized two foundational assumptions that underlie the evolutionary approach to comparative psychology: that there are differences in intelligence across species, and that intelligent behavior in animals is based on more than associative learning. Here, we provide evidence from recent work in avian cognition that supports both these assumptions: intelligence across species varies, and animals can perform intelligent behaviors that are not guided solely by associative learning mechanisms. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of comparative psychology that led to Macphail's claims and suggest strategies researchers can use to make more advances in the field.

Enhancing "self-control": The paradoxical effect of delay of reinforcement

Delay of reinforcement is generally thought to be inversely correlated with speed of acquisition. However, in the case of simultaneous discrimination learning, in which choice results in immediate reinforcement, delay of reinforcement can improve acquisition. For example, in the ephemeral reward task, animals are given a choice between two alternatives, A and B. Choice of A provides reinforcement, and the trial is over. Choice of B provides reinforcement and access to alternative A (thus, two reinforcements). Many animals appear unable to learn to choose B consistently, but inserting a 20-s delay between choice and outcome has been shown to facilitate optimal choice. Similarly, pigeons given a choice between a signal for one pellet and a signal for two pellets (each occurring without a delay) have difficulty learning to choose the two-pellet alternative, unless the reinforcement is delayed. In a version of object permanence, food is placed in one of two containers, and the pigeon must choose the container with the food. Pigeons have difficulty reliably choosing the correct container unless a brief delay is inserted between baiting and choice. Finally, pigeons have been shown to prefer a suboptimal alternative (a 20% chance of getting a cue for reinforcement) over an optimal alternative (a 100% chance of getting a cue for 50% reinforcement). However, if pigeons are forced to wait 20 s following their choice to receive the cues, no preference for the suboptimal alternative is found. Thus, impulsive choice may be reduced by delaying the consequence of that choice.

Kea (Nestor notabilis) represent object trajectory and identity

The ability to represent both the identity and trajectory of hidden objects underlies our capacity to reason about causal mechanisms. However, to date no studies have shown that non-human animals are capable of representing these two factors simultaneously. Here, we tested whether kea can represent out-of-sight object trajectories and identities by presenting subjects with three tasks, each of which involved tracking or predicting hand trajectories as they moved behind a screen. Taken together, our results suggest that kea have the capacity for mental simulation in complex tasks involving moving hidden objects.

Establishing an infrastructure for collaboration in primate cognition research

Inferring the evolutionary history of cognitive abilities requires large and diverse samples. However, such samples are often beyond the reach of individual researchers or institutions, and studies are often limited to small numbers of species. Consequently, methodological and site-specific-differences across studies can limit comparisons between species. Here we introduce the ManyPrimates project, which addresses these challenges by providing a large-scale collaborative framework for comparative studies in primate cognition. To demonstrate the viability of the project we conducted a case study of short-term memory. In this initial study, we were able to include 176 individuals from 12 primate species housed at 11 sites across Africa, Asia, North America and Europe. All subjects were tested in a delayed-response task using consistent methodology across sites. Individuals could access food rewards by remembering the position of the hidden reward after a 0, 15, or 30-second delay. Overall, individuals performed better with shorter delays, as predicted by previous studies. Phylogenetic analysis revealed a strong phylogenetic signal for short-term memory. Although, with only 12 species, the validity of this analysis is limited, our initial results demonstrate the feasibility of a large, collaborative open-science project. We present the ManyPrimates project as an exciting opportunity to address open questions in primate cognition and behaviour with large, diverse datasets.

Comparative metaphysics: Evolutionary and ontogenetic roots of essentialist thought about objects

How do animals and young children see the world around them in its most basic structure, and how do such world-views develop over time? These are questions of what could be called comparative and developmental metaphysics. The present paper gives an introduction to this newly emerging field of research. Special emphasis is put on thinking about the world as made up of discrete and enduring objects as the most fundamental form of objective thought. The paper discusses whether language is necessary for such basic forms of objective thought, and whether thinking about objects, in turn, may lay a foundation for psychological essentialism. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Foraging in a social setting: a comparative analysis of captive gorillas and chimpanzees

This study was designed to investigate the foraging behavior of zoo-housed western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and compare it with that of zoo-housed chimpanzees (Pan trogloydytes) tested previously in a similar paradigm. Specifically, we aimed to document how a group of zoo-housed gorillas foraged within a familiar environment to discover novel food sources and whether they sought out more preferred foods, even if they had to travel further to reach them, as they do in the wild. Gorillas were provided plastic tokens to exchange with researchers at two locations-at the same location as the tokens (close) for carrot pieces and another 6.5 m away (far) for grapes. Over the course of 30 sessions, a single individual-the silverback male-accounted for 96% of the 1546 tokens exchanged, all of which took place at the far location. Inter-individual distance measures collected during each session, as well as during matched control sessions, showed that while both gorillas and chimpanzees express similar patterns of social association across the two conditions, the average dyadic association for chimpanzees was stronger than that for gorillas. Together, these findings provide an example of the value of employing identical methodologies to compare cognition and behavior across species as well highlight the importance of the social context in which studies take place.

Comparative psychometrics: establishing what differs is central to understanding what evolves

Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is individual variation in task performance. In this paper, we first make the case for why we should be interested in mapping individual differences in task performance onto particular cognitive abilities: we suggest that it is crucial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of inhibitory control for non-human animals do indeed produce correlated task performance; however, no clear pattern emerges that would support the notion of a common cognitive ability underpinning individual differences in performance. We advocate a psychometric approach involving a three-step programme to make theoretical and empirical progress: first, we need tasks that reveal signature limits in performance. Second, we need to assess the reliability of individual differences in task performance. Third, multi-trait multi-method test batteries will be instrumental in validating cognitive abilities. Together, these steps will help us to establish what varies between individuals that could impact their fitness and ultimately shape the course of the evolution of animal minds. Finally, we propose executive functions, including working memory, inhibitory control and attentional shifting, as a sensible starting point for this endeavour.This article is part of the theme issue 'Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities'.

Where's the cookie? The ability of monkeys to track object transpositions

Object permanence is the ability to represent mentally an object and follow its position even when it has disappeared from view. According to Piaget’s 6-stage scale of the sensorimotor period of development, it seems that object permanence appears in Stage 4 and fully develops in Stage 6. In this study, we investigated the ability of some species of monkeys (i.e. pig-tailed macaque, lion-tailed macaque, Celebes crested macaque, barbary macaque, De Brazza’s monkey, L’Hoest’s monkey, Allen’s swamp monkey, black crested mangabeys, collared mangabeys, Geoffroy’s spider monkey) to track the displacement of an object, which consisted of a reward hidden under one of two cups. Our findings showed that the examined subjects possess Stage 6 of object permanence. We then compared our results with data on apes and dogs participating in Rooijakkers et al. (Anim Cogn 12:789–796, 2009) experiment, where the same method was applied. The monkeys examined by us performed significantly better than the dogs but worse than the apes. In our experiment, the monkeys performed above chance level in all variants, but it should be noted that we observed significant differences in the number of correct choices according to the level of a variant’s complexity.

Comparing physical and social cognitive skills in macaque species with different degrees of social tolerance

Contemporary evolutionary theories propose that living in groups drives the selection of enhanced cognitive skills to face competition and facilitate cooperation between individuals. Being able to coordinate both in space and time with others and make strategic decisions are essential skills for cooperating within groups. Social tolerance and an egalitarian social structure have been proposed as one specific driver of cooperation. Therefore, social tolerance is predicted to be associated with enhanced cognitive skills that underpin communication and coordination. Social tolerance should also be associated with enhanced inhibition, which is crucial for suppressing automatic responses and permitting delayed gratification in cooperative contexts. We tested the performance of four closely related non-human primate species (genus Macaca) characterized by different degrees of social tolerance on a large battery of cognitive tasks covering physical and social cognition, and on an inhibitory control task. All species performed at a comparable level on the physical cognition tasks but the more tolerant species outperformed the less tolerant species at a social cognition task relevant to cooperation and in the inhibitory control task. These findings support the hypothesis that social tolerance is associated with the evolution of sophisticated cognitive skills relevant for cooperative social living.

Does size really matter? Investigating cognitive differences in spatial memory ability based on size in domestic dogs

The study of canine cognition can be useful in understanding the selective pressures affecting cognitive abilities. Dogs have undergone intensive artificial selection yielding distinctive breeds, which differ both phenotypically and behaviorally and no other species has a wider range in brain size. As brain size has long been hypothesized to relate to cognitive capacity, this species offers a useful model to further explore this relationship. The influence of physical size on canine cognition has not been thoroughly addressed, despite the fact that large dogs are often perceived to be 'smarter' than small dogs. To date, this preconception has only recently been addressed and supported in one study comparing large and small dogs in a social cognition task, where large dogs outperformed small dogs in a pointing choice task. We assessed large and small dogs using a series of spatial cognition tasks and detected no differences between the two groups. Further research is needed to clarify why our results failed to compliment previous findings. It is possible that differences found in social cognition tasks may not be due to differences in size, rather they may be based on other factors such as methodology, prior training experience, or past experience with humans in general.

The Effects of Visual Discriminability and Rotation Angle on 30-Month-Olds' Search Performance in Spatial Rotation Tasks

Tracking objects that are hidden and then moved is a crucial ability related to object permanence, which develops across several stages in early childhood. In spatial rotation tasks, children observe a target object that is hidden in one of two or more containers before the containers are rotated around a fixed axis. Usually, 30-month-olds fail to find the hidden object after it was rotated by 180°. We examined whether visual discriminability of the containers improves 30-month-olds’ success in this task and whether children perform better after 90° than after 180° rotations. Two potential hiding containers with same or different colors were placed on a board that was rotated by 90° or 180° in a within-subjects design. Children (N = 29) performed above chance level in all four conditions. Their overall success in finding the object did not improve by differently colored containers. However, different colors prevented children from showing an inhibition bias in 90° rotations, that is, choosing the empty container more often when it was located close to them than when it was farther away: This bias emerged in the same colors condition but not in the different colors condition. Results are discussed in view of particular challenges that might facilitate or deteriorate spatial rotation tasks for young children.

Now You See It, Now You Don’t

The cognitive ability of dogs can be assessed using tasks from the human developmental literature. A task that appears to have ecological relevance is the object-permanence task, in which performance hinges on understanding that an object continues to exist once it can no longer be seen. Although dogs are good at visible displacement tasks, in which an object disappears into a container, they can also understand an invisible displacement, in which the container holding the object is moved. Furthermore, we have found that dogs are able to show considerable memory for the invisibly displaced object. We have also found evidence for object permanence in dogs using the violation-of-expectancy procedure, in which subjects look longer at a stimulus that violates expectations (a screen that appears to pass through an object that has been placed behind the screen) than one that does not. Similarly, we have found that dogs look longer at an object that appears to have changed color or size after being placed behind a screen compared to an object that has not changed. Object-permanence tasks provide an ecologically relevant means of evaluating the cognitive development of dogs.

The use of a displacement device negatively affects the performance of dogs (Canis familiaris) in visible object displacement tasks

Visible and invisible displacement tasks have been used widely for comparative studies of animals' understanding of object permanence, with evidence accumulating that some species can solve invisible displacement tasks and, thus, reach Piagetian stage 6 of object permanence. In contrast, dogs appear to rely on associative cues, such as the location of the displacement device, during invisible displacement tasks. It remains unclear, however, whether dogs, and other species that failed in invisible displacement tasks, do so because of their inability to form a mental representation of the target object, or simply because of the involvement of a more salient but potentially misleading associative cue, the displacement device. Here we show that the use of a displacement device impairs the performance of dogs also in visible displacement tasks: their search accuracy was significantly lower when a visible displacement was performed with a displacement device, and only two of initially 42 dogs passed the sham-baiting control conditions. The negative influence of the displacement device in visible displacement tasks may be explained by strong associative cues overriding explicit information about the target object's location, reminiscent of an overshadowing effect, and/or object individuation errors as the target object is placed within the displacement device and moves along a spatiotemporally identical trajectory. Our data suggest that a comprehensive appraisal of a species' performance in object permanence tasks should include visible displacement tasks with the same displacement device used in invisible displacements, which typically has not been done in the past.

Double invisible displacement understanding in orangutans: testing in non-locomotor and locomotor space

The nonadjacent double invisible displacement task has been used to test for the ability of different species to mentally represent the unperceived trajectory of an object. The task typically requires three occluders/boxes in a linear array and involves hiding an object in one of two nonadjacent boxes visited in succession. Previous research indicates that 19-, 26-, and 30-month-old children and various nonhuman species cannot solve these displacements. It has been hypothesized that this is because individuals are unable to inhibit searching in the unbaited center box that was never visited by the experimenter. It has been suggested that presenting the task in a large-scale locomotor space might allow individuals to overcome this inhibition problem. In the present study, we tested orangutans on adjacent and nonadjacent double invisible displacements with the traditional setup (experiment 1) and in locomotor space with boxes placed 1.22 m apart (experiment 2). In both experiments, subjects were able to solve adjacent, but not nonadjacent, trials. The failure on nonadjacent trials appeared to be because of an inability to inhibit sequential search on the second choice as well as because of a large number of first-choice errors (directly choosing an incorrect box). The current results support previous findings that orangutans exhibit some constraints when representing the invisible trajectory of objects.

Comparative Developmental Psychology: How is Human Cognitive Development Unique?

The fields of developmental and comparative psychology both seek to illuminate the roots of adult cognitive systems. Developmental studies target the emergence of adult cognitive systems over ontogenetic time, whereas comparative studies investigate the origins of human cognition in our evolutionary history. Despite the long tradition of research in both of these areas, little work has examined the intersection of the two: the study of cognitive development in a comparative perspective. In the current article, we review recent work using this comparative developmental approach to study non-human primate cognition. We argue that comparative data on the pace and pattern of cognitive development across species can address major theoretical questions in both psychology and biology. In particular, such integrative research will allow stronger biological inferences about the function of developmental change, and will be critical in addressing how humans come to acquire species-unique cognitive abilities.

Delayed response task performance as a function of age in cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis)

We compared delayed response task performance in young, middle-aged, and old cynomolgus monkeys using three memory tests that have been used with non-human primates. Eighteen cynomolgus monkeys—6 young (4–9 years), 6 middle-aged (10–19 years), and 6 old (above 20 years)—were tested. In general, the old monkeys scored significantly worse than did the animals in the two other age groups. Longer delays between stimulus presentation and response increased the performance differences between the old and younger monkeys. The old monkeys in particular showed signs of impaired visuo-spatial memory and deteriorated memory consolidation and executive functioning. These results add to the body of evidence supporting the utility of Macaca fascicularis in studies of cognition and as a potential translational model for age-associated memory impairment/dementia-related disorders.

Socio-spatial cognition in vervet monkeys

Safety in numbers is thought to be the principal advantage of living in groups for many species. The group can only provide protection against predators, however, when group cohesion is maintained. Vocalisations are used to monitor inter-individual distances, especially under conditions of poor visibility, but should be avoided in the presence of predators. Mentally tracking the movements of silent and invisible group members would allow animals foraging in dense vegetation to stay close to their group members while reducing the use of vocal contact. We tested the socio-spatial cognitive abilities of wild vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) by comparing their reactions to plausible and implausible displacements of group members simulated by sound playbacks. Our methods are comparable to those used in studies of 'object permanence' and 'invisible displacements' of inanimate objects. Our results show that vervets can track the whereabouts of invisibly and silently moving group members, at least over short periods of time.

Visuospatial working memory in toddlers with a history of periventricular Leukomalacia: an EEG narrow-band power analysis

BACKGROUND

Periventricular Leukomalacia (PVL) affects white matter, but grey matter injuries have also been reported, particularly in the dorsomedial nucleus and the cortex. Both structures have been related to working memory (WM) processes. The aim of this study was to compare behavioral performances and EEG power spectra during a visuospatial working memory task (VSWMT) of toddlers with a history of PVL and healthy toddlers.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

A prospective, comparative study of WM was conducted in toddlers with a history of PVL and healthy toddlers. The task responses and the EEG narrow-band power spectra during a VSWMT were compared in both groups. The EEG absolute power was analyzed during the following three conditions: baseline, attention and WM retention. The number of correct responses was higher in the healthy group (20.5 ± 5.0) compared to the PVL group (16.1 ± 3.9) (p = 0.04). The healthy group had absolute power EEG increases (p ≤ 0.05) during WM compared to the attention condition in the bilateral frontal and right temporal, parietal and occipital regions in frequencies ranging from 1.17 to 2.34 Hz and in the right temporal, parietal and occipital regions in frequencies ranging from 14.06 to 15.23 Hz. In contrast, the PVL group had absolute power increases (p ≤ 0.05) in the bilateral fronto-parietal, left central and occipital regions in frequencies that ranged from 1.17 to 3.52 Hz and in the bilateral frontal and right temporal regions in frequencies ranging from 9.37 to 19.14 Hz.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

This study provides evidence that PVL toddlers have visuospatial WM deficits and a very different pattern of absolute power increases compared to a healthy group of toddlers, with greater absolute power in the low frequency range and widespread neuronal networks in the WM retention phase.

Evolution of working memory

Working memory (WM) is fundamental to many aspects of human life, including learning, speech and text comprehension, prospection and future planning, and explicit "system 2" forms of reasoning, as well as overlapping heavily with fluid general intelligence. WM has been intensively studied for many decades, and there is a growing consensus about its nature, its components, and its signature limits. Remarkably, given its central importance in human life, there has been very little comparative investigation of WM abilities across species. Consequently, much remains unknown about the evolution of this important human capacity. Some questions can be tentatively answered from the existing comparative literature. Even studies that were not intended to do so can nonetheless shed light on the WM capacities of nonhuman animals. However, many questions remain.

What counts for 'counting'? Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, respond appropriately to relevant and irrelevant information in a quantity judgment task

Nonhuman animals quantify all manner of things, and the way in which this is done is fairly well understood. However, little research has been conducted to determine how they know what is or is not relevant in the instances in which they quantify stimuli. We assessed how four chimpanzees chose between two sets of food items when the items were distributed across separate spatial arrays. Each item was covered by a container, and then was revealed in sequence so that neither whole set was visible at one time. After all containers were revealed, some were revealed again. The chimpanzees should have ignored items that were seen a second time and instead enumerated each item only once. In another test, some of the items were transposed in location and then uncovered again. Here, the chimpanzees needed to recognize that the newly shown food items were ones they already had seen. Overall, the chimpanzees were successful in selecting the truly larger array of items despite these potential distracting re-presentations of items. Discrimination performance also reflected analogue magnitude estimation because comparisons of sets that differed by larger amounts were easier than comparisons that differed by smaller amounts. Thus, chimpanzee quantity judgments for nonvisible sets of items are inexact, but they include an aspect of control for determining when items are uniquely presented versus re-presented.

Can black-and-white ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata) solve object permanence tasks?

We examined object permanence in black-and-white-ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata) at Zoo Atlanta. A series of visible and invisible displacement tasks with suitable controls were presented to five adult subjects. Subjects performed significantly above chance on all regular tasks, except for the double invisible displacements. Subjects failed visible and invisible controls. Failure on the control trials did not appear to be because subjects used the "last box touched" strategy (subjects did not choose the last box touched significantly more than expected by chance). However, a substantial percentage of choices was made to the last box touched by the experimenter. There was no significant difference between this percentage, and the percentage of choices made to the baited box (on both visible and invisible controls), which indicates that subjects were drawn to both boxes which the experimenter visited/touched, and thus failed the controls. Based on the results from the present study, we believe that there is no evidence that black-and-white ruffed lemurs understand visible and invisible tasks in the traditional object permanence battery.

Are there geniuses among the apes?

We are often asked whether some apes are smarter than others. Here we used two individual-based datasets on cognitive abilities to answer this question and to elucidate the structure of individual differences. We identified some individuals who consistently scored well across multiple tasks, and even one individual who could be classified as exceptional when compared with her conspecifics. However, we found no general intelligence factor. Instead, we detected some clusters of certain abilities, including inferences, learning and perhaps a tool-use and quantities cluster. Thus, apes in general and chimpanzees in particular present a pattern characterized by the existence of some smart animals but no evidence of a general intelligence factor. This conclusion contrasts with previous studies that have found evidence of a g factor in primates. However, those studies have used group-based as opposed to the individual-based data used here, which means that the two sets of analyses are not directly comparable. We advocate an approach based on testing multiple individuals (of multiple species) on multiple tasks that capture cognitive, motivational and temperament factors affecting performance. One of the advantages of this approach is that it may contribute to reconcile the general and domain-specific views on primate intelligence.

A modular mind? A test using individual data from seven primate species

It has long been debated whether the mind consists of specialized and independently evolving modules, or whether and to what extent a general factor accounts for the variance in performance across different cognitive domains. In this study, we used a hierarchical Bayesian model to re-analyse individual level data collected on seven primate species (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas, spider monkeys, brown capuchin monkeys and long-tailed macaques) across 17 tasks within four domains (inhibition, memory, transposition and support). Our modelling approach evidenced the existence of both a domain-specific factor and a species factor, each accounting for the same amount (17%) of the observed variance. In contrast, inter-individual differences played a minimal role. These results support the hypothesis that the mind of primates is (at least partially) modular, with domain-specific cognitive skills undergoing different evolutionary pressures in different species in response to specific ecological and social demands.

Rotational displacement skills in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Rotational displacement tasks, in which participants must track an object at a hiding location within an array while the array rotates, exhibit a puzzling developmental pattern in humans. Human children take an unusually long time to master this task and tend to solve rotational problems through the use of nongeometric features or landmarks as opposed to other kinds of spatial cues. We investigated whether these developmental characteristics are unique to humans by testing rotational displacement skills in a monkey species, the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta), using a looking-time method. Monkeys first saw food hidden in two differently colored boxes within an array. The array was then rotated 180° and the boxes reopened to reveal the food in an expected or unexpected location. Our first two experiments explored the developmental time-course of performance on this rotational displacement task. We found that adult macaques looked longer at the unexpected event, but such performance was not mirrored in younger-aged macaques. In a third study, we systematically varied featural information and visible access to the array to investigate which strategies adult macaques used in solving rotational displacements. Our results show that adult macaques need both sets of information to solve the task. Taken together, these results suggest both similarities and differences in mechanisms by which human and nonhuman primates develop this spatial skill.

Evolution of the brain and intelligence in primates

Primates are, on average, more intelligent than other mammals, with great apes and finally humans on top. They generally have larger brains and cortices, and because of higher relative cortex volume and neuron packing density (NPD), they have much more cortical neurons than other mammalian taxa with the same brain size. Likewise, information processing capacity is generally higher in primates due to short interneuronal distance and high axonal conduction velocity. Across primate taxa, differences in intelligence correlate best with differences in number of cortical neurons and synapses plus information processing speed. The human brain stands out by having a large cortical volume with relatively high NPD, high conduction velocity, and high cortical parcellation. All aspects of human intelligence are present at least in rudimentary form in nonhuman primates or some mammals or vertebrates except syntactical language. The latter can be regarded as a very potent "intelligence amplifier."

Information seeking by orangutans: a generalized search strategy?

Recent empirical work has suggested that some species of non-human primates may be aware of their knowledge states. One finding to support this claim is that they seek information about the location of a hidden food item when they are unsure of its location, but not when they already know where it is, which purportedly demonstrates metacognition. However, this behaviour may instead reflect a generalized search strategy, in which subjects reach for food when they see it, and search for it when they do not. In this experiment, this possibility was addressed by testing orangutans in three conditions in which the location of a food item was sometimes known to subjects, and other times required subjects to visually seek the missing information. All subjects exhibited behaviour consistent with a metacognitive interpretation in at least two of the three conditions. Critically, in two of the conditions, subjects refrained from seeking visual information, and correctly found the hidden food item without ever seeing it, using inference by exclusion. The results suggest that animals that succeed in this information-seeking task are not merely acting according to a generalized search strategy, and instead seek information adaptively according to their knowledge states.

Executive function in young children and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): evidence from a nonverbal dimensional change card sort task

In this article the authors compared chimpanzees' executive function with that of children. They developed a nonverbal dimensional change card sorting task, which indexed the development of executive function. Three pairs of mother and offspring chimpanzees and 30 typically developed 5-year-old children were presented with 2 target stimuli and a test stimulus comprising 2 dimensions (size and shape) on a display; they were required to sort the test stimulus according to 1 dimension (e.g., shape). After 5 consecutive correct trials, the participants had to sort the test stimulus according to the other dimension (e.g., size). The results showed that the chimpanzees often failed to sort the test stimuli according to the first and reversed dimensions. On the other hand, the children were correctly able to use both dimensions. These results indicate that chimpanzees may have less developed executive skills than children.

Great apes use landmark cues over spatial relations to find hidden food

We investigated whether chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans encoded the location of a reward hidden underneath one of three identical cups in relation to (1) the other cups in the array-i.e., the relative position of the baited cup within the array; or (2) the landmarks surrounding the cups-e.g., the edge of the table. Apes witnessed the hiding of a food reward under one of three cups forming a straight line on a platform. After 30 s, they were allowed to search for the reward. In three different experiments, we varied the distance of the cups to the edge of the platform and the distance between the cups. Results showed that both manipulated variables affected apes' retrieval accuracy. Subjects' retrieval accuracy was higher for the outer cups compared with the Middle cup, especially if the outer cups were located next to the platform's edge. Additionally, the larger the distance between the cups, the better performance became.

Great apes' strategies to map spatial relations

We investigated reasoning about spatial relational similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes compared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping the left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups from each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar relations to nearby landmarks (table's visual boundaries).

Origins of spatial, temporal and numerical cognition: Insights from comparative psychology

Contemporary comparative cognition has a large repertoire of animal models and methods, with concurrent theoretical advances that are providing initial answers to crucial questions about human cognition. What cognitive traits are uniquely human? What are the species-typical inherited predispositions of the human mind? What is the human mind capable of without certain types of specific experiences with the surrounding environment? Here, we review recent findings from the domains of space, time and number cognition. These findings are produced using different comparative methodologies relying on different animal species, namely birds and non-human great apes. The study of these species not only reveals the range of cognitive abilities across vertebrates, but also increases our understanding of human cognition in crucial ways.

Great apes track hidden objects after changes in the objects' position and in subject's orientation

Eight chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), five bonobos (Pan paniscus), five gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and seven orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were presented with two invisible object displacement tasks. In full view of the subject, a food item was hidden under one of three opaque cups resting on a platform and, after an experimental manipulation, the subject was allowed to select one of the cups. In the rotation task, the platform was rotated 180 degrees while the subject remained stationary. In the translocation task, the platform remained stationary while the subject walked to the opposite side from where she saw the reward being hidden. The final position of the food relative to the subject was equivalent in both tasks. Single displacement trials consisted of only one manipulation, either a rotation or a translocation, whereas double displacement trials consisted of both a rotation and a translocation. We also included no displacement trials in which no displacements took place. No displacement trials were easier than single displacements which, in turn, were easier than double displacements. Unlike earlier studies with children, there was no difference in performance between rotation and translocation displacements. Overall, apes performed above chance in all conditions, but chimpanzees outperformed the other species. This study reinforces the notion that the great apes use an allocentric spatial coding.

Do apes know that they could be wrong?

When confronted with uncertain or incomplete information in decision-making situations, monkeys and apes opt for either escaping the situation or seeking additional information. These responses have been interpreted as evidence of metacognitive abilities. However, this interpretation has been challenged. On the one hand, studies using the information-seeking paradigm have been criticized because subjects may simply engage in a search for information routine (e.g., search until spot the reward) without any metacognitive involvement. On the other hand, studies using the escape response paradigm have been criticized because subjects may not recognize their own state of uncertainty but have learned to use the escape response in the presence of certain stimuli configurations that create uncertainty. The current study attempted to address these two criticisms by presenting great apes (seven gorillas, eight chimpanzees, four bonobos, seven orangutans) with a seeking information task whose basic procedure consisted of presenting two hollow tubes, baiting one of them and letting subjects choose. Conditions varied depending on whether subjects had visual access to the baiting, the cost associated with seeking information, the time interval between baiting and choosing, the food quality and the additional information offered regarding the food's location. Although subjects showed a high retrieval accuracy when they had witnessed the baiting, they were more likely to check inside the tube before choosing when high stakes were involved (Experiment 3) or after a longer period of time had elapsed between the baiting and the retrieval of the reward (Experiment 2). In contrast, providing subjects with indirect auditory information about the food's location or increasing the cost of checking reduced checking before choosing (Experiment 1). Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects knew that they could be wrong when choosing.

Reaching around barriers: the performance of the great apes and 3-5-year-old children

Inhibitory control has been suggested as a key predictive measure of problem-solving skills in human and nonhuman animals. However, there has yet to be a direct comparison of the inhibitory skills of the nonhuman apes and their development in human children. We compared the inhibitory skills of all great ape species, including 3-5-year-old children in a detour-reaching task, which required subjects to avoid reaching directly for food and instead use an indirect reaching method to successfully obtain the food. We tested 22 chimpanzees, 18 bonobos, 18 orangutans, 6 gorillas and 42 children. Our sample included chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans housed in zoos (N = 27) and others housed in sanctuaries in their native habitats (N = 37). Overall, orangutans were the most skilful apes, including human children. As expected older children outperformed younger children. Sanctuary chimpanzees and bonobos outperformed their zoo counterparts whereas there was no difference between the two orangutan samples. Most zoo chimpanzees and bonobos failed to solve the original task, but improved their performance with additional training, although the training method determined to a considerable extent the level of success that the apes achieved in a transfer phase. In general, the performance of the older children was far from perfect and comparable to some of the nonhuman apes tested.