People's hypercorrection of high-confidence errors: did they know it all along?

Guessing as a learning intervention: A meta-analytic review of the prequestion effect

Giving students test questions before they have learned the correct answers (i.e., prequestions) enhances learning. However, existing research has provided conflicting evidence on whether the benefits of prequestions are specific to the initially tested material or if they generalize to new, nontested material. In this review, we summarize the literature on the prequestion effect, describe the attention-based account underlying this effect, report a meta-analysis of the magnitude of the specific and general effects, and explore theoretically and empirically relevant moderator variables that influence the size and direction of the prequestion effect. This preregistered meta-analysis demonstrated a moderate specific effect (g = 0.54, k = 97) but a virtually nonexistent general effect (g = 0.04, k = 91). Overall, the attention-based account received support from some theoretically relevant moderator analyses. Future researchers are encouraged to conduct theoretically motivated studies to help clarify the mechanisms that underlie the attention-enhancing effects of prequestions and to explore the benefits of prequestions in educational domains to establish the extent to which these effects translate into the classroom.

Cognitive perspectives on maintaining physicians' medical expertise: IV. Best practices and open questions in using testing to enhance learning and retention

Although tests and assessments-such as those used to maintain a physician's Board certification-are often viewed merely as tools for decision-making about one's performance level, strong evidence now indicates that the experience of being tested is a powerful learning experience in its own right: The act of retrieving targeted information from memory strengthens the ability to use it again in the future, known as the testing effect. We review meta-analytic evidence for the learning benefits of testing, including in the domain of medicine, and discuss theoretical accounts of its mechanism(s). We also review key moderators-including the timing, frequency, order, and format of testing and the content of feedback-and what they indicate about how to most effectively use testing for learning. We also identify open questions for the optimal use of testing, such as the timing of feedback and the sequencing of complex knowledge domains. Lastly, we consider how to facilitate adoption of this powerful study strategy by physicians and other learners.

Older adults recover more marginal knowledge and use feedback more effectively than younger adults: evidence using "I don't know" vs. "I don't remember" for general knowledge questions

Through three experiments, we examined older and younger adults' metacognitive ability to distinguish between what is not stored in the knowledge base versus merely inaccessible. Difficult materials were selected to test this ability when retrieval failures were very frequent. Of particular interest was the influence of feedback (and lack thereof) in potential new learning and recovery of marginal knowledge across age groups. Participants answered short-answer general knowledge questions, responding "I do not know" (DK) or "I do not remember" (DR) when retrieval failed. After DKs, performance on a subsequent multiple-choice (Exp. 1) and short-answer test following correct-answer feedback (Exp. 2) was lower than after DRs, supporting self-reported not remembering reflects failures of accessibility whereas not knowing captures a lack of availability. Yet, older adults showed a tendency to answer more DK questions correctly on the final tests than younger adults. Experiment 3 was a replication and extension of Experiment 2 including two groups of online participants in which one group was not provided correct answer feedback during the initial short-answer test. This allowed us to examine the degree to which any new learning and recovery of access to marginal knowledge was occurring across the age groups. Together, the findings indicate that (1) metacognitive awareness regarding underlying causes of retrieval failures is maintained across different distributions of knowledge accessibility, (2) older adults use correct answer feedback more effectively than younger adults, and (3) in the absence of feedback, older adults spontaneously recover marginal knowledge.

Learning from errors: Exploration of the monitoring learning effect

The present study examined spontaneous detection and repair of naming errors in people with aphasia to advance a theoretical understanding of how monitoring impacts learning in lexical access. Prior work in aphasia has found that spontaneous repair, but not mere detection without repair, of semantic naming errors leads to improved naming on those same items in the future when other factors are accounted for. The present study sought to replicate this finding in a new, larger sample of participants and to examine the critical role of self-generated repair in this monitoring learning effect. Twenty-four participants with chronic aphasia with naming impairment provided naming responses to a 660-item corpus of common, everyday objects at two timepoints. At the first timepoint, a randomly selected subset of trials ended in experimenter-provided corrective feedback. Each naming trial was coded for accuracy, error type, and for any monitoring behavior that occurred, specifically detection with repair (i.e., correction), detection without repair, and no detection. Focusing on semantic errors, the original monitoring learning effect was replicated, with enhanced accuracy at a future timepoint when the first trial with that item involved detection with repair, compared to error trials that were not detected. This enhanced accuracy resulted from learning that arose from the first trial rather than the presence of repair simply signifying easier items. A second analysis compared learning from trials of self-corrected errors to that of trials ending in feedback that were detected but not self-corrected and found enhanced learning after self-generated repair. Implications for theories of lexical access and monitoring are discussed.

Older and younger adults' revision of health misconceptions

Although ample younger adult research has detailed effective strategies for revising misconceptions, research with older adults is less extensive. Older adults may be less able to correct errors in knowledge due to age-related changes in cognition, but it is also possible that older adults' revision of misconceptions has been limited by methodologies which do not provide adequate support for correction. In two experiments, we examined how older and younger adults revise health-related misconceptions when provided with cognitive support in the form of explicit detailed feedback and an immediate test. Older and younger adults in Experiment 1 answered true/false health statements, received feedback with a detailed explanation of the correct response, took an additional test on the same statements immediately following the initial test, and completed a final test 1-week later. Older and younger adults corrected a similar proportion of misconceptions immediately and maintained most of those revisions across a 1-week delay. In Experiment 2, older adults corrected the same proportion of misconceptions on the final test regardless of whether or not they received a test immediately following feedback. Overall, older adults revised health misconceptions as effectively as did younger adults but variables influencing correction (e.g., belief in feedback) may differ.

Curiosity and the desire for agency: wait, wait … don't tell me!

Past research has shown that when people are curious they are willing to wait to get an answer if the alternative is to not get the answer at all—a result that has been taken to mean that people valued the answers, and interpreted as supporting a reinforcement-learning (RL) view of curiosity. An alternative 'need for agency' view is forwarded that proposes that when curious, people are intrinsically motivated to actively seek the answer themselves rather than having it given to them. If answers can be freely obtained at any time, the RL view holds that, because time delay depreciates value, people will not wait to receive the answer. Because they value items that they are curious about more than those about which they are not curious they should seek the former more quickly. In contrast, the need for agency view holds that in order to take advantage of the opportunity to obtain the answer by their own efforts, when curious, people may wait. Consistent with this latter view, three experiments showed that even when the answer could be obtained at any time, people spontaneously waited longer to request the answer when they were curious. Furthermore, rather than requesting the answer itself—a response that would have maximally reduced informational uncertainty—in all three experiments, people asked for partial information in the form of hints, when curious. Such active hint seeking predicted later recall. The 'need for agency' view of curiosity, then, was supported by all three experiments.

Retrieval practice via corrective feedback: is learning better for targets in an expected or surprising sense?

Adult participants learned homographic cue words and weakly associated targets. Each target was in the dominant (expected) sense of the cue (e.g., habit - daily) or the subordinate (surprising) sense (e.g., habit - nun). Attempting to guess the target before reading it produced better target retention than did simply reading the cue and target without guessing. Replicating recent studies, recall accuracy was also higher for expected than surprising targets, whether the cue + target reading time was fixed (Experiment 1) or under participants' control (Experiment 2). A new result was that this advantage was larger in the guess than the read condition. In Experiment 3, all targets were in the dominant sense of the cue, and prime phrases activated the dominant or subordinate sense before the target was either guessed or presented. Experiment 3 thus disentangled guess-target congruence from target sense. When the analysis was restricted to trials with a guess consistent with the prime, subordinate primes (incongruent with the targets) produced substantially lower target recall accuracy. This result suggests that guess-target congruence aids learning, and that the results of Experiment 1 and 2 were not due to pre-existing differences in the characteristics of dominant and subordinate targets.

Memory updating after retrieval: when new information is false or correct

We conducted three experiments testing the malleability of memory in incorporating new information following retrieval. All experiments used associative lists typical of the DRM paradigm [Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(1), 17-22; Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(4), 803-814]. This paradigm enabled the evaluation of the integration of false information and correct information with the original information. In Experiment 1, participants studied DRM lists, and in a later phase either retrieved or restudied the lists and were presented with never-presented critical lures. The results of Experiment 1 showed that compared to restudy, retrieval enhanced the integration of subsequent false information, as measured by later recall in a follow-up test. In Experiments 2 and 3, after initial study, participants retrieved or studied incorrect information and received corrective feedback. The results showed that retrieval led to more error correction than restudy, when feedback was presented immediately. In general, this research suggests retrieval facilitates incorporation of new, related information, regardless of whether it is false or correct.

Epistemic Curiosity and the Region of Proximal Learning

We propose a framework for understanding epistemic curiosity as a metacognitive feeling state that is related to the individual's Region of Proximal Learning (RPL), an adaptive mental space where we feel we are on the verge of knowing or understanding. First, we review several historical views, contrasting the RPL perspective with alternative views of curiosity. Second, we detail the processes, conditions, and outcomes within the RPL framework which are proposed to be related to curiosity. Finally, we review several lines of evidence relevant to the relation between RPL and curiosity. These include (1) differences in the conditions under which experts and novices mind wander, (2) experiments investigating people's choices of whether to study materials for which they have high versus low feelings of knowing, (3) results related to people's engagement with corrections to errors made with high confidence, and (4) curiosity, attention, and learning data related to the tip-of-the-tongue state.

Cheaters claim they knew the answers all along

Cheating has become commonplace in academia and beyond. Yet, almost everyone views themselves favorably, believing that they are honest, trustworthy, and of high integrity. We investigate one possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy between people's actions and their favorable self-concepts: People who cheat on tests believe that they knew the answers all along. We found consistent correlational evidence across three studies that, for those particular cases in which participants likely cheated, they were more likely to report that they knew the answers all along. Experimentally, we then found that participants were more likely to later claim that they knew the answers all along after having the opportunity to cheat to find the correct answers - relative to exposure to the correct answers without the opportunity to cheat. These findings provide new insights into relationships between memory, metacognition, and the self-concept.

Does evaluating belief prior to its retraction influence the efficacy of later corrections?

News stories unfold over time, with initial reports sometimes containing mistaken accounts of the newsworthy outcome that are ultimately revised or corrected. Because facts associated with newsworthy events are accumulated in this piecemeal fashion, readers often have repeated opportunities to reflect upon, discuss, and evaluate their belief in these accounts before they learn that initial news reports have been revised or retracted. The primary goal of the present study was to assess whether rating the strength of one's belief in the initially reported, mistaken cause might influence the efficacy of a later correction. In the current study, participants evaluated their belief in the target cause by either rating how much they believed it caused the outcome (Experiment 1) or rating the probability that the target caused the outcome (Experiment 2). The results showed that evaluating belief in a target cause prior to its retraction (relative to not doing so) rendered the correction more effective. This enhanced correction effect was not observed when participants generated the target information prior to its retraction (Experiment 3). Collectively, the results suggest that it is not how much people believe something, but whether they have thought about why they do or do not believe it, that affects their later willingness to revise their mistaken beliefs.

Reward Prediction Error and Declarative Memory

Learning based on reward prediction error (RPE) was originally proposed in the context of nondeclarative memory. We postulate that RPE may support declarative memory as well. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a number of independent empirical studies reporting effects of RPE on declarative memory. We provide a brief overview of these studies, identify emerging patterns, and discuss open issues such as the role of signed versus unsigned RPEs in declarative learning.

Learning from errors is attributable to episodic recollection rather than semantic mediation

Many recent studies have shown that memory for correct answers is enhanced when an error is committed and then corrected, as compared to when the correct answer is provided without intervening error commission. The fact that the kind of errors that produced such a benefit, in past research, were those that were semantically related to the correct answer suggested that the effect may occur because the error provides a semantic stepping stone to the correct answer: the Semantic Mediation hypothesis. This hypothesis seems at odds with the finding that amnesicsgenerate answers, again including those studied by Tulving and his colleagues-who purportedly have spared semantic/implicit memory-experience enormous difficulties when they commit errors. Accordingly, the present experiments investigated whether the error-generation benefit seen in typicals was attributable Semantic Mediation or to Episodic Recollection. In Experiment 1, we used polysemous materials to create Congruent (e.g., wrist-palm) and Incongruent (e.g., tree-palm) cues for target words (e.g., HAND). In the Congruent condition, participants generated errors that were semantically related to the target (e.g., finger), and which could have provided a semantic mediator. In the Incongruent condition they generated errors that were unrelated to the target (e.g., coconut), and which, therefore, should not have provided a semantic mediator. The Congruent and Incongruent conditions both produced an error-generation benefit-contradicting the Semantic Mediation hypothesis. Experiment 2 showed that the error-generation benefit only occurred when the original error was also recollected on the final memory test. Indeed, in the Incongruent condition, when the error was not, itself, recalled, error generation resulted in a deficit in memory for the correct response. These results point to episodic/explicit, rather than semantic/implicit memory, as the locus of the 'learning from errors' benefits.

Formative assessments using text messages to develop students’ ability to provide causal reasoning in general chemistry

Formative assessment is critical in providing students the opportunity to self-assess their content knowledge and providing data to inform instructional decisions. It also provides students with information about course expectations. If, as called for in numerous science instruction reform efforts, we expect students to be able to apply their chemistry knowledge to analyze data and construct coherent explanations, then not only must summative assessments include items that require this of students, but students must also be provided with frequent and ongoing opportunities to individually practice this difficult task and receive feedback. Although online homework systems can be quite effective at providing students with feedback regarding their mastery of basic skills, it is typically less useful in providing meaningful feedback on constructed student explanations. This study examined the impact of providing students with frequent out-of-class formative assessment activities initiated by text messages. Student responses were then used to facilitate in-class instruction. Increased student participation in these formative assessment tasks correlated positively with success on exams even after accounting for student prior knowledge. There was also evidence that students increased their ability to construct complete explanation over the course of the semester. All results were consistent across two different institutions and three instructors.

"A" for Effort: Rewarding Effortful Retrieval Attempts Improves Learning From General Knowledge Errors in Women

Previous research has shown that the prospect of attaining a reward can promote task-engagement, up-regulate attention toward reward-relevant information, and facilitate enhanced encoding of new information into declarative memory. However, past research on reward-based enhancement of declarative memory has focused primarily on paradigms in which rewards are contingent upon accurate responses. Yet, findings from test-enhanced learning show that making errors can also be useful for learning if those errors represent effortful retrieval attempts and are followed by corrective feedback. Here, we used a challenging general knowledge task to examine the effects of explicitly rewarding retrieval effort, defined as a semantically plausible answer to a question (referenced to a semantic knowledge database www.mangelslab.org/bknorms), regardless of response accuracy. In particular, we asked whether intermittent rewards following effortful incorrect responses facilitated learning from corrective feedback as measured by incidental learning outcomes on a 24-48 h delayed retest. Given that effort-contingent extrinsic rewards represent the intersection between an internal locus of control and competency, we compared participants in this "Effort" group to three other groups in a between-subjects design: a Luck group that framed rewards as related to participant-chosen lottery numbers (reward with internal control, not competence-based), a random Award group that framed rewards as computer generated (no control, not competence-based), and a Control group with no reward, but matched on all other task features. Both men and women in the Effort group showed increased self-reports of concentration and positive feelings following the receipt of rewards, as well as subjective effort on the retest, compared to the Control group. However, only women additionally exhibited performance benefits of effort framing on error correction. These benefits were found for both rewarded and non-rewarded trials, but only for correction of low confidence errors, suggesting that effort-contingent rewards produced task-level changes in motivation to learn less familiar information in women, rather than trial-level influences in encoding or consolidation. The Luck and Award groups did not demonstrate significant motivational or behavioral benefits for either gender. These results suggest that both reward context and gender are important factors contributing to the effectiveness of rewards as tools to enhance learning from errors.

Memory and truth: correcting errors with true feedback versus overwriting correct answers with errors

In five experiments, we examined the conditions under which participants remembered true and false information given as feedback. Participants answered general information questions, expressed their confidence in the correctness of their answers, and were given true or false feedback. In all five experiments, participants hypercorrected when they had made a mistake; that is, they remembered better the correct feedback to errors made with high compared to low confidence. However, in none of the experiments did participants hyper'correct' when false feedback followed an initially correct response. Telling people whether the feedback was right or wrong made little difference, suggesting that people already knew whether the feedback was true or false and differentially encoded the true feedback compared to the false feedback. An exception occurred when false feedback followed an error: participants hyper'corrected' to this false feedback, suggesting that when people are wrong initially, they are susceptible to further incorrect information. These results indicate that people have some kind of privileged access to whether their answers are right or wrong, above and beyond their confidence ratings, and that they behave differently when trying to remember new “corrective” information depending upon whether they, themselves, were right or wrong initially. The likely source of this additional information is knowledge about the truth of the feedback, which they rapidly process and use to modulate memory encoding.

Developing an assessment of epistemic trust: a research protocol

Epistemic trust (ET) describes the willingness to accept new information from another person as trustworthy, generalizable, and relevant. It has been recently proposed that a pervasive failure to establish epistemic trust may underpin personality disorders. Although the introduction of the concept of ET has been inspiring to clinicians and is already impacting the field, the idea that there may be individual differences in ET has yet to be operationalized and tested empirically. This report illustrates the development of an Epistemic trust assessment and describes the protocol for its validation. The sample will include 60 university students. The Trier Social Stress Test for Groups will be administered to induce a state of uncertainty and stress, thereby increasing the relevance of information for the participants. The experiment will entail asking information from the participants about their performance and internal states during a simulated employment interview, and then tracking how participants are able to revise their own judgments about themselves in light of the feedback coming from an expert committee. To control for social desirability and personality disorder traits, the short scale for social desirability (Kurzskala Soziale Erwunschtheit-Gamma) and the Inventory of Personality Organization are utilized. After the procedure, the participants will complete an app-based Epistemic trust questionnaire (ETQ) app. Confirmatory Factor Analysis will be utilized to investigate the structure and dimensionality of the ETQ, and ANOVAs will be used to investigate mean differences within and between persons for ET scores by item category. This study operationalizes a newly developed ET paradigm and provides a framework for the investigation of the theoretical assumptions about the connection of ET and personality functioning.

Hypercorrection of high-confidence errors in the classroom

People often have erroneous knowledge about the world that is firmly entrenched in memory and endorsed with high confidence. Although strong errors in memory would seem difficult to "un-learn," evidence suggests that errors are more likely to be corrected through feedback when they are originally endorsed with high confidence compared to low confidence. This hypercorrection effect has been predominantly studied in laboratory settings with general knowledge (i.e., trivia) questions, however, and has not been systematically explored in authentic classroom contexts. In the current study, college students in an introductory horticulture class answered questions about the course content, rated their confidence in their answers, received feedback of the correct answers, and then later completed a posttest. Results revealed a significant hypercorrection effect, along with a tendency for students with higher prior knowledge of the material to express higher confidence in, and in turn more effective correction of, their error responses.

Signed reward prediction errors drive declarative learning

Reward prediction errors (RPEs) are thought to drive learning. This has been established in procedural learning (e.g., classical and operant conditioning). However, empirical evidence on whether RPEs drive declarative learning-a quintessentially human form of learning-remains surprisingly absent. We therefore coupled RPEs to the acquisition of Dutch-Swahili word pairs in a declarative learning paradigm. Signed RPEs (SRPEs; "better-than-expected" signals) during declarative learning improved recognition in a follow-up test, with increasingly positive RPEs leading to better recognition. In addition, classic declarative memory mechanisms such as time-on-task failed to explain recognition performance. The beneficial effect of SRPEs on recognition was subsequently affirmed in a replication study with visual stimuli.

Beyond hypercorrection: remembering corrective feedback for low-confidence errors

Correcting errors based on corrective feedback is essential to successful learning. Previous studies have found that corrections to high-confidence errors are better remembered than low-confidence errors (the hypercorrection effect). The aim of this study was to investigate whether corrections to low-confidence errors can also be successfully retained in some cases. Participants completed an initial multiple-choice test consisting of control, trick and easy general-knowledge questions, rated their confidence after answering each question, and then received immediate corrective feedback. After a short delay, they were given a cued-recall test consisting of the same questions. In two experiments, we found high-confidence errors to control questions were better corrected on the second test compared to low-confidence errors - the typical hypercorrection effect. However, low-confidence errors to trick questions were just as likely to be corrected as high-confidence errors. Most surprisingly, we found that memory for the feedback and original responses, not confidence or surprise, were significant predictors of error correction. We conclude that for some types of material, there is an effortful process of elaboration and problem solving prior to making low-confidence errors that facilitates memory of corrective feedback.

Metacognitive monitoring and the hypercorrection effect in autism and the general population: Relation to autism(-like) traits and mindreading

Among neurotypical adults, errors made with high confidence (i.e. errors a person strongly believed they would not make) are corrected more reliably than errors made with low confidence. This 'hypercorrection effect' is thought to result from enhanced attention to information that reflects a 'metacognitive mismatch' between one's beliefs and reality. In Experiment 1, we employed a standard measure of this effect. Participants answered general knowledge questions and provided confidence judgements about how likely each answer was to be correct, after which feedback was given. Finally, participants were retested on all questions answered incorrectly during the initial phase. Mindreading ability and autism spectrum disorder-like traits were measured. We found that a representative sample of ( n = 83) neurotypical participants made accurate confidence judgements (reflecting good metacognition) and showed the hypercorrection effect. Mindreading ability was associated with autism spectrum disorder-like traits and metacognition. However, the hypercorrection effect was non-significantly associated with mindreading or autism spectrum disorder-like traits. In Experiment 2, 11 children with autism spectrum disorder and 11 matched comparison participants completed the hypercorrection task. Although autism spectrum disorder children showed significantly diminished metacognitive ability, they showed an undiminished hypercorrection effect. The evidence in favour of an undiminished hypercorrection effect (null result) was moderate, according to Bayesian analysis (Bayes factor = 0.21).

Learning from Errors

Although error avoidance during learning appears to be the rule in American classrooms, laboratory studies suggest that it may be a counterproductive strategy, at least for neurologically typical students. Experimental investigations indicate that errorful learning followed by corrective feedback is beneficial to learning. Interestingly, the beneficial effects are particularly salient when individuals strongly believe that their error is correct: Errors committed with high confidence are corrected more readily than low-confidence errors. Corrective feedback, including analysis of the reasoning leading up to the mistake, is crucial. Aside from the direct benefit to learners, teachers gain valuable information from errors, and error tolerance encourages students' active, exploratory, generative engagement. If the goal is optimal performance in high-stakes situations, it may be worthwhile to allow and even encourage students to commit and correct errors while they are in low-stakes learning situations rather than to assiduously avoid errors at all costs.

Does naming accuracy improve through self-monitoring of errors?

This study examined spontaneous self-monitoring of picture naming in people with aphasia. Of primary interest was whether spontaneous detection or repair of an error constitutes an error signal or other feedback that tunes the production system to the desired outcome. In other words, do acts of monitoring cause adaptive change in the language system? A second possibility, not incompatible with the first, is that monitoring is indicative of an item's representational strength, and strength is a causal factor in language change. Twelve PWA performed a 615-item naming test twice, in separate sessions, without extrinsic feedback. At each timepoint, we scored the first complete response for accuracy and error type and the remainder of the trial for verbalizations consistent with detection (e.g., "no, not that") and successful repair (i.e., correction). Data analysis centered on: (a) how often an item that was misnamed at one timepoint changed to correct at the other timepoint, as a function of monitoring; and (b) how monitoring impacted change scores in the Forward (Time 1 to Time 2) compared to Backward (Time 2 to Time 1) direction. The Strength hypothesis predicts significant effects of monitoring in both directions. The Learning hypothesis predicts greater effects in the Forward direction. These predictions were evaluated for three types of errors--Semantic errors, Phonological errors, and Fragments--using mixed-effects regression modeling with crossed random effects. Support for the Strength hypothesis was found for all three error types. Support for the Learning hypothesis was found for Semantic errors. All effects were due to error repair, not error detection. We discuss the theoretical and clinical implications of these novel findings.

On Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks

Although older adults rarely outperform young adults on learning tasks, in the study reported here they surpassed their younger counterparts not only by answering more semantic-memory general-information questions correctly, but also by better correcting their mistakes. While both young and older adults exhibited a hypercorrection effect, correcting their high-confidence errors more than their low-confidence errors, the effect was larger for young adults. Whereas older adults corrected high-confidence errors to the same extent as did young adults, they outdid the young in also correcting their low-confidence errors. Their event-related potentials point to an attentional explanation: Both groups showed a strong attention-related P3a in conjunction with high-confidence-error feedback, but the older adults also showed strong P3as to low-confidence-error feedback. Indeed, the older adults were able to rally their attentional resources to learn the true answers regardless of their original confidence in the errors and regardless of their familiarity with the answers.

Hypercorrection of High Confidence Errors in Lexical Representations

Memory errors associated with higher confidence are more likely to be corrected than errors made with lower confidence, a phenomenon called the hypercorrection effect. This study investigated whether the hypercorrection effect occurs with phonological information of lexical representations. In Experiment 1, 15 participants performed a Japanese Kanji word-reading task, in which the words had several possible pronunciations. In the initial task, participants were required to read aloud each word and indicate their confidence in their response; this was followed by receipt of visual feedback of the correct response. A hypercorrection effect was observed, indicating generality of this effect beyond previous observations in memories based upon semantic or episodic representations. This effect was replicated in Experiment 2, in which 40 participants performed the same task as in Experiment 1. When the participant's ratings of the practical value of the words were controlled, a partial correlation between confidence and likelihood of later correcting the initial mistaken response was reduced. This suggests that the hypercorrection effect may be partially caused by an individual's recognition of the practical value of reading the words correctly.

The hypercorrection effect in younger and older adults

ABSTRACT The hypercorrection effect, which refers to the finding that errors committed with high confidence are more likely to be corrected than are low confidence errors, has been replicated many times, and with both young adults and children. In the present study, we contrasted older with younger adults. Participants answered general-information questions, made confidence ratings about their answers, were given corrective feedback, and then were retested on questions that they had gotten wrong. While younger adults showed the hypercorrection effect, older adults, despite higher overall accuracy on the general-information questions and excellent basic metacognitive ability, showed a diminished hypercorrection effect. Indeed, the correspondence between their confidence in their errors and the probability of correction was not significantly greater than zero, showing, for the first time, that a particular participant population is selectively impaired on this error correction task. These results potentially offer leverage both on the mechanisms underlying the hypercorrection effect and on reasons for older adults' memory impairments, as well as on memory functions that are spared.

Self-regulated learning: beliefs, techniques, and illusions

Knowing how to manage one's own learning has become increasingly important in recent years, as both the need and the opportunities for individuals to learn on their own outside of formal classroom settings have grown. During that same period, however, research on learning, memory, and metacognitive processes has provided evidence that people often have a faulty mental model of how they learn and remember, making them prone to both misassessing and mismanaging their own learning. After a discussion of what learners need to understand in order to become effective stewards of their own learning, we first review research on what people believe about how they learn and then review research on how people's ongoing assessments of their own learning are influenced by current performance and the subjective sense of fluency. We conclude with a discussion of societal assumptions and attitudes that can be counterproductive in terms of individuals becoming maximally effective learners.

Neural correlates of people's hypercorrection of their false beliefs

Despite the intuition that strongly held beliefs are particularly difficult to change, the data on error correction indicate that general information errors that people commit with a high degree of belief are especially easy to correct. This finding is called the hypercorrection effect. The hypothesis was tested that the reason for hypercorrection stems from enhanced attention and encoding that results from a metacognitive mismatch between the person's confidence in their responses and the true answer. This experiment, which is the first to use imaging to investigate the hypercorrection effect, provided support for this hypothesis, showing that both metacognitive mismatch conditions-that in which high confidence accompanies a wrong answer and that in which low confidence accompanies a correct answer-revealed anterior cingulate and medial frontal gyrus activations. Only in the high confidence error condition, however, was an error that conflicted with the true answer mentally present. And only the high confidence error condition yielded activations in the right TPJ and the right dorsolateral pFC. These activations suggested that, during the correction process after error commission, people (1) were entertaining both the false belief as well as the true belief (as in theory of mind tasks, which also manifest the right TPJ activation) and (2) may have been suppressing the unwanted, incorrect information that they had, themselves, produced (as in think/no-think tasks, which also manifest dorsolateral pFC activation). These error-specific processes as well as enhanced attention because of metacognitive mismatch appear to be implicated.