Dissociations Among Attention, Perception, and Awareness During Object-Substitution Masking

Need for cross-level iterative re-entry in models of visual processing

Two main hypotheses regarding the directional flow of visual information processing in the brain have been proposed: feed-forward (bottom-up) and re-entrant (top-down). Early theories espoused feed-forward principles in which processing was said to advance from simple to increasingly complex attributes terminating at a higher area where conscious perceptions occur. That view is disconfirmed by advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, which implicate re-entrant two-way signaling as the predominant form of communication between brain regions. With some notable exceptions, the notion of re-entrant processing has had a relatively modest effect on computational models of perception and cognition, which continue to be predominantly based on feed-forward or within-level re-entrant principles. In the present work we describe five sets of empirical findings that defy interpretation in terms of feed-forward or within-level re-entrant principles. We conclude by urging the adoption of psychophysical, biological, and computational models based on cross-level iterative re-entrant principles.

Attention with or without working memory: mnemonic reselection of attended information

Attention has been regarded as the 'gatekeeper' controlling what information gets selected into working memory. However, a new perspective has emerged with the discovery of attribute amnesia, a phenomenon revealing that people are frequently unable to report information they have just attended to moments ago. This report failure is thought to stem from a lack of consolidating the attended information into working memory, indicating a dissociation between attention and working memory. Building on these findings, a new concept called memory reselection is proposed to describe a secondary round of selection among the attended information. These discoveries challenge the conventional view of how attention and working memory are related and shed new light onto modeling attention and memory as dissociable processes.

Neural Correlates of Visual Attention and Short-Term Memory in Children with Reading Difficulty

Visual attention and memory of 20 children with reading difficulty (M_age = 134 months), 24 chronological (M_age = 138 months) and 19 reading-age controls (M_age = 92 months) were examined using object substitution masking; mask offset delay increases visual attention and visual short-term memory demands. ERP amplitude differences in the N1 (alerting), N2pc (N2-posterior-contralateral; selective attention), and SPCN (sustained posterior contralateral negativity; memory load) were expected between groups. Chronological controls performed best, but ERP results were mixed. No group differences were found for N1 or N2pc. SPCN showed enhanced negativity in reading difficulty, indicating greater memory load and anomalous inhibition.

Nonconscious information can be identified as task-relevant but not prioritized in working memory

Two critical features of working memory are the identification and appropriate use of task-relevant information while avoiding distraction. Here, in 3 experiments, we explored if these features can be achieved also for nonconscious stimuli. Participants performed a delayed match-to-sample task in which task relevance of 2 competing stimuli was indicated by a cue, and continuous flash suppression was used to manipulate the conscious/nonconscious visual experience. Experiment 1 revealed better-than-chance performance with nonconscious stimuli, demonstrating goal-directed use of nonconscious task-relevant information. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the cue that defined task relevance must be conscious to allow such goal-directed use. In Experiment 3, multi-voxel pattern analyses of brain activity revealed that only the target was prioritized and maintained during conscious trials. Conversely, during nonconscious trials, both target and distractor were maintained. However, decoding of task relevance during the probe/test phase demonstrated identification of both target and distractor information. These results show that identification of task-relevant information can operate also on nonconscious material. However, they do not support the prioritization of nonconscious task-relevant information, thus suggesting a mismatch in the attentional mechanisms involved during conscious and nonconscious working memory.

Neural processing of lateralised task-irrelevant fearful faces under different awareness conditions

The neural fate of task-irrelevant emotional faces under different awareness conditions is poorly understood. Here, we examined the electrophysiological activity during an experiment where the location of target information (contrast-induced line) was manipulated orthogonally to the location of task-irrelevant fearful faces, under subliminal or supraliminal viewing conditions. We found that only target lines elicited an N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc), indexing spatial attention shifting, in the supraliminal condition. No N2pc was found for the targets in the subliminal condition or for task-irrelevant fearful faces in either conditions. However, the mere presence of a fearful face enhanced early neural activity between 200 and 300 ms only in the subliminal condition. Additionally, the presence of a target line, but not a fearful face, enhanced the P3. Our results suggest that the N2pc is dependent on visual awareness and task-relevancy of the information and that laterally-presented task-irrelevant fearful expressions can be processed without awareness during early visual processing.

The central-peripheral dichotomy and metacontrast masking

According to the central-peripheral dichotomy (CPD), feedback from higher to lower cortical areas along the visual pathway to aid recognition is weaker in the more peripheral visual field. Metacontrast masking is predominantly a reduced visibility of a brief target by a brief and spatially adjacent mask when the mask succeeds rather than precedes or coincides with the target. If this masking works mainly by interfering with the feedback mechanisms for target recognition, then, by the CPD, this masking should be weaker at more peripheral visual locations. We extended the metacontrast masking at fovea by Enns and Di Lollo to visual field eccentricities 1∘, 3∘, and 9∘. Relative to the target’s onset, the mask appeared at a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of −50, 0, 50, 92, or 142 milliseconds (ms). Enlarged stimuli were used for larger eccentricities to equalize target discrimination performance across eccentricities as best as possible for zero SOA and when SOA was too long for substantial masking. At each eccentricity, the masking was weakest at 0 or −50 ms SOA, strongest at 50 ms SOA, and weakened with larger (positive) SOAs. Consistent with the CPD, larger eccentricities presented weaker maskings at all nonzero, and particularly the positive, SOAs.

Do Subliminal Fearful Facial Expressions Capture Attention?

In two experiments, we tested whether fearful facial expressions capture attention in an awareness-independent fashion. In Experiment 1, participants searched for a visible neutral face presented at one of two positions. Prior to the target, a backward-masked and, thus, invisible emotional (fearful/disgusted) or neutral face was presented as a cue, either at target position or away from the target position. If negative emotional faces capture attention in a stimulus-driven way, we would have expected a cueing effect: better performance where fearful or disgusted facial cues were presented at target position than away from the target. However, no evidence of capture of attention was found, neither in behavior (response times or error rates), nor in event-related lateralizations (N2pc). In Experiment 2, we went one step further and used fearful faces as visible targets, too. Thereby, we sought to boost awareness-independent capture of attention by fearful faces. However, still, we found no significant attention-capture effect. Our results show that fearful facial expressions do not capture attention in an awareness-independent way. Results are discussed in light of existing theories.

Consciousness explained or described?

Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means—science—and the end—explaining consciousness—gave rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). Science can sidestep trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an explanatory theory.

The diachronic account of attentional selectivity

Many models of attention assume that attentional selection takes place at a specific moment in time that demarcates the critical transition from pre-attentive to attentive processing of sensory input. We argue that this intuitively appealing standard account of attentional selectivity is not only inaccurate, but has led to substantial conceptual confusion. As an alternative, we offer a 'diachronic' framework that describes attentional selectivity as a process that unfolds over time. Key to this view is the concept of attentional episodes, brief periods of intense attentional amplification of sensory representations that regulate access to working memory and response-related processes. We describe how attentional episodes are linked to earlier attentional mechanisms and to recurrent processing at the neural level. We review studies that establish the existence of attentional episodes, delineate the factors that determine if and when they are triggered, and discuss the costs associated with processing multiple events within a single episode. Finally, we argue that this framework offers new solutions to old problems in attention research that have never been resolved. It can provide a unified and conceptually coherent account of the network of cognitive and neural processes that produce the goal-directed selectivity in perceptual processing that is commonly referred to as 'attention'.

The attention schema theory in a neural network agent: Controlling visuospatial attention using a descriptive model of attention

Attention, the deep processing of select items, is one of the most important cognitive operations in the brain. But how does the brain control its attention? One proposed part of the mechanism is that the brain builds a model, or attention schema, that helps monitor and predict the changing state of attention. Here, we show that an artificial neural network agent can be trained to control visual attention when it is given an attention schema, but its performance is greatly reduced when the schema is not available. We suggest that the brain may have evolved a model of attention because of the profound practical benefit for the control of attention.

In the attention schema theory (AST), the brain constructs a model of attention, the attention schema, to aid in the endogenous control of attention. Growing behavioral evidence appears to support the presence of a model of attention. However, a central question remains: does a controller of attention actually benefit by having access to an attention schema? We constructed an artificial deep Q-learning neural network agent that was trained to control a simple form of visuospatial attention, tracking a stimulus with an attention spotlight in order to solve a catch task. The agent was tested with and without access to an attention schema. In both conditions, the agent received sufficient information such that it should, theoretically, be able to learn the task. We found that with an attention schema present, the agent learned to control its attention spotlight and learned the catch task. Once the agent learned, if the attention schema was then disabled, the agent’s performance was greatly reduced. If the attention schema was removed before learning began, the agent was impaired at learning. The results show how the presence of even a simple attention schema can provide a profound benefit to a controller of attention. We interpret these results as supporting the central argument of AST: the brain contains an attention schema because of its practical benefit in the endogenous control of attention.

The development of metacognitive accuracy in working memory across childhood

Growth in working memory capacity, the number of items kept active in mind, is thought to be an important aspect of childhood cognitive development. Here, we focused on participants' awareness of the contents of their working memory, or meta-working memory, which seems important because people can put cognitive abilities to best use only if they are aware of their limitations. In two experiments on the development of meta-working memory in children between 6 and 13 years old and adults, participants were to remember arrays of colored squares and to indicate if a probe item was in the array. On many trials, before the probe recognition test, they reported a metajudgment, how many items they thought they remembered. We compared meta-working memory judgments to actual performance and looked for associations between these measures on individual and trial-by-trial levels. Despite much lower working memory capacity in younger children there was little change in meta-working memory judgments across age groups. Consequently, younger participants were much less realistic in their metajudgments concerning their working memory capability. Higher cognitive capacity was associated with more accurate meta-working memory judgments within an age group. Trial-by-trial tuning of metajudgments was evident only in young adults and then only for small array set sizes. In sum, meta-working memory ability is a sophisticated skill that develops with age and may be an integral aspect of the development of working memory across the school years. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness

Much research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has focused on two evoked potentials, the P3b and the visual or auditory awareness negativity (VAN, AAN). Surveying a broad range of recent experimental evidence, we find that repeated failures to observe the P3b during conscious perception eliminate it as a putative NCC. Neither the VAN nor the AAN have been dissociated from consciousness; furthermore, a similar neural signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities can be maximal contralateral to the evoking stimulus, are likely generated in underlying sensory cortices, and point to the existence of a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) reflecting the onset of sensory consciousness.

Growing evidence for separate neural mechanisms for attention and consciousness

Our conscious experience of the world seems to go in lockstep with our attentional focus: We tend to see, hear, taste, and feel what we attend to, and vice versa. This tight coupling between attention and consciousness has given rise to the idea that these two phenomena are indivisible. In the late 1950s, the honoree of this special issue, Charles Eriksen, was among a small group of early pioneers that sought to investigate whether a transient increase in overall level of attention (alertness) in response to a noxious stimulus can be decoupled from conscious perception using experimental techniques. Recent years saw a similar debate regarding whether attention and consciousness are two dissociable processes. Initial evidence that attention and consciousness are two separate processes primarily rested on behavioral data. However, the past couple of years witnessed an explosion of studies aimed at testing this conjecture using neuroscientific techniques. Here we provide an overview of these and related empirical studies on the distinction between the neuronal correlates of attention and consciousness, and detail how advancements in theory and technology can bring about a more detailed understanding of the two. We argue that the most promising approach will combine ever-evolving neurophysiological and interventionist tools with quantitative, empirically testable theories of consciousness that are grounded in a mathematically formalized understanding of phenomenology.

The self-face captures attention without consciousness: Evidence from the N2pc ERP component analysis

It is well established that stimuli representing or associated with ourselves, like our own name or an image of our own face, benefit from preferential processing. However, two key questions concerning the self-prioritization mechanism remain to be addressed. First, does it operate in an automatic manner during the early processing, or rather in a more controlled fashion at later processing stages? Second, is it specific to the self-related stimuli, or can it be activated also by other stimuli that are familiar or salient? We conducted a dot-probe experiment to investigate the mechanism behind the attentional prioritization of the self-face image and to tackle both questions. The former, by employing a backwards masking procedure to isolate the early and preconscious processing stages. The latter, by investigating whether a face that becomes visually familiar due to repeated presentations is able to capture attention in a similar manner as the self-face. Analysis of the N2pc ERP component revealed that the self-face image automatically captures attention, both when processed consciously and unconsciously. In contrast, the visually familiar face did not attract attention, neither in the conscious, nor in the unconscious condition. We conclude that the self-prioritization mechanism is early and automatic, and is not triggered by mere visual familiarity. More generally, our results provide further evidence for efficient unconscious processing of faces, and for dissociation between attention and consciousness.

Unseen food images capture the attention of hungry viewers: Evidence from event-related potentials

Motivationally relevant visual targets appear to capture visuospatial attention. This capture is evident behaviorally as faster and more accurate responses, and neurally as an enhanced-amplitude of the N2pc - an index of spatial attention allocation, which is observed even when observers are unaware of the target. In the case of reinforcers such as food or substances of dependence, it is likely that the motivational state of craving accompanying deprivation potentiates this capture. The automaticity of such attentional capture by reward-associated stimuli, as well as its possible interaction with craving, is as yet not completely understood, though it is likely a major explanatory factor in motivated behaviors. For the present experiment, participants completed two EEG recording sessions: one just after eating lunch (sated/non-craving), and the other following a minimum 12-h period of fasting (hungry/craving). For both sessions, participants identified food- and clothing-related targets embedded in an object-substitution masking paradigm, which yielded trials of full target visibility, as well as trials for which targets were present but undetected. Although masking equally disrupted visual awareness of both classes of targets as measured behaviorally, a three-way hunger by visibility by target interaction was observed in the neural data, with unseen food targets eliciting an enhanced N2pc. Interestingly, this subliminal attentional capture by food-related items was observed only during the "hungry" session. No such capture was evident under conditions of full visibility. These findings indicate that attentional capture by food-related images, and reflected in enhancements of the N2pc, is spurred by hunger, and that this effect can be viewed as automatic, or independent of explicit awareness of food-relevant target content.

The Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Attention: Two Sister Processes of the Brain

During the last three decades our understanding of the brain processes underlying consciousness and attention has significantly improved, mainly because of the advances in functional neuroimaging techniques. Still, caution is needed for the correct interpretation of these empirical findings, as both research and theoretical proposals are hampered by a number of conceptual difficulties. We review some of the most significant theoretical issues concerning the concepts of consciousness and attention in the neuroscientific literature, and put forward the implications of these reflections for a coherent model of the neural correlates of these brain functions. Even though consciousness and attention have an overlapping pattern of neural activity, they should be considered as essentially separate brain processes. The contents of phenomenal consciousness are supposed to be associated with the activity of multiple synchronized networks in the temporo-parietal-occipital areas. Only subsequently, attention, supported by fronto-parietal networks, enters the process of consciousness to provide focal awareness of specific features of reality.

Neural correlates of goal-directed enhancement and suppression of visual stimuli in the absence of conscious perception

An observer's current goals can influence the processing of visual stimuli. Such influences can work to enhance goal-relevant stimuli and suppress goal-irrelevant stimuli. Here, we combined behavioral testing and electroencephalography (EEG) to examine whether such enhancement and suppression effects arise even when the stimuli are masked from awareness. We used a feature-based spatial cueing paradigm, in which participants searched four-item arrays for a target in a specific color. Immediately before the target array, a nonpredictive cue display was presented in which a cue matched or mismatched the searched-for target color, and appeared either at the target location (spatially valid) or another location (spatially invalid). Cue displays were masked using continuous flash suppression. The EEG data revealed that target-colored cues produced robust N2pc and N_T responses-both signatures of spatial orienting-and distractor-colored cues produced a robust P_D-a signature of suppression. Critically, the cueing effects occurred for both conscious and unconscious cues. The N2pc and N_T were larger in the aware versus unaware cue condition, but the P_D was roughly equivalent in magnitude across the two conditions. Our findings suggest that top-down control settings for task-relevant features elicit selective enhancement and suppression even in the absence of conscious perception. We conclude that conscious perception modulates selective enhancement of visual features, but suppression of those features is largely independent of awareness.

Does the influence of near-threshold primes depend on the type of task?

Most studies investigating the influence of primes on the processing of subsequent targets involve a main task in which responses are made to the targets, and a task that tests prime awareness. If the participant is not aware of the prime location/identity but an influence of the prime is observed in the main task, researchers conclude that this influence can be ascribed to unconscious processing of the prime. This implies the assumption that the prime's influence is independent of task instructions: a prime consciously perceived in the prime task is consciously perceived in the main task. In the metacontrast-masking study, we compared motor- and attention-related electroencephalographic (EEG) components in three tasks with the same stimuli but different instructions and showed that early posterior contralateral negativities (PCNs) and lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) were smaller when primes were task-relevant than when targets were task-relevant. This suggests that early components may depend on task instruction and are not purely prime-related.

An EEG study of detection without localisation in change blindness

Previous studies of change blindness have suggested a distinction between detection and localisation of changes in a visual scene. Using a simple paradigm with an array of coloured squares, the present study aimed to further investigate differences in event-related potentials (ERPs) between trials in which participants could detect the presence of a colour change but not identify the location of the change (sense trials), versus those where participants could both detect and localise the change (localise trials). Individual differences in performance were controlled for by adjusting the difficulty of the task in real time. Behaviourally, reaction times for sense, blind, and false alarm trials were distinguishable when comparing across levels of participant certainty. In the EEG data, we found no significant differences in the visual awareness negativity ERP, contrary to previous findings. In the N2pc range, both awareness conditions (localise and sense) were significantly different to trials with no change detection (blind trials), suggesting that this ERP is not dependent on explicit awareness. Within the late positivity range, all conditions were significantly different. These results suggest that changes can be ‘sensed’ without knowledge of the location of the changing object, and that participant certainty scores can provide valuable information about the perception of changes in change blindness.

Kanizsa-figure object completion gates selection in the attentional blink

Previous work has demonstrated that perceptual grouping modulates the selectivity of attention across space. By contrast, how grouping influences the allocation of attention over time is much less clear. This study investigated this issue, using an attentional blink (AB) paradigm to test how grouping influences the initial selection and the subsequent short-term memory consolidation of a target. On a given trial, two red Kanizsa-type targets (T1 and T2) with varying grouping strength were embedded in a rapid serial visual presentation stream of irrelevant distractors. Our results showed the typical AB finding: impaired identification of T2 when presented close in time following T1. Moreover, the AB was modulated by the T2 grouping-independently of the T1 structure-with stronger grouping leading to a decreased AB and overall higher performance. Conversely, a reversed pattern, namely an increased AB with increasing grouping strength was observed when the Kanizsa figure was not task-relevant. Together, these findings suggest that the grouping benefit emerges at early perceptual stages, automatically drawing attentional resources, thereby leading to either sustained benefits or transient costs-depending on the task-relevance of the grouped object. This indicates that grouping modulates processing of objects in time.

Neural Correlates of Conscious Motion Perception

The nature of the proper neural signature of conscious perception remains a topic of active debate. Theoretical support from integrative theories of consciousness is consistent with such signature being P3b, one of the main candidates in the literature. Recent work has also put forward a mid-latency and more localized component, the Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN), as a proper Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC). Early local components like P1 have also been proposed. However, experiments exploring visual NCCs are conducted almost exclusively using static images as the content to be consciously perceived, favoring ventral stream processing, therefore limiting the scope of the NCCs that have been identified. Here we explored the visual NCCs isolating local motion, a dorsally processed feature, as the primary feature being consciously perceived. Physical equality between Seen and Unseen conditions in addition to a minimal contrast difference between target and no-target displays was employed. In agreement with previous literature, we found a P3b with a wide centro-parietal distribution that strongly correlated with the detection of the stimuli. P3b magnitude was larger for Seen vs. Unseen conditions, a result that was consistently observed at the single subject level. In contrast, we were unable to detect VAN in our data, regardless of whether the subject perceived or not the stimuli. In the 200-300 ms time window we found a N2pc component, consistent with the high attentional demands of our task. Early components like P1 were not observed in our data, in agreement with their proposed role in the processing of visual features, but not as proper NCCs. Our results extend the role of P3b as a content independent NCC to conscious visual motion perception.

N2pc reflects two modes for coding the number of visual targets

Humans share with a variety of animal species the spontaneous ability to detect the numerical correspondence between limited quantities of visual objects and discrete auditory events. Here, we explored how such mental representation is generated in the visual modality by monitoring a parieto-occipital ERP component, N2pc, whose amplitude covaries with the number of visual targets in explicit enumeration. Participants listened to an auditory sequence of one to three tones followed by a visual search display containing one to three targets. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to respond based on the numerical correspondence between tones and visual targets. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to ignore the tones and detect a target presence in the search display. The results of Experiment 1 showed an N2pc amplitude increase determined by the number of visual targets followed by a centroparietal ERP component modulated by the numerical correspondence between tones and visual targets. The results of Experiment 2 did not show an N2pc amplitude increase as a function of the number of visual targets. However, the numerical correspondence between tones and visual targets influenced N2pc amplitude. By comparing a subset of amplitude/latency parameters between Experiment 1 and 2, the present results suggest N2pc reflects two modes for representing the number of visual targets. One mode, susceptible to subjective control, relies on visual target segregation for exact target individuation, whereas a different mode, likely enabling spontaneous cross-modal matching, relies on the extraction of rough information about number of targets from visual input.

Perceptual averaging of facial expressions requires visual awareness and attention

Humans, as highly social animals, are regularly exposed to the faces of conspecifics-often more than one at a time. This feature of social living is important for understanding face perception, not just because it means that information from faces is available in bulk, but also because it changes the way individuals are perceived. For instance, when two faces are seen nearby one another, they tend to look like each other. This phenomenon of perceptual averaging is robust when both faces are seen and attended. But in everyday life, some faces may not receive the full benefit of attention, or they may not be visible at all. We evaluated whether perceptual averaging of relatively complex and simple information on faces, including facial expression and head orientation, can still occur even in these circumstances. In particular, we used object-substitution masking (OSM) and a dual-task designed to disrupt visual awareness and attention, respectively, during evaluations of briefly presented face pairs. Disruptions of awareness or attention eliminated averaging of facial expression, whereas orientation averaging persisted in spite of these challenges. These results demonstrate boundary conditions for the process of perceptual averaging. More generally, they provide insight into how the visual system processes multitudes of objects, both simple and complex, both with and without attention and awareness.

Impaired conscious access and abnormal attentional amplification in schizophrenia

Previous research suggests that the conscious perception of a masked stimulus is impaired in schizophrenia, while unconscious bottom-up processing of the same stimulus, as assessed by subliminal priming, can be preserved. Here, we test this postulated dissociation between intact bottom-up and impaired top-down processing and evaluate its brain mechanisms using high-density recordings of event-related potentials. Sixteen patients with schizophrenia and sixteen controls were exposed to peripheral digits with various degrees of visibility, under conditions of either focused attention or distraction by another task. In the distraction condition, the brain activity evoked by masked digits was drastically reduced in both groups, but early bottom-up visual activation could still be detected and did not differ between patients and controls. By contrast, under focused top-down attention, a major impairment was observed: in patients, contrary to controls, the late non-linear ignition associated with the P3 component was reduced. Interestingly, the patients showed an essentially normal attentional amplification of the P1 and N2 components. These results suggest that some but not all top-down attentional amplification processes are impaired in schizophrenia, while bottom-up processing seems to be preserved.

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An elevated consciousness threshold is observed in schizophrenia.

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Under unattended conditions, brain activity was similarly reduced in schizophrenic patients and controls.

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Under attended conditions, the late ignition associated with the P3 component is impaired in patients.

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In schizophrenia, top-down attentional amplification is abnormal while bottom-up processing is essentially spared.

Perceptual Learning Induces Persistent Attentional Capture by Nonsalient Shapes

Visual attention can be attracted automatically by salient simple features, but whether and how nonsalient complex stimuli such as shapes may capture attention in humans remains unclear. Here, we present strong electrophysiological evidence that a nonsalient shape presented among similar shapes can provoke a robust and persistent capture of attention as a consequence of extensive training in visual search (VS) for that shape. Strikingly, this attentional capture that followed perceptual learning (PL) was evident even when the trained shape was task-irrelevant, was presented outside the focus of top-down spatial attention, and was undetected by the observer. Moreover, this attentional capture persisted for at least 3-5 months after training had been terminated. This involuntary capture of attention was indexed by electrophysiological recordings of the N2pc component of the event-related brain potential, which was localized to ventral extrastriate visual cortex, and was highly predictive of stimulus-specific improvement in VS ability following PL. These findings provide the first evidence that nonsalient shapes can capture visual attention automatically following PL and challenge the prominent view that detection of feature conjunctions requires top-down focal attention.

EEG measures of brain activity reveal that smoking-related images capture the attention of smokers outside of awareness

The capture of attention by substance-related stimuli in dependent users is a major factor in the maintenance and/or cessation of substance use. The present study examined the automaticity of this process in smokers, as well as the effects of craving. Event-related potential (ERP) measures of spatial-attention allocation (N2pc) and extended target processing (SPCN) were isolated during an object-substitution masking (OSM) task that disrupted the perceptual visibility of smoking-related and office-related targets. Each participant completed two experimental sessions: one in which they were deprived of nicotine for a period of several hours prior to the session (craving), and one before which they were allowed to smoke (non-craving). Results were consistent with an account of automatic attentional capture by smoking-related images outside of awareness, with masked trials yielding a selective enhancement of the attention-sensitive N2pc in response to these images, but in the absence of a corresponding behavioral enhancement on those trials. Finally, the manipulation of craving appeared to increase the overall task demand, yielding an enhancement of the SPCN component across target type and masking conditions. Together, these results suggest that smoking-related visual stimuli in the environment can capture the attention of smokers outside of awareness, in what seems to be an automatic process.

The task novelty paradox: Flexible control of inflexible neural pathways during rapid instructed task learning

Rapid instructed task learning (RITL) is one of the most remarkable human abilities, when considered from both computational and evolutionary perspectives. A key feature of RITL is that it enables new goals to be immediately pursued (and shared) following formation of task representations. Although RITL is a form of cognitive control that engenders immense flexibility, it also seems to produce inflexible activation of action plans in inappropriate contexts. We argue that this "prepared reflex" effect arises because RITL is implemented in the brain via a "flexible hub" mechanism, in which top-down influences from the frontoparietal control network reroute pathways among procedure-implementing brain areas (e.g., perceptual and motor areas). Specifically, we suggest that RITL-based proactive control - the preparatory biasing of task-relevant functional network routes - results in inflexible associative processing, demanding compensation in the form of increased reactive (in-the-moment) control. Thus, RITL produces a computational trade-off, in which the top-down influences of flexible hubs increase overall cognitive flexibility, but at the cost of temporally localized inflexibility (the prepared reflex effect).

Neural processes underlying the orienting of attention without awareness

Despite long being of interest to both philosophers and scientists, the relationship between attention and perceptual awareness is not well understood, especially to what extent they are even dissociable. Previous studies have shown that stimuli of which we are unaware can orient spatial attention and affect behavior. Yet, relatively little is understood about the neural processes underlying such unconscious orienting of attention, and how they compare to conscious orienting. To directly compare the cascade of attentional processes with and without awareness of the orienting stimulus, we employed a spatial-cueing paradigm and used object-substitution masking to manipulate subjects' awareness of the cues. We recorded EEG during the task, from which we extracted hallmark event-related-potential (ERP) indices of attention. Behaviorally, there was a 61 ms validity effect (invalidly minus validly cued target RTs) on cue-aware trials. On cue-unaware trials, subjects also had a robust validity effect of 20 ms, despite being unaware of the cue. An N2pc to the cue, a hallmark ERP index of the lateralized orienting of attention, was observed for cue-aware but not cue-unaware trials, despite the latter showing a clear behavioral validity effect. Finally, the P1 sensory-ERP response to the targets was larger when validly versus invalidly cued, even when subjects were unaware of the preceding cue, demonstrating enhanced sensory processing of targets following subliminal cues. These results suggest that subliminal stimuli can orient attention and lead to subsequent enhancements to both stimulus sensory processing and behavior, but through different neural mechanisms (such as via a subcortical pathway) than stimuli we perceive.

Early visual processing allows for selective behavior, shifts of attention, and conscious visual experience in spite of masking

Object-substitution masking (OSM) occurs when a briefly displayed target in a search array is surrounded by a mask, which remains onscreen after the target has disappeared. It has been suggested that OSM results from a specific interference with reentrant visual processing, while the initial feedforward processing is left intact. Here, we tested the prediction that the fastest saccadic responses towards a masked target, supposedly triggered before the onset of reentrant processing, are not impaired by OSM. Indeed, saccades faster than 350ms "escaped" the influence of the mask. Notably, participants' judgements of subjective awareness indicated that stimulus processing during this early stage is not entirely devoid of conscious awareness. Furthermore, the N2pc event-related potential component indicated shifts of spatial attention towards the masked targets on trials with correct fast saccades, suggesting that both target detection and spatial attention can be based on the computations accomplished during the initial feedforward sweep.

Multiple attentional sets while monitoring rapid serial visual presentations

The present study examined whether observers are able to establish multiple attentional sets to concurrently monitor two different spatial locations. Observers identified a target letter in red or cyan among nontarget letters of other heterogeneous colours during a temporal feature search. A peripheral distractor display consisted of one item of either the same colour as the current target, and the other potential target colour, or an irrelevant colour that could never be the target. They identified an odd-ball colour letter among homogenous colours during a singleton search. The results revealed that observers maintained multiple attentional sets for detecting two singletons or for targets involving two (or three) features. However, they were unable to maintain a mixture of sets. Moreover, exposure to a distractor containing feature that corresponded to a feature of the current target was advantageous for target identification. The presence or absence of this set-specific capture depended on top-down knowledge and did not occur automatically in the singleton-detection stream. These results demonstrate a limitation in the flexibility of attentional sets. Although two singleton detections were possible, multiple attentional templates for a more complex attentional set could not be maintained concurrently when monitoring multiple rapid serial visual presentations.

Decoding the Locus of Covert Visuospatial Attention from EEG Signals

Visuospatial attention can be deployed to different locations in space independently of ocular fixation, and studies have shown that event-related potential (ERP) components can effectively index whether such covert visuospatial attention is deployed to the left or right visual field. However, it is not clear whether we may obtain a more precise spatial localization of the focus of attention based on the EEG signals during central fixation. In this study, we used a modified Posner cueing task with an endogenous cue to determine the degree to which information in the EEG signal can be used to track visual spatial attention in presentation sequences lasting 200 ms. We used a machine learning classification method to evaluate how well EEG signals discriminate between four different locations of the focus of attention. We then used a multi-class support vector machine (SVM) and a leave-one-out cross-validation framework to evaluate the decoding accuracy (DA). We found that ERP-based features from occipital and parietal regions showed a statistically significant valid prediction of the location of the focus of visuospatial attention (DA = 57%, p < .001, chance-level 25%). The mean distance between the predicted and the true focus of attention was 0.62 letter positions, which represented a mean error of 0.55 degrees of visual angle. In addition, ERP responses also successfully predicted whether spatial attention was allocated or not to a given location with an accuracy of 79% (p < .001). These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for visuospatial attention decoding and future paths for research are proposed.

Reward-associated features capture attention in the absence of awareness: Evidence from object-substitution masking

Reward-associated visual features have been shown to capture visual attention, evidenced in faster and more accurate behavioral performance, as well as in neural responses reflecting lateralized shifts of visual attention to those features. Specifically, the contralateral N2pc event-related-potential (ERP) component that reflects attentional shifting exhibits increased amplitude in response to task-relevant targets containing a reward-associated feature. In the present study, we examined the automaticity of such reward-association effects using object-substitution masking (OSM) in conjunction with MEG measures of visual attentional shifts. In OSM, a visual-search array is presented, with the target item to be detected indicated by a surrounding mask (here, four surrounding squares). Delaying the offset of the target-surrounding four-dot mask relative to the offset of the rest of the target/distracter array disrupts the viewer's awareness of the target (masked condition), whereas simultaneous offsets do not (unmasked condition). Here we manipulated whether the color of the OSM target was or was not of a previously reward-associated color. By tracking reward-associated enhancements of behavior and the N2pc in response to masked targets containing a previously rewarded or unrewarded feature, the automaticity of attentional capture by reward could be probed. We found an enhanced N2pc response to targets containing a previously reward-associated color feature. Moreover, this enhancement of the N2pc by reward did not differ between masking conditions, nor did it differ as a function of the apparent visibility of the target within the masked condition. Overall, these results underscore the automaticity of attentional capture by reward-associated features, and demonstrate the ability of feature-based reward associations to shape attentional capture and allocation outside of perceptual awareness.

Electrophysiological measurement of information flow during visual search

The temporal relationship between different stages of cognitive processing is long debated. This debate is ongoing, primarily because it is often difficult to measure the time course of multiple cognitive processes simultaneously. We employed a manipulation that allowed us to isolate ERP components related to perceptual processing, working memory, and response preparation, and then examined the temporal relationship between these components while observers performed a visual search task. We found that, when response speed and accuracy were equally stressed, our index of perceptual processing ended before both the transfer of information into working memory and response preparation began. However, when we stressed speed over accuracy, response preparation began before the completion of perceptual processing or transfer of information into working memory on trials with the fastest reaction times. These findings show that individuals can control the flow of information transmission between stages, either waiting for perceptual processing to be completed before preparing a response or configuring these stages to overlap in time.

Keeping postdiction simple

Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can render a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process it, and (ii) the order in which the processing of stimuli is completed corresponds with the apparent temporal order of stimuli. As a result, the theories that account for more than a single postdiction effect reject at least one of these theses. This paper presents a new framework for the timing of experiences-the non-linear latency difference view-in which the three most discussed postdiction effects-apparent motion, the flash-lag effect, and metacontrast masking-can be accounted for while simultaneously holding theses (i) and (ii). This view is grounded in the local reentrant processes, which are known to have a crucial role in perception. Accordingly, the non-linear latency difference view is both more parsimonious and more empirically plausible than the competing theories, all of which remain largely silent about the neural implementation of the mechanisms they postulate.

Interhemispheric ERP asymmetries over inferior parietal cortex reveal differential visual working memory maintenance for fearful versus neutral facial identities

The goal of the present investigation was to discover whether visual working memory maintenance for faces is modulated by facial expression using event-related potentials (ERPs). Each trial consisted of two sequential arrays, a memory array and a test array, each including either two or four faces with neutral or fearful expressions. The faces were displayed to the left and to the right of a central fixation cross. Two central arrows cued participants to encode one face or two faces displayed on one side of the memory array. The sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) component of the ERP time-locked to the onset of the memory array was used as an index of visual working memory maintenance. Visual working memory performance was quantified using indexes of memory capacity (Cowan's K and K-iterative), a standard index of sensitivity (d'), and reaction times (RTs). Relative to neutral faces, superior memory and longer change-detection RTs to fearful face identities were observed when two faces were displayed on the cued side of the memory array. Fearful faces elicited an enhanced SPCN relative to neutral faces, especially when only one face was displayed on the cued side of the memory array. These findings suggest increased maintenance in visual working memory of faces with a fearful expression relative to faces with a neutral expression and that the representational format in which fearful faces are stored in memory may be characterized by enhanced resolution relative to that subtended in the maintenance of neutral faces.

Detection of the number of changes in a display in working memory

Here we examine a new task to assess working memory for visual arrays in which the participant must judge how many items changed from a studied array to a test array. As a clue to processing, on some trials in the first 2 experiments, participants carried out a metamemory judgment in which they were to decide how many items were in working memory. Trial-to-trial fluctuations in these working memory storage judgments correlated with performance fluctuations within an individual, indicating a need to include trial-to-trial variation within capacity models (through either capacity fluctuation or some other attention parameter). Mathematical modeling of the results achieved a good fit to a complex pattern of results, suggesting that working memory capacity limits can apply even to judgments that involve an entire array rather than just a single item that may have changed, thus providing the expected conscious access to at least some of the contents of working memory.

Individual differences in perceptual abilities predict target visibility during masking

Many studies have shown that the visual system can implicitly process a single stimulus under conditions of low visibility. However, it remains unknown whether this ability extends when viewing conditions become more difficult, and whether differences in early perceptual abilities modulate masking sensitivity. To address these issues, participants enumerated a variable number of target elements among distracters in two electroencephalography experiments. Either one (Experiment 1) or all targets (Experiment 2) were masked through object-substitution. Results showed that an event-related potential measure of selective individuation, the N2pc component, was modulated by target numerosity in both masked and unmasked trials, suggesting that multiple object individuation can operate in conditions of limited visibility. However, this effect was present mainly for participants with low masking effects, who overall showed more pronounced N2pc modulations as a function of target numerosity. Finally, oscillatory activity analyses revealed that early segmentation mechanisms, as reflected by lateralized gamma synchronization, were more active in participants with low sensitivity to masking, suggesting that individual variation in early perceptual functions is associated with susceptibility to masking such that more efficient segmentation and individuation mechanisms reduce the effects of masking. These findings cast doubt on the claim that effectively masked stimuli can be individuated.

Visualizing Trumps Vision in Training Attention

Mental imagery can have powerful training effects on behavior, but how this occurs is not well understood. Here we show that even a single instance of mental imagery can improve attentional selection of a target more effectively than actually practicing visual search. By recording subjects' brain activity, we found that these imagery-induced training effects were due to perceptual attention being more effectively focused on targets following imagined training. Next, we examined the downside of this potent training by changing the target after several trials of training attention with imagery and found that imagined search resulted in more potent interference than actual practice following these target changes. Finally, we found that proactive interference from task-irrelevant elements in the visual displays appears to underlie the superiority of imagined training relative to actual practice. Our findings demonstrate that visual attention mechanisms can be effectively trained to select target objects in the absence of visual input, and this results in more effective control of attention than practicing the task itself.

The attention schema theory: a mechanistic account of subjective awareness

We recently proposed the attention schema theory, a novel way to explain the brain basis of subjective awareness in a mechanistic and scientifically testable manner. The theory begins with attention, the process by which signals compete for the brain's limited computing resources. This internal signal competition is partly under a bottom-up influence and partly under top-down control. We propose that the top-down control of attention is improved when the brain has access to a simplified model of attention itself. The brain therefore constructs a schematic model of the process of attention, the 'attention schema,' in much the same way that it constructs a schematic model of the body, the 'body schema.' The content of this internal model leads a brain to conclude that it has a subjective experience. One advantage of this theory is that it explains how awareness and attention can sometimes become dissociated; the brain's internal models are never perfect, and sometimes a model becomes dissociated from the object being modeled. A second advantage of this theory is that it explains how we can be aware of both internal and external events. The brain can apply attention to many types of information including external sensory information and internal information about emotions and cognitive states. If awareness is a model of attention, then this model should pertain to the same domains of information to which attention pertains. A third advantage of this theory is that it provides testable predictions. If awareness is the internal model of attention, used to help control attention, then without awareness, attention should still be possible but should suffer deficits in control. In this article, we review the existing literature on the relationship between attention and awareness, and suggest that at least some of the predictions of the theory are borne out by the evidence.

Attentional modulations of the early and later stages of the neural processing of visual completion

The brain effortlessly recognizes objects even when the visual information belonging to an object is widely separated, as well demonstrated by the Kanizsa-type illusory contours (ICs), in which a contour is perceived despite the fragments of the contour being separated by gaps. Such large-range visual completion has long been thought to be preattentive, whereas its dependence on top-down influences remains unclear. Here, we report separate modulations by spatial attention and task relevance on the neural activities in response to the ICs. IC-sensitive event-related potentials that were localized to the lateral occipital cortex were modulated by spatial attention at an early processing stage (130–166 ms after stimulus onset) and modulated by task relevance at a later processing stage (234–290 ms). These results not only demonstrate top-down attentional influences on the neural processing of ICs but also elucidate the characteristics of the attentional modulations that occur in different phases of IC processing.