Delay choice versus delay maintenance: different measures of delayed gratification in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Intrinsic anticipatory motives in non-human primate food consumption behavior

Future-oriented behavior is regarded as a cornerstone of human cognition. One key phenomenon through which future orientation can be studied is the delay of gratification, when consumption of an immediate reward is withstood to achieve a larger reward later. The delays used in animal delay of gratification paradigms are rather short to be considered relevant for studying human-like future orientation. Here, for the first time, we show that rhesus macaques exhibit human-relevant future orientation downregulating their operant food consumption in anticipation of a nutritionally equivalent but more palatable food with an unprecedentedly long delay of approximately 2.5 h. Importantly, this behavior is not a result of conditioning but intrinsic to the animals. Our results show that the cognitive time horizon of primates, when tested in ecologically valid foraging-like experiments, extends much further into the future than previously considered, opening up new avenues for translational biomedical research.

State-dependent risky choices in primates: Variation in energy budget does not affect tufted capuchin monkeys' (Sapajus spp.) risky choices

Economic models predict that rational decision makers' choices between a constant, "safe" option and a variable, "risky" option leading, on average, to the same payoff, should be random. However, a wealth of research has revealed that, when faced with risky decisions, both human and nonhuman animals deviate from economic rationality. According to the risk-sensitivity theory, individuals should prefer a safe option when they are in a positive energy state and a risky option when they are in a negative energy state. The abundance/risk hypothesis proposes that individuals should prefer risky options when diet quality exceeds their nutritional requirements. We tested how energy budget affects decision making under risk by presenting 22 capuchins belonging to two colonies (IT: N = 12, US: N = 10) with a risky choice task. Capuchins had to choose between a constant option (always four food items) and a variable option (one or seven food items with a 50% probability) in two conditions. In the Low-energy condition capuchins were tested before their main meal, whereas in the High-energy condition they were tested following a high-caloric meal. In neither colony did we find a significant difference between conditions, suggesting that the energy budget did not affect risk preferences. However, we found differences between colonies in their general response to risky choices: US capuchins were more risk-prone after selecting a safe option than a risky option and after selecting a bad (one food item) than a good (seven food items) risky option, whereas this did not hold true in IT capuchins. Furthermore, in the IT colony, males were more risk-prone under the High-energy condition compared to the Low-energy condition. Subtle differences in individual characteristics, management conditions, or stochastic founder effects may be implied, with relevant consequences for the outcomes of research on risky decision-making across laboratories.

Neural dynamics underlying self-control in the primate subthalamic nucleus

The subthalamic nucleus (STN) is hypothesized to play a central role in neural processes that regulate self-control. Still uncertain, however, is how that brain structure participates in the dynamically evolving estimation of value that underlies the ability to delay gratification and wait patiently for a gain. To address that gap in knowledge, we studied the spiking activity of neurons in the STN of monkeys during a task in which animals were required to remain motionless for varying periods of time in order to obtain food reward. At the single-neuron and population levels, we found a cost-benefit integration between the desirability of the expected reward and the imposed delay to reward delivery, with STN signals that dynamically combined both attributes of the reward to form a single integrated estimate of value. This neural encoding of subjective value evolved dynamically across the waiting period that intervened after instruction cue. Moreover, this encoding was distributed inhomogeneously along the antero-posterior axis of the STN such that the most dorso-posterior-placed neurons represented the temporal discounted value most strongly. These findings highlight the selective involvement of the dorso-posterior STN in the representation of temporally discounted rewards. The combination of rewards and time delays into an integrated representation is essential for self-control, the promotion of goal pursuit, and the willingness to bear the costs of time delays.

Working Memory Depletion Affects Intertemporal Choice Among Internet Addicts and Healthy Controls

Addiction to the Internet has emerged as a new kind of addictive behavior. Although previous studies have revealed that impairments in working memory led to suboptimal decision making (e.g., a greater willingness to choose smaller, more immediate rewards), little is known about how working memory affects intertemporal choice in Internet addicts and normal users. Thus, this study’s aim was to investigate the effect of working memory task on intertemporal choice in 33 participants addicted to internet and 25 healthy controls. Participants were administered (a) a test for Internet Addiction, (b) a single delay discounting self-report questionnaire (c) a working memory task. Differences between the Internet addicts and the control group were observed in terms of delay discounting rates, reaction times, and in memory accuracy rates. We observed significantly higher delay discounting rates among individuals addicted to the Internet. Moreover, it was documented that reaction times follow the 4-level working memory condition were significantly longer than follow the 2-level condition, in both the Internet addicts and the control group. The current findings suggest that Internet addicts are more likely to make short-sighted decisions than normal Internet users. The higher the level of working memory, the more likely an individual is to choose the present smaller reward, thus making short-sighted decisions, and have longer response times.

Are capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) sensitive to lost opportunities? The role of opportunity costs in intertemporal choice

Principles of economics predict that the costs associated with obtaining rewards can influence choice. When individuals face choices between a smaller, immediate option and a larger, later option, they often experience opportunity costs associated with waiting for delayed rewards because they must forego the opportunity to make other choices. We evaluated how reducing opportunity costs affects delay tolerance in capuchin monkeys. After choosing the larger option, in the High cost condition, subjects had to wait for the delay to expire, whereas in the Low cost different and Low cost same conditions, they could perform a new choice during the delay. To control for the effect of intake rate on choices, the Low cost same condition had the same intake rate ratio as the High cost condition. We found that capuchins attended both to intake rates and to opportunity costs. They chose the larger option more often in the Low cost different and Low cost same conditions than in the High cost condition, and more often in the Low cost different condition than in the Low cost same condition. Understanding how non-human primates represent and use costs in making decisions not only helps to develop theoretical frameworks to explain their choices but also addresses similarities with and differences from human decision-making. These outcomes provide insights into the origins of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Variation in primate decision-making under uncertainty and the roots of human economic behaviour

Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of biological differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evidence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations, between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Decision-making flexibility in New Caledonian crows, young children and adult humans in a multi-dimensional tool-use task

The ability to make profitable decisions in natural foraging contexts may be influenced by an additional requirement of tool-use, due to increased levels of relational complexity and additional work-effort imposed by tool-use, compared with simply choosing between an immediate and delayed food item. We examined the flexibility for making the most profitable decisions in a multi-dimensional tool-use task, involving different apparatuses, tools and rewards of varying quality, in 3-5-year-old children, adult humans and tool-making New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides). We also compared our results to previous studies on habitually tool-making orangutans (Pongo abelii) and non-tool-making Goffin's cockatoos (Cacatua goffiniana). Adult humans, cockatoos and crows, but not children and orangutans, did not select a tool when it was not necessary, which was the more profitable choice in this situation. Adult humans, orangutans and cockatoos, but not crows and children, were able to refrain from selecting non-functional tools. By contrast, the birds, but not the primates tested, struggled to attend to multiple variables-where two apparatuses, two tools and two reward qualities were presented simultaneously-without extended experience. These findings indicate: (1) in a similar manner to humans and orangutans, New Caledonian crows and Goffin's cockatoos can flexibly make profitable decisions in some decision-making tool-use tasks, though the birds may struggle when tasks become more complex; (2) children and orangutans may have a bias to use tools in situations where adults and other tool-making species do not.

Self-control in crows, parrots and nonhuman primates

Self-control is critical for both humans and nonhuman animals because it underlies complex cognitive abilities, such as decision-making and future planning, enabling goal-directed behavior. For instance, it is positively associated with social competence and life success measures in humans. We present the first review of delay of gratification as a measure of self-control in nonhuman primates, corvids (crow family) and psittacines (parrot order): disparate groups that show comparable advanced cognitive abilities and similar socio-ecological factors. We compare delay of gratification performance and identify key issues and outstanding areas for future research, including finding the best measures and drivers of delayed gratification. Our review therefore contributes to our understanding of both delayed gratification as a measure of self-control and of complex cognition in animals. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology.

Dogs and wolves do not differ in their inhibitory control abilities in a non-social test battery

Being able to inhibit certain behaviours is of clear advantage in various situations. In particular, it has been suggested that inhibitory control plays a role in problem-solving and cooperation. Interspecific differences in the capacity for inhibitory control have been attributed to social and ecological factors, while one additional factor, namely domestication, has received only little attention so far. Dogs are an interesting species to test the effects of socio-ecological factors and also the influence of domestication on inhibitory control abilities. While dogs might have been selected for enhanced inhibition skills during domestication, the predictions derived from their socio-ecological background are reversed. Wolves are cooperative hunters and breeders, while dogs predominately scavenge and raise their young alone, accordingly, it would be predicted that dogs show impaired inhibitory control abilities since they no longer rely on these coordinated actions. To test these hypotheses, we assessed inhibitory control abilities in dogs and wolves raised and kept under similar conditions. Moreover, considering the problem of context-specificity in inhibitory control measures, we employed a multiple-test-approach. In line with previous studies, we found that the single inhibition tests did not correlate with each other. Using an exploratory approach, we found three components that explained the variation of behaviours across tests: motivation, flexibility, and perseveration. Interestingly, these inhibition components did not differ between dogs and wolves, which contradicts the predictions based on their socio-ecological backgrounds but also suggests that at least in tasks with minimal human influence, domestication did not affect dogs' inhibitory control abilities, thus raising questions in regard to the selection processes that might have affected inhibitory control abilities during the course of domestication.

Better, Not Just More-Contrast in Qualitative Aspects of Reward Facilitates Impulse Control in Pigs

Delay-of-gratification paradigms, such as the famous "Marshmallow Test," are designed to investigate the complex cognitive concepts of self-control and impulse control in humans and animals. Such tests determine whether a subject will demonstrate impulse control by choosing a large, delayed reward over an immediate, but smaller reward. Documented relationships between impulsive behavior and aggression in humans and animals suggest important implications for farm animal husbandry and welfare, especially in terms of inadequate social behavior, tail biting and maternal behavior. In a preliminary study, we investigated whether the extent of impulse control would differ between quantitatively and qualitatively different aspects of reward in pigs. Twenty female piglets were randomly divided into two groups, with 10 piglets each. After a preference test to determine individual reward preference among six different food items, a discrimination test was conducted to train for successful discrimination between different amounts of reward (one piece vs. four pieces) and different qualitative aspects of reward (highly preferred vs. least preferred food item). Then, an increasing delay (2, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32 s) was introduced for the larger/highly preferred reward. Each piglet could choose to get the smaller/least preferred reward immediately or to wait for the larger/highly preferred reward. Piglets showed clear differences in their preference for food items. Moreover, the "quality group" displayed faster learning in the discrimination test (number of sessions until 90% of the animals completed the discrimination test: "quality group"-3 days vs. "quantity group"-5 days) and reached a higher level of impulse control in the delay-of-gratification test compared to the "quantity group" (maximum delay that was mastered: "quality group"-24 s vs. "quantity group"-8 s). These results demonstrate that impulse control is present in piglets but that the opportunity to get a highly preferred reward is more valued than the opportunity to get more of a given reward. This outcome also underlines the crucial role of motivation in cognitive test paradigms. Further investigations will examine whether impulse control is related to traits that are relevant to animal husbandry and welfare.

A new approach to measuring patience in preschoolers

Patience in children has usually been studied using delay of gratification paradigms. However, another important aspect of patience that has not been well documented is the ability to adjust one's behavior while waiting without an explicit reward as a motivator (e.g., sitting in the doctor's waiting room). To examine this aspect of patience, video-recordings of sixty-one 3- and 4-year olds waiting for two separate 3-min periods were examined and coded for children's spontaneous behaviors. We found that 4-year olds displayed more patient (i.e., staying still) behaviors than 3-year olds during this "waiting paradigm." Interestingly, we also found that children who displayed less patient behaviors during the waiting paradigm were also those who succeeded on a future-thinking task. These findings have important implications for measuring patience in young children and highlight the potential impact of spontaneous behaviors on children's performance in cognitive tasks such as those assessing future-oriented cognition.

Reward type and behavioural patterns predict dogs' success in a delay of gratification paradigm

Inhibiting an immediate behaviour in favour of an alternative but more advantageous behaviour has been linked to individual success in life, especially in humans. Dogs, which have been living in the human environment for thousands of years, are exposed to daily situations that require inhibition different in context from other non-domesticated species. One task regularly used to study inhibitory control is the delay of gratification task, which requires individuals to choose between an immediate option of lower value and a delayed option of higher value. We tested sixteen dogs in a non-social delay of gratification task, conducting two different conditions: a quality and a quantity condition. While the majority of dogs failed to wait for more than 10 s, some dogs tolerated delays of up to 140 s, while one dog waited for 15 minutes. Moreover, dogs had more difficulties to wait if the reward increased in terms of quantity than quality. Interestingly, dogs were able to anticipate the delay duration and some dogs developed behavioural patterns that predicted waiting, which seems similar in some respects to 'coping-strategies' found in children, chimpanzees and parrots. Our results indicate that strategies to cope with impulsivity seem to be consistent and present across animal taxa.

Too cool? Symbolic but not iconic stimuli impair 4-year-old children's performance on the delay-of-gratification choice paradigm

A common method of improving the performance of children and non-human primates on the delay-of-gratification maintenance paradigm and measures of executive function (e.g., the Less is More task) is to represent the rewards subjects can acquire symbolically. This method, known as symbolic distancing, is thought to lower activation of the "hot" impulsive system and allow the "cool" rational system to dominate processing. Surprisingly, in contrast to its impact on the measures noted above, recent developmental and comparative studies have reported that symbolic distancing has a null or negative impact on performance on the delay-of-gratification choice paradigm. Here, we add to this literature by demonstrating that 4-year-old children's performance on the choice paradigm is impaired when symbolic stimuli, but not iconic stimuli (i.e., pictures of the rewards), are used to represent rewards. These data add to a growing body of comparative work demonstrating task manipulations have a similar impact on children and non-human primates and also support other research suggesting different decision making processes may underlie performance on the delay-of-gratification choice and maintenance paradigms.

Primate cognition: attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, self-control, and metacognition as examples of cognitive control in nonhuman primates

Primate Cognition is the study of cognitive processes, which represent internal mental processes involved in discriminations, decisions, and behaviors of humans and other primate species. Cognitive control involves executive and regulatory processes that allocate attention, manipulate and evaluate available information (and, when necessary, seek additional information), remember past experiences to plan future behaviors, and deal with distraction and impulsivity when they are threats to goal achievement. Areas of research that relate to cognitive control as it is assessed across species include executive attention, episodic memory, prospective memory, metacognition, and self-control. Executive attention refers to the ability to control what sensory stimuli one attends to and how one regulates responses to those stimuli, especially in cases of conflict. Episodic memory refers to memory for personally experienced, autobiographical events. Prospective memory refers to the formation and implementation of future-intended actions, such as remembering what needs to be done later. Metacognition consists of control and monitoring processes that allow individuals to assess what information they have and what information they still need, and then if necessary to seek information. Self-control is a regulatory process whereby individuals forego more immediate or easier to obtain rewards for more delayed or harder to obtain rewards that are objectively more valuable. The behavioral complexity shown by nonhuman primates when given tests to assess these capacities indicates psychological continuities with human cognitive control capacities. However, more research is needed to clarify the proper interpretation of these behaviors with regard to possible cognitive constructs that may underlie such behaviors. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:294-316. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1397 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Testing the Glucose Hypothesis among Capuchin Monkeys: Does Glucose Boost Self-Control?

The ego-depletion hypothesis states that self-control diminishes over time and with exertion. Accordingly, the glucose hypothesis attributes this depletion of self-control resources to decreases in blood glucose levels. Research has led to mixed findings among humans and nonhuman animals, with limited evidence for such a link between glucose and self-control among closely-related nonhuman primate species, but some evidence from more distantly related species (e.g., honeybees and dogs). We tested this hypothesis in capuchin monkeys by manipulating the sugar content of a calorie-matched breakfast meal following a nocturnal fast, and then presenting each monkey with the accumulation self-control task. Monkeys were presented with food items one-by-one until the subject retrieved and ate the accumulating items, which required continual inhibition of food retrieval in the face of an increasingly desirable reward. Results indicated no relationship between self-control performance on the accumulation task and glucose ingestion levels following a fast. These results do not provide support for the glucose hypothesis of self-control among capuchin monkeys within the presented paradigm. Further research assessing self-control and its physiological correlates among closely- and distantly-related species is warranted to shed light on the mechanisms underlying self-control behavior.

Self-control assessments of capuchin monkeys with the rotating tray task and the accumulation task

Recent studies of delay of gratification in capuchin monkeys using a rotating tray (RT) task have shown improved self-control performance in these animals in comparison to the accumulation (AC) task. In this study, we investigated whether this improvement resulted from the difference in methods between the rotating tray task and previous tests, or whether it was the result of greater overall experience with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 1 produced similar performance levels by capuchins monkeys in the RT and AC tasks when identical reward and temporal parameters were used. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar result using reward amounts that were more similar to previous AC experiments with these monkeys. In Experiment 3, monkeys performed multiple versions of the AC task with varied reward and temporal parameters. Their self-control behavior was found to be dependent on the overall delay to reward consumption, rather than the overall reward amount ultimately consumed. These findings indicate that these capuchin monkeys' self-control capacities were more likely to have improved across studies because of the greater experience they had with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 tested new, task-naïve monkeys on both tasks, finding more limited evidence of self-control, and no evidence that one task was more beneficial than the other in promoting self-control. The results of this study suggest that future testing of this kind should focus on temporal parameters and reward magnitude parameters to establish accurate measures of delay of gratification capacity and development in this species and perhaps others.

Social choice for one: On the rationality of intertemporal decisions

When faced with an intertemporal choice between a smaller short-term reward and a larger long-term prize, is opting for the latter always indicative of delay tolerance? And is delay tolerance always to be regarded as a manifestation of self-control, and thus as a rational solution to intertemporal dilemmas? I argue in favor of a negative answer to both questions, based on evidence collected in the delay discounting literature. This highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of rationality in intertemporal choice, to capture also situations in which waiting is not the optimal strategy. This paper suggests that such an understanding is fostered by adopting social choice theory as a promising framework to model intertemporal decision making. Some preliminary results of this approach are discussed, and its potential is compared with a much more studied formal model for intertemporal choice, i.e. game theory.

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

Measuring Delay Discounting in Humans Using an Adjusting Amount Task

Delay discounting refers to a decline in the value of a reward when it is delayed relative to when it is immediately available. Delay discounting tasks are used to identify indifference points, which reflect equal preference for two dichotomous reward alternatives differing in both delay and magnitude. Indifference points are key to assessing the shape of a delay-discounting gradient because they allow us to isolate the effect of delay on value. For example, if at a 1 week delay and a maximum of $1,000, the indifference point is at $700 we know that, for that participant, a 1-week delay corresponds to a 30% reduction in value. This video outlines an adjusting amount delay-discounting task that identifies indifference points relatively quickly and is inexpensive and easy to administer. Once data have been collected, non-linear regression techniques are typically used to generate discounting curves. The steepness of the discounting curve reflects the degree of impulsive choice of a group or individual. These techniques have been used with a wide range of commodities and have identified populations that are relatively impulsive. For example, people with substance abuse problems discount delayed rewards more steeply than control participants. Although degree of discounting varies as a function of the commodity examined, discounting of one commodity correlates with discounting of other commodities, which suggests that discounting may be a persistent pattern of behavior(1).

Self-control depletion in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.): does delay of gratification rely on a limited resource?

Self-control failure has enormous personal and societal consequences. One of the most debated models explaining why self-control breaks down is the Strength Model, according to which self-control depends on a limited resource. Either previous acts of self-control or taking part in highly demanding cognitive tasks have been shown to reduce self-control, possibly due to a reduction in blood glucose levels. However, several studies yielded negative findings, and recent meta-analyses questioned the robustness of the depletion effect in humans. We investigated, for the first time, whether the Strength Model applies to a non-human primate species, the tufted capuchin monkey. We tested five capuchins in a self-control task (the Accumulation task) in which food items were accumulated within individual’s reach for as long as the subject refrained from taking them. We evaluated whether capuchins’ performance decreases: (i) when tested before receiving their daily meal rather than after consuming it (Energy Depletion Experiment), and (ii) after being tested in two tasks with different levels of cognitive complexity (Cognitive Depletion Experiment). We also tested, in both experiments, how implementing self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task affected this capacity within each session and/or across consecutive sessions. Repeated acts of self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task progressively reduced this capacity within each session, as predicted by the Strength Model. However, neither experiencing a reduction in energy level nor taking part in a highly demanding cognitive task decreased performance in the subsequent Accumulation task. Thus, whereas capuchins seem to be vulnerable to within-session depletion effects, to other extents our findings are in line with the growing body of studies that failed to find a depletion effect in humans. Methodological issues potentially affecting the lack of depletion effects in capuchins are discussed.

False belief understanding and "cool" inhibitory control in 3-and 4-years-old Italian children

During preschool years, major developments occur in both executive function and theory of mind (ToM), and several studies have demonstrated a correlation between these processes. Research on the development of inhibitory control (IC) has distinguished between more cognitive, “cool” aspects of self-control, measured by conflict tasks, that require inhibiting an habitual response to generate an arbitrary one, and “hot,” affective aspects, such as affective decision making, measured by delay tasks, that require inhibition of a prepotent response. The aim of this study was to investigate the relations between 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance on a task measuring false belief understanding, the most widely used index of ToM in preschoolers, and three tasks measuring cognitive versus affective aspects of IC. To this end, we tested 101 Italian preschool children in four tasks: (a) the Unexpected Content False Belief task, (b) the Conflict task (a simplified version of the Day–Night Stroop task), (c) the Delay task, and (d) the Delay Choice task. Children’s receptive vocabulary was assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test. Children’s performance in the False Belief task was significantly related only to performance in the Conflict task, controlling for vocabulary and age. Importantly, children’s performance in the Conflict task did not significantly correlate with their performance in the Delay task or in the Delay Choice task, suggesting that these tasks measure different components of IC. The dissociation between the Conflict and the Delay tasks may indicate that monitoring and regulating a cool process (as flexible categorization) may involve different abilities than monitoring and regulating a hot process (not touching an available and highly attractive stimulus or choosing between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed one). Moreover, our findings support the view that “cool” aspects of IC and ToM are interrelated, extending to an Italian sample of children previous findings on an association between self-control and ToM.

Waiting for what comes later: capuchin monkeys show self-control even for nonvisible delayed rewards

Self-control tasks used with nonhuman animals typically involve the choice between an immediate option and a delayed, but more preferred option. However, in many self-control scenarios, not only does the more impulsive option come sooner in time, it is often more concrete than the delayed option. For example, studies have presented children with the option of eating a visible marshmallow immediately, or foregoing it for a better reward that can only be seen later. Thus, the immediately available option is visible and concrete, whereas the delayed option is not visible and more abstract. We tested eight capuchin monkeys to better understand this potential effect by manipulating the visibility of the response options and the visibility of the baiting itself. Monkeys observed two food items (20 or 5 g pieces of banana) each being placed either on top of or inside of one of the two opaque containers attached to a revolving tray apparatus, either in full view of monkeys or occluded by a barrier. Trials ended when monkeys removed a reward from the rotating tray. To demonstrate self-control, monkeys should have allowed the smaller piece of food to pass if the larger piece was forthcoming. Overall, monkeys were successful on the task, allowing a smaller, visible piece of banana to pass from reach in order to access the larger, nonvisible banana piece. This was true even when the entire baiting process took place out of sight of the monkeys. This finding suggests that capuchin monkeys succeed on self-control tasks even when the delayed option is also more abstract than the immediate one-a situation likely faced by primates in everyday life.

Monkeys are more patient in a foraging task than in a standard intertemporal choice task

Studies of animal impulsivity generally find steep subjective devaluation, or discounting, of delayed rewards – often on the order of a 50% reduction in value in a few seconds. Because such steep discounting is highly disfavored in evolutionary models of time preference, we hypothesize that discounting tasks provide a poor measure of animals’ true time preferences. One prediction of this hypothesis is that estimates of time preferences based on these tasks will lack external validity, i.e. fail to predict time preferences in other contexts. We examined choices made by four rhesus monkeys in a computerized patch-leaving foraging task interleaved with a standard intertemporal choice task. Monkeys were significantly more patient in the foraging task than in the intertemporal choice task. Patch-leaving behavior was well fit by parameter-free optimal foraging equations but poorly fit by the hyperbolic discount parameter obtained from the intertemporal choice task. Day-to-day variation in time preferences across the two tasks was uncorrelated with each other. These data are consistent with the conjecture that seemingly impulsive behavior in animals is an artifact of their difficulty understanding the structure of intertemporal choice tasks, and support the idea that animals are more efficient rate maximizers in the multi-second range than intertemporal choice tasks would suggest.

The evolutionary roots of human decision making

Humans exhibit a suite of biases when making economic decisions. We review recent research on the origins of human decision making by examining whether similar choice biases are seen in nonhuman primates, our closest phylogenetic relatives. We propose that comparative studies can provide insight into four major questions about the nature of human choice biases that cannot be addressed by studies of our species alone. First, research with other primates can address the evolution of human choice biases and identify shared versus human-unique tendencies in decision making. Second, primate studies can constrain hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms underlying such biases. Third, comparisons of closely related species can identify when distinct mechanisms underlie related biases by examining evolutionary dissociations in choice strategies. Finally, comparative work can provide insight into the biological rationality of economically irrational preferences.

Evolutionary pressures on primate intertemporal choice

From finding food to choosing mates, animals must make intertemporal choices that involve fitness benefits available at different times. Species vary dramatically in their willingness to wait for delayed rewards. Why does this variation across species exist? An adaptive approach to intertemporal choice suggests that time preferences should reflect the temporal problems faced in a species's environment. Here, I use phylogenetic regression to test whether allometric factors relating to body size, relative brain size and social group size predict how long 13 primate species will wait in laboratory intertemporal choice tasks. Controlling for phylogeny, a composite allometric factor that includes body mass, absolute brain size, lifespan and home range size predicted waiting times, but relative brain size and social group size did not. These findings support the notion that selective pressures have sculpted intertemporal choices to solve adaptive problems faced by animals. Collecting these types of data across a large number of species can provide key insights into the evolution of decision making and cognition.

Waiting for better, not for more: corvids respond to quality in two delay maintenance tasks

Self-control, that is, overcoming impulsivity towards immediate gratification in favour of a greater but delayed reward, is seen as a valuable skill when making future-oriented decisions. Experimental studies in nonhuman primates revealed that individuals of some species are willing to tolerate delays of up to several minutes in order to gain food of a higher quantity or quality. Recently, birds (carrion crows, Corvus corone, common ravens, Corvus corax, Goffin cockatoos, Cacatua goffiniana) performed comparably to primates in an exchange task, contradicting previous notions that birds may lack any impulse control. However, performance differed strikingly with the currency of exchange: individuals of all three species performed better when asked to wait for a higher food quality, rather than quantity. Here, we built on this work and tested whether the apparent difference in levels of self-control expressed in quality versus quantity tasks reflects cognitive constraints or is merely due to methodological limitations. In addition to the exchange paradigm, we applied another established delay maintenance methodology: the accumulation task. In this latter task, food items accumulated to a maximum of four pieces, whereas in the exchange task, an initial item could be exchanged for a reward item after a certain time delay elapsed. In both tasks, birds (seven crows, five ravens) were asked to wait in order to optimize either the quality or the quantity of food. We found that corvids were willing to delay gratification when it led to a food reward of higher quality, but not when waiting was rewarded with a higher quantity, independent of the experimental paradigm. This study is the first to test crows and ravens with two different paradigms, the accumulation and the exchange of food, within the same experiment, allowing for fair comparisons between methods and species.

Waiting for better, not for more: corvids respond to quality in two delay maintenance tasks

Self-control, that is, overcoming impulsivity towards immediate gratification in favour of a greater but delayed reward, is seen as a valuable skill when making future-oriented decisions. Experimental studies in nonhuman primates revealed that individuals of some species are willing to tolerate delays of up to several minutes in order to gain food of a higher quantity or quality. Recently, birds (carrion crows, Corvus corone, common ravens, Corvus corax, Goffin cockatoos, Cacatua goffiniana) performed comparably to primates in an exchange task, contradicting previous notions that birds may lack any impulse control. However, performance differed strikingly with the currency of exchange: individuals of all three species performed better when asked to wait for a higher food quality, rather than quantity. Here, we built on this work and tested whether the apparent difference in levels of self-control expressed in quality versus quantity tasks reflects cognitive constraints or is merely due to methodological limitations. In addition to the exchange paradigm, we applied another established delay maintenance methodology: the accumulation task. In this latter task, food items accumulated to a maximum of four pieces, whereas in the exchange task, an initial item could be exchanged for a reward item after a certain time delay elapsed. In both tasks, birds (seven crows, five ravens) were asked to wait in order to optimize either the quality or the quantity of food. We found that corvids were willing to delay gratification when it led to a food reward of higher quality, but not when waiting was rewarded with a higher quantity, independent of the experimental paradigm. This study is the first to test crows and ravens with two different paradigms, the accumulation and the exchange of food, within the same experiment, allowing for fair comparisons between methods and species.

Capuchin monkey research priorities and urgent issues

The "Capuchin research community roundtable: working together towards a comparative biology of Cebus and Sapajus" was held at the International Primatological Society Congress in Cancún, Mexico, August 2012. Goals of the roundtable were to strengthen interactions among the capuchin research community, and to prioritize and coordinate research and training in a more systematic and interactive way in light of increasing conservation urgency. New phylogenetic and biogeographic evidence highlights the distinct evolutionary histories of the two radiations of capuchin monkeys, Cebus (untufted or gracile capuchins) and Sapajus (tufted or robust capuchins), that were formerly lumped under Cebus, and points to a higher number of species, or Evolutionarily Significant Units, in each compared to past capuchin taxonomies. Many of the lesser-known species face increasing fragmentation and destruction of habitat, and most populations of still non-threatened species face encroachment from human settlements. Here, we present capuchin research priorities and urgent issues based on the discussion by capuchin researchers in the roundtable. These include a call for the immediate end to the use of the name Cebus apella and the employment of the term Sapajus spp. instead for captive robust capuchins of unknown origin; for the implementation of rapid assessments for previously unstudied capuchin species or populations in biomes of interest; for the development of standardized methods to allow for comparative analyses across capuchin field sites; and for the creation and maintenance of an open-access website for capuchin monkey data. Finally, we planned the creation of an international Capuchin Action Network, to help disseminate research information; to work as a research community in a more efficient, collaborative manner; to help prioritize research and conservation goals as a community of experts; and to strengthen our political voice.

Working and waiting for better rewards: self-control in two monkey species (Cebus apella and Macaca mulatta)

Self-control is typically defined as choosing a greater, delayed reward over a lesser, more immediate reward. However, in nature, there are other costs besides delay associated with obtaining the greatest outcome including increased effort, potential punishment, and low probability of reward. Effort is an interesting case because it sometimes impairs self-control, by acting as an additional cost, and at other times facilitates self-control, by distracting one from impulsive options. Additionally, different species may perform differently in effortful self-control tasks, based on their natural ecology. To gain insight into these aspects of self-control behavior, we examined capuchin monkeys' and rhesus monkeys' self-control in separate working and waiting choice tasks. We hypothesized that capuchins would show greater self-control in the working task, given their naturally higher activity level, whereas rhesus would perform similarly in both tasks. Rhesus performed as predicted, whereas contrary to our hypothesis, capuchins exhibited lesser performance in the working task. Nonetheless, these results may still stem from inherent species differences interacting with details of the methodology. Capuchins, being highly energetic and social monkeys, may have divided their energy and attention between the working task and other elements of the test environment such as visible group mates or manipulanda.

Waiting by mistake: symbolic representation of rewards modulates intertemporal choice in capuchin monkeys, preschool children and adult humans

In the Delay choice task subjects choose between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed option. This paradigm, also known as intertemporal choice task, is frequently used to assess delay tolerance, interpreting a preference for the larger delayed option as willingness to wait. However, in the Delay choice task subjects face a dilemma between two preferred responses: "go for more" (i.e., selecting the larger, but delayed, option) vs. "go for sooner" (i.e., selecting the immediate, but smaller, option). When the options consist of visible food amounts, at least some of the choices of the larger delayed option might be due to a failure to inhibit a prepotent response towards the larger option rather than to a sustained delay tolerance. To disentangle this issue, we tested 10 capuchin monkeys, 101 preschool children, and 88 adult humans in a Delay choice task with food, low-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-one correspondence with food items), and high-symbolic tokens (objects that can be exchanged with food and have a one-to-many correspondence with food items). This allows evaluating how different methods of representing rewards modulate the relative contribution of the "go for more" and "go for sooner" responses. Consistently with the idea that choices for the delayed option are sometimes due to a failure at inhibiting the prepotent response for the larger quantity, we expected high-symbolic tokens to decrease the salience of the larger option, thus reducing "go for more" responses. In fact, previous findings have shown that inhibiting prepotent responses for quantity is easier when the problem is framed in a symbolic context. Overall, opting for the larger delayed option in the visible-food version of the Delay choice task seems to partially result from an impulsive preference for quantity, rather than from a sustained delay tolerance. In capuchins and children high-symbolic stimuli decreased the individual's preference for the larger reward by distancing from its appetitive features. Conversely, the sophisticated symbolic skills of adult humans prevented the distancing effect of high-symbolic stimuli in this population, although this result may be due to methodological differences between adult humans and the other two populations under study. Our data extend the knowledge concerning the influence of symbols on both human and non-human primate behavior and add a new element to the interpretation of the Delay choice task. Since high-symbolic stimuli decrease the individual's preference for the larger reward by eliminating those choices due to prepotent responses towards the larger quantity, they allow to better discriminate responses based on genuine delay aversion. Thus, these findings invite greater caution in interpreting the results obtained with the visible-food version of the Delay choice task, which may overestimate delay tolerance.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) can wait, when they choose to: a study with the hybrid delay task

Self-control has been studied in nonhuman animals using a variety of tasks. The inter-temporal choice (ITC) task presents choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) options. Using food amounts as rewards, this presents two problems: (a) choices of the LL option could either reflect self-control or instead result from animals' difficulty with pointing to smaller amounts of food; (b) there is no way to verify whether the subjects would not revert their choice for the LL option, if given the opportunity to do so during the ensuing delay. To address these problems, we have recently introduced a new protocol, the hybrid delay task, which combines an initial ITC with a subsequent accumulation phase in which selection of the SS option leads to its immediate delivery, but choice of the LL option then leads to one-by-one presentation of those items that continues only as long as the subject does not eat any of the accumulated items. The choice of the LL option therefore only reflects self-control when the number of items obtained from LL choices during the accumulation phase is higher than what could be received in the SS option. Previous research with capuchin monkeys demonstrated that their apparent self-control responses in the ITC task may have overestimated their general self-control abilities, given their poor performance in the hybrid delay task. Here, chimpanzees instead demonstrated that their choices for the LL option in the ITC phase of the hybrid delay task were confirmed by their ability to sustain long delays during accumulation of LL rewards.

The hybrid delay task: can capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) sustain a delay after an initial choice to do so?

Choosing to wait for a better outcome (delay choice) and sustaining the delay prior to that outcome (delay maintenance) are both prerequisites for successful self-control in intertemporal choices. However, most existing experimental methods test these skills in isolation from each other, and no significant correlation has been observed in performance across these tasks. In this study we introduce a new paradigm, the hybrid delay task, which combines an initial delay choice with a subsequent delay maintenance stage. This allows testing how often choosing to wait is paired with the actual ability to do so. We tested 18 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) from two laboratories in various conditions, and we found that subjects frequently chose the delayed reward but then failed to wait for it, due to poor delay maintenance. However, performance improved with experience and different behavioral responses for error correction were evident. These findings have far reaching implications: if such a high error rate was observed also in other species (possibly including Homo sapiens), this may indicate that delay choice tasks that make use of salient, prepotent stimuli do not reliably assess generalized self-control, insofar as choosing to wait does not entail always being able to do so.