Real and hypothetical monetary rewards modulate risk taking in the brain

Hilaire MA, Arrona-Palacios A, Czeisler CA, Duffy JF. Time of Day and Sleep Deprivation Effects on Risky Decision Making

Previous research has revealed that daily variations in human neurobehavioral functions are driven in part by the endogenous circadian system. The objective of this study was to explore whether there exists a circadian influence on performance regarding a risky decision-making task and to determine whether the performance changes with sleep deprivation (SD). Thirteen participants underwent a 39 h constant routine (CR) protocol, during which they remained awake in constant conditions and performed the BART (balloon analogue risk task) every two hours. The mean pumps (gains) (p < 0.001) and balloons popped (losses) (p = 0.003) exhibited variation during the CR. The reaction time (RT) also showed significant variation across the CR (p < 0.001), with slower mean RTs in the morning hours following SD. A greater risk propensity was observed around midday before SD and a lower risk propensity after 29.5 h of being awake. The sensitivity to punishment varied during the CR, but did not follow a predictable trend. Further research using real monetary incentives and neurophysiological measures is warranted to elucidate these findings.

The link between social comparison orientation and domain-specific risk-taking: exploring the mediating role of two dimensions of trait competitiveness

Introduction

Our recent research has demonstrated that social comparison orientation of ability (SCO-ability) is an antecedent of trait competitiveness (TC), and TC mediates the relation between SCO-ability and domain-specific risk-taking. TC is a multi-dimensional trait, therefore we sought to expand on prior research by examining whether SCO-ability predicted two distinct dimensions of TC: hypercompetitive orientation (HCO) and self-development competitive orientation (SDCO).

Methods

We investigated how these different dimensions of TC mediated the relation between SCO-ability and both overall and domain-specific risk-taking in two correlational studies of 622 college students (313 males, mean age = 22.10, SD = 2.35) and 717 adult workers (368 males, mean age = 27.92, SD = 5.11).

Results

We found that SCO-ability positively predicted HCO. Together, SCO-ability and HCO predicted overall risk-taking and risk-taking in the recreational and ethical domains in both samples. HCO mediated the relation between SCO-ability and both overall risk-taking and risk-taking in the recreational and ethical domains. Additionally, SCO-ability positively predicted SDCO. SCO-ability and SDCO mainly predicted risk-taking in the recreational domain in both studies. SDCO mediated the relation between SCO-ability and risk-taking only in the recreational domain.

Discussion

Collectively, the findings above advance our understanding of the relation between competition and risk-taking by using differentiated measures of TC (HCO and SDCO). Our findings suggest that HCO is more strongly related to risk-taking than SDCO, thereby refining the possible role of SCO-ability and TC in predicting overall risk-taking and domain-specific risk-taking.

Adaptations of the balloon analog risk task for neuroimaging settings: a systematic review

Introduction

The Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART), a computerized behavioral paradigm, is one of the most common tools used to assess the risk-taking propensity of an individual. Since its initial behavioral version, the BART has been adapted to neuroimaging technique to explore brain networks of risk-taking behavior. However, while there are a variety of paradigms adapted to neuroimaging to date, no consensus has been reached on the best paradigm with the appropriate parameters to study the brain during risk-taking assessed by the BART. In this review of the literature, we aimed to identify the most appropriate BART parameters to adapt the initial paradigm to neuroimaging and increase the reliability of this tool.

Methods

A systematic review focused on the BART versions adapted to neuroimaging was performed in accordance with PRISMA guidelines.

Results

A total of 105 articles with 6,879 subjects identified from the PubMed database met the inclusion criteria. The BART was adapted in four neuroimaging techniques, mostly in functional magnetic resonance imaging or electroencephalography settings.

Discussion

First, to adapt the BART to neuroimaging, a delay was included between each trial, the total number of inflations was reduced between 12 and 30 pumps, and the number of trials was increased between 80 and 100 balloons, enabling us to respect the recording constraints of neuroimaging. Second, explicit feedback about the balloon burst limited the decisions under ambiguity associated with the first trials. Third, employing an outcome index that provides more informative measures than the standard average pump score, along with a model incorporating an exponential monotonic increase in explosion probability and a maximum explosion probability between 50 and 75%, can yield a reliable estimation of risk profile. Additionally, enhancing participant motivation can be achieved by increasing the reward in line with the risk level and implementing payment based on their performance in the BART. Although there is no universal adaptation of the BART to neuroimaging, and depending on the objectives of a study, an adjustment of parameters optimizes its evaluation and clinical utility in assessing risk-taking.

Tools for the Assessment of Risk-Taking Behavior in Older Adults with Mild Dementia: A Cross-Sectional Clinical Study

Diseases such as Alzheimer's cause an alteration of cognitive functions, which can lead to increased daily risk-taking in older adults living at home. The assessment of decision-making abilities is primarily based on clinicians' global analysis. Usual neuropsychological tests such as the MoCA (Montreal Cognitive Assessment) cover most of the cognitive domains and include mental flexibility tasks. Specific behavioral tasks for risk-taking, such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) or the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), have been developed to assess risk-taking behavior, particularly in the field of addictology. Our cross-sectional study aims to determine whether the MoCA global cognitive assessment could be used as a substitute for behavioral tasks in the assessment of risky behavior. In the current study, 24 patients (age: 82.1 ± 5.9) diagnosed with mild dementia completed the cognitive assessment (MoCA and executive function assessment) and two behavioral risk-taking tasks (BART, simplified version of the IGT). Results revealed no relationship between scores obtained in the MoCA and behavioral decision-making tasks. However, the two tasks assessing risk-taking behavior resulted in concordant risk profiles. In addition, patients with a high risk-taking behavior profile on the BART had better Trail Making Test (TMT) scores and thus retained mental flexibility. These findings suggest that MoCA scores are not representative of risk-taking behavioral inclinations. Thus, additional clinical tests should be used to assess risk-taking behavior in geriatric settings. Executive function measures, such as the TMT, and behavioral laboratory measures, such as the BART, are recommended for this purpose.

Distinct inter-brain synchronization patterns underlying group decision-making under uncertainty with partners in different interpersonal relationships

Humans may behave in different manners when making decisions with friends and strangers. Whether the interpersonal relationship and the characteristics of the individuals in the group affected the group decision-making under uncertainty in the real-time interaction remains unknown. Using the turn-based Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), the present study examined the group decision-making propensity under uncertainty with partners in different interpersonal relationships and interpersonal orientations. Corresponding inter-brain synchronization (IBS) patterns at the prefrontal cortex (PFC) were also uncovered with the fNIRS-based hyperscanning approach. Behavioral results identified that dyads in the friend group exhibited the uncertainty-averse propensity when comparing with the stranger group. The fNIRS results reported that feedback-related IBS at the left inferior frontal gyrus (l-IFG) and medial frontopolar cortex (mFPC) during different feedbacks was modulated by interpersonal relationships. The IBS at all channels in the PFC during the positive and negative feedbacks, respectively, predicted the decision-making propensity under uncertainty in the stranger and friend groups based on the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm. The moderating role of the social value orientation (SVO) was also verified in the mediation effect of the dyad closeness on the decision-making propensity under uncertainty via the IBS at the right lateral frontopolar cortex (r-FPC). These findings demonstrated disparate behavioral responses and inter-brain synchronization patterns underlying group decision-making under uncertainty with partners in different interpersonal relationships.

A negative emotional context disrupts the framing effect on outcome evaluation in decision making under uncertainty: An ERP study

The framing effect refers to the phenomenon that different descriptions of the same option lead to a shift in the choice of the decision maker. Several studies have found that emotional contexts irrelevant to a decision in progress still influence the framing effect on decision making. However, little is known about the potential role of emotional contexts in the framing effect on outcome evaluation under uncertainty and the related neural mechanisms. The present study measured event-related potentials (ERPs) to capture the time series of brain activities during the processing of gain- and loss-framed choices and outcomes primed with neutral and negative emotional contexts. The results revealed that in the neutral emotional context, the P300 amplitudes following both positive and negative feedback were greater in the gain-framed condition than those in the loss-framed condition, demonstrating a framing effect, whereas in the negative emotional context, this effect was unstable and observed only following negative feedback. In contrast, regardless of whether the feedback was positive or negative, the framing effect on the feedback-related negativity (FRN) amplitudes was insensitive to neutral and negative emotional contexts. Furthermore, the time-frequency analysis showed that the framing effect on the theta power related to the FRN was also insensitive to neutral and negative emotional contexts. Our findings suggest that brain responses to framing effects on outcome evaluation in a later cognitive appraisal stage of decision making under uncertainty may depend on the emotional context, as the effects were observed only following negative feedback in the negative emotional context.

Relationship between virtual reality balloon analogue risk task and risky decision-making

The balloon analogue risk task (BART) is widely used to assess risk-taking tendencies on behavioral tests. However, biases or unstable results are sometimes reported, and there are concerns about whether the BART can predict risk behavior in the real world. To address this problem, the present study developed a virtual reality (VR) BART to enhance the reality of the task and narrow the gap between performance on the BART and risk behavior in the real world. We evaluated the usability of our VR BART through assessments of the relationships between BART scores and psychological metrics and additionally implemented an emergency decision-making VR driving task to investigate further whether the VR BART can predict risk-related decision-making in emergency situations. Notably, we found that the BART score significantly correlated with both sensation-seeking and risky driving behavior. Additionally, when we split participants into groups with high and low BART scores and compared their psychological metrics, we found that the high-score BART group included more male participants and exhibited higher sensation-seeking and more risky decision-making in an emergency situation. Overall, our study shows the potential of our new VR BART paradigm to predict risky decision-making in the real world.

Deterministic and probabilistic regularities underlying risky choices are acquired in a changing decision context

Predictions supporting risky decisions could become unreliable when outcome probabilities temporarily change, making adaptation more challenging. Therefore, this study investigated whether sensitivity to the temporal structure in outcome probabilities can develop and remain persistent in a changing decision environment. In a variant of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task with 90 balloons, outcomes (rewards or balloon bursts) were predictable in the task's first and final 30 balloons and unpredictable in the middle 30 balloons. The temporal regularity underlying the predictable outcomes differed across three experimental conditions. In the deterministic condition, a repeating three-element sequence dictated the maximum number of pumps before a balloon burst. In the probabilistic condition, a single probabilistic regularity ensured that burst probability increased as a function of pumps. In the hybrid condition, a repeating sequence of three different probabilistic regularities increased burst probabilities. In every condition, the regularity was absent in the middle 30 balloons. Participants were not informed about the presence or absence of the regularity. Sensitivity to both the deterministic and hybrid regularities emerged and influenced risk taking. Unpredictable outcomes of the middle phase did not deteriorate this sensitivity. In conclusion, humans can adapt their risky choices in a changing decision environment by exploiting the statistical structure that controls how the environment changes.

People conform to social norms when gambling with lives or money

Many consider moral decisions to follow an internal "moral compass", resistant to social pressures. Here we examine how social influence shapes moral decisions under risk, and how it operates in different decision contexts. We employed an adapted Asian Disease Paradigm where participants chose between certain losses/gains and probabilistic losses/gains in a series of moral (lives) or financial (money) decisions. We assessed participants' own risk preferences before and after exposing them to social norms that are generally risk-averse or risk-seeking. Our results showed that participants robustly shifted their own choices towards the observed risk preferences. This conformity holds even after a re-testing in three days. Interestingly, in the monetary domain, risk-averse norms have more influence on choices in the loss frame, whereas risk-seeking norms have more influence in the gain frame, presumably because norms that contradict default behavior are most informative. In the moral domain, risk-averse as opposed to risk-seeking norms are more effective in the loss frame but in the gain frame different norms are equally effective. Taken together, our results demonstrate conformity in risk preferences across contexts and highlight unique features of decisions and conformity in moral and monetary domains.

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays causal role in probability weighting during risky choice

In this study, we provide causal evidence that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) supports the computation of subjective value in choices under risk via its involvement in probability weighting. Following offline continuous theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (cTBS) of the DLPFC subjects (N = 30, mean age 23.6, 56% females) completed a computerized task consisting of 96 binary lottery choice questions presented in random order. Using the hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach, we then estimated the structural parameters of risk preferences (the degree of risk aversion and the curvature of the probability weighting function) and analyzed the obtained posterior distributions to determine the effect of stimulation on model parameters. On a behavioral level, temporary downregulation of the left DLPFC excitability through cTBS decreased the likelihood of choosing an option with higher expected reward while the probability of choosing a riskier lottery did not significantly change. Modeling the stimulation effects on risk preference parameters showed anecdotal evidence as assessed by Bayes factors that probability weighting parameter increased after the left DLPFC TMS compared to sham.

Appropriately Tuning Stochastic-Psychometric Properties of the Balloon Analog Risk Task

The Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) allows to experimentally assess individuals’ risk-taking profiles in an ecologically sound setting. Many psychological and neuroscientific studies implemented the BART for its simplicity and intuitive nature. However, some issues in the design of the BART are systematically unconsidered in experimental paradigms, which may bias the estimation of individual risk-taking profiles. Since there are no methodological guidelines for implementing the BART, many variables (e.g., the maximum explosion probabilities, the rationale underlying stochastic events) vary inconstantly across experiments, possibly producing contrasting results. Moreover, the standard version of the BART is affected by the interaction of an individual-dependent, unavoidable source of stochasticity with a trial-dependent, more ambiguous source of stochasticity (i.e., the probability of the balloon to explode). This paper shows the most appropriate experimental choices for having the lowest error in the approximation of risk-taking profiles. Performance tests of a series of simulated data suggest that a more controlled, eventually non-stochastic version of the BART, better approximates original risk-taking profiles. Selecting optimal BART parameters is particularly important in neuroscience experiments to optimize the number of trials in a time window appropriate for acquiring neuroimaging data. We also provide helpful suggestions to researchers in many fields to allow the implementation of optimized risk-taking experiments using the BART.

A Bayesian method for measuring risk propensity in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task

The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) is widely-used to measure risk propensity in theoretical, clinical, and applied research. In the task, people choose either to pump a balloon to increase its value at the risk of the balloon bursting and losing all value, or to bank the current value of the balloon. Risk propensity is most commonly measured as the average number of pumps on trials for which the balloon does not burst. Burst trials are excluded because they necessarily underestimate the number of pumps people intended to make. However, their exclusion discards relevant information about people's risk propensity. A better measure of risk propensity uses the statistical method of censoring to incorporate all of the trials. We develop a new Bayesian method, based on censoring, for measuring both risk propensity and behavioral consistency in the BART. Through applications to previous data we demonstrate how the method can be extended to consider the correlation of risk propensity with external measures, and to compare differences in risk propensity between groups. We provide implementations of all of these methods in R, MATLAB, and the GUI-based statistical software JASP.

Event-related brain potentials reflect predictive coding of anticipated economic change

Research has demonstrated the importance of economic forecasts for financial decisions at the aggregate economic level. However, little is known about the psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms that economic forecasts activate at the level of individual decision-making. In the present study, we used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to test the hypothesis that economic forecasts influence individuals’ internal model of the economy and their subsequent decision behavior. Using a simple economic decision-making game, the Balloon Analogue of Risk Task (BART) and predictive messages about possible economic changes in the game before each block, we test the idea that brain potentials time-locked to decision outcomes can vary as a function of exposure to economic forecasts. Behavioural results indicate that economic forecasts influenced the amount of risk that participants were willing to take. Analyses of brain potentials indicated parametric increases of the N1, P2, P3a, and P3b amplitudes as a function of the level of risk in subsequent inflation steps in the BART. Mismatches between economic forecasts and decision outcomes in the BART (i.e., reward prediction errors) were reflected in the amplitude of the P2, P3a, and P3b, suggesting increased attentional processing of unexpected outcomes. These electrophysiological results corroborate the idea that economic messages may indeed influence people’s beliefs about the economy and bias their subsequent financial decision-making. Our findings present a first important step in the development of a low-level neurophysiological model that may help to explain the self-fulfilling prophecy effect of economic news in the larger economy.

Risk-Aversion for Negative Health Outcomes May Promote Individual Compliance to Containment Measures in Covid-19 Pandemic

First-person experience of stressful life events can change individuals' risk attitudes, driving to increased or decreased risk perception. This shift to more risk-averse or risk-loving behaviors may find a correlate in the individual psycho-socio-emotional profile. To this purpose, we aimed to estimate the relationship between differences in risk-taking attitudes toward possible negative health outcomes and psycho-socio-emotional dimensions modulating the experience of life-threatening situations, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. In March 2020, we launched the PsyCovid Study (https://wprn.org/item/428452) to assess psycho-socio-emotional changes due to Covid-19 pandemic in the Italian population. Additionally, we distributed to 130 participants the Covid-19 Risk Task, including monetary and health-related stimuli, estimating a measure of risk-aversion toward health and classifying participants on the basis of their risk-attitude profiles. The set of psycho-socio-emotional variables was reduced to three PCA components: Proactivity, Isolation, Inactivity. The individual degree of risk-aversion toward negative health outcomes was directly related to Proactivity, encasing empathic, social support and positive coping strategies, which may prompt individuals to put in place self-protection strategies toward possible negative health consequences. These findings indicate that a risk-averse profile toward possible negative health outcomes may be associated to higher levels of individual prosocial and proactive dispositions, possibly making individuals' more compliant with the social and hygienic guidelines and, thus, reducing their exposure to the SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Towards a Functional Neuromarker of Impulsivity: Feedback-Related Brain Potential during Risky Decision-Making Associated with Self-Reported Impulsivity in a Non-Clinical Sample

Risk-taking is part of the multidimensional nature of impulsivity, consisting of an active engagement in behaviors or choices with potentially undesirable results, with probability as the cost for an expected reward. In order to understand the neurophysiological activity during risky behavior and its relationship with other dimensions of impulsivity, we have acquired event-related-potential (ERP) data and self-reported impulsivity scores from 17 non-clinical volunteers. They underwent high-resolution electroencephalography (HR-EEG) combined with an adapted version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), and completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-10) and the Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS). The ERP components were sensitive to valence (FRN, P300) and risk/reward magnitude (SPN, RewP). Our main finding evidenced a positive correlation between the amplitude of the P300 component following positive feedback and both the global UPPS score and the (lack of) perseverance UPPS subscale, significant for several adjacent electrodes. This finding might suggest an adaptive form of impulsive behavior, which could be associated to the reduction on the difference of the P300 amplitude following negative and positive feedback. However, further investigation with both larger clinical and non-clinical samples is required.

Adaptation to recent outcomes attenuates the lasting effect of initial experience on risky decisions

Both primarily and recently encountered information have been shown to influence experience-based risky decision making. The primacy effect predicts that initial experience will influence later choices even if outcome probabilities change and reward is ultimately more or less sparse than primarily experienced. However, it has not been investigated whether extended initial experience would induce a more profound primacy effect upon risky choices than brief experience. Therefore, the present study tested in two experiments whether young adults adjusted their risk-taking behavior in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task after an unsignaled and unexpected change point. The change point separated early "good luck" or "bad luck" trials from subsequent ones. While mostly positive (more reward) or mostly negative (no reward) events characterized the early trials, subsequent trials were unbiased. In Experiment 1, the change point occurred after one-sixth or one-third of the trials (brief vs. extended experience) without intermittence, whereas in Experiment 2, it occurred between separate task phases. In Experiment 1, if negative events characterized the early trials, after the change point, risk-taking behavior increased as compared with the early trials. Conversely, if positive events characterized the early trials, risk-taking behavior decreased after the change point. Although the adjustment of risk-taking behavior occurred due to integrating recent experiences, the impact of initial experience was simultaneously observed. The length of initial experience did not reliably influence the adjustment of behavior. In Experiment 2, participants became more prone to take risks as the task progressed, indicating that the impact of initial experience could be overcome. Altogether, we suggest that initial beliefs about outcome probabilities can be updated by recent experiences to adapt to the continuously changing decision environment.

Self-reported daily sleep quality modulates the impact of the framing effect on outcome evaluation in decision-making under uncertainty: An ERP study

A growing body of research has largely confirmed and supported the idea that experimental sleep loss, such as sleep deprivation or sleep restriction, could affect individuals' risk-taking behavior and brain activity. However, whether self-reported sleep quality resulting from daily life modulates how feedback is evaluated during decision-making is still unclear. In this study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) with a Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) to investigate how self-reported daily sleep quality modulates the brain's response to feedback from decision-making in the gain and loss frames. Behavioral data showed an increased aversion to uncertainty in the gain frame relative to the loss frame for individuals with higher sleep quality. However, this was not true for individuals with lower voluntary sleep quality. Similarly, the ERP data demonstrated that individuals with lower self-reported daily sleep quality displayed no changes in feedback-related negativity (FRN) in response to outcomes from decision-making in the gain and loss frames; however, individuals with higher self-reported daily sleep quality showed a greater FRN in response to decision-making in the gain frame than that in the loss frame. A Pearson correlation analysis showed that self-reported daily sleep quality was positively related to the variance of the FRN amplitude in response to the gain and loss frames. These findings suggest that framing effects on decision-making under uncertainty may depend on self-reported daily sleep quality and that the effects disappear when the sleep quality declines.

Age differences in risk taking: now you see them, now you don't

Older age has often, but not always, been associated with less risk taking. Inconsistencies may be due to diversity in the risk-taking measures used and/or individual differences in cognitive abilities. We investigated the robustness of age differences in risk taking across three measures, and tested whether age differences in risk taking remained after accounting for cognitive abilities. Younger (aged 25-36) and older (aged 60+) adults completed behavioral (i.e., Balloon Analogue Risk Task, BART) and self-report (i.e., framing tasks and Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire) measures of risk, as well as several measures of cognitive ability (i.e., analytic thinking, numeracy, processing speed, memory, and attention). Older adults showed significantly less risk taking than younger adults on the behavioral measure of risk, but not on the two self-report measures. Older adults also had significantly lower analytic thinking, slower processing speed, and worse executive control compared to younger adults. Less risk taking on the BART was associated with lower analytic thinking and numeracy, slower processing speed, and worse shifting of attention. Age differences in risk taking on the BART remained after accounting for older adults' lower scores on tests of cognitive abilities. Implications for measuring age differences in risk taking are discussed.

When piloting health services interventions, what predicts real world behaviours? A systematic concept mapping review

Background

Modeling studies to inform the design of complex health services interventions often involves elements that differ from the intervention’s ultimate real-world use. These “hypothetical” elements include pilot participants, materials, and settings. Understanding the conditions under which studies with “hypothetical” elements can yield valid results would greatly help advance health services research. Our objectives are: 1) to conduct a systematic review of the literature to identify factors affecting the relationship between hypothetical decisions and real-world behaviours, and 2) to summarise and organize these factors into a preliminary framework.

Methods

We conducted an electronic database search using PsycINFO and Medline on November 30th, 2015, updated March 7th, 2019. We also conducted a supplemental snowball search on December 9th 2015 and a reverse citation search using Scopus and Web of Science. Studies were eligible to be included in this review if they clearly addressed the consistency between some type of hypothetical decision and a corresponding real decision or behaviour. Two reviewers extracted data using a standardized data collection form developed through an iterative consensus-based process. We extracted basic study information and data about each study’s research area, design, and research question. Quotations from the articles were extracted and summarized into standardized factor statements.

Results

Of the 2444 articles that were screened, 68 articles were included in the review. The articles identified 27 factors that we grouped into 4 categories: decision maker factors, cognitive factors, task factors, and matching factors.

Conclusions

We have summarized a large number of factors that may be relevant when considering whether hypothetical health services pilot work can be expected to yield results that are consistent with real-world behaviours. Our descriptive framework can serve as the basis for organizing future work exploring which factors are most relevant when seeking to develop complex health services interventions.

Consequences of Poverty on Economic Decision-Making: Assessing the Verisimilitude of the Cognitive Mechanism

The paper aims to assess the verisimilitude of the hypothesized model of poverty perpetuation which links socioeconomic situation and economic preferences via cognitive load, executive functions, and intuitive/deliberative decision-making styles. In order to test the model against the data, three studies (exploratory, confirmatory, and replication) were conducted with a total sample size of 1182 participants. The results showed that neither the proposed model as a whole found the required support in the data nor the consequent, theoretically justifiable, respecifications improved its fit so that it could be deemed acceptable. Simultaneously, the dyadic relationships between the variables were mainly found to be weak. The sensitivity analysis revealed that the majority of the observed estimates varied substantively depending on the arbitrary analytic decisions of the researcher. In summary, the hypothesized cognitive mechanism does not explain what economic decision-making depends on nor why people fall into poverty traps. The paper discusses several plausible sources of the negative findings and possible directions for future research are suggested.

Test-retest reliability of brain responses to risk-taking during the balloon analogue risk task

The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) provides a reliable and ecologically valid model for the assessment of individual risk-taking propensity and is frequently used in neuroimaging and developmental research. Although the test-retest reliability of risk-taking behavior during the BART is well established, the reliability of brain activation patterns in response to risk-taking during the BART remains elusive. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and evaluated the test-retest reliability of brain responses in 34 healthy adults during a modified BART by calculating the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) and Dice’s similarity coefficients (DSC). Analyses revealed that risk-induced brain activation patterns showed good test-retest reliability (median ICC = 0.62) and moderate to high spatial consistency, while brain activation patterns associated with win or loss outcomes only had poor to fair reliability (median ICC = 0.33 for win and 0.42 for loss). These findings have important implications for future utility of the BART in fMRI to examine brain responses to risk-taking and decision-making.

Agreeableness modulates group member risky decision-making behavior and brain activity

When facing difficult decisions, people typically believe that "two heads are better than one". However, findings from previous studies are inconsistent regarding the advantages of decision-making in groups as compared to individual decision-making. We hypothesize that personality traits may modulate risk-taking behavior and brain activity changes during group decision-making. In this study, we used event-related potentials (ERP) with a well-validated balloon analogue risk task (BART) paradigm to examine the relationships between personality traits, decision-making behavior, and brain activity patterns when a cohort of male participants make decisions and take risks both in groups and in isolation. We found significantly increased risk-taking behavior and reduced P300 component during group decision-making as compared to individual decision-making only for participants with high Agreeableness, but not for those with low Agreeableness. Moreover, Agreeableness scores correlated with risk-taking behavior and P300 amplitude changes in group decisions. These findings suggest that Agreeableness personality modulates risk-taking behavior and brain activity when people make decisions in groups, which have implications for future group decision research and practice.

Do our risk preferences change when we make decisions for others? A meta-analysis of self-other differences in decisions involving risk

BACKGROUND

Are we more risk-averse or risk-seeking when we make decisions on behalf of other people as opposed to ourselves? So far, findings have not been able to provide a clear and consistent answer.

METHOD

We propose a meta-analysis to assess whether self-other differences vary according to particular features of the decision. We reviewed 78 effect sizes from 49 studies (7,576 participants).

RESULTS

There was no overall self-other difference, but there were moderating effects of domain and frame. Decisions in the interpersonal domain were more risk-averse for self than for other. Decisions in the medical domain were more risk-seeking for self than for other. There were no overall self-other differences in the financial domain, however there was a moderating effect of frame: decisions in a gain frame were more risk-averse for self than other whereas decisions in a loss frame were more risk-seeking for self than other. This effect of frame was slightly different overall and in the medical domain, where self-other differences occurred in a loss frame but not in a gain frame.

CONCLUSION

Future work should continue to investigate how the specific content and context of the decision impacts self-other differences in order to understand the effects of domain and frame we report.

Event-related potentials in response to feedback following risk-taking in the hot version of the Columbia Card Task

Given the importance of risk-taking in individuals' personal and professional life, several behavioral tasks for measuring the construct have been developed. Recently, a new task was introduced, the Columbia Card Task (CCT). This task measures participants' risk levels and establishes how sensitive participants are to gains, losses, and probabilities when taking risk. So far, the CCT has been examined in behavioral studies and in combination with several (neuro)biological techniques. However, no electroencephalography (EEG) research has been done on the task. The present study fills this gap and helps to validate this relatively new experimental task. To this end, n = 126 students were asked to complete self-reports (reward responsiveness, impulsiveness, and sensation-seeking) and to perform the CCT (and other risk tasks) in an EEG setup. The results show that feedback appraisal after risky decision-making in the CCT was accompanied by a feedback-related negativity (FRN) and a P300, which were stronger in response to negative than positive feedback. Correlations between the FRN and P300 difference wave on the one hand and risk-related self-reports and behavior on the other were nonsignificant and small, but were mostly in the expected direction. This pattern did not change after excluding participants with psychiatric/neurological disorders and outliers. Excluding participants with reversed (positive > negative) difference waves strengthened FRN correlations. The impact such individuals can have on the data should be taken into account in future studies. Regarding the CCT in particular, future studies should also address its oddball structure and its masking of true values (censoring).

Hypothetical Versus Real Monetary Reward Decrease the Behavioral and Affective Effects in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task

Abstract. A critical question is whether the same decision-making processes underlie task performance with hypothetical and real money as rewards. Across two studies, we administered the Balloon Analogue Risk Task to healthy young adults under these two reward conditions. We found that participants displayed greater risk aversion during trials immediately after the balloon exploded in the previous trial in case the reward was real money, than if the reward was hypothetical money and exhibited greater subjective ratings of regret following losing trials. Moreover, subjective regret ratings after the balloon exploded in the previous trial with real money correlated with risk-taking behavior changes in the current trial, whereas we did not observe this correlation with hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, when we manipulated the real money amounts to be large or small, participants were more risk averse in the large real money condition compared to the real money amount, whereas we did not observe these differences with varying amounts of hypothetical money.

Differential effects of real versus hypothetical monetary reward magnitude on risk-taking behavior and brain activity

Human decisions are more easily affected by a larger amount of money than a smaller one. Although numerous studies have used hypothetical money as incentives to motivate human behavior, the validity of hypothetical versus real monetary rewards remains controversial. In the present study, we used event-related potential (ERP) with the balloon analogue risk task to investigate how magnitudes of real and hypothetical monetary rewards modulate risk-taking behavior and feedback-related negativity (FRN). Behavioral data showed that participants were more risk averse after negative feedback with increased magnitude of real monetary rewards, while no behavior differences were observed between large and small hypothetical monetary rewards. Similarly, ERP data showed a larger FRN in response to negative feedback during risk taking with large compared to small real monetary rewards, while no FRN differences were observed between large and small hypothetical monetary rewards. Moreover, FRN amplitude differences correlated with risk-taking behavior changes from small to large real monetary rewards, while such correlation was not observed for hypothetical monetary rewards. These findings suggest that the magnitudes of real and hypothetical monetary rewards have differential effects on risk-taking behavior and brain activity. Real and hypothetical money incentives may have different validity for modulating human decisions.

Hot and cool executive function in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorder: Cross-sectional developmental trajectories

The development of executive function (EF) in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has only been investigated using "cool"-cognitive-EF tasks. Little is known about the development of "hot"-affective-EF and whether it follows a similar developmental pathway. This study employed a cross-sectional developmental trajectories approach to examine the developmental changes in cool (working memory, inhibition, and planning) and hot EF (delay discounting and affective decision-making) of ASD participants (n = 79) and controls (n = 91) relative to age and IQ, shedding more light on the hot-cool EF organization. The developmental trajectories of some aspects of cool EF (working memory and planning) differed significantly as a function of age in ASD participants relative to controls. For both hot EFs, no significant age-related changes were found in either group. These findings extend our understanding regarding the maturation of EF from childhood through adolescence in ASD.

The influence of groups and alcohol consumption on individual risk-taking

BACKGROUND

Research addressing the influence of alcohol and groups on risky behaviour has yielded contradictory findings regarding the extent to which intoxicated groups exaggerate or minimise risk-taking. Previous work has examined the effect of intoxication on risk-taking focusing on collective group decision-making, and to date the influence of alcohol consumption and groups on individual risk-taking has yet to be explored experimentally. The current study therefore examined the impact of intoxication and groups on individual risk-taking.

METHODS

In a mixed design, 99 social drinkers (62 female) attended an experimental session individually (N=48) or in groups of three (N=51). Individuals completed the study in isolation while groups were tested in the same room. Participants completed two behavioural measures of risk-taking: Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) and Stoplight Task (SLT), both before and following consumption of an alcoholic (0.6g/kg males, 0.5g/kg females) or a placebo beverage.

RESULTS

Those who participated in groups took significantly more risks in both tasks than those in isolation. Alcohol did not increase risk-taking on either risk-taking tasks. However, those who consumed placebo were significantly less risky on the SLT, compared to baseline. No interactions were found between context and beverage on risk-taking.

CONCLUSION

The findings do not support a combined effect of alcohol and groups on individual risk-taking. Rather, results indicate that risk-taking behaviour is influenced by peer presence regardless of alcohol consumption. Targeting the influence of groups (above those of alcohol) may hold promise for reducing risk-taking behaviours in drinking environments.

Temporal dynamics of object location processing in allocentric reference frame

The spatial location of objects is processed in egocentric and allocentric reference frames, the early temporal dynamics of which have remained relatively unexplored. Previous experiments focused on ERP components related only to egocentric navigation. Thus, we designed a virtual reality experiment to see whether allocentric reference frame-related ERP modulations can also be registered. Participants collected reward objects at the end of the west and east alleys of a cross maze, and their ERPs to the feedback objects were measured. Participants made turn choices from either the south or the north alley randomly in each trial. In this way, we were able to discern place and response coding of object location. Behavioral results indicated a strong preference for using the allocentric reference frame and a preference for choosing the rewarded place in the next trial, suggesting that participants developed probabilistic expectations between places and rewards. We also found that the amplitude of the P1 was sensitive to the allocentric place of the reward object, independent of its value. We did not find evidence for egocentric response learning. These results show that early ERPs are sensitive to the location of objects during navigation in an allocentric reference frame.