Studying the neural representations of uncertainty

Lesions to the mediodorsal thalamus, but not orbitofrontal cortex, enhance volatility beliefs linked to paranoia

Beliefs-attitudes toward some state of the environment-guide action selection and should be robust to variability but sensitive to meaningful change. Beliefs about volatility (expectation of change) are associated with paranoia in humans, but the brain regions responsible for volatility beliefs remain unknown. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is central to adaptive behavior, whereas the magnocellular mediodorsal thalamus (MDmc) is essential for arbitrating between perceptions and action policies. We assessed belief updating in a three-choice probabilistic reversal learning task following excitotoxic lesions of the MDmc (n = 3) or OFC (n = 3) and compared performance with that of unoperated monkeys (n = 14). Computational analyses indicated a double dissociation: MDmc, but not OFC, lesions were associated with erratic switching behavior and heightened volatility belief (as in paranoia in humans), whereas OFC, but not MDmc, lesions were associated with increased lose-stay behavior and reward learning rates. Given the consilience across species and models, these results have implications for understanding paranoia.

Multiple and subject-specific roles of uncertainty in reward-guided decision-making

Decision-making in noisy, changing, and partially observable environments entails a basic tradeoff between immediate reward and longer-term information gain, known as the exploration-exploitation dilemma. Computationally, an effective way to balance this tradeoff is by leveraging uncertainty to guide exploration. Yet, in humans, empirical findings are mixed, from suggesting uncertainty-seeking to indifference and avoidance. In a novel bandit task that better captures uncertainty-driven behavior, we find multiple roles for uncertainty in human choices. First, stable and psychologically meaningful individual differences in uncertainty preferences actually range from seeking to avoidance, which can manifest as null group-level effects. Second, uncertainty modulates the use of basic decision heuristics that imperfectly exploit immediate rewards: a repetition bias and win-stay-lose-shift heuristic. These heuristics interact with uncertainty, favoring heuristic choices under higher uncertainty. These results, highlighting the rich and varied structure of reward-based choice, are a step to understanding its functional basis and dysfunction in psychopathology.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Dopamine regulates attitude toward risk

Specific brain pathways can lower or raise the willingness of monkeys to take risks.

An opponent striatal circuit for distributional reinforcement learning

Machine learning research has achieved large performance gains on a wide range of tasks by expanding the learning target from mean rewards to entire probability distributions of rewards - an approach known as distributional reinforcement learning (RL)1. The mesolimbic dopamine system is thought to underlie RL in the mammalian brain by updating a representation of mean value in the striatum2,3, but little is known about whether, where, and how neurons in this circuit encode information about higher-order moments of reward distributions4. To fill this gap, we used high-density probes (Neuropixels) to acutely record striatal activity from well-trained, water-restricted mice performing a classical conditioning task in which reward mean, reward variance, and stimulus identity were independently manipulated. In contrast to traditional RL accounts, we found robust evidence for abstract encoding of variance in the striatum. Remarkably, chronic ablation of dopamine inputs disorganized these distributional representations in the striatum without interfering with mean value coding. Two-photon calcium imaging and optogenetics revealed that the two major classes of striatal medium spiny neurons - D1 and D2 MSNs - contributed to this code by preferentially encoding the right and left tails of the reward distribution, respectively. We synthesize these findings into a new model of the striatum and mesolimbic dopamine that harnesses the opponency between D1 and D2 MSNs5-15 to reap the computational benefits of distributional RL.

Bayesian encoding and decoding as distinct perspectives on neural coding

The Bayesian brain hypothesis is one of the most influential ideas in neuroscience. However, unstated differences in how Bayesian ideas are operationalized make it difficult to draw general conclusions about how Bayesian computations map onto neural circuits. Here, we identify one such unstated difference: some theories ask how neural circuits could recover information about the world from sensory neural activity (Bayesian decoding), whereas others ask how neural circuits could implement inference in an internal model (Bayesian encoding). These two approaches require profoundly different assumptions and lead to different interpretations of empirical data. We contrast them in terms of motivations, empirical support and relationship to neural data. We also use a simple model to argue that encoding and decoding models are complementary rather than competing. Appreciating the distinction between Bayesian encoding and Bayesian decoding will help to organize future work and enable stronger empirical tests about the nature of inference in the brain.