Responses to the Assurance game in monkeys, apes, and humans using equivalent procedures

A Comparison of Rapid Rule-Learning Strategies in Humans and Monkeys

Interspecies comparisons are key to deriving an understanding of the behavioral and neural correlates of human cognition from animal models. We perform a detailed comparison of the strategies of female macaque monkeys to male and female humans on a variant of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a widely studied and applied task that provides a multiattribute measure of cognitive function and depends on the frontal lobe. WCST performance requires the inference of a rule change given ambiguous feedback. We found that well-trained monkeys infer new rules three times more slowly than minimally instructed humans. Input-dependent hidden Markov model-generalized linear models were fit to their choices, revealing hidden states akin to feature-based attention in both species. Decision processes resembled a win-stay, lose-shift strategy with interspecies similarities as well as key differences. Monkeys and humans both test multiple rule hypotheses over a series of rule-search trials and perform inference-like computations to exclude candidate choice options. We quantitatively show that perseveration, random exploration, and poor sensitivity to negative feedback account for the slower task-switching performance in monkeys.

Dogs understand the role of a human partner in a cooperative task

Humans are exceptionally flexible in cooperation, partly due to our ability to recognize the roles of cooperative partners. While some non-human animals understand the need for a partner in such interactions, it is unclear whether they grasp the consequences of their partner's actions and adjust accordingly. Previous studies utilizing economic games with non-human animals yielded mixed results. We investigated dogs, known for their close cooperation with humans, in a stag hunt game. Dogs could cooperate for better rewards or defect for lower ones, while their human partners would either cooperate, never cooperate, or act randomly. We control for attraction to food, side bias, and local enhancement. Dogs were more likely to coordinate with their partners when it led to better rewards, suggesting that they understood their partner's actions. By highlighting this cognitive skill in dogs, we advance our knowledge of the intricate mechanisms driving cooperative behavior in non-human animals.

The Joint Simon task is not joint for capuchin monkeys

Human cooperation can be facilitated by the ability to create a mental representation of one's own actions, as well as the actions of a partner, known as action co-representation. Even though other species also cooperate extensively, it is still unclear whether they have similar capacities. The Joint Simon task is a two-player task developed to investigate this action co-representation. We tested brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a highly cooperative species, on a computerized Joint Simon task and found that, in line with previous research, the capuchins' performance was compatible with co-representation. However, a deeper exploration of the monkeys' responses showed that they, and potentially monkeys in previous studies, did not understand the control conditions, which precludes the interpretation of the results as a social phenomenon. Indeed, further testing to investigate alternative explanations demonstrated that our results were due to low-level cues, rather than action co-representation. This suggests that the Joint Simon task, at least in its current form, cannot determine whether non-human species co-represent their partner's role in joint tasks.

Some dogs can find the payoff-dominant outcome in the Assurance game

Studies on coordination often present animals with the choice of either cooperating or remaining inactive; however, in nature, animals may also choose to act alone. This can be modeled with the Assurance game, an economic game that has recently been used to explore decision-making in primates. We investigated whether dyads of pet dogs coordinate in the Assurance game. Pairs were presented with two alternatives: they could individually solve an apparatus baited with a low-value reward (Hare) or they could coordinate to solve a cooperative apparatus baited with a high-value reward for each dog (Stag). All individuals matched their partner's choices, but after controlling for side bias, only four out of eleven dyads consistently coordinated on the payoff-dominant strategy (Stag-Stag). Thus, some dogs are capable of finding coordinated outcomes, as do primates, at least when their partner's actions are visible and coordination results in the biggest payoff for both individuals.

Competitive and cooperative games for probing the neural basis of social decision-making in animals

In a social environment, it is essential for animals to consider the behavior of others when making decisions. To quantitatively assess such social decisions, games offer unique advantages. Games may have competitive and cooperative components, modeling situations with antagonistic and shared objectives between players. Games can be analyzed by mathematical frameworks, including game theory and reinforcement learning, such that an animal's choice behavior can be compared against the optimal strategy. However, so far games have been underappreciated in neuroscience research, particularly for rodent studies. In this review, we survey the varieties of competitive and cooperative games that have been tested, contrasting strategies employed by non-human primates and birds with rodents. We provide examples of how games can be used to uncover neural mechanisms and explore species-specific behavioral differences. We assess critically the limitations of current paradigms and propose improvements. Together, the synthesis of current literature highlights the advantages of using games to probe the neural basis of social decisions for neuroscience studies.

Comparative economics: how studying other primates helps us better understand the evolution of our own economic decision making

The origins of evolutionary games are rooted in both economics and animal behaviour, but economics has, until recently, focused primarily on humans. Although historically, specific games were used in targeted circumstances with non-human species (i.e. the Prisoner's Dilemma), experimental economics has been increasingly recognized as a valuable method for directly comparing both the outcomes of economic decisions and their underlying mechanisms across species, particularly in comparison with humans, thanks to the structured procedures that allow for them to be instantiated across a variety of animals. So far, results in non-human primates suggest that even when outcomes are shared, underlying proximate mechanisms can vary substantially. Intriguingly, in some contexts non-human primates more easily find a Nash equilibrium than do humans, possibly owing to their greater willingness to explore the parameter space, but humans excel at more complex outcomes, such as alternating between two Nash equilibria, even when deprived of language or instruction, suggesting potential mechanisms that humans have evolved to allow us to solve complex social problems. We consider what these results suggest about the evolution of economic decision-making and suggest future directions, in particular the need to expand taxonomic diversity, to expand this promising approach. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Systematic comparison of risky choices in humans and monkeys

The past decades have seen tremendous progress in fundamental studies on economic choice in humans. However, elucidation of the underlying neuronal processes requires invasive neurophysiological studies that are met with difficulties in humans. Monkeys as evolutionary closest relatives offer a solution. The animals display sophisticated and well-controllable behavior that allows to implement key constructs of proven economic choice theories. However, the similarity of economic choice between the two species has never been systematically investigated. We investigated compliance with the independence axiom (IA) of expected utility theory as one of the most demanding choice tests and compared IA violations between humans and monkeys. Using generalized linear modeling and cumulative prospect theory (CPT), we found that humans and monkeys made comparable risky choices, although their subjective values (utilities) differed. These results suggest similar fundamental choice mechanism across these primate species and encourage to study their underlying neurophysiological mechanisms.

Human and macaque pairs employ different coordination strategies in a transparent decision game

Many real-world decisions in social contexts are made while observing a partner's actions. To study dynamic interactions during such decisions, we developed a setup where two agents seated face-to-face to engage in game-theoretical tasks on a shared transparent touchscreen display ('transparent games'). We compared human and macaque pairs in a transparent version of the coordination game 'Bach-or-Stravinsky', which entails a conflict about which of two individually-preferred opposing options to choose to achieve coordination. Most human pairs developed coordinated behavior and adopted dynamic turn-taking to equalize the payoffs. All macaque pairs converged on simpler, static coordination. Remarkably, two animals learned to coordinate dynamically after training with a human confederate. This pair selected the faster agent's preferred option, exhibiting turn-taking behavior that was captured by modeling the visibility of the partner's action before one's own movement. Such competitive turn-taking was unlike the prosocial turn-taking in humans, who equally often initiated switches to and from their preferred option. Thus, the dynamic coordination is not restricted to humans but can occur on the background of different social attitudes and cognitive capacities in rhesus monkeys. Overall, our results illustrate how action visibility promotes the emergence and maintenance of coordination when agents can observe and time their mutual actions.

The importance of thinking about the future in culture and cumulative cultural evolution

Thinking about possibilities plays a critical role in the choices humans make throughout their lives. Despite this, the influence of individuals' ability to consider what is possible on culture has been largely overlooked. We propose that the ability to reason about future possibilities or prospective cognition, has consequences for cultural change, possibly facilitating the process of cumulative cultural evolution. In particular, by considering potential future costs and benefits of specific behaviours, prospective cognition may lead to a more flexible use of cultural behaviours. In species with limited planning abilities, this may lead to the development of cultures that promote behaviours with future benefits, circumventing this limitation. Here, we examine these ideas from a comparative perspective, considering the relationship between human and nonhuman assessments of future possibilities and their cultural capacity to invent new solutions and improve them over time. Given the methodological difficulties of assessing prospective cognition across species, we focus on planning, for which we have the most data in other species. Elucidating the role of prospective cognition in culture will help us understand the variability in when and how we see culture expressed, informing ongoing debates, such as that surrounding which social learning mechanisms underlie culture. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Anything for a cheerio: Brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) consistently coordinate in an Assurance Game for unequal payoffs

Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner. Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas coordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated play results in the lowest payoff when playing Stag. We varied this structure such that one capuchin received double the rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome; thus, it was still both animals' best option, but no longer equally rewarding. Despite the inequality, capuchins coordinated on Stag in 78% of trials, and neither payoff structure nor their partner's choice impacted their decision. Additionally, there was no relationship between self-scratching, a measure of stress in capuchins, and choices. After completing the study, we discovered our reward, cheerios, was sufficiently valuable that in another study, capuchins never refused it, so post hoc we repeated the study using a lower value reward, banana flavored pellets. Capuchins completed only 26% of the pellet trials (compared to 98% with cheerios), constraining our ability to interpret the results, but nonetheless the monkeys showed a decrease in preference for Stag, particularly when they received fewer rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome. These results reinforce capuchins' ability to find coordinated outcomes in the Stag Hunt game, but more work is needed to determine whether the monkeys did not mind the inequality or were unwilling to sacrifice a highly preferred food to rectify it. In either case, researchers should carefully consider the impact of their chosen rewards on subjects' choices.

What behaviour in economic games tells us about the evolution of non-human species' economic decision-making behaviour

In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species' propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Comparative performance of orangutans (Pongo spp.), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and drills (Mandrillus leucophaeus), in an ephemeral foraging task

A goal of the comparative approach is to test a variety of species on the same task. Here, we examined whether the factors that helped capuchin monkeys improve their performance in a dichotomous choice task would generalize to three other primate species: orangutans, gorillas, and drill monkeys. In this task, subjects have access to two options, each resulting in an identical food, but one (the ephemeral option) is only available if it is chosen first, whereas the other one (the permanent option) is always available. Therefore, the food-maximizing solution is to choose the ephemeral option first, followed by the permanent option for an additional reward. On the original version (plate task), the options were discriminated by the color and pattern of the plates holding the food, while on two subsequent versions we used altered cues that we predicted would improve performance: (1) the color of the foods themselves (color task), which we hypothesized was relevant to primates, who choose foods rather than substrates on which foods are found when foraging, and (2) patterned cups covering the foods (cup task), which we hypothesized would help primates avoid the prepotent response associated with visible food. Like capuchins, all three species initially failed to solve the plate task. However, while orangutans improved their performance from the plate to the color task, they did not for the cup task, and only a few gorillas and no drills succeeded in either task. Unfortunately, our ability to interpret these data was obscured by differences in the subjects' level of experience with cognitive testing and practical constraints that precluded the use of completely identical procedures across species. Nonetheless, we consider what these results can tell us, and discuss the value of conducting studies across multiple sites despite unavoidable differences.

Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games

Real-world agents, humans as well as animals, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners' ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously without knowing each other's current choices. To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent games, where each player has a certain probability of observing the partner's choice before deciding on its own action. By means of evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partner's choice before one's own decision substantially changes the evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in an iterated coordination game, but reduces cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In both games, "Win-stay, lose-shift" and "Tit-for-tat" strategies are predominant for moderate transparency, while a "Leader-Follower" strategy emerges for high transparency. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions.

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates?

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.

Chimpanzees Rarely Settle on Consistent Patterns of Play in the Hawk Dove, Assurance, and Prisoner's Dilemma Games, in a Token Exchange Task

Games derived from experimental economics can be used to directly compare decision-making behavior across primate species, including humans. For example, the use of coordination games, such as the Assurance game, has shown that a variety of primate species can coordinate; however, the mechanism by which they do so appears to differ across species. Recently, these games have been extended to explore anti-coordination and cooperation in monkeys, with evidence that they play the Nash equilibria in sequential games in these other contexts. In the current paper, we use the same methods to explore chimpanzees' behavior in the Assurance Game; an anti-coordination game, the Hawk Dove game; and a cooperation game with a temptation to defect, the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We predicted that they would consistently play the Nash equilibria, as do the monkeys, and that, as in previous work, the subjects' level of experience with cognitive experiments would impact performance. Surprisingly, few of our pairs consistently played the same outcome (i.e., no statistically significant preferences), although those who did showed evidence consistent with Nash equilibria play, the same pattern seen more consistently in the monkeys. We consider reasons for their inconsistent performance; for instance, perhaps it was due to lack of interest in a task that rewarded them almost every trial no matter what option they chose, although this does not explain why they were inconsistent when the monkeys were not. A second goal of our study was to ascertain the effects of exogenous oxytocin in their decision making in one population. In line with recent work showing complex effects of oxytocin on social behavior, we found no effect on subjects' outcomes. We consider possible explanations for this as well.

Responses to Economic Games of Cooperation and Conflict in Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis)

Games from experimental economics have provided insights into the evolutionary roots of social decision making in primates and other species. Multiple primate species' abilities to cooperate, coordinate and anti-coordinate have been tested utilizing variants of these simple games. Past research, however, has focused on species known to cooperate and coordinate in the wild. To begin to address the degree to which cooperation and coordination may be a general ability that manifests in specific contexts, the present study assessed the decisions of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis; N = 10), a species not known for their cooperative behavior in these games. Pairs of monkeys were presented with the Assurance Game (a coordination game), the Hawk-Dove Game (an anti-coordination game) and the Prisoner's Dilemma (a cooperation game with a temptation to defect). We then compared squirrel monkeys' performance to existing data on capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a closely related species that routinely cooperates, to determine what, if any, differences in decision making emerged. Some pairs of both species found the payoff-dominant Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the coordination game, but failed to find the NE in subsequent games. Our results suggest that, like capuchins, squirrel monkeys coordinate their behavior with others, suggesting that such mutual outcomes occur in at least some contexts, even in species that do not routinely cooperate.

Helping in humans and other animals: a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue

Humans are arguably unique in the extent and scale of cooperation with unrelated individuals. While pairwise interactions among non-relatives occur in some non-human species, there is scant evidence of the large-scale, often unconditional prosociality that characterizes human social behaviour. Consequently, one may ask whether research on cooperation in humans can offer general insights to researchers working on similar questions in non-human species, and whether research on humans should be published in biology journals. We contend that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Most importantly, social behaviour in humans and other species operates under the same evolutionary framework. Moreover, we highlight how an open dialogue between different fields can inspire studies on humans and non-human species, leading to novel approaches and insights. Biology journals should encourage these discussions rather than drawing artificial boundaries between disciplines. Shared current and future challenges are to study helping in ecologically relevant contexts in order to correctly interpret how payoff matrices translate into inclusive fitness, and to integrate mechanisms into the hitherto largely functional theory. We can and should study human cooperation within a comparative framework in order to gain a full understanding of the evolution of helping.

Humans as a model for understanding biological fundamentals

How special are humans? This question drives scholarly output across both the sciences and the humanities. Whereas some disciplines, and the humanities in particular, aim at gaining a better understanding of humans per se, most biologists ultimately aim to understand life in general. This raises the question of whether and when humans are acceptable, or even desirable, models of biological fundamentals. Especially for basic biological processes, non-human species are generally accepted as a relevant model to study topics for which studying humans is impractical, impossible, or ethically inadvisable, but the reverse is controversial: are humans 'too unique' to be informative with respect to biological fundamentals relevant to other species? Or are there areas where we share key components, or for which our very uniqueness serves to allow novel explorations? In this special feature, authors from disciplines including biology, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience and philosophy tackle this question. Their overall conclusion is a qualified yes: humans do tell us about biological fundamentals, in some contexts. We hope this special feature will spur a discussion that will lead to a more careful delineation of the similarities and the differences between humans and other species, and how these impact the study of biological fundamentals.

The language of cooperation: shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership

While we know that the degree to which humans are able to cooperate is unrivalled by other species, the variation humans actually display in their cooperative behaviour has yet to be fully explained. This may be because research based on experimental game-theoretical studies neglects fundamental aspects of human sociality and psychology, namely social interaction and language. Using a new optimal foraging game loosely modelled on the prisoner's dilemma, the egg hunt, we categorized players as either in-group or out-group to each other and studied their spontaneous language usage while they made interactive, potentially cooperative decisions. Both shared group membership and the possibility to talk led to increased cooperation and overall success in the hunt. Notably, analysis of players' conversations showed that in-group members engaged more in shared intentionality, the human ability to both mentally represent and then adopt another's goal, whereas out-group members discussed individual goals more. Females also helped more and displayed more shared intentionality in discussions than males. Crucially, we show that shared intentionality was the mechanism driving the increase in helping between in-group players over out-group players at a cost to themselves. By studying spontaneous language during social interactions and isolating shared intentionality as the mechanism underlying successful cooperation, the current results point to a probable psychological source of the variation in cooperation humans display.

Oxytocin and Vasopressin Receptor Gene Polymorphisms: Role in Social and Psychiatric Traits

Oxytocin (OXT) and arginine-vasopressin (AVP) are two phylogenetically conserved neuropeptides that have been implicated in a wide range of social behaviors. Although a large body of research, ranging from rodents to humans, has reported on the effects of OXT and AVP administration on affiliative and trust behaviors, and has highlighted the genetic contributions of OXT and AVP receptor polymorphisms to both social behaviors and to diseases related to social deficits, the consequences of peptide administration on psychiatric symptoms, and the impact of receptor polymorphisms on receptor function, are still unclear. Despite the exciting advances that these reports have brought to social neuroscience, they remain preliminary and suffer from the problems that are inherent to monogenetic linkage and association studies. As an alternative, some studies are using polygenic approaches, and consider the contributions of other genes and pathways, including those involving DA, 5-HT, and reelin, in addition to OXT and AVP; a handful of report are also using genome-wide association studies. This review summarizes findings on the associations between OXT and AVP receptor polymorphism, social behavior, and psychiatric diseases. In addition, we discuss reports on the interactions of OXT and AVP receptor genes and genes involved in other pathways (such as those of dopamine, serotonin, and reelin), as well as research that has shed some light on the impact of gene polymorphisms on the volume, connectivity, and activation of specific neural structures, differential receptor expression, and plasma levels of the OXT and AVP peptides. We hope that this effort will be helpful for understanding the studies performed so far, and for encouraging the inclusion of other candidate genes not explored to date.

Trading up: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show self-control through their exchange behavior

Self-control is defined as the ability or capacity to obtain an objectively more valuable outcome rather than an objectively less valuable outcome though tolerating a longer delay or a greater effort requirement (or both) in obtaining that more valuable outcome. A number of tests have been devised to assess self-control in non-human animals, including exchange tasks. In this study, three chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) participated in a delay of gratification task that required food exchange as the behavioral response that reflected self-control. The chimpanzees were offered opportunities to inhibit eating and instead exchange a currently possessed food item for a different (and sometimes better) item, often needing to exchange several food items before obtaining the highest valued reward. We manipulated reward type, reward size, reward visibility, delay to exchange, and location of the highest valued reward in the sequence of exchange events to compare performance within the same individuals. The chimpanzees successfully traded until obtaining the best item in most cases, although there were individual differences among participants in some variations of the test. These results support the idea that self-control is robust in chimpanzees even in contexts in which they perhaps anticipate future rewards and sustain delay of gratification until they can obtain the ultimately most valuable item.

Coordination strategies of chimpanzees and human children in a Stag Hunt game

Much of human cooperation takes place in mutualistic contexts in which the main challenge for individuals is how to coordinate decisions. In the current studies, we compared the abilities of chimpanzees and young children to coordinate with a partner in two versions of a Stag Hunt game. When risks were low (the hare was of low value) and information was cheap (the partner's behaviour was readily observable), partners of both species were able to successfully coordinate on the higher value stag more than 90% of the time. By contrast, when the risks were raised and observing the partner was more difficult, the chimpanzees became less successful, whereas the children compensated, and so remained highly successful, by communicating more often and more specifically. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that humans evolved unique skills of coordination and communication in the context of especially risky coordination problems.

Gambling primates: reactions to a modified Iowa Gambling Task in humans, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys

Humans will, at times, act against their own economic self-interest, for example, in gambling situations. To explore the evolutionary roots of this behavior, we modified a traditional human gambling task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), for use with chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and humans. We expanded the traditional task to include two additional payoff structures to fully elucidate the ways in which these primate species respond to differing reward distributions versus overall quantities of rewards, a component often missing in the existing literature. We found that while all three species respond as typical humans do in the standard IGT payoff structure, species and individual differences emerge in our new payoff structures. Specifically, when variance avoidance and reward maximization conflicted, roughly equivalent numbers of apes maximized their rewards and avoided variance, indicating that the traditional payoff structure of the IGT is insufficient to disentangle these competing strategies. Capuchin monkeys showed little consistency in their choices. To determine whether this was a true species difference or an effect of task presentation, we replicated the experiment but increased the intertrial interval. In this case, several capuchin monkeys followed a reward maximization strategy, while chimpanzees retained the same strategy they had used previously. This suggests that individual differences in strategies for interacting with variance and reward maximization are present in apes, but not in capuchin monkeys. The primate gambling task presented here is a useful methodology for disentangling strategies of variance avoidance and reward maximization.

Chimpanzee choice rates in competitive games match equilibrium game theory predictions

The capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well understood across species. We use game theory to make predictions about choices and temporal dynamics in three abstract competitive situations with chimpanzee participants. Frequencies of chimpanzee choices are extremely close to equilibrium (accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts. The chimpanzee choices are also closer to the equilibrium prediction, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from experiments in which humans were also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally. The results are consistent with a tentative interpretation of game theory as explaining evolved behavior, with the additional hypothesis that chimpanzees may retain or practice a specialized capacity to adjust strategy choice during competition to perform at least as well as, or better than, humans have.

Comparative approaches to studying strategy: towards an evolutionary account of primate decision making

How do primates, humans included, deal with novel problems that arise in interactions with other group members? Despite much research regarding how animals and humans solve social problems, few studies have utilized comparable procedures, outcomes, or measures across different species. Thus, it is difficult to piece together the evolution of decision making, including the roots from which human economic decision making emerged. Recently, a comparative body of decision making research has emerged, relying largely on the methodology of experimental economics in order to address these questions in a cross-species fashion. Experimental economics is an ideal method of inquiry for this approach. It is a well-developed method for distilling complex decision making involving multiple conspecifics whose decisions are contingent upon one another into a series of simple decision choices. This allows these decisions to be compared across species and contexts. In particular, our group has used this approach to investigate coordination in New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, and great apes (including humans), using identical methods. We find that in some cases there are remarkable continuities of outcome, as when some pairs in all species solved a coordination game, the Assurance game. On the other hand, we also find that these similarities in outcomes are likely driven by differences in underlying cognitive mechanisms. New World monkeys required exogenous information about their partners' choices in order to solve the task, indicating that they were using a matching strategy. Old World monkeys, on the other hand, solved the task without exogenous cues, leading to investigations into what mechanisms may be underpinning their responses (e.g., reward maximization, strategy formation, etc.). Great apes showed a strong experience effect, with cognitively enriched apes following what appears to be a strategy. Finally, humans were able to solve the task with or without exogenous cues. However, when given the chance to do so, they incorporated an additional mechanism unavailable to the other primates - language - to coordinate outcomes with their partner. We discuss how these results inform not only comparative psychology, but also evolutionary psychology, as they provide an understanding of the evolution of human economic behavior, and the evolution of decision making more broadly.

Comparative approaches to studying strategy: towards an evolutionary account of primate decision making

How do primates, humans included, deal with novel problems that arise in interactions with other group members? Despite much research regarding how animals and humans solve social problems, few studies have utilized comparable procedures, outcomes, or measures across different species. Thus, it is difficult to piece together the evolution of decision making, including the roots from which human economic decision making emerged. Recently, a comparative body of decision making research has emerged, relying largely on the methodology of experimental economics in order to address these questions in a cross-species fashion. Experimental economics is an ideal method of inquiry for this approach. It is a well-developed method for distilling complex decision making involving multiple conspecifics whose decisions are contingent upon one another into a series of simple decision choices. This allows these decisions to be compared across species and contexts. In particular, our group has used this approach to investigate coordination in New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, and great apes (including humans), using identical methods. We find that in some cases there are remarkable continuities of outcome, as when some pairs in all species solved a coordination game, the Assurance game. On the other hand, we also find that these similarities in outcomes are likely driven by differences in underlying cognitive mechanisms. New World monkeys required exogenous information about their partners' choices in order to solve the task, indicating that they were using a matching strategy. Old World monkeys, on the other hand, solved the task without exogenous cues, leading to investigations into what mechanisms may be underpinning their responses (e.g., reward maximization, strategy formation, etc.). Great apes showed a strong experience effect, with cognitively enriched apes following what appears to be a strategy. Finally, humans were able to solve the task with or without exogenous cues. However, when given the chance to do so, they incorporated an additional mechanism unavailable to the other primates - language - to coordinate outcomes with their partner. We discuss how these results inform not only comparative psychology, but also evolutionary psychology, as they provide an understanding of the evolution of human economic behavior, and the evolution of decision making more broadly.

Human risky choice in a repeated-gambles procedure: an up-linkage replication of Lakshminarayanan, Chen and Santos (2011)

Lakshminarayanan et al. (J Exp Soc Psychol 47: 689-693, 2011) showed that when choice is between variable (risky) and fixed (safe) food amounts with the same expected values, capuchins prefer the safe alternative if choice is framed as a gain, but the risky alternative if it is framed as a loss. These results seem similar to those seen in human prospect-theory tests in choice between variable and fixed gains or losses. Based on this similarity, they interpreted their results as identifying a between-species commonality in cognitive function. In this report, we repeat their experiment with humans as subjects (an up-linkage replication). Whether choices were rewarded with candy or nickels, choice approximated indifference whether framed as gains or losses. Our data mirror those of others who found that when humans make risky choices within a repeated-trials procedure without verbal instruction about outcome likelihoods, preference biases seen in one-shot, language-guided, prospect-theory tests such as Tversky and Kahneman's (Science 211:453-458, 1981) reflection effect may not appear. The disparity between our findings and those of Lakshminarayanan et al. suggests their study does not evidence a cognitive process shared by humans and capuchins.

Chimpanzees play the ultimatum game

Is the sense of fairness uniquely human? Human reactions to reward division are often studied by means of the ultimatum game, in which both partners need to agree on a distribution for both to receive rewards. Humans typically offer generous portions of the reward to their partner, a tendency our close primate relatives have thus far failed to show in experiments. Here we tested chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children on a modified ultimatum game. One individual chose between two tokens that, with their partner's cooperation, could be exchanged for rewards. One token offered equal rewards to both players, whereas the other token favored the chooser. Both apes and children responded like humans typically do. If their partner's cooperation was required, they split the rewards equally. However, with passive partners--a situation akin to the so-called dictator game--they preferred the selfish option. Thus, humans and chimpanzees show similar preferences regarding reward division, suggesting a long evolutionary history to the human sense of fairness.

Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness

Darwin's claim 'that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals … is certainly one of degree and not of kind' is at the core of the comparative study of cognition. Recent research provides unprecedented support for Darwin's claim as well as new reasons to question it, stimulating new theories of human cognitive uniqueness. This article compares and evaluates approaches to such theories. Some prominent theories propose sweeping domain-general characterizations of the difference in cognitive capabilities and/or mechanisms between adult humans and other animals. Dual-process theories for some cognitive domains propose that adult human cognition shares simple basic processes with that of other animals while additionally including slower-developing and more explicit uniquely human processes. These theories are consistent with a modular account of cognition and the 'core knowledge' account of children's cognitive development. A complementary proposal is that human infants have unique social and/or cognitive adaptations for uniquely human learning. A view of human cognitive architecture as a mosaic of unique and species-general modular and domain-general processes together with a focus on uniquely human developmental mechanisms is consistent with modern evolutionary-developmental biology and suggests new questions for comparative research.

Delaying gratification for food and tokens in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): when quantity is salient, symbolic stimuli do not improve performance

Capuchin monkeys have been tested for the capacity to delay gratification for accumulating rewards in recent studies and have exhibited variable results. Meanwhile, chimpanzees have consistently excelled at this task. However, neither species have ever been tested at accumulating symbolic tokens instead of food items, even though previous reports indicate that tokens sometimes facilitate performance in other self-control tasks. Thus, in the present study, we tested capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees for their capacity to delay gratification in a delay maintenance task, in which an experimenter presented items, one at a time, to within reach of an animal for as long as the animal refrained from taking them. In Experiment 1, we assessed how long capuchin monkeys could accumulate items in the delay maintenance task when items were food rewards or tokens exchangeable for food rewards. Monkeys accumulated more food rewards than they did tokens. In Experiment 2, we tested capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees in a similar accumulation test. Whereas capuchins again accumulated more food than tokens, all chimpanzees but one showed no difference in performance in the two conditions. These findings provide additional evidence that chimpanzees exhibit greater self-control capacity in this task than do capuchin monkeys and indicate that symbolic stimuli fail to facilitate delay maintenance when they do not abstract away from the quantitative dimension of the task. This is consistent with previous findings on the effects of symbols on self-control and illuminates what makes accumulation a particularly challenging task.

Old World monkeys are more similar to humans than New World monkeys when playing a coordination game

There is much debate about how humans' decision-making compares with that of other primates. One way to explore this is to compare species' performance using identical methodologies in games with strategical interactions. We presented a computerized Assurance Game, which was either functionally simultaneous or sequential, to investigate how humans, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys used information in decision-making. All species coordinated via sequential play on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating that information about the partner's choice improved decisions. Furthermore, some humans and rhesus monkeys found the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game, even when it was the first condition presented. Thus, Old World primates solved the task without any external cues to their partner's choice. Finally, when not explicitly prohibited, humans spontaneously used language to coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating an alternative mechanism for converting a simultaneous move game into a sequential move game. This phylogenetic distribution implies that no single mechanism drives coordination decisions across the primates, while humans' ability to spontaneously use language to change the structure of the game emphasizes that multiple mechanisms may be used even within the same species. These results provide insight into the evolution of decision-making strategies across the primates.

A Hypothesis of the Co-evolution of Cooperation and Responses to Inequity

Recent evidence demonstrates that humans are not the only species to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes which are to their disadvantage. Several species respond negatively if they subsequently receive a less good reward than a social partner for completing the same task. While these studies suggest that the negative response to inequity is not a uniquely human behavior, they do not provide a functional explanation for the emergence of these responses due to similar characteristics among these species. However, emerging data support the hypothesis that an aversion to inequity is a mechanism to promote successful long-term cooperative relationships amongst non-kin. In this paper, I discuss several converging lines of evidence which illustrate the need to further evaluate this relationship. First, cooperation can survive modest inequity; in explicitly cooperative interactions, individuals are willing to continue to cooperate despite inequitable outcomes as long as the partner's overall behavior is equitable. Second, the context of inequity affects reactions to it in ways which support the idea that joint efforts lead to an expectation of joint payoffs. Finally, comparative studies indicate a link between the degree and extent of cooperation between unrelated individuals in a species and that species’ response to inequitable outcomes. This latter line of evidence indicates that this behavior evolved in conjunction with cooperation and may represent an adaptation to increase the payoffs associated with cooperative interactions. Together these data inform a testable working hypothesis for understanding decision-making in the context of inequity and provide a new, comparative framework for evaluating decision-making behavior.