Statement on the consideration of biodefence and biosecurity

Establishing a theoretical foundation for measuring global health security: a scoping review

Background

Since the 2014–2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic, the concept of measuring health security capacity has become increasingly important within the broader context of health systems-strengthening, enhancing responses to public health emergencies, and reducing global catastrophic biological risks. Efforts to regularly and sustainably track the evolution of health security capabilities and capacities over time – while also accounting for political, social, and environmental risks – could help countries progress toward eliminating sources of health insecurity. We sought to aggregate evidence-based principles that capture a country’s baseline public health and healthcare capabilities, its health security system performance before and during infectious disease crises, and its broader social, political, security, and ecological risk environments.

Methods

We conducted a scoping review of English-language scholarly and gray literature to identify evidence- and practice-based indicators and proxies for measuring health security at the country level over time. We then used a qualitative coding framework to identify recurrent themes in the literature and synthesize foundational principles for measuring global health security. Documents reviewed included English-language literature published after 2001 until the end of the research period—September 2017—to ensure relevance to the current global health security landscape; literature examining acute infectious disease threats with potential for transnational spread; and literature addressing global health security efforts at the country level.

Results

We synthesized four foundational principles for measuring global health security: measurement requires assessment of existing capacities, as well as efforts to build core public health, healthcare, and biosecurity capabilities; assessments of national programs and efforts to mitigate a critical subset of priority threats could inform efforts to generate useful metrics for global health security; there are measurable enabling factors facilitating health security-strengthening efforts; and finally, measurement requires consideration of social, political, and ecological risk environments.

Conclusion

The themes identified in this review could inform efforts to systematically assess the impacts and effectiveness of activities undertaken to strengthen global health security.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12889-019-7216-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Biological Dual-Use Research and Synthetic Biology of Yeast

In recent years, the publication of the studies on the transmissibility in mammals of the H5N1 influenza virus and synthetic genomes has triggered heated and concerned debate within the community of scientists on biological dual-use research; these papers have raised the awareness that, in some cases, fundamental research could be directed to harmful experiments, with the purpose of developing a weapon that could be used by a bioterrorist. Here is presented an overview regarding the dual-use concept and its related international agreements which underlines the work of the Australia Group (AG) Export Control Regime. It is hoped that the principles and activities of the AG, that focuses on export control of chemical and biological dual-use materials, will spread and become well known to academic researchers in different countries, as they exchange biological materials (i.e. plasmids, strains, antibodies, nucleic acids) and scientific papers. To this extent, and with the aim of drawing the attention of the scientific community that works with yeast to the so called Dual-Use Research of Concern, this article reports case studies on biological dual-use research and discusses a synthetic biology applied to the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, namely the construction of the first eukaryotic synthetic chromosome of yeast and the use of yeast cells as a factory to produce opiates. Since this organism is considered harmless and is not included in any list of biological agents, yeast researchers should take simple actions in the future to avoid the sharing of strains and advanced technology with suspicious individuals.

Do Latin American scientific journals follow dual-use review policies?

During the past decade, a number of journals have implemented dual-use policies in order to analyze whether the papers submitted for publication could raise concern because of the potential for misuse of their content. In this context, an analysis was performed on Latin American scientific journals to examine whether they apply formal written dual-use review policies and whether they inform their authors and reviewers about potentially sensitive issues in this area, as other international journals do. Peer-reviewed life sciences journals indexed in Latindex from Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were analyzed. The Guide for Authors and the Instructions to Referees of 216 journals included in the Latindex catalogue (which means that they meet the best quality standards of the Latindex system) were screened for biosecurity-related information using the keywords biosecurity, biological weapons, and dual-use research of concern. Results showed that the screened publications had a total lack of dual-use review policies, even though some of them pointed out ethical behaviors to be followed related to authorship, plagiarism, simultaneous submission, research results misappropriation, ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects, guiding principles for the care and use of animals in research, research standard violations, and reviewer bias, among others.

Implementing biosecurity education: approaches, resources and programmes

This paper aims to present possible approaches, resources and programmes to introduce the topic of biosecurity to life scientists and engineers at the higher education level. Firstly, we summarise key findings from a number of international surveys on biosecurity education that have been carried out in the United States, Europe, Israel and the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, we describe the development of our openly-accessible education resource, illustrating the scope and content of these materials. Thirdly, we report on actual cases of biosecurity education that have been implemented. These include achievements in and lessons derived from the implementation of biosecurity education at the National Defense Medical College in Japan. These experiences are followed by presentation of the expert-level "Train-the-Trainer" programmes subsequently launched by the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. These examples will help readers to understand how educators can enhance their own understanding about biosecurity issues and how they can then disseminate their knowledge through development of their own customised, relevantly-targeted and stage-tailored education programmes within their own life science communities. By providing these examples, we argue that education for life scientists, policy-makers and other stakeholders about social responsibility on dual-use issues is easily achievable and need not be expensive, time-consuming or over-burdening. We suggest that recurring classes or courses be held at appropriate times during educational programmes to accommodate the developing expertise and advancing learning stages of students.

The Microbe: The Basics of Structure, Morphology, and Physiology as They Relate to Microbial Characterization and Attribution

This chapter is meant to (1) review classical methods used to characterize and classify microbes and (2) introduce new molecular methods used in microbial characterization. The fundamental composition of microbes is discussed as well as their importance in classification of microbes into genus and species. Classical microbiological methods in general seek to define the common features of specific bacterial groups as a means of classification and identification of microbes. Thus, the focus was to describe the common features which discriminated closely related groups of organisms. In contrast, the newer molecular methods often seek to expand the classification of microbes not only as a means to organize microbial phylogeny but also to differentiate signatures between microbes identified within a species in greater detail. Molecular biology tools are used both as an adjunct to established methods and as replacement for classical methods for detection, discrimination, or identification of bacterial and viral species.

Managing dual use technology: it takes two to tango

Like nuclear energy, most technologies could have dual use-for health and well being and disaster and terror. Some research publications have brought to the forefront the tragic consequences of the latter potential through their possible use. Monitoring life science research and development (R&D) to prevent possible misuse is a challenging task globally, more so in developing economies like India, which are emerging as major biotech hubs. As a signatory to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, India has put in motion a process of evolving a series of measures to manage dual-use technology. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has taken a lead in drafting model codes of conduct, ethics and practice for use by other S&T agencies to tailor them as per their requirements. Taking cue from the discussions held by the editors of the various medical and science journals in the developed world, the Indian Journal of Medical Research, the official publication of the ICMR, is working on policy and uniform practice of publication of dual-use research results. The Government of India too has promulgated legal provisions to minimize the risks of misuse of technology, like the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. Clearly, no single agency would be able to manage the dual-use of technology effectively. Multiple agencies have to come together to work in tandem for effective implementation of various measure and also like Janus, ensure that they are neither too restrictive nor intrusive to discourage the development of science.

Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease

Rapid progress in DNA synthesis and sequencing is spearheading the deliberate, large-scale genetic alteration of organisms. These new advances in DNA manipulation have been extended to the level of whole-genome synthesis, as evident from the synthesis of poliovirus, from the resurrection of the extinct 1918 strain of influenza virus and of human endogenous retroviruses and from the restructuring of the phage T7 genome. The largest DNA synthesized so far is the 582,970 base pair genome of Mycoplasma genitalium, although, as yet, this synthetic DNA has not been 'booted' to life. As genome synthesis is independent of a natural template, it allows modification of the structure and function of a virus's genetic information to an extent that was hitherto impossible. The common goal of this new strategy is to further our understanding of an organism's properties, particularly its pathogenic armory if it causes disease in humans, and to make use of this new information to protect from, or treat, human viral disease. Although only a few applications of virus synthesis have been described as yet, key recent findings have been the resurrection of the 1918 influenza virus and the generation of codon- and codon pair-deoptimized polioviruses.

Biosecurity policies at international life science journals

The prospect of bioterrorism has raised concerns about the potential abuse of scientific information for malign purposes and the pressure on scientific publishers to prevent the publication of "recipes" for weapons of mass destruction. Here we present the results of a survey of 28 major life science journals--20 English-language international journals and 3 Chinese and 5 Russian journals--with regard to their biosecurity policies and procedures. The survey addressed the extent to which life science journals have implemented biosecurity procedures in recent years, how authors and reviewers are advised about these procedures and the underlying concerns, and what the practical experiences have been. Few of the English-language publishers and none of the Russian and Chinese publishers surveyed implement formal biosecurity policies or inform their authors and reviewers about potentially sensitive issues in this area.

Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of "experiments of concern" in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.

Environmental health research in the post-genome era: new fields, new challenges, and new opportunities

The human genome sequence provides researchers with a genetic framework to eventually understand the relationships of gene-environment interactions. This wealth of information has led to the birth of several related areas of research, including proteomics, functional genomics, pharmacogenomics, and toxicogenomics. Developing techniques such as DNA/protein microarrays, small-interfering RNA (siRNA) applications, two-dimensional gel electrophoresis, and mass spectrometry in conjunction with advanced analysis software and the availability of Internet databases offers a powerful set of tools to investigate an individual's response to specific stimuli. This review summarizes these emerging scientific fields and techniques focusing specifically on their applications to the complexities of gene-environment interactions and their potential role in environ-mental biosecurity.

Bioterrorism and biodefence research: changing the focus of microbiology

Fear that terrorists can use biological agents as weapons of mass destruction is significantly impacting the conduct of microbiological research. Abundant new funds are available for biodefence research, and many researchers are racing to enter the field. There are some concerns, however, that a large emphasis on this issue could skew the microbiology research agenda. Furthermore, new responsibilities for safely conducting research with biothreat agents and concern that information might be misused could drive some researchers away from the field.

A genomics-based approach to biodefence preparedness

Since October 2001, the United States has greatly expanded its commitment to biodefence-related research, with $1.75 billion earmarked for this activity in fiscal year 2003.

The goals of this accelerated research and development effort are to understand better the biology of potential bioterror agents and to use this information in the development of new diagnostics, antibiotics and vaccines to protect the world's population against bioterrorism.

Genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics approaches are considered to be key enabling technologies in the development of these new products.

Genome sequence data for all of the principal human pathogens, including most of the potential bioterror agents on the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) category A–C lists, are available in public databases and provide a new foundation for follow-up studies.

Comparative genomics approaches, together with large-scale methods for studying gene function, such as DNA microarrays, are providing insights into the molecular basis and evolution of pathogenicity, diversity within closely related isolates of the same pathogen and the molecular determinants of host–pathogen interactions.

Genomics-based approaches have already proven to be of great use in the identification of new targets for antimicrobial compounds and in the identification of new vaccine candidates.

Comparative genomics is also providing important information on the natural variability between closely related isolates that is aiding in the development of the new field of microbial forensics.

The anthrax letter attacks in October 2001, followed by the SARS outbreak in early 2003, dramatically illustrated our vulnerability to both deliberate and natural outbreaks of infectious disease. The availability of pathogen genome sequences and high-throughput methods for studying the biology of both pathogens and their hosts have provided new insights into the mechanisms of pathogenesis and host defence. As infectious disease research expands to include major bioterror agents, genomics-based approaches will provide one of the cornerstones of efforts to develop more accurate diagnostics, new therapeutics and vaccines, and further capabilities for microbial forensics.