Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

What does preferential viewing tell us about the neurobiology of recognition memory?

The two tests most widely used in nonhuman primates to assess the neurobiology of recognition memory produce conflicting results. Preferential viewing tests (e.g., visual paired comparison) produce robust impairments following hippocampal lesions, whereas matching tests (e.g., delayed nonmatching-to-sample) often show complete sparing. Here, we review the data, the proposed explanations for this discrepancy, and then critically evaluate those explanations. The most likely explanation is that preferential viewing tests are not a process-pure assessment of recognition memory, but also test elements of novelty-seeking, habituation, and motivation. These confounds likely explain the conflicting results. Thus, we propose that memory researchers should prefer explicit matching tests and readers interested in the neural substrates of recognition memory should give explicit matching tests greater interpretive weight.

The attentional boost effect in free recall dynamics

With the attentional boost effect (ABE), responding to a briefly presented target in a detection task enhances the encoding of other items presented at the same time. However, the effects of target detection on context memory for the event in which the stimulus appeared remain unclear. Here, we present findings from verbal free recall and recognition experiments that test the effects of target detection during encoding on temporal and relational aspects of context memory. Consistent with prior demonstrations of limited effects of target detection on context memory, in Experiment 1 there was no evidence that target detection influenced the likelihood of transitioning to items that were presented at similar times during encoding, or that were in the same encoding condition. These null effects were replicated in a second experiment, which added an old/new recognition and relational memory test. These results indicate that target detection during encoding has minimal effects on the formation of temporal associations between words in memory.

The influence of the precuneus on the medial temporal cortex determines the subjective quality of memory during the retrieval of naturalistic episodes

Memory retrieval entails dynamic interactions between the medial temporal lobe and areas in the parietal and frontal cortices. Here, we tested the hypothesis that effective connectivity between the precuneus, in the medial parietal cortex, and the medial temporal cortex contributes to the subjective quality of remembering objects together with information about their rich spatio-temporal encoding context. During a 45 min encoding session, the participants were presented with pictures of objects while they actively explored a virtual town. The following day, under fMRI, participants were presented with images of objects and had to report whether: they recognized the object and could remember the place/time of encoding, the object was familiar only, or the object was new. The hippocampus/parahippocampus, the precuneus and the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex activated when the participants successfully recognized objects they had seen in the virtual town and reported that they could remember the place/time of these events. Analyses of effective connectivity showed that the influence exerted by the precuneus on the medial temporal cortex mediates this effect of episodic recollection. Our findings demonstrate the role of the inter-regional connectivity in mediating the subjective experience of remembering and underline the relevance of studying memory in contextually-rich conditions.

The amygdala is not necessary for the familiarity aspect of recognition memory

Dual-process accounts of item recognition posit two memory processes: slow but detailed recollection, and quick but vague familiarity. It has been proposed, based on prior rodent work, that the amygdala is critical for the familiarity aspect of item recognition. Here, we evaluated this proposal in male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) with selective bilateral excitotoxic amygdala damage. We used four established visual memory tests designed to assess different aspects of familiarity, all administered on touchscreen computers. Specifically, we assessed monkeys' tendencies to make low-latency false alarms, to make false alarms to recently seen lures, to produce curvilinear ROC curves, and to discriminate stimuli based on repetition across days. Three of the four tests showed no familiarity impairment and the fourth was explained by a deficit in reward processing. Consistent with this, amygdala damage did produce an anticipated deficit in reward processing in a three-arm-bandit gambling task, verifying the effectiveness of the lesions. Together, these results contradict prior rodent work and suggest that the amygdala is not critical for the familiarity aspect of item recognition.

Recognition, remember-know, and confidence judgments: no evidence of cross-contamination here!

ABSTRACTWe report three experiments designed to reveal the mechanisms that underlie subjective experiences of recognition by examining effects of how those experiences are measured. Prior research has explored the potential influences of collecting metacognitive measures on memory performance. Building on this work, here we systematically evaluated whether cross-measure contamination occurs when remember-know (RK) and/or confidence (C) judgments are made after old/new recognition decisions. In Experiment 1, making either RK or C judgments did not significantly influence recognition relative to a standard no-judgment condition. In Experiment 2, making RK judgments in addition to C judgments did not significantly affect recognition or confidence. In Experiment 3, making C judgments in addition to RK judgments did not significantly affect recognition or patterns of RK responses. Cross-contamination was not apparent regardless of whether items were studied using a shallow or deep levels-of-processing task - a manipulation that yielded robust effects on recognition, RK judgments, and C. Our results indicate that under some conditions, participants can independently evaluate their recognition, subjective recognition experience, and confidence. Though contamination across measures of metamemory and memory is always possible, it may not be inevitable. This has implications for the mechanisms that underlie subjective experiences that accompany recognition judgments.

Critical tests of the continuous dual-process model of recognition

Dual process recognition models assume recognition depends upon context recollection and/or item familiarity. While most assume recollection is more highly valued or weighted than familiarity during judgment, we tested a continuous dual process (CDP) model that instead assumes recollection and familiarity are equally weighted during recognition judgment. Experiments 1a and 1b used a joint rating scale in which each probe was rated for recollection and familiarity strength, which were then used to predict overall recognition confidence. In both, recollection dominated familiarity such that familiarity ratings were only predictive of confidence when recollection ratings were relatively weaker. In contrast, when recollection ratings were stronger, familiarity made no contribution to recognition confidence. Experiment 2 used a different, bifurcated rating scale previously demonstrating that strong ratings of familiarity can lead to better recognition yet worse contextual source memory than weak ratings of recollection. However, the current study failed to find this dissociation, instead demonstrating that weak recollection ratings were as or more accurate than the strongest familiarity ratings in both recognition and source memory. Replacing the CDP model equal weighting decision rule with one incorporating a strong relative preference for recollection over familiarity yielded simulation data more consistent with the empirical data and is more optimal if recollection is in fact more diagnostic of recognition than familiarity. Overall, these findings suggest that observers have a strong preference for relying on recollection over familiarity during recognition, presumably because it better situates the probe within a specific episode.

Developmental Differences in Subjective Recollection and Its Role in Decision Making

We examined how subjective assessments of recollection guide decision making. Subjective recollection was dissociated from accuracy during a forced-choice recognition task. Distracters were either similar to targets (match condition) or to other studied, but untested items (nonmatch condition). We assessed 223 participants (112 males) across three experiments (137 White, 37 Asian-American, 7 African-American, 4 American-Indian, 32 mixed race, 6 undisclosed). In Experiment 1, 6- to 10-year-olds and adults (N = 119) were less accurate (d = 0.70), but more likely to claim subjective recollection and make memory selections in anticipation of a reward in the nonmatch condition (ds = 0.64-0.70). This pattern was eliminated in 6- to 7-year-olds when we limited the number of selections (Experiment 2, N = 52), but was replicated when we required the selections to be counted (Experiment 3, N = 52), underscoring the effects of decision complexity on children's self-reflections.

Different definitions of the nonrecollection-based response option(s) change how people use the "remember" response in the remember/know paradigm

In the remember/know paradigm, a "know" response can be defined to participants as a high-confidence state of certainty or as a low-confidence state based on a feeling of familiarity. To examine the effects of definition on use of responses, in two experiments, definitions of "remember" and "guess" were kept constant, but definitions of "know" and/or "familiar" were systematically varied to emphasize (a) a subjective experience of high confidence without recollection, (b) a feeling of familiarity, (c) both of these subjective experiences combined within one response option, or (d) both of these experiences as separate response options. The confidence expressed in "know" and/or "familiar" definitions affected how participants used response options. Importantly, this included use of the "remember" response, which tended to be used more frequently when the nonrecollection-based middle response option emphasized a feeling of familiarity rather than an experience of "just knowing." The influence of the definitions on response patterns was greater for items that had undergone deep rather than shallow processing, and was greater when deep-encoded and shallow-encoded items were mixed, rather than blocked, at test. Our findings fit with previous research suggesting that the mnemonic traces underlying subjective judgments are continuous and that the remember/know paradigm is not a pure measure of underlying processes. Findings also emphasize the importance of researchers publishing the exact definitions they have used to enable accurate comparisons across studies.

Electrocortical indices of subjectively perceived confidence in episodic memory

Electrophysiological studies on recognition memory have identified several brain signals that are associated with subjective perceived confidence. However, the extent these brain signals reflect a generic process and are independent of the type of information recognized remains an open question. To address this issue, twenty-seven healthy volunteers performed an episodic memory task while their electro-encephalogram (EEG) was recorded. Participants encoded a set of abstract pictures, and subsequently rated their confidence on recognition decisions. Similar to results reported in previous studies using concrete words, we found retrieval-related theta power, FN400 and late positive component (LPC) effects. In contrast to previous studies using verbal material, a subsequent memory effect for encoding-related evoked theta power, sensitive to subjectively perceived memory confidence, was observed. Our findings suggest that brain signals that are associated with subjectively perceived confidence reflect specific encoding, but generic retrieval processes.

How do memory modules differentially contribute to familiarity and recollection?

We fully support dissociating the subjective experience from the memory contents in recognition memory, as Bastin et al. posit in the target article. However, having two generic memory modules with qualitatively different functions is not mandatory and is in fact inconsistent with experimental evidence. We propose that quantitative differences in the properties of the memory modules can account for the apparent dissociation of recollection and familiarity along anatomical lines.

Scale-invariant Characteristics of Forgetting: Toward a Unifying Account of Hippocampal Forgetting across Short and Long Timescales

After over 100 years of relative silence in the cognitive literature, recent advances in the study of the neural underpinnings of memory-specifically, the hippocampus-have led to a resurgence of interest in the topic of forgetting. This review draws a theoretically driven picture of the effects of time on forgetting of hippocampus-dependent memories. We review evidence indicating that time-dependent forgetting across short and long timescales is reflected in progressive degradation of hippocampal-dependent relational information. This evidence provides an important extension to a growing body of research accumulated in recent years, showing that-in contrast to the once prevailing view that the hippocampus is exclusively involved in memory and forgetting over long timescales-the role of the hippocampus also extends to memory and forgetting over short timescales. Thus, we maintain that similar rules govern not only remembering but also forgetting of hippocampus-dependent information over short and long timescales.

Effects of divided attention at encoding and retrieval: Further data

Division of attention (DA) at the time of learning has large detrimental effects on subsequent memory performance, but DA at retrieval has much smaller effects (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 518-540; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 159-180). Experiment 1 confirmed the relatively small effects of DA on retrieval and also showed that retrieval operations do consume processing resources. The experiment also found that the effect is not attributable to a trade-off in performance with the concurrent task or to recognition decisions made on the basis of familiarity judgments. Participants made levels-of-processing (LOP) judgments during encoding to check whether deeper semantic judgments were differentially vulnerable to the effects of DA. In fact DA did not interact with LOP. Experiment 2 explored reports that the comparatively slight effect of DA on recognition accuracy is accompanied by a compensatory increase in recognition latency (Baddeley et al., 1984). The experiment replicated findings that neither DA nor differential emphasis between recognition and a concurrent continuous reaction time (CRT) task affected recognition accuracy, but also found evidence for a lawful trade-off in decision latencies between recognition and CRT performance. Further analysis showed that the relationship between response rates on the two tasks was well described by a linear function, and that this function was demonstrated by the majority of individual participants. It is concluded that the small effect of DA on recognition performance is attributable to a trade-off within the recognition task itself; accuracy is maintained by a compensatory increase in decision latency.

Human aging reduces the neurobehavioral influence of motivation on episodic memory

The neural circuitry mediating the influence of motivation on long-term declarative or episodic memory formation is delineated in young adults, but its status is unknown in healthy aging. We examined the effect of reward and punishment anticipation on intentional declarative memory formation for words using an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) monetary incentive encoding task in twenty-one younger and nineteen older adults. At 24-hour memory retrieval testing, younger adults were significantly more likely to remember words associated with motivational cues than neutral cues. Motivational enhancement of memory in younger adults occurred only for recollection ("remember" responses) and not for familiarity ("familiar" responses). Older adults had overall diminished memory and did not show memory gains in association with motivational cues. Memory encoding associated with monetary rewards or punishments activated motivational (substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area) and memory-related (hippocampus) brain regions in younger, but not older, adults during the target word periods. In contrast, older and younger adults showed similar activation of these brain regions during the anticipatory motivational cue interval. In a separate monetary incentive delay task that did not require learning, we found evidence for relatively preserved striatal reward anticipation in older adults. This supports a potential dissociation between incidental and intentional motivational processes in healthy aging. The finding that motivation to obtain rewards and avoid punishments had reduced behavioral and neural influence on intentional episodic memory formation in older compared to younger adults is relevant to life-span theories of cognitive aging including the dopaminergic vulnerability hypothesis.

Evidence for a confidence–accuracy relationship in memory for same- and cross-race faces

Discrimination accuracy is usually higher for same- than for cross-race faces, a phenomenon known as the cross-race effect (CRE). According to prior research, the CRE occurs because memories for same- and cross-race faces rely on qualitatively different processes. However, according to a continuous dual-process model of recognition memory, memories that rely on qualitatively different processes do not differ in recognition accuracy when confidence is equated. Thus, although there are differences in overall same- and cross-race discrimination accuracy, confidence-specific accuracy (i.e., recognition accuracy at a particular level of confidence) may not differ. We analysed datasets from four recognition memory studies on same- and cross-race faces to test this hypothesis. Confidence ratings reliably predicted recognition accuracy when performance was above chance levels (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) but not when performance was at chance levels (Experiment 4). Furthermore, at each level of confidence, confidence-specific accuracy for same- and cross-race faces did not significantly differ when overall performance was above chance levels (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) but significantly differed when overall performance was at chance levels (Experiment 4). Thus, under certain conditions, high-confidence same-race and cross-race identifications may be equally reliable.

Independent contributions of fMRI familiarity and novelty effects to recognition memory and their stability across the adult lifespan

The impact of age on the neural correlates of familiarity-driven recognition memory has received relatively little attention. Here, the relationships between age, the neural correlates of familiarity, and memory performance were investigated using an associative recognition test in young, middle-aged and older participants. Test items comprised studied, rearranged (items studied on different trials) and new word pairs. fMRI 'familiarity effects' were operationalized as greater activity for studied test pairs incorrectly identified as 'rearranged' than for correctly rejected new pairs. The reverse contrast was employed to identify 'novelty' effects. Estimates of familiarity strength were slightly but significantly lower for the older relative to the younger group. With the exception of one region in dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, fMRI familiarity effects (which were identified in medial and lateral parietal cortex, dorsal medial and left lateral prefrontal cortex, and bilateral caudate among other regions) did not differ significantly with age. Age-invariant 'novelty effects' were identified in the anterior hippocampus and the perirhinal cortex. When entered into the same regression model, familiarity and novelty effects independently predicted familiarity strength across participants, suggesting that the two classes of memory effect reflect functionally distinct mnemonic processes. It is concluded that the neural correlates of familiarity-based memory judgments, and their relationship with familiarity strength, are largely stable across much of the healthy adult lifespan.

Decoding the content of recollection within the core recollection network and beyond

Recollection - retrieval of qualitative information about a past event - is associated with enhanced neural activity in a consistent set of neural regions (the 'core recollection network') seemingly regardless of the nature of the recollected content. Here, we employed multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to assess whether retrieval-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity in core recollection regions - including the hippocampus, angular gyrus, medial prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial/posterior cingulate cortex, and middle temporal gyrus - contain information about studied content and thus demonstrate retrieval-related 'reinstatement' effects. During study, participants viewed objects and concrete words that were subjected to different encoding tasks. Test items included studied words, the names of studied objects, or unstudied words. Participants judged whether the items were recollected, familiar, or new by making 'remember', 'know', and 'new' responses, respectively. The study history of remembered test items could be reliably decoded using MVPA in most regions, as well as from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region where univariate recollection effects could not be detected. The findings add to evidence that members of the core recollection network, as well as at least one neural region where mean signal is insensitive to recollection success, carry information about recollected content. Importantly, the study history of recognized items endorsed with a 'know' response could be decoded with equal accuracy. The results thus demonstrate a striking dissociation between mean signal and multi-voxel indices of recollection. Moreover, they converge with prior findings in suggesting that, as it is operationalized by classification-based MVPA, reinstatement is not uniquely a signature of recollection.

Looking for graded recollection: manipulating the number of details to be recollected does not affect recollection variance

Recollection has been the subject of much debate, with some models maintaining that it is subject to a threshold, some maintaining that it is a continuous process, and some maintaining that both are true. Threshold models maintain that recollection can fail (i.e., fall below threshold), whereas signal detection models treat recollection as a continuous process. Recent research has revealed that some manipulations can influence this behavior, but the general reasons why threshold patterns emerge in some conditions and graded patterns emerge in others are still unclear. One potential explanation is the number of retrieved details; recollection of stimuli with few details may succeed or fail, whereas recollection of stimuli with many details may be graded. If this is true, manipulating the amount of detail should produce threshold patterns for "few details" conditions, but more graded patterns for "many details" conditions. This hypothesis was tested in six experiments examining source memory, and the number-of-details manipulation consistently failed to affect the nature of recollection. Overall, the results suggest that the amount of information available to be retrieved does not, by itself, explain recollection variability.

Forget all that nonsense: The role of meaning during the forgetting of recollective and familiarity-based memories

Memory can be divided into recollection and familiarity. Recollection is characterized as the ability to vividly re-experience past events, and is believed to be supported by the hippocampus, whereas familiarity is defined as an undifferentiated feeling of knowing or acquaintance, and is believed to be supported by extra-hippocampal regions, such as the perirhinal cortex. Recent evidence suggests that the neural architectures of the hippocampus and neocortex lead information in these regions being susceptible to different forgetting processes. We expand on these accounts and propose that the neocortex may be sensitive to the semantic content of a trace, with more meaningful traces being more easily retained. The hippocampus, in contrast, is not hypothesized to be influenced by semantics in the same way. To test this new account, we use a continuous-recognition paradigm to examine the forgetting rates words and nonwords that are either recollected or familiar. We find that words and nonwords that are recollected are equally likely to be forgotten over time. However, nonwords that are familiar are more likely to be forgotten over time than are words that are familiar. Our results support recent neuropsychologically-based forgetting theories of recollection and familiarity and provide new insight into how and why representations are forgotten over time.

Dissociable behavioural outcomes of visual statistical learning

Statistical learning refers to the extraction of probabilistic relationships between stimuli and is increasingly used as a method to understand learning processes. However, numerous cognitive processes are sensitive to the statistical relationships between stimuli and any one measure of learning may conflate these processes; to date little research has focused on differentiating these processes. To understand how multiple processes underlie statistical learning, here we compared, within the same study, operational measures of learning from different tasks that may be differentially sensitive to these processes. In Experiment 1, participants were visually exposed to temporal regularities embedded in a stream of shapes. Their task was to periodically detect whether a shape, whose contrast was staircased to a threshold level, was present or absent. Afterwards, they completed a search task, where statistically predictable shapes were found more quickly. We used the search task to label shape pairs as "learned" or "non-learned", and then used these labels to analyse the detection task. We found a dissociation between learning on the search task and the detection task where only non-learned pairs showed learning effects in the detection task. This finding was replicated in further experiments with recognition memory (Experiment 2) and associative learning tasks (Experiment 3). Taken together, these findings are consistent with the view that statistical learning may comprise a family of processes that can produce dissociable effects on different aspects of behaviour.

The representational consequences of intentional forgetting: Impairments to both the probability and fidelity of long-term memory

We investigated whether intentional forgetting impacts only the likelihood of later retrieval from long-term memory or whether it also impacts the fidelity of those representations that are successfully retrieved. We accomplished this by combining an item-method directed forgetting task with a testing procedure and modeling approach inspired by the delayed-estimation paradigm used in the study of visual short-term memory (STM). Abstract or concrete colored images were each followed by a remember (R) or forget (F) instruction and sometimes by a visual probe requiring a speeded detection response (E1-E3). Memory was tested using an old-new (E1-E2) or remember-know-no (E3) recognition task followed by a continuous color judgment task (E2-E3); a final experiment included only the color judgment task (E4). Replicating the existing literature, more "old" or "remember" responses were made to R than F items and RTs to postinstruction visual probes were longer following F than R instructions. Color judgments were more accurate for successfully recognized or recollected R than F items (E2-E3); a mixture model confirmed a decrease to both the probability of retrieving the F items as well as the fidelity of the representation of those F items that were retrieved (E4). We conclude that intentional forgetting is an effortful process that not only reduces the likelihood of successfully encoding an item for later retrieval, but also produces an impoverished memory trace even when those items are retrieved; these findings draw a parallel between the control of memory representations within working and long-term memory.

"What-Where-Which" Episodic Retrieval Requires Conscious Recollection and Is Promoted by Semantic Knowledge

Episodic memory is defined as the conscious retrieval of specific past events. Whether accurate episodic retrieval requires a recollective experience or if a feeling of knowing is sufficient remains unresolved. We recently devised an ecological approach to investigate the controlled cued-retrieval of episodes composed of unnamable odors (What) located spatially (Where) within a visual context (Which context). By combining the Remember/Know procedure with our laboratory-ecological approach in an original way, the present study demonstrated that the accurate odor-evoked retrieval of complex and multimodal episodes overwhelmingly required conscious recollection. A feeling of knowing, even when associated with a high level of confidence, was not sufficient to generate accurate episodic retrieval. Interestingly, we demonstrated that the recollection of accurate episodic memories was promoted by odor retrieval-cue familiarity and describability. In conclusion, our study suggested that semantic knowledge about retrieval-cues increased the recollection which is the state of awareness required for the accurate retrieval of complex episodic memories.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events

An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.

Examining the causes of memory strength variability: recollection, attention failure, or encoding variability?

A prominent finding in recognition memory is that studied items are associated with more variability in memory strength than new items. Here, we test 3 competing theories for why this occurs-the encoding variability, attention failure, and recollection accounts. Distinguishing among these theories is critical because each provides a fundamentally different account of the processes underlying recognition memory. The encoding variability and attention failure accounts propose that old item variance will be unaffected by retrieval manipulations because the processes producing this effect are ascribed to encoding. The recollection account predicts that both encoding and retrieval manipulations that preferentially affect recollection will affect memory variability. These contrasting predictions were tested by examining the effect of response speeding (Experiment 1), dividing attention at retrieval (Experiment 2), context reinstatement (Experiment 3), and increased test delay (Experiment 4) on recognition performance. The results of all 4 experiments confirm the predictions of the recollection account and are inconsistent with the encoding variability account. The evidence supporting the attention failure account is mixed, with 2 of the 4 experiments confirming the account and 2 disconfirming the account. These results indicate that encoding variability and attention failure are insufficient accounts of memory variance and provide support for the recollection account. Several alternative theoretical accounts of the results are also considered.

A novel approach to an old problem: analysis of systematic errors in two models of recognition memory

For more than a decade, the high threshold dual process (HTDP) model has served as a guide for studying the functional neuroanatomy of recognition memory. The HTDP model's utility has been that it provides quantitative estimates of recollection and familiarity, two processes thought to support recognition ability. Important support for the model has been the observation that it fits experimental data well. The continuous dual process (CDP) model also fits experimental data well. However, this model does not provide quantitative estimates of recollection and familiarity, making it less immediately useful for illuminating the functional neuroanatomy of recognition memory. These two models are incompatible and cannot both be correct, and an alternative method of model comparison is needed. We tested for systematic errors in each model's ability to fit recognition memory data from four independent data sets from three different laboratories. Across participants and across data sets, the HTDP model (but not the CDP model) exhibited systematic error. In addition, the pattern of errors exhibited by the HTDP model was predicted by the CDP model. We conclude that the CDP model provides a better account of recognition memory than the HTDP model.

Relating the content and confidence of recognition judgments

The Remember/Know procedure, developed by Tulving (1985) to capture the distinction between the conscious correlates of episodic and semantic retrieval, has spawned considerable research and debate. However, only a handful of reports have examined the recognition content beyond this dichotomous simplification. To address this, we collected participants' written justifications in support of ordinary old/new recognition decisions accompanied by confidence ratings using a 3-point scale (high/medium/low). Unlike prior research, we did not provide the participants with any descriptions of Remembering or Knowing and thus, if the justifications mapped well onto theory, they would do so spontaneously. Word frequency analysis (unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams), independent ratings, and machine learning techniques (Support Vector Machine [SVM]) converged in demonstrating that the linguistic content of high and medium confidence recognition differs in a manner consistent with dual process theories of recognition. For example, the use of "I remember," particularly when combined with temporal or perceptual information (e.g., "when," "saw," "distinctly"), was heavily associated with high confidence recognition. Conversely, participants also used the absence of remembering for personally distinctive materials as support for high confidence new reports ("would have remembered"). Thus, participants afford a special status to the presence or absence of remembering and use this actively as a basis for high confidence during recognition judgments. Additionally, the pattern of classification successes and failures of a SVM was well anticipated by the dual process signal detection model of recognition and inconsistent with a single process, strictly unidimensional approach.

Recognition errors suggest fast familiarity and slow recollection in rhesus monkeys

One influential model of recognition posits two underlying memory processes: recollection, which is detailed but relatively slow, and familiarity, which is quick but lacks detail. Most of the evidence for this dual-process model in nonhumans has come from analyses of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves in rats, but whether ROC analyses can demonstrate dual processes has been repeatedly challenged. Here, we present independent converging evidence for the dual-process model from analyses of recognition errors made by rhesus monkeys. Recognition choices were made in three different ways depending on processing duration. Short-latency errors were disproportionately false alarms to familiar lures, suggesting control by familiarity. Medium-latency responses were less likely to be false alarms and were more accurate, suggesting onset of a recollective process that could correctly reject familiar lures. Long-latency responses were guesses. A response deadline increased false alarms, suggesting that limiting processing time weakened the contribution of recollection and strengthened the contribution of familiarity. Together, these findings suggest fast familiarity and slow recollection in monkeys, that monkeys use a “recollect to reject” strategy to countermand false familiarity, and that primate recognition performance is well-characterized by a dual-process model consisting of recollection and familiarity.

Recollection, familiarity, and content-sensitivity in lateral parietal cortex: a high-resolution fMRI study

Numerous studies have identified brain regions where activity is consistently correlated with the retrieval (recollection) of qualitative episodic information. This 'core recollection network' can be contrasted with regions where activity differs according to the contents of retrieval. The present study used high-resolution fMRI to investigate whether these putatively-distinct retrieval processes engage common versus dissociable regions. Subjects studied words with two encoding tasks and then performed a memory test in which they distinguished between recollection and different levels of recognition confidence. The fMRI data from study and test revealed several overlapping regions where activity differed according to encoding task, suggesting that content was selectively reinstated during retrieval. The majority of recollection-related regions, though, did not exhibit reinstatement effects, providing support for a core recollection network. Importantly, lateral parietal cortex demonstrated a clear dissociation, whereby recollection effects were localized to angular gyrus and confidence effects were restricted to intraparietal sulcus. Moreover, the latter region exhibited a non-monotonic pattern, consistent with a neural signal reflecting item familiarity rather than a generic form of memory strength. Together, the findings show that episodic retrieval relies on both content-sensitive and core recollective processes, and these can be differentiated from familiarity-based recognition memory.

Rethinking Familiarity: Remember/Know Judgments in Free Recall

Although frequently used with recognition, a few studies have used the Remember/Know procedure with free recall. In each case, participants gave Know judgments to a significant number of recalled items (items that were presumably not remembered on the basis of familiarity). What do these Know judgments mean? We investigated this issue using a source memory/free-recall procedure. For each word that was recalled, participants were asked to (a) make a confidence rating on a 5-point scale, (b) make a Remember/Know judgment, and (c) recollect a source detail. The large majority of both Remember judgments and Know judgments were made with high confidence and high accuracy, but source memory was nevertheless higher for Remember judgments than for Know judgments. These source memory results correspond to what is found using recognition, and they raise the possibility that Know judgments in free recall identify the cue-dependent retrieval of item-only information from an episodic memory search set. In agreement with this idea, we also found that the temporal dynamics of free recall were similar for high-confidence Remember and high-confidence Know judgments (as if both judgments reflected retrieval from the same search set). If Know judgments in free recall do in fact reflect the episodic retrieval of item-only information, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same might be true of high-confidence Know judgments in recognition. If so, then a longstanding debate about the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity may have a natural resolution.

Verbal description benefits for faces when description conditions are unknown a priori

Some prior research has shown a benefit for describing nonverbal study stimuli, particularly faces, on a later recognition test relative to a control (no description) condition. In such studies, participants have known a priori whether a stimulus will need to be described, meaning that encoding differences other than the description could account for the effect. In Experiment 1, a description benefit was obtained for faces that could not be attributed to encoding differences. A direct manipulation of description duration, thus allowing more time to produce descriptors, did not influence the description effect. In Experiment 2, visual rehearsal instructions (without any verbal descriptions) failed to produce a rehearsal benefit. The experiments provide direct evidence against an account where the description or rehearsal enhances the featural information of nonverbal representations. For the present results, a benefit stemming from the encoding and retrieval of descriptors appears to be an attractive theoretical alternative over one that posits an enhancement or alteration of featural or holistic information.

An fMRI investigation of posttraumatic flashbacks

Flashbacks are a defining feature of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but there have been few studies of their neural basis. We tested predictions from a dual representation model of PTSD that, compared with ordinary episodic memories of the same traumatic event, flashbacks would be associated with activity in dorsal visual stream and related areas rather than in the medial temporal lobe. Participants with PTSD, with depression but not PTSD, and healthy controls were scanned during a recognition task with personally relevant stimuli. The contrast of flashbacks versus ordinary episodic trauma memories in PTSD was associated with increased activation in sensory and motor areas including the insula, precentral gyrus, supplementary motor area, and mid-occipital cortex. The same contrast was associated with decreased activation in the midbrain, parahippocampal gyrus, and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex. The results were discussed in terms of theories of PTSD and dual-process models of recognition.

Item memory, context memory and the hippocampus: fMRI evidence

Dual-process models of recognition memory distinguish between the retrieval of qualitative information about a prior event (recollection), and judgments of prior occurrence based on an acontextual sense of familiarity. fMRI studies investigating the neural correlates of memory encoding and retrieval conducted within the dual-process framework have frequently reported findings consistent with the view that the hippocampus selectively supports recollection, and has little or no role in familiarity-based recognition. An alternative interpretation of these findings has been proposed, however, in which it is argued that the hippocampus supports the encoding and retrieval of 'strong' memories, regardless of whether the memories are recollection- or familiarity-based. Here, we describe the findings of eight fMRI studies from our laboratory: one study of source memory encoding, four studies of the retrieval of contextual information, and three studies of continuous recognition. Together, the findings support the proposal that hippocampal activity co-varies with the amount of contextual information about a study episode that is encoded or retrieved, and not with the strength of an undifferentiated memory signal.

Measuring recollection and familiarity: Improving the remember/know procedure

The remember/know (RK) procedure is the most widely used method to investigate recollection and familiarity. It uses trial-by-trial reports to determine how much recollection and familiarity contribute to different kinds of recognition. Few other methods provide information about individual memory judgements and no alternative allows such direct indications of recollection and familiarity influences. Here we review how the RK procedure has been and should be used to help resolve theoretical disagreements about the processing and neural bases of components of recognition memory. Emphasis is placed on procedural weaknesses and a possible confound of recollection and familiarity with recognition memory strength. Recommendations are made about how to minimise these problems including using modified versions of the procedure. The proposals here are important for improving behavioural and lesion research, and vital for brain imaging work.

Development of Dual-Retrieval Processes in Recall: Learning, Forgetting, and Reminiscence

We investigated the development of dual-retrieval processes with a low-burden paradigm that is suitable for research with children and neurocognitively impaired populations (e.g., older adults with mild cognitive impairment or dementia). Rich quantitative information can be obtained about recollection, reconstruction, and familiarity judgment by defining a Markov model over simple recall tasks like those that are used in clinical neuropsychology batteries. The model measures these processes separately for learning, forgetting, and reminiscence. We implemented this procedure in some developmental experiments, whose aims were (a) to measure age changes in recollective and nonrecollective retrieval during learning, forgetting, and reminiscence and (b) to measure age changes in content dimensions (e.g., taxonomic relatedness) that affect the two forms of retrieval. The model provided excellent fits in all three domains. Concerning (a), recollection, reconstruction, and familiarity judgment all improved during the child-to-adolescent age range in the learning domain, whereas only recollection improved in the forgetting domain, and the processes were age-invariant in the reminiscence domain. Concerning (b), although some elements of the adult pattern of taxonomic relatedness effects were detected by early adolescence, the adult pattern differs qualitatively from corresponding patterns in children and adolescents.

The hippocampus supports both recollection and familiarity when memories are strong

Recognition memory is thought to consist of two component processes--recollection and familiarity. It has been suggested that the hippocampus supports recollection, while adjacent cortex supports familiarity. However, the qualitative experiences of recollection and familiarity are typically confounded with a quantitative difference in memory strength (recollection > familiarity). Thus, the question remains whether the hippocampus might in fact support familiarity-based memories whenever they are as strong as recollection-based memories. We addressed this problem in a novel way by using the Remember/Know procedure, which allowed us to explicitly match the confidence and accuracy of Remember and Know decisions. As in earlier studies, recollected items had higher accuracy and confidence than familiar items, and hippocampal activity was higher for recollected items than for familiar items. Furthermore, hippocampal activity was similar for familiar items, misses, and correct rejections. When the accuracy and confidence of recollected and familiar items were matched, the findings were dramatically different. Hippocampal activity was now similar for recollected and familiar items. Importantly, hippocampal activity was also greater for familiar items than for misses or correct rejections (as well as for recollected items vs misses or correct rejections). Our findings suggest that the hippocampus supports both recollection and familiarity when memories are strong.