Detection of Micrometer-Sized Virus Aerosols by Using a Real-Time Bioaerosol Monitoring System

This study investigates a real-time handheld bioaerosol monitoring system for the detection of biological particles using UV-LED and light-induced fluorescence technology. Biological particles produce both scattering and fluorescence signals simultaneously, which can help distinguish them from general particles. The detected scattering, fluorescence, and simultaneous signals are then converted into photon signals and categorized based on predetermined criteria. A reliable biological particle generator was required to validate the performance of the system. This study explores the use of an M13 bacteriophage as a virus simulant of biological agents and employs a customized inkjet aerosol generator to produce M13 bacteriophage aerosols of a specific size by controlling the concentration of M13. We confirmed that micro-sized, narrowly dispersed M13 aerosols were efficiently generated. Additionally, we confirmed the performance of this real-time handheld bioaerosol monitoring system by detecting viruses.

Plasmids Increase the Competitive Ability of Plasmid-Bearing Cells Even When Transconjugants Are Poor Donors, as Shown by Computer Simulations

Bacterial cells often suffer a fitness cost after conjugative plasmids' entry because these cells replicate slower than plasmid-free cells. Compensatory mutations may appear after tens of or a few hundred generations, reducing or eliminating this cost. A previous work based on a mathematical model and computer simulations has shown that plasmid-bearing cells already adapted to the plasmid may gain a fitness advantage when plasmids transfer into neighboring plasmid-free cells because these cells are still unadapted to the plasmid. These slow-growing transconjugants use fewer resources, which can benefit donor cells. However, opportunities for compensatory mutations in transconjugants increase if these cells become numerous (through replication or conjugation). Moreover, transconjugants also gain an advantage when transferring the plasmid, but the original donors may be too distant from conjugation events to gain an advantage. To understand which consequence prevails, we performed further computer simulations allowing versus banning transfer from transconjugants. The advantage to donors is higher if transconjugants do not transfer plasmids, mainly when donors are rare and when the plasmid transfer rate (from donors) is high. These results show that conjugative plasmids are efficient biological weapons even if the transconjugant cells are poor plasmid donors. After some time, conjugative plasmids gain other host-benefit genes, such as virulence and drug-resistance.

A New Method for Extraction and Analysis of Ricin Samples through MALDI-TOF-MS/MS

We report for the first time the efficient use of accelerated solvent extraction (ASE) for extraction of ricin to analytical purposes, followed by the combined use of sodium dodecyl sulfate-polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (SDS-PAGE), Matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), and MALDI-TOF MS/MS method. That has provided a fast and unambiguous method of ricin identification for in real cases of forensic investigation of suspected samples. Additionally, MALDI-TOF MS was applied to characterize the presence and the toxic activity of ricin in irradiated samples. Samples containing ricin were subjected to ASE, irradiated with different dosages of gamma radiation, and analyzed by MALDI-TOF MS/MS for verification of the intact protein signal. For identification purposes, samples were previously subjected to SDS-PAGE, for purification and separation of the chains, followed by digestion with trypsin, and analysis by MALDI-TOF MS/MS. The results were confirmed by verification of the amino acid sequences of some selected peptides by MALDI-TOF MS/MS. The samples residual toxic activity was evaluated through incubation with a DNA substrate, to simulate the attack by ricin, followed by MALDI-TOF MS/MS analyses.

Anticipating Emerging Biotechnology Threats: A case study of CRISPR

This article discusses the contingencies and complexities of CRISPR. It outlines key problems regarding off-target effects and replication of experimental work that are important to consider in light of CRISPR's touted ease of use and diffusion. In light of literature on the sociotechnical dimensions of the life sciences and biotechnology and literature on former bioweapons programs, this article argues that we need more detailed empirical case studies of the social and technical factors shaping CRISPR and related gene-editing techniques in order to better understand how they may be different from other advances in biotechnology-or whether similar features remain. This information will be critical to better inform intelligence practitioners and policymakers about the security implications of new gene-editing techniques.

Military Importance of Natural Toxins and Their Analogs

Toxin weapon research, development, production and the ban on its uses is an integral part of international law, with particular attention paid to the protection against these weapons. In spite of this, hazards associated with toxins cannot be completely excluded. Some of these hazards are also pointed out in the present review. The article deals with the characteristics and properties of natural toxins and synthetic analogs potentially constituting the basis of toxin weapons. It briefly describes the history of military research and the use of toxins from distant history up to the present age. With respect to effective disarmament conventions, it mentions certain contemporary concepts of possible toxin applications for military purposes and the protection of public order (suppression of riots); it also briefly refers to the question of terrorism. In addition, it deals with certain traditional as well as modern technologies of the research, synthesis, and use of toxins, which can affect the continuing development of toxin weapons. These are, for example, cases of new toxins from natural sources, their chemical synthesis, production of synthetic analogs, the possibility of using methods of genetic engineering and modern biotechnologies or the possible applications of nanotechnology and certain pharmaceutical methods for the effective transfer of toxins into the organism. The authors evaluate the military importance of toxins based on their comparison with traditional chemical warfare agents. They appeal to the ethics of the scientific work as a principal condition for the prevention of toxin abuse in wars, military conflicts, as well as in non-military attacks.

Mass spectrometry for the detection of bioterrorism agents: from environmental to clinical applications

In the current context of international conflicts and localized terrorist actions, there is unfortunately a permanent threat of attacks with unconventional warfare agents. Among these, biological agents such as toxins, microorganisms, and viruses deserve particular attention owing to their ease of production and dissemination. Mass spectrometry (MS)-based techniques for the detection and quantification of biological agents have a decisive role to play for countermeasures in a scenario of biological attacks. The application of MS to every field of both organic and macromolecular species has in recent years been revolutionized by the development of soft ionization techniques (MALDI and ESI), and by the continuous development of MS technologies (high resolution, accurate mass HR/AM instruments, novel analyzers, hybrid configurations). New possibilities have emerged for exquisite specific and sensitive detection of biological warfare agents. MS-based strategies for clinical application can now address a wide range of analytical questions mainly including issues related to the complexity of biological samples and their available volume. Multiplexed toxin detection, discovery of new markers through omics approaches, and identification of untargeted microbiological or of novel molecular targets are examples of applications. In this paper, we will present these technological advances along with the novel perspectives offered by omics approaches to clinical detection and follow-up.

Biological Warfare Plan in the 17th Century—the Siege of Candia, 1648–1669

A little-known effort to conduct biological warfare occurred during the 17th century. The incident transpired during the Venetian–Ottoman War, when the city of Candia (now Heraklion, Greece) was under siege by the Ottomans (1648–1669). The data we describe, obtained from the Archives of the Venetian State, are related to an operation organized by the Venetian Intelligence Services, which aimed at lifting the siege by infecting the Ottoman soldiers with plague by attacking them with a liquid made from the spleens and buboes of plague victims. Although the plan was perfectly organized, and the deadly mixture was ready to use, the attack was ultimately never carried out. The conception and the detailed cynical planning of the attack on Candia illustrate a dangerous way of thinking about the use of biological weapons and the absence of reservations when potential users, within their religious framework, cast their enemies as undeserving of humanitarian consideration.

John Bartlett and bioterrorism

Until 1997, the subject of bioterrorism was not discussed within the medical community and deliberately ignored in national planning efforts. Biological weapons were regarded as "morally repulsive." This complacency stemmed from a 1972 Biological Weapons Convention where all countries agreed to cease offensive biological weapons research. In the 1990s, however, the Soviet Union was discovered to have an extensive bioweapons program and a Japanese religious cult sought to launch an anthrax attack on Tokyo. Biological weapons such as smallpox and anthrax had the potential to cause a national catastrophe. However, little was done until John Bartlett in 1997 led a symposium and program to educate the medical community and the country of the need for definitive bioweapons programs. It was highly persuasive and received a final stimulus when the anthrax attack occurred in the United States in 2001.

Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the "myths"

Synthetic biology, a field that aims to "make biology easier to engineer," is routinely described as leading to an increase in the "dual-use" threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research to be "used" for peaceful purposes or "misused" for warfare or terrorism. Fears have been expressed that the "de-skilling" of biology, combined with online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to people operating outside well-equipped professional research laboratories, including people with malevolent intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology communities and of the student iGEM competition has come to epitomize this supposed trend toward greater ease of access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors. In this article, we identify five "myths" that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and biosecurity, and argue that they embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and bioterrorism. We demonstrate how these myths are challenged by more realistic understandings of the scientific research currently being conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories, and by an analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. We show that the importance of tacit knowledge is commonly overlooked in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to biological materials and digital information, rather than on human practices and institutional dimensions. As a result, public discourse on synthetic biology and biosecurity tends to portray speculative scenarios about the future as realities in the present or the near future, when this is not warranted. We suggest that these "myths" play an important role in defining synthetic biology as a "promissory" field of research and as an "emerging technology" in need of governance.

Possibilities, intentions and threats: dual use in the life sciences reconsidered

Due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax letters of a few weeks later, the concept of dual use has spread widely in the life sciences during the past decade. This article is aimed at a clarification of the dual use concept and its scope of application for the life sciences. Such a clarification would greatly facilitate the work of policymakers seeking to ensure security while avoiding undesirable interventions of government in the conduct of science. The article starts with an overview of the main developments in life sciences in relation to dual use. This is illustrated by discussions on synthetic biology and dual use. The findings lead to a reconsideration of the dual use concept. An area in need of further attention is to what extent threats and intentions should have impact on the definition of dual use. Possible threats are analyzed against the background of the phenomenon of securitization of health care and life sciences: considering these sectors of society in security terms. Some caveats that should be taken into account in a dual use policy are described. An acceptable, adequate and applicable definition of the dual use concept could help researchers, universities, companies and policy makers. Such a definition should build upon, but go beyond, the view developed in the influential Fink-report, which concentrates on the so-called 'experiments of concern', e.g. experiments that enhance the virulence of pathogens (National Research Council of the National Academies 2004) It will be argued that-in addition to these more technical aspects-a definition of dual use should include the aspect of threats and intentions.

Synthetic biology, security and governance

The twenty-first century has witnessed an increasing confluence of rapidly advancing science and its embodiment in practical technologies, an extensive global diffusion of the knowledge and capabilities associated with those developments, and a seemingly unending shift in the international security environment. The scope and intensity of these interactions in the life sciences have generated concern about security risks stemming from possible misuse. This lecture focuses on one of the key emerging life science technologies of concern, gene synthesis, and considers how the new risks and challenges it poses for governance can best be managed.

Bioterrorism: Challenges and considerations

Bioterrorism, the deliberate, private use of biological agents to harm and frighten the people of a state or society, is related to the military use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Attacks with biological agents are among the most insidious and breed the greatest fear. Attacks could go undetected for a long time, potentially exposing a vast number of people, who are unaware of the threat. Dentist's responses to catastrophes have been redefined by bioterrorism. Accurate and substantial information given to the public by credible public health and medical experts can do much to allay their fears and encourage their cooperation and participation in constructive, organized community response efforts. The dental profession could potentially play a significant role in the emergency response to a major bioterrorism attack.

Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of "experiments of concern" in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.

Passive antibody administration (immediate immunity) as a specific defense against biological weapons

The potential threat of biological warfare with a specific agent is proportional to the susceptibility of the population to that agent. Preventing disease after exposure to a biological agent is partially a function of the immunity of the exposed individual. The only available countermeasure that can provide immediate immunity against a biological agent is passive antibody. Unlike vaccines, which require time to induce protective immunity and depend on the host's ability to mount an immune response, passive antibody can theoretically confer protection regardless of the immune status of the host. Passive antibody therapy has substantial advantages over antimicrobial agents and other measures for postexposure prophylaxis, including low toxicity and high specific activity. Specific antibodies are active against the major agents of bioterrorism, including anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, tularemia, and plague. This article proposes a biological defense initiative based on developing, producing, and stockpiling specific antibody reagents that can be used to protect the population against biological warfare threats.