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Monov G, Stein H, Klock L, Gallinat J, Kühn S, Lincoln T, Krkovic K, Murphy PR, Donner TH. Linking Cognitive Integrity to Working Memory Dynamics in the Aging Human Brain. J Neurosci 2024; 44:e1883232024. [PMID: 38760163 PMCID: PMC11211717 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.1883-23.2024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2023] [Revised: 04/13/2024] [Accepted: 04/18/2024] [Indexed: 05/19/2024] Open
Abstract
Aging is accompanied by a decline of working memory, an important cognitive capacity that involves stimulus-selective neural activity that persists after stimulus presentation. Here, we unraveled working memory dynamics in older human adults (male and female) including those diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) using a combination of behavioral modeling, neuropsychological assessment, and MEG recordings of brain activity. Younger adults (male and female) were studied with behavioral modeling only. Participants performed a visuospatial delayed match-to-sample task under systematic manipulation of the delay and distance between sample and test stimuli. Their behavior (match/nonmatch decisions) was fit with a computational model permitting the dissociation of noise in the internal operations underlying the working memory performance from a strategic decision threshold. Task accuracy decreased with delay duration and sample/test proximity. When sample/test distances were small, older adults committed more false alarms than younger adults. The computational model explained the participants' behavior well. The model parameters reflecting internal noise (not decision threshold) correlated with the precision of stimulus-selective cortical activity measured with MEG during the delay interval. The model uncovered an increase specifically in working memory noise in older compared with younger participants. Furthermore, in the MCI group, but not in the older healthy controls, internal noise correlated with the participants' clinically assessed cognitive integrity. Our results are consistent with the idea that the stability of working memory contents deteriorates in aging, in a manner that is specifically linked to the overall cognitive integrity of individuals diagnosed with MCI.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gina Monov
- Section of Computational Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Neurophysiology & Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
| | - Henrik Stein
- Department of Psychiatry, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
| | - Leonie Klock
- Department of Psychiatry, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
| | - Juergen Gallinat
- Department of Psychiatry, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
| | - Simone Kühn
- Department of Psychiatry, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
| | - Tania Lincoln
- Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, Institute of Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg 20146, Germany
| | - Katarina Krkovic
- Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, Institute of Psychology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg 20146, Germany
| | - Peter R Murphy
- Section of Computational Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Neurophysiology & Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Maynooth University, Co. Kildare, Ireland
| | - Tobias H Donner
- Section of Computational Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Neurophysiology & Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
- Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Charité Universitätsmedizin, Berlin 10115, Germany
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2
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Olschewski S, Spektor MS, Le Mens G. Frequent winners explain apparent skewness preferences in experience-based decisions. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2317751121. [PMID: 38489382 PMCID: PMC10962955 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2317751121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/13/2023] [Accepted: 01/17/2024] [Indexed: 03/17/2024] Open
Abstract
Do people's attitudes toward the (a)symmetry of an outcome distribution affect their choices? Financial investors seek return distributions with frequent small returns but few large ones, consistent with leading models of choice in economics and finance that assume right-skewed preferences. In contrast, many experiments in which decision-makers learn about choice options through experience find the opposite choice tendency, in favor of left-skewed options. To reconcile these seemingly contradicting findings, the present work investigates the effect of skewness on choices in experience-based decisions. Across seven studies, we show that apparent preferences for left-skewed outcome distributions are a consequence of those distributions having a higher value in most direct outcome comparisons, a "frequent-winner effect." By manipulating which option is the frequent winner, we show that choice tendencies for frequent winners can be obtained even with identical outcome distributions. Moreover, systematic choice tendencies in favor of right- or left-skewed options can be obtained by manipulating which option is experienced as the frequent winner. We also find evidence for an intrinsic preference for right-skewed outcome distributions. The frequent-winner phenomenon is robust to variations in outcome distributions and experimental paradigms. These findings are confirmed by computational analyses in which a reinforcement-learning model capturing frequent winning and intrinsic skewness preferences provides the best account of the data. Our work reconciles conflicting findings of aggregated behavior in financial markets and experiments and highlights the need for theories of decision-making sensitive to joint outcome distributions of the available options.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Olschewski
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, 4055Basel, Switzerland
- Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, CV4 7EQCoventry, United Kingdom
| | - Mikhail S. Spektor
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, CV4 7EQCoventry, United Kingdom
- Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005Barcelona, Spain
| | - Gaël Le Mens
- Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005Barcelona, Spain
- Barcelona School of Economics (BSE), Barcelona08005, Spain
- Universitat Pompeu Fabra–Barcelona School of Management, 08008Barcelona, Spain
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3
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Olschewski S, Scheibehenne B. What's in a sample? Epistemic uncertainty and metacognitive awareness in risk taking. Cogn Psychol 2024; 149:101642. [PMID: 38401485 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101642] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2023] [Revised: 02/01/2024] [Accepted: 02/13/2024] [Indexed: 02/26/2024]
Abstract
In a fundamentally uncertain world, sound information processing is a prerequisite for effective behavior. Given that information processing is subject to inevitable cognitive imprecision, decision makers should adapt to this imprecision and to the resulting epistemic uncertainty when taking risks. We tested this metacognitive ability in two experiments in which participants estimated the expected value of different number distributions from sequential samples and then bet on their own estimation accuracy. Results show that estimates were imprecise, and this imprecision increased with higher distributional standard deviations. Importantly, participants adapted their risk-taking behavior to this imprecision and hence deviated from the predictions of Bayesian models of uncertainty that assume perfect integration of information. To explain these results, we developed a computational model that combines Bayesian updating with a metacognitive awareness of cognitive imprecision in the integration of information. Modeling results were robust to the inclusion of an empirical measure of participants' perceived variability. In sum, we show that cognitive imprecision is crucial to understanding risk taking in decisions from experience. The results further demonstrate the importance of metacognitive awareness as a cognitive building block for adaptive behavior under (partial) uncertainty.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Olschewski
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland; Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, United Kingdom.
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4
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Olschewski S, Luckman A, Mason A, Ludvig EA, Konstantinidis E. The Future of Decisions From Experience: Connecting Real-World Decision Problems to Cognitive Processes. PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2024; 19:82-102. [PMID: 37390328 PMCID: PMC10790535 DOI: 10.1177/17456916231179138] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/02/2023]
Abstract
In many important real-world decision domains, such as finance, the environment, and health, behavior is strongly influenced by experience. Renewed interest in studying this influence led to important advancements in the understanding of these decisions from experience (DfE) in the last 20 years. Building on this literature, we suggest ways the standard experimental design should be extended to better approach important real-world DfE. These extensions include, for example, introducing more complex choice situations, delaying feedback, and including social interactions. When acting upon experiences in these richer and more complicated environments, extensive cognitive processes go into making a decision. Therefore, we argue for integrating cognitive processes more explicitly into experimental research in DfE. These cognitive processes include attention to and perception of numeric and nonnumeric experiences, the influence of episodic and semantic memory, and the mental models involved in learning processes. Understanding these basic cognitive processes can advance the modeling, understanding and prediction of DfE in the laboratory and in the real world. We highlight the potential of experimental research in DfE for theory integration across the behavioral, decision, and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, this research could lead to new methodology that better informs decision-making and policy interventions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Olschewski
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel
- Warwick Business School, University of Warwick
| | - Ashley Luckman
- Warwick Business School, University of Warwick
- University of Exeter Business School, University of Exeter
| | - Alice Mason
- Department of Psychology, University of Bath
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick
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5
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Lee DG, D'Alessandro M, Iodice P, Calluso C, Rustichini A, Pezzulo G. Risky decisions are influenced by individual attributes as a function of risk preference. Cogn Psychol 2023; 147:101614. [PMID: 37837926 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101614] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2022] [Revised: 09/13/2023] [Accepted: 10/05/2023] [Indexed: 10/16/2023]
Abstract
It has long been assumed in economic theory that multi-attribute decisions involving several attributes or dimensions - such as probabilities and amounts of money to be earned during risky choices - are resolved by first combining the attributes of each option to form an overall expected value and then comparing the expected values of the alternative options, using a unique evidence accumulation process. A plausible alternative would be performing independent comparisons between the individual attributes and then integrating the results of the comparisons afterwards. Here, we devise a novel method to disambiguate between these types of models, by orthogonally manipulating the expected value of choice options and the relative salience of their attributes. Our results, based on behavioral measures and drift-diffusion models, provide evidence in favor of the framework where information about individual attributes independently impacts deliberation. This suggests that risky decisions are resolved by running in parallel multiple comparisons between the separate attributes - possibly alongside an additional comparison of expected value. This result stands in contrast with the assumption of standard economic theory that choices require a unique comparison of expected values and suggests that at the cognitive level, decision processes might be more distributed than commonly assumed. Beyond our planned analyses, we also discovered that attribute salience affects people of different risk preference type in different ways: risk-averse participants seem to focus more on probability, except when monetary amount is particularly high; risk-neutral/seeking participants, in contrast, seem to focus more on monetary amount, except when probability is particularly low.
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Affiliation(s)
- Douglas G Lee
- Tel Aviv University, School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv, Israel; Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Marco D'Alessandro
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy
| | - Pierpaolo Iodice
- Université de Rouen, Rouen, France; Movement Interactions Performance Lab, Le Mans Université, Le Mans, France
| | | | | | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
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6
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Li L, Hou C, Peng C, Chen Y. Encoding, working memory, or decision: how feedback modulates time perception. Cereb Cortex 2023; 33:10355-10366. [PMID: 37522300 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhad287] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2023] [Revised: 07/10/2023] [Indexed: 08/01/2023] Open
Abstract
The hypothesis that individuals can accurately represent temporal information within approximately 3 s is the premise of several theoretical models and empirical studies in the field of temporal processing. The significance of accurately representing time within 3 s and the universality of the overestimation contrast dramatically. To clarify whether this overestimation arises from an inability to accurately represent time or a response bias, we systematically examined whether feedback reduces overestimation at the 3 temporal processing stages of timing (encoding), working memory, and decisions proposed by the scalar timing model. Participants reproduced the time interval between 2 circles with or without feedback, while the electroencephalogram (EEG) was synchronously recorded. Behavioral results showed that feedback shortened reproduced times and significantly minimized overestimation. EEG results showed that feedback significantly decreased the amplitude of contingent negative variation (CNV) in the decision stage but did not modulate the CNV amplitude in the encoding stage or the P2-P3b amplitudes in the working memory stage. These results suggest that overestimation arises from response bias when individuals convert an accurate representation of time into behavior. Our study provides electrophysiological evidence to support the conception that short intervals under approximately 3 s can be accurately represented as "temporal gestalt."
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Affiliation(s)
- Langyu Li
- Key Laboratory of Cognition and Personality (Ministry of Education), Faculty of Psychology, Time Psychology Research Center, Center of Studies for Psychology and Social Development, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
| | - Chunna Hou
- Key Laboratory of Cognition and Personality (Ministry of Education), Faculty of Psychology, Time Psychology Research Center, Center of Studies for Psychology and Social Development, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
| | - Chunhua Peng
- Chongqing Key Laboratory of Emotion and Mental Health, Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences, Chongqing 402160, China
| | - Youguo Chen
- Key Laboratory of Cognition and Personality (Ministry of Education), Faculty of Psychology, Time Psychology Research Center, Center of Studies for Psychology and Social Development, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
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7
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Liu Y, Trueblood JS. The effect of preference learning on context effects in multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice. Cognition 2023; 233:105365. [PMID: 36587529 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105365] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2021] [Revised: 12/08/2022] [Accepted: 12/23/2022] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
Within the domain of preferential choice, it has long been thought that context effects, such as the attraction and compromise effects, arise due to the constructive nature of preferences and thus should not emerge when preferences are stable. We examined this hypothesis with a series of experiments where participants had the opportunity to experience selected alternatives and develop more enduring preferences. In our tasks, the options are presented in a description-based format so that participants need only learn their preferences for various options rather than the objective values of those options. Our results suggest that context effects can still emerge when stable preferences form through experience. This suggests that multi-alternative, multi-attribute decisions are likely influenced by relative evaluations, even when participants have the opportunity to experience options and learn their preferences. We hypothesize what was learned from experience in our tasks is the weights for various attributes. Through model simulations, we show that the observed choice patterns are well captured by a model with unequal attribute weights. A secondary finding is that the direction of observed context effects is opposite to standard effects and appears to be quite robust. Model simulations show that reserved effects can arise through various processes including representational noise and sensitivity to advantages and disadvantages when comparing options.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yanjun Liu
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, United States of America.
| | - Jennifer S Trueblood
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, United States of America.
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8
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Pirrone A, Tsetsos K. Toward an Atlas of Canonical Cognitive Mechanisms. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13243. [PMID: 36744746 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13243] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/31/2022] [Revised: 12/19/2022] [Accepted: 01/04/2023] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Abstract
A central goal in Cognitive Science is understanding the mechanisms that underlie cognition. Here, we contend that Cognitive Science, despite intense multidisciplinary efforts, has furnished surprisingly few mechanistic insights. We attribute this slow mechanistic progress to the fact that cognitive scientists insist on performing underdetermined exercises, deriving overparametrized mechanistic theories of complex behaviors and seeking validation of these theories to the elusive notions of optimality and biological plausibility. We propose that mechanistic progress in Cognitive Science will accelerate once cognitive scientists start focusing on simpler explananda that will enable them to chart an atlas of elementary cognitive operations. Looking forward, the next challenge for Cognitive Science will be to understand how these elementary cognitive processes are pieced together to explain complex behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angelo Pirrone
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics
| | - Konstantinos Tsetsos
- School of Psychological Science, University of Bristol
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf
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9
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Mantri P, Subramonyam H, Michal AL, Xiong C. How Do Viewers Synthesize Conflicting Information from Data Visualizations? IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VISUALIZATION AND COMPUTER GRAPHICS 2023; 29:1005-1015. [PMID: 36166526 DOI: 10.1109/tvcg.2022.3209467] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/04/2023]
Abstract
Scientific knowledge develops through cumulative discoveries that build on, contradict, contextualize, or correct prior findings. Scientists and journalists often communicate these incremental findings to lay people through visualizations and text (e.g., the positive and negative effects of caffeine intake). Consequently, readers need to integrate diverse and contrasting evidence from multiple sources to form opinions or make decisions. However, the underlying mechanism for synthesizing information from multiple visualizations remains under-explored. To address this knowledge gap, we conducted a series of four experiments ( N=1166) in which participants synthesized empirical evidence from a pair of line charts presented sequentially. In Experiment 1, we administered a baseline condition with charts depicting no specific context where participants held no strong belief. To test for the generalizability, we introduced real-world scenarios to our visualizations in Experiment 2 and added accompanying text descriptions similar to online news articles or blog posts in Experiment 3. In all three experiments, we varied the relative direction and magnitude of line slopes within the chart pairs. We found that participants tended to weigh the positive slope more when the two charts depicted relationships in the opposite direction (e.g., one positive slope and one negative slope). Participants tended to weigh the less steep slope more when the two charts depicted relationships in the same direction (e.g., both positive). Through these experiments, we characterize participants' synthesis behaviors depending on the relationship between the information they viewed, contribute to theories describing underlying cognitive mechanisms in information synthesis, and describe design implications for data storytelling.
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10
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EEG-representational geometries and psychometric distortions in approximate numerical judgment. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010747. [DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010747] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2022] [Revised: 12/15/2022] [Accepted: 11/18/2022] [Indexed: 12/12/2022] Open
Abstract
When judging the average value of sample stimuli (e.g., numbers) people tend to either over- or underweight extreme sample values, depending on task context. In a context of overweighting, recent work has shown that extreme sample values were overly represented also in neural signals, in terms of an anti-compressed geometry of number samples in multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) patterns. Here, we asked whether neural representational geometries may also reflect a relative underweighting of extreme values (i.e., compression) which has been observed behaviorally in a great variety of tasks. We used a simple experimental manipulation (instructions to average a single-stream or to compare dual-streams of samples) to induce compression or anti-compression in behavior when participants judged rapid number sequences. Model-based representational similarity analysis (RSA) replicated the previous finding of neural anti-compression in the dual-stream task, but failed to provide evidence for neural compression in the single-stream task, despite the evidence for compression in behavior. Instead, the results indicated enhanced neural processing of extreme values in either task, regardless of whether extremes were over- or underweighted in subsequent behavioral choice. We further observed more general differences in the neural representation of the sample information between the two tasks. Together, our results indicate a mismatch between sample-level EEG geometries and behavior, which raises new questions about the origin of common psychometric distortions, such as diminishing sensitivity for larger values.
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11
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Mason A, Madan CR, Simonsen N, Spetch ML, Ludvig EA. Biased confabulation in risky choice. Cognition 2022; 229:105245. [PMID: 35961162 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105245] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2021] [Revised: 06/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
When people make risky decisions based on past experience, they must rely on memory. The nature of the memory representations that support these decisions is not yet well understood. A key question concerns the extent to which people recall specific past episodes or whether they have learned a more abstract rule from their past experience. To address this question, we examined the precision of the memories used in risky decisions-from-experience. In three pre-registered experiments, we presented people with risky options, where the outcomes were drawn from continuous ranges (e.g., 100-190 or 500-590), and then assessed their memories for the outcomes experienced. In two preferential tasks, people were more risk seeking for high-value than low-value options, choosing as though they overweighted the outcomes from more extreme ranges. Moreover, in two preferential tasks and a parallel evaluation task, people were very poor at recalling the exact outcomes encountered, but rather confabulated outcomes that were consistent with the outcomes they had seen and were biased towards the more extreme ranges encountered. This common pattern suggests that the observed decision bias in the preferential task reflects a basic cognitive process to overweight extreme outcomes in memory. These results highlight the importance of the edges of the distribution in providing the encoding context for memory recall. They also suggest that episodic memory influences decision-making through gist memory and not through direct recall of specific instances.
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12
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Molter F, Thomas AW, Huettel SA, Heekeren HR, Mohr PNC. Gaze-dependent evidence accumulation predicts multi-alternative risky choice behaviour. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010283. [PMID: 35793388 PMCID: PMC9292127 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010283] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2021] [Revised: 07/18/2022] [Accepted: 06/07/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Choices are influenced by gaze allocation during deliberation, so that fixating an alternative longer leads to increased probability of choosing it. Gaze-dependent evidence accumulation provides a parsimonious account of choices, response times and gaze-behaviour in many simple decision scenarios. Here, we test whether this framework can also predict more complex context-dependent patterns of choice in a three-alternative risky choice task, where choices and eye movements were subject to attraction and compromise effects. Choices were best described by a gaze-dependent evidence accumulation model, where subjective values of alternatives are discounted while not fixated. Finally, we performed a systematic search over a large model space, allowing us to evaluate the relative contribution of different forms of gaze-dependence and additional mechanisms previously not considered by gaze-dependent accumulation models. Gaze-dependence remained the most important mechanism, but participants with strong attraction effects employed an additional similarity-dependent inhibition mechanism found in other models of multi-alternative multi-attribute choice. Faced with different choice alternatives, such as food options or risky prospects, our decisions and allocation of gaze (that is where we look) are closely linked, such that items that are looked at longer are often more likely to be chosen. In simple decisions (e.g., choosing between two chocolate bars), these decisions and their associations with gaze allocation are well described by computational models that assume accumulation of evidence in favour of each alternative over time and discounting of momentarily unattended information. However, an important question is whether this class of models can also describe choice behaviour in more complex settings. Specifically, so-called context effects, where preferences between two alternatives can vary with the addition of a third alternative, challenge many models of simple decision making. Our study addresses this question by evaluating gaze-dependent evidence accumulation models in a setting where choices between two risky lotteries are systematically influenced by a third alternative. We find gaze-dependent models to be able to describe context effects because decision-makers‘ gaze allocation also varies with different sets of alternatives.
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Affiliation(s)
- Felix Molter
- School of Business & Economics, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
- * E-mail:
| | - Armin W. Thomas
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, United States of America
| | - Scott A. Huettel
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, United States of America
- Department for Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, United States of America
| | - Hauke R. Heekeren
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Department for Education and Psychology, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Peter N. C. Mohr
- School of Business & Economics, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
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13
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The repulsion effect in preferential choice and its relation to perceptual choice. Cognition 2022; 225:105164. [PMID: 35596968 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105164] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/12/2021] [Revised: 05/02/2022] [Accepted: 05/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
People rely on the choice context to guide their decisions, violating fundamental principles of rational choice theory and exhibiting phenomena called context effects. Recent research has uncovered that dominance relationships can both increase or decrease the choice share of the dominating option, marking the two ends of an attraction-repulsion continuum. However, empirical links between the two opposing effects are scarce and theoretical accounts are missing altogether. The present study (N = 55) used eye tracking alongside a within-subject design that contrasts a perceptual task and a preferential-choice analog in order to bridge this gap and uncover the underlying information-search processes. Although individuals differed in their perceptual and preferential choices, they generally engaged in alternative-wise comparisons and a repulsion effect was present in both conditions that became weaker the more predominant the attribute-wise comparisons were. Altogether, our study corroborates the notion that repulsion effects are a robust and general phenomenon that theoretical accounts need to take seriously.
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14
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Dennison JB, Sazhin D, Smith DV. Decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics: Recent progress and ongoing challenges. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2022; 13:e1589. [PMID: 35137549 PMCID: PMC9124684 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2020] [Revised: 11/28/2021] [Accepted: 12/21/2021] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
In the past decade, decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics have developed many new insights in the study of decision making. This review provides an overarching update on how the field has advanced in this time period. Although our initial review a decade ago outlined several theoretical, conceptual, methodological, empirical, and practical challenges, there has only been limited progress in resolving these challenges. We summarize significant trends in decision neuroscience through the lens of the challenges outlined for the field and review examples where the field has had significant, direct, and applicable impacts across economics and psychology. First, we review progress on topics including reward learning, explore-exploit decisions, risk and ambiguity, intertemporal choice, and valuation. Next, we assess the impacts of emotion, social rewards, and social context on decision making. Then, we follow up with how individual differences impact choices and new exciting developments in the prediction and neuroforecasting of future decisions. Finally, we consider how trends in decision-neuroscience research reflect progress toward resolving past challenges, discuss new and exciting applications of recent research, and identify new challenges for the field. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Emotion and Motivation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeffrey B Dennison
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
| | - Daniel Sazhin
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
| | - David V Smith
- Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
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15
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Glickman M, Moran R, Usher M. Evidence integration and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency. Nat Hum Behav 2022; 6:988-999. [PMID: 35379981 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-022-01318-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2020] [Accepted: 02/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Evidence integration is a normative algorithm for choosing between alternatives with noisy evidence, which has been successful in accounting for vast amounts of behavioural and neural data. However, this mechanism has been challenged by non-integration heuristics, and tracking decision boundaries has proven elusive. Here we first show that the decision boundaries can be extracted using a model-free behavioural method termed decision classification boundary, which optimizes choice classification based on the accumulated evidence. Using this method, we provide direct support for evidence integration over non-integration heuristics, show that the decision boundaries collapse across time and identify an integration bias whereby incoming evidence is modulated based on its consistency with preceding information. This consistency bias, which is a form of pre-decision confirmation bias, was supported in four cross-domain experiments, showing that choice accuracy and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency. Strikingly, despite its seeming sub-optimality, the consistency bias fosters performance by enhancing robustness to integration noise.
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Affiliation(s)
- Moshe Glickman
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK. .,Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Rani Moran
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, UK.,Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
| | - Marius Usher
- School of Psychology, University of Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel. .,Sagol School of Neuroscience, University of Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel.
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16
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Appelhoff S, Hertwig R, Spitzer B. Control over sampling boosts numerical evidence processing in human decisions from experience. Cereb Cortex 2022; 33:207-221. [PMID: 35266973 PMCID: PMC9758588 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhac062] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2021] [Revised: 01/30/2022] [Accepted: 01/31/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
When acquiring information about choice alternatives, decision makers may have varying levels of control over which and how much information they sample before making a choice. How does control over information acquisition affect the quality of sample-based decisions? Here, combining variants of a numerical sampling task with neural recordings, we show that control over when to stop sampling can enhance (i) behavioral choice accuracy, (ii) the build-up of parietal decision signals, and (iii) the encoding of numerical sample information in multivariate electroencephalogram patterns. None of these effects were observed when participants could only control which alternatives to sample, but not when to stop sampling. Furthermore, levels of control had no effect on early sensory signals or on the extent to which sample information leaked from memory. The results indicate that freedom to stop sampling can amplify decisional evidence processing from the outset of information acquisition and lead to more accurate choices.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefan Appelhoff
- Corresponding author: Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany.
| | - Ralph Hertwig
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
| | - Bernhard Spitzer
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany,Research Group Adaptive Memory and Decision Making, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
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17
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Bansal S, Bae GY, Robinson BM, Hahn B, Waltz J, Erickson M, Leptourgos P, Corlett P, Luck SJ, Gold JM. Association Between Failures in Perceptual Updating and the Severity of Psychosis in Schizophrenia. JAMA Psychiatry 2022; 79:169-177. [PMID: 34851373 PMCID: PMC8811632 DOI: 10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.3482] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022]
Abstract
IMPORTANCE Recent accounts suggest that delusions and hallucinations may result from alterations in how prior knowledge is integrated with new information, but experimental evidence supporting this idea has been complex and inconsistent. Evidence from a simpler perceptual task would make clear whether psychotic symptoms are associated with overreliance on prior information and impaired updating. OBJECTIVE To investigate whether individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (PSZ) and healthy control individuals (HCs) differ in the ability to update their beliefs based on evidence in a relatively simple perceptual paradigm. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This case-control study included individuals who met DSM-IV criteria for PSZ and matched HC participants in 2 independent samples. The PSZ group was recruited from the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Yale University, and community clinics, and the HC group was recruited from the community. To test perceptual updating, a random dot kinematogram paradigm was implemented in which dots moving coherently in a single direction were mixed with randomly moving dots. On 50% of trials, the direction of coherent motion changed by 90° midway through the trial. Participants were asked to report the direction perceived at the end of the trial. The Peters Delusions Inventory and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) were used to quantify the severity of positive symptoms. Data were collected from September 2018 to March 2020 and were analyzed from approximately March 2020 to March 2021. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Critical measures included the proportion of responses centered around the initial direction vs the subsequent changed direction and the overall precision of motion perception and reaction times. RESULTS A total of 48 participants were included in the PSZ group (31 [65%] male; mean [SD] age, 36.56 [9.76] years) and 36 in the HC group (22 [61%] male; mean [SD] age, 35.67 [10.74] years) in the original sample. An independent replication sample included 42 participants in the PSZ group (29 [69%] male; mean [SD] age, 33.98 [11.03] years) and 34 in the HC group (20 [59%] male; mean [SD] age, 34.29 [10.44] years). In line with previous research, patients with PSZ were less precise and had slower reaction times overall. The key finding was that patients with PSZ were significantly more likely (original sample: mean, 27.88 [95% CI, 24.19-31.57]; replication sample: mean, 26.70 [95% CI, 23.53-29.87]) than HC participants (original sample: mean, 18.86 [95% CI, 16.56-21.16]; replication sample: mean, 15.67 [95% CI, 12.61-18.73]) to report the initial motion direction rather than the final one. Moreover, the tendency to report the direction of initial motion correlated with the degree of conviction on the Peters Delusions Inventory (original sample: r = 0.32 [P = .05]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]) and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Reality Distortion score (original sample: r = 0.55 [P = .001]; replication sample: r = 0.35 [P = .03]) and severity of hallucinations (original sample: r = 0.39 [P = .02]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings of this case-control study suggest that the severity of psychotic symptoms is associated with a tendency to overweight initial information over incoming sensory evidence. These results are consistent with predictive coding accounts of the origins of positive symptoms and suggest that deficits in very elementary perceptual updating may be a critical mechanism in psychosis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sonia Bansal
- Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore
| | - Gi-Yeul Bae
- Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe
| | - Benjamin M. Robinson
- Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore
| | - Britta Hahn
- Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore
| | - James Waltz
- Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore
| | - Molly Erickson
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
| | - Pantelis Leptourgos
- Department of Psychiatry, Connecticut Mental Health Center, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
| | - Phillip Corlett
- Department of Psychiatry, Connecticut Mental Health Center, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
| | - Steven J. Luck
- Center for Mind and Brain and Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis
| | - James M. Gold
- Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore
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18
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Establishing the laws of preferential choice behavior. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2021. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008457] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractMathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studying choice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposed over the long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. The existence of so many models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy, obscuring key insights into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about the essential properties of preferential choice. We provide a synthesis of formal models of risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal choice, three important domains in decision making. We identify recurring insights discovered by scholars of different generations and different disciplines across these three domains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing models as involving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computational properties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical development in decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities and differences between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses and empirical tests.
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19
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How top-down and bottom-up attention modulate risky choice. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2021; 118:2025646118. [PMID: 34561303 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2025646118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/31/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
We examine how bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) and top-down (or goal-driven) processes govern the distribution of attention in risky choice. In three experiments, participants chose between a certain payoff and the chance of receiving a payoff drawn randomly from an array of eight numbers. We tested the hypothesis that initial attention is driven by perceptual properties of the stimulus (e.g., font size of the numbers), but subsequent choice is goal-driven (e.g., win the best outcome). Two experiments in which task framing (goal driven) and font size (stimulus driven) were manipulated demonstrated that payoffs with the highest values and the largest font sizes had the greatest impact on choice. The third experiment added a number in large font to the array, which could not be an outcome of the gamble (i.e., a distractor). Eye movement and choice data indicated that although the distractor attracted attention, it had no influence on option selection. Together with computational modeling analyses, the results suggest that perceptual salience can induce bottom-up effects of overt selection but that the perceived value of information is the crucial arbiter of intentional control over risky choice.
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20
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Abstract
The decisions we make are shaped by a lifetime of learning. Past experience guides the way that we encode information in neural systems for perception and valuation, and determines the information we retrieve when making decisions. Distinct literatures have discussed how lifelong learning and local context shape decisions made about sensory signals, propositional information, or economic prospects. Here, we build bridges between these literatures, arguing for common principles of adaptive rationality in perception, cognition, and economic choice. We discuss how a single common framework, based on normative principles of efficient coding and Bayesian inference, can help us understand a myriad of human decision biases, including sensory illusions, adaptive aftereffects, choice history biases, central tendency effects, anchoring effects, contrast effects, framing effects, congruency effects, reference-dependent valuation, nonlinear utility functions, and discretization heuristics. We describe a simple computational framework for explaining these phenomena. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 73 is January 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christopher Summerfield
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, United Kingdom;
| | - Paula Parpart
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, United Kingdom;
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21
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Consumers’ ability to identify a surplus when returns to attributes are nonlinear. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2021. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500008391] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractPrevious research in multiple judgment domains has found that nonlinear functions are typically processed less accurately than linear ones. This empirical regularity has potential implications for consumer choice, given that nonlinear functions (e.g., diminishing returns) are commonplace. In two experimental studies we measured precision and bias in consumers’ ability to identify surpluses when returns to product attributes were nonlinear. We hypothesized that nonlinear functions would reduce precision and induce bias toward linearization of nonlinear relationships. Neither hypothesis was supported for monotonic nonlinearities. However, precision was greatly reduced for products with nonmonotonic attributes. Moreover, assessments of surplus were systematically and strongly biased, regardless of the shape of returns and despite feedback and incentives. The findings imply that consumers use a flexible but coarse mechanism to compare attributes against prices, with implications for the prevalence of costly mistakes.
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22
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Spektor MS, Bhatia S, Gluth S. The elusiveness of context effects in decision making. Trends Cogn Sci 2021; 25:843-854. [PMID: 34426050 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2021.07.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2021] [Accepted: 07/25/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Contextual features influence human and non-human decision making, giving rise to preference reversals. Decades of research have documented the species and situations in which these effects are observed. More recently, however, researchers have focused on boundary conditions, that is, settings in which established effects disappear or reverse. This work is scattered across academic disciplines and some results appear to contradict each other. We synthesize recent findings and resolve apparent contradictions by considering them in terms of three core categories of decision context: spatial arrangement, attribute concreteness, and deliberation time. We suggest that these categories could be understood using theories of choice representation, which specify how context shapes the information over which deliberation processes operate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mikhail S Spektor
- Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain.
| | - Sudeep Bhatia
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3720 Walnut Street, 19104 Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Sebastian Gluth
- Department of Psychology, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 11, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
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23
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Sareen PF, McCurdy LY, Nitabach MN. A neuronal ensemble encoding adaptive choice during sensory conflict in Drosophila. Nat Commun 2021; 12:4131. [PMID: 34226544 PMCID: PMC8257655 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-24423-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2020] [Accepted: 06/18/2021] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Feeding decisions are fundamental to survival, and decision making is often disrupted in disease. Here, we show that neural activity in a small population of neurons projecting to the fan-shaped body higher-order central brain region of Drosophila represents food choice during sensory conflict. We found that food deprived flies made tradeoffs between appetitive and aversive values of food. We identified an upstream neuropeptidergic and dopaminergic network that relays internal state and other decision-relevant information to a specific subset of fan-shaped body neurons. These neurons were strongly inhibited by the taste of the rejected food choice, suggesting that they encode behavioral food choice. Our findings reveal that fan-shaped body taste responses to food choices are determined not only by taste quality, but also by previous experience (including choice outcome) and hunger state, which are integrated in the fan-shaped body to encode the decision before relay to downstream motor circuits for behavioral implementation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Preeti F Sareen
- Department of Cellular and Molecular Physiology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
| | - Li Yan McCurdy
- Department of Cellular and Molecular Physiology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
- Interdepartmental Neuroscience Program, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
| | - Michael N Nitabach
- Department of Cellular and Molecular Physiology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
- Department of Genetics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
- Department of Neuroscience, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
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24
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Fisher G. A multiattribute attentional drift diffusion model. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.04.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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25
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Adaptive circuit dynamics across human cortex during evidence accumulation in changing environments. Nat Neurosci 2021; 24:987-997. [PMID: 33903770 DOI: 10.1038/s41593-021-00839-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2020] [Accepted: 03/12/2021] [Indexed: 02/02/2023]
Abstract
Many decisions under uncertainty entail the temporal accumulation of evidence that informs about the state of the environment. When environments are subject to hidden changes in their state, maximizing accuracy and reward requires non-linear accumulation of evidence. How this adaptive, non-linear computation is realized in the brain is unknown. We analyzed human behavior and cortical population activity (measured with magnetoencephalography) recorded during visual evidence accumulation in a changing environment. Behavior and decision-related activity in cortical regions involved in action planning exhibited hallmarks of adaptive evidence accumulation, which could also be implemented by a recurrent cortical microcircuit. Decision dynamics in action-encoding parietal and frontal regions were mirrored in a frequency-specific modulation of the state of the visual cortex that depended on pupil-linked arousal and the expected probability of change. These findings link normative decision computations to recurrent cortical circuit dynamics and highlight the adaptive nature of decision-related feedback to the sensory cortex.
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26
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Hertz U. Learning how to behave: cognitive learning processes account for asymmetries in adaptation to social norms. Proc Biol Sci 2021; 288:20210293. [PMID: 34074119 PMCID: PMC8170188 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2021.0293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Accepted: 05/10/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Changes to social settings caused by migration, cultural change or pandemics force us to adapt to new social norms. Social norms provide groups of individuals with behavioural prescriptions and therefore can be inferred by observing their behaviour. This work aims to examine how cognitive learning processes affect adaptation and learning of new social norms. Using a multiplayer game, I found that participants initially complied with various social norms exhibited by the behaviour of bot-players. After gaining experience with one norm, adaptation to a new norm was observed in all cases but one, where an active-harm norm was resistant to adaptation. Using computational learning models, I found that active behaviours were learned faster than omissions, and harmful behaviours were more readily attributed to all group members than beneficial behaviours. These results provide a cognitive foundation for learning and adaptation to descriptive norms and can inform future investigations of group-level learning and cross-cultural adaptation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Uri Hertz
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa 3498838, Israel
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27
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Kvam PD, Busemeyer JR, Pleskac TJ. Temporal oscillations in preference strength provide evidence for an open system model of constructed preference. Sci Rep 2021; 11:8169. [PMID: 33854162 PMCID: PMC8046775 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-87659-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/21/2020] [Accepted: 03/30/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
The decision process is often conceptualized as a constructive process in which a decision maker accumulates information to form preferences about the choice options and ultimately make a response. Here we examine how these constructive processes unfold by tracking dynamic changes in preference strength. Across two experiments, we observed that mean preference strength systematically oscillated over time and found that eliciting a choice early in time strongly affected the pattern of preference oscillation later in time. Preferences following choices oscillated between being stronger than those without prior choice and being weaker than those without choice. To account for these phenomena, we develop an open system dynamic model which merges the dynamics of Markov random walk processes with those of quantum walk processes. This model incorporates two sources of uncertainty: epistemic uncertainty about what preference state a decision maker has at a particular point in time; and ontic uncertainty about what decision or judgment will be observed when a person has some preference state. Representing these two sources of uncertainty allows the model to account for the oscillations in preference as well as the effect of choice on preference formation.
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28
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Talluri BC, Urai AE, Bronfman ZZ, Brezis N, Tsetsos K, Usher M, Donner TH. Choices change the temporal weighting of decision evidence. J Neurophysiol 2021; 125:1468-1481. [PMID: 33689508 PMCID: PMC8285578 DOI: 10.1152/jn.00462.2020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2020] [Revised: 02/16/2021] [Accepted: 03/04/2021] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Many decisions result from the accumulation of decision-relevant information (evidence) over time. Even when maximizing decision accuracy requires weighting all the evidence equally, decision-makers often give stronger weight to evidence occurring early or late in the evidence stream. Here, we show changes in such temporal biases within participants as a function of intermittent judgments about parts of the evidence stream. Human participants performed a decision task that required a continuous estimation of the mean evidence at the end of the stream. The evidence was either perceptual (noisy random dot motion) or symbolic (variable sequences of numbers). Participants also reported a categorical judgment of the preceding evidence half-way through the stream in one condition or executed an evidence-independent motor response in another condition. The relative impact of early versus late evidence on the final estimation flipped between these two conditions. In particular, participants' sensitivity to late evidence after the intermittent judgment, but not the simple motor response, was decreased. Both the intermittent response as well as the final estimation reports were accompanied by nonluminance-mediated increases of pupil diameter. These pupil dilations were bigger during intermittent judgments than simple motor responses and bigger during estimation when the late evidence was consistent than inconsistent with the initial judgment. In sum, decisions activate pupil-linked arousal systems and alter the temporal weighting of decision evidence. Our results are consistent with the idea that categorical choices in the face of uncertainty induce a change in the state of the neural circuits underlying decision-making.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The psychology and neuroscience of decision-making have extensively studied the accumulation of decision-relevant information toward a categorical choice. Much fewer studies have assessed the impact of a choice on the processing of subsequent information. Here, we show that intermittent choices during a protracted stream of input reduce the sensitivity to subsequent decision information and transiently boost arousal. Choices might trigger a state change in the neural machinery for decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bharath Chandra Talluri
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Anne E Urai
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | | | - Noam Brezis
- School of Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
| | - Konstantinos Tsetsos
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
| | - Marius Usher
- School of Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
| | - Tobias H Donner
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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29
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Olschewski S, Newell BR, Oberholzer Y, Scheibehenne B. Valuation and estimation from experience. JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 2021. [DOI: 10.1002/bdm.2241] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/29/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Olschewski
- Warwick Business School University of Warwick Coventry UK
- Department of Psychology University of Basel Basel Switzerland
| | - Ben R. Newell
- School of Psychology University of New South Wales Sydney New South Wales Australia
| | - Yvonne Oberholzer
- Institute of Information Systems and Marketing Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Karlsruhe Germany
| | - Benjamin Scheibehenne
- Institute of Information Systems and Marketing Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Karlsruhe Germany
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30
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Reward sensitivity differs depending on global self-esteem in value-based decision-making. Sci Rep 2020; 10:21525. [PMID: 33299062 PMCID: PMC7725803 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-78635-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2020] [Accepted: 11/25/2020] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Global self-esteem is a component of individual personality that impacts decision-making. Many studies have discussed the different preferences for decision-making in response to threats to a person's self-confidence, depending on global self-esteem. However, studies about global self-esteem and non-social decision-making have indicated that decisions differ due to reward sensitivity. Here, reward sensitivity refers to the extent to which rewards change decisions. We hypothesized that individuals with lower global self-esteem have lower reward sensitivity and investigated the relationship between self-esteem and reward sensitivity using a computational model. We first examined the effect of expected value and maximum value in learning under uncertainties because some studies have shown the possibility of saliency (e.g. maximum value) and relative value (e.g. expected value) affecting decisions, respectively. In our learning task, expected value affected decisions, but there was no significant effect of maximum value. Therefore, we modelled participants' choices under the condition of different expected value without considering maximum value. We used the Q-learning model, which is one of the traditional computational models in explaining experiential learning decisions. Global self-esteem correlated positively with reward sensitivity. Our results suggest that individual reward sensitivity affects decision-making depending on one's global self-esteem.
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31
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Vestergaard MD, Schultz W. Retrospective Valuation of Experienced Outcome Encoded in Distinct Reward Representations in the Anterior Insula and Amygdala. J Neurosci 2020; 40:8938-8950. [PMID: 33077553 PMCID: PMC7659459 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.2130-19.2020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/03/2019] [Revised: 08/12/2020] [Accepted: 08/25/2020] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Our ability to evaluate an experience retrospectively is important because it allows us to summarize its total value, and this summary value can then later be used as a guide in deciding whether the experience merits repeating, or whether instead it should rather be avoided. However, when an experience unfolds over time, humans tend to assign disproportionate weight to the later part of the experience, and this can lead to poor choice in repeating, or avoiding experience. Using model-based computational analyses of fMRI recordings in 27 male volunteers, we show that the human brain encodes the summary value of an extended sequence of outcomes in two distinct reward representations. We find that the overall experienced value is encoded accurately in the amygdala, but its merit is excessively marked down by disincentive anterior insula activity if the sequence of experienced outcomes declines temporarily. Moreover, the statistical strength of this neural code can separate efficient decision-makers from suboptimal decision-makers. Optimal decision-makers encode overall value more strongly, and suboptimal decision-makers encode the disincentive markdown (DM) more strongly. The separate neural implementation of the two distinct reward representations confirms that suboptimal choice for temporally extended outcomes can be the result of robust neural representation of a displeasing aspect of the experience such as temporary decline.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT One of the numerous foibles that prompt us to make poor decisions is known as the "Banker's fallacy," the tendency to focus on short-term growth at the expense of long-term value. This effect leads to unwarranted preference for happy endings. Here, we show that the anterior insula in the human brain marks down the overall value of an experience as it unfolds over time if the experience entails a sequence of predominantly negative temporal contrasts. By contrast, the amygdala encodes overall value accurately. These results provide neural indices for the dichotomy of decision utility and experienced utility popularized as Thinking fast and slow by Daniel Kahneman.
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Affiliation(s)
- Martin D Vestergaard
- Department of Physiology, Development and Neuroscience, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3DY, United Kingdom
| | - Wolfram Schultz
- Department of Physiology, Development and Neuroscience, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3DY, United Kingdom
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The averaging of numerosities: A psychometric investigation of the mental line. Atten Percept Psychophys 2020; 83:1152-1168. [PMID: 33078378 PMCID: PMC7571790 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-020-02140-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 09/02/2020] [Indexed: 01/29/2023]
Abstract
Humans and animals are capable of estimating and discriminating nonsymbolic numerosities via mental representation of magnitudes—the approximate number system (ANS). There are two models of the ANS system, which are similar in their prediction in numerosity discrimination tasks. The log-Gaussian model, which assumes numerosities are represented on a compressed logarithmic scale, and the scalar variability model, which assumes numerosities are represented on a linear scale. In the first experiment of this paper, we contrasted these models using averaging of numerosities. We examined whether participants generate a compressed mean (i.e., geometric mean) or a linear mean when averaging two numerosities. Our results demonstrated that half of the participants are linear and half are compressed; however, in general, the compression is milder than a logarithmic compression. In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined averaging of numerosities in sequences larger than two. We found that averaging precision increases with sequence length. These results are in line with previous findings, suggesting a mechanism in which the estimate is generated by population averaging of the responses each stimulus generates on the numerosity representation.
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33
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Abstract
Imagine you are deciding between two goods: A is simple but inexpensive, B is luxurious but more costly. Introducing a less advantageous option (e.g., lower quality than A, same price) should not alter your choice between A and B. However, this principle is often violated; three classic biases known as “decoy effects” have been identified, each describing a stereotyped choice pattern in the presence of irrelevant information. Through behavioral testing in human participants and computer simulations, we show that these decoy effects are special cases of a wider principle, whereby stimulus value information is encoded in a relative, rather than an absolute, format. This work clarifies the origin of three behavioral phenomena that are widely studied in psychology and economics. Human decisions can be biased by irrelevant information. For example, choices between two preferred alternatives can be swayed by a third option that is inferior or unavailable. Previous work has identified three classic biases, known as the attraction, similarity, and compromise effects, which arise during choices between economic alternatives defined by two attributes. However, the reliability, interrelationship, and computational origin of these three biases have been controversial. Here, a large cohort of human participants made incentive-compatible choices among assets that varied in price and quality. Instead of focusing on the three classic effects, we sampled decoy stimuli exhaustively across bidimensional multiattribute space and constructed a full map of decoy influence on choices between two otherwise preferred target items. Our analysis reveals that the decoy influence map is highly structured even beyond the three classic biases. We identify a very simple model that can fully reproduce the decoy influence map and capture its variability in individual participants. This model reveals that the three decoy effects are not distinct phenomena but are all special cases of a more general principle, by which attribute values are repulsed away from the context provided by rival options. The model helps us understand why the biases are typically correlated across participants and allows us to validate a prediction about their interrelationship. This work helps to clarify the origin of three of the most widely studied biases in human decision-making.
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34
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Cavanagh SE, Lam NH, Murray JD, Hunt LT, Kennerley SW. A circuit mechanism for decision-making biases and NMDA receptor hypofunction. eLife 2020; 9:e53664. [PMID: 32988455 PMCID: PMC7524553 DOI: 10.7554/elife.53664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2019] [Accepted: 08/19/2020] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Decision-making biases can be features of normal behaviour, or deficits underlying neuropsychiatric symptoms. We used behavioural psychophysics, spiking-circuit modelling and pharmacological manipulations to explore decision-making biases during evidence integration. Monkeys showed a pro-variance bias (PVB): a preference to choose options with more variable evidence. The PVB was also present in a spiking circuit model, revealing a potential neural mechanism for this behaviour. To model possible effects of NMDA receptor (NMDA-R) antagonism on this behaviour, we simulated the effects of NMDA-R hypofunction onto either excitatory or inhibitory neurons in the model. These were then tested experimentally using the NMDA-R antagonist ketamine, a pharmacological model of schizophrenia. Ketamine yielded an increase in subjects' PVB, consistent with lowered cortical excitation/inhibition balance from NMDA-R hypofunction predominantly onto excitatory neurons. These results provide a circuit-level mechanism that bridges across explanatory scales, from the synaptic to the behavioural, in neuropsychiatric disorders where decision-making biases are prominent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sean Edward Cavanagh
- Department of Clinical and Movement Neurosciences, University College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom
| | - Norman H Lam
- Department of Physics, Yale UniversityNew HavenUnited States
| | - John D Murray
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University School of MedicineNew HavenUnited States
| | - Laurence Tudor Hunt
- Department of Clinical and Movement Neurosciences, University College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom
- Max Planck-UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Aging, University College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom
- Wellcome Centre for Integrative Neuroimaging, Department of Psychiatry, University of OxfordOxfordUnited Kingdom
| | - Steven Wayne Kennerley
- Department of Clinical and Movement Neurosciences, University College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom
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35
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Zhao WJ, Walasek L, Bhatia S. Psychological mechanisms of loss aversion: A drift-diffusion decomposition. Cogn Psychol 2020; 123:101331. [PMID: 32777328 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2020.101331] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2019] [Revised: 07/07/2020] [Accepted: 07/16/2020] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
Decision makers often reject mixed gambles offering equal probabilities of a larger gain and a smaller loss. This important phenomenon, referred to as loss aversion, is typically explained by prospect theory, which proposes that decision makers give losses higher utility weights than gains. In this paper we consider alternative psychological mechanisms capable of explaining loss aversion, such as a fixed utility bias favoring rejection, as well as a bias favoring rejection prior to gamble valuation. We use a drift diffusion model of decision making to conceptually distinguish, formally define, and empirically measure these mechanisms. In two preregistered experiments, we show that the pre-valuation bias provides a very large contribution to model fits, predicts key response time patterns, reflects prior expectations regarding gamble desirability, and can be manipulated independently of the valuation process. Our results indicate that loss aversion is the result of multiple different psychological mechanisms, and that the pre-valuation bias is a fundamental determinant of this well-known behavioral tendency. These results have important implications for how we model behavior in risky choice tasks, and how we interpret its relationship with various psychological, clinical, and neurobiological variables.
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36
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Shinn M, Lam NH, Murray JD. A flexible framework for simulating and fitting generalized drift-diffusion models. eLife 2020; 9:56938. [PMID: 32749218 PMCID: PMC7462609 DOI: 10.7554/elife.56938] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2020] [Accepted: 08/03/2020] [Indexed: 01/10/2023] Open
Abstract
The drift-diffusion model (DDM) is an important decision-making model in cognitive neuroscience. However, innovations in model form have been limited by methodological challenges. Here, we introduce the generalized drift-diffusion model (GDDM) framework for building and fitting DDM extensions, and provide a software package which implements the framework. The GDDM framework augments traditional DDM parameters through arbitrary user-defined functions. Models are solved numerically by directly solving the Fokker-Planck equation using efficient numerical methods, yielding a 100-fold or greater speedup over standard methodology. This speed allows GDDMs to be fit to data using maximum likelihood on the full response time (RT) distribution. We demonstrate fitting of GDDMs within our framework to both animal and human datasets from perceptual decision-making tasks, with better accuracy and fewer parameters than several DDMs implemented using the latest methodology, to test hypothesized decision-making mechanisms. Overall, our framework will allow for decision-making model innovation and novel experimental designs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maxwell Shinn
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University, New Haven, United States.,Interdepartmental Neuroscience Program, Yale University, New Haven, United States
| | - Norman H Lam
- Department of Physics, Yale University, New Haven, United States
| | - John D Murray
- Department of Psychiatry, Yale University, New Haven, United States.,Interdepartmental Neuroscience Program, Yale University, New Haven, United States.,Department of Physics, Yale University, New Haven, United States
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37
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Luyckx F, Spitzer B, Blangero A, Tsetsos K, Summerfield C. Selective Integration during Sequential Sampling in Posterior Neural Signals. Cereb Cortex 2020; 30:4454-4464. [PMID: 32147695 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhaa039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2019] [Revised: 01/13/2020] [Accepted: 01/30/2020] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Decisions are typically made after integrating information about multiple attributes of alternatives in a choice set. Where observers are obliged to consider attributes in turn, a computational framework known as "selective integration" can capture salient biases in human choices. The model proposes that successive attributes compete for processing resources and integration is biased towards the alternative with the locally preferred attribute. Quantitative analysis shows that this model, although it discards choice-relevant information, is optimal when the observers' decisions are corrupted by noise that occurs beyond the sensory stage. Here, we used electroencephalography (EEG) to test a neural prediction of the model: that locally preferred attributes should be encoded with higher gain in neural signals over the posterior cortex. Over two sessions, human observers judged which of the two simultaneous streams of bars had the higher (or lower) average height. The selective integration model fits the data better than a rival model without bias. Single-trial analysis showed that neural signals contralateral to the preferred attribute covaried more steeply with the decision information conferred by locally preferred attributes. These findings provide neural evidence in support of selective integration, complementing existing behavioral work.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fabrice Luyckx
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK
| | - Bernhard Spitzer
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK.,Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin 14195, Germany
| | - Annabelle Blangero
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK
| | - Konstantinos Tsetsos
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg 20246, Germany
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38
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Sato H, Motoyoshi I. Distinct strategies for estimating the temporal average of numerical and perceptual information. Vision Res 2020; 174:41-49. [PMID: 32521341 DOI: 10.1016/j.visres.2020.05.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2019] [Revised: 05/17/2020] [Accepted: 05/20/2020] [Indexed: 01/29/2023]
Abstract
Humans can estimate global trends in dynamic information presented either as perceptual features or as symbolic codes such as numbers. Previous studies on temporal statistics estimation have shown that observers judge the temporal average of visual attributes according to information from the last few frames of the presentation sequence (in what is referred to as the recency effect). Here, we investigated how humans estimate the temporal average of number vs. orientation using identical stimuli for the two tasks. In Experiment 1, a randomly-selected single-digit number was serially presented at orientations randomly varying over time. In Experiment 2, a texture comprising a random number of Gabor elements was shown at orientations randomly varying over time. In both experiments, observers judged the temporal averages of the numerical values and orientations in separate blocks. Results showed that observers judging the temporal average of orientation relied upon information from later frames as predicted by a typical model of perceptual decision making. By contrast, for the judgement of numerical values, we found that the impacts of each temporal frame were constant or varied little across temporal frames regardless of whether the numerical information was given as digits or by the number of texture elements. The results are interpreted as evidence that distinct computational strategies may be involved in estimating the temporal averages of perceptual features and numerical information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hiromi Sato
- Department of Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan.
| | - Isamu Motoyoshi
- Department of Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan
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39
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Gluth S, Kern N, Kortmann M, Vitali CL. Value-based attention but not divisive normalization influences decisions with multiple alternatives. Nat Hum Behav 2020; 4:634-645. [PMID: 32015490 PMCID: PMC7306407 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-0822-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/13/2019] [Accepted: 01/07/2020] [Indexed: 01/13/2023]
Abstract
Violations of economic rationality principles in choices between three or more options are critical for understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms of decision-making. A recent study reported that the relative choice accuracy between two options decreases as the value of a third (distractor) option increases and attributed this effect to divisive normalization of neural value representations. In two preregistered experiments, a direct replication and an eye-tracking experiment, we assessed the replicability of this effect and tested an alternative account that assumes value-based attention to mediate the distractor effect. Surprisingly, we could not replicate the distractor effect in our experiments. However, we found a dynamic influence of distractor value on fixations to distractors as predicted by the value-based attention theory. Computationally, we show that extending an established sequential sampling decision-making model by a value-based attention mechanism offers a comprehensive account of the interplay between value, attention, response times and decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Gluth
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland.
| | - Nadja Kern
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Maria Kortmann
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Cécile L Vitali
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
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40
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Vanunu Y, Hotaling JM, Newell BR. Elucidating the differential impact of extreme-outcomes in perceptual and preferential choice. Cogn Psychol 2020; 119:101274. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2020.101274] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2019] [Revised: 01/05/2020] [Accepted: 01/07/2020] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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41
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Summerfield C, Dumbalska T. How does value distract? Nat Hum Behav 2020; 4:564. [DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-0824-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/10/2022]
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42
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Wu S, Yu R. The impact of phantom decoys on the neural processing of valuation. Brain Struct Funct 2020; 225:1523-1535. [PMID: 32385518 DOI: 10.1007/s00429-020-02079-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2019] [Accepted: 04/11/2020] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Rational decision theories posit that good choices should be based solely on information that is relevant to the choice at hand. However, introducing an inferior option that would never be chosen can influence choices among other relevant options, known as decoy effect. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) combined with a simple gambling task to investigate the neural signature of decision-making in or against the influence of the decoy effect in inferior and superior phantom decoy conditions. The fMRI results show that compared with choosing against the influence of the dominated phantom inferior option, choosing in the influence of the same option was associated with stronger activation in bilateral caudate and weaker functional connectivity between the left ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) and the left caudate. Phantom inferior effect selectively enhanced the connectivity from the caudate to the vACC but not vice versa. Choosing in the influence of the dominated phantom superior option engaged greater activity in the left dorsal ACC and stronger functional connectivity between the left dACC and bilateral anterior insula. Furthermore, the direction of the phantom superior effect was restricted from left dACC to the anterior insula, but not vice versa. Our findings suggest that a phantom inferior decoy may boost the value of the target via the reward network, whereas a phantom superior decoy may diminish the value of the target option via the aversion network. Our study provides neural evidence to support that valuation is context dependent and delineates differential neural networks underlying the influence of unavailable inferior and superior decoy options on our decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shuyi Wu
- School of Psychology, Center for Studies of Psychological Application and Key Laboratory of Mental Health and Cognitive Science of Guangdong Province, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, People's Republic of China
| | - Rongjun Yu
- Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Block AS4, 02-17, 9 Arts Link, Singapore, 117570, Singapore.
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43
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Scheibehenne B, Coppin G. How does the peak-end rule smell? Tracing hedonic experience with odours. Cogn Emot 2019; 34:713-727. [PMID: 31615343 DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2019.1675599] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Abstract
The peak-end rule predicts that retrospective evaluations of affective events heavily depend on their most intense and last moment and imply duration neglect. It was originally proposed for negative experiences such as painful medical procedures. It is unclear, however, to what degree it also applies to positive experiences. Previously, rigorous comparisons between the two domains were limited due to the use of qualitatively different stimuli. Hence, it is not clear if the peak-end rule holds for short positive and negative experiences alike. To address these questions in a genuinely emotional domain, we conducted two experiments (n = 48 each) in which we used odours as stimuli. Participants repeatedly evaluated continuous odour sequences delivered into their noses via an olfactometer. The sequences differed in valence (positive vs. negative), length (36 vs. 72 s), and trajectory (increasing, decreasing, U-shaped, and inverse U-shaped). Results provide evidence for the peak-end rule for both positive and negative experiences alike. Results further show an overweighting of intense negative experiences for sequences that contain both pleasant and unpleasant episodes but provide little evidence for an effect of the trajectory manipulation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Géraldine Coppin
- Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, Geneva, Switzerland.,Laboratory for the Study of Emotion Elicitation and Expression, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.,Swiss Distance University Institute (UniDistance), Centre d'Etudes Suisse Romand, Sierre, Switzerland
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44
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Spitmaan M, Horno O, Chu E, Soltani A. Combinations of low-level and high-level neural processes account for distinct patterns of context-dependent choice. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1007427. [PMID: 31609970 PMCID: PMC6812848 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007427] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/04/2019] [Revised: 10/24/2019] [Accepted: 09/20/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Context effects have been explained by either low-level neural adjustments or high-level cognitive processes but not their combination. It is currently unclear how these processes interact to shape individuals’ responses to context. Here, we used a large cohort of human subjects in experiments involving choice between two or three gambles in order to study the dependence of context effects on neural adaptation and individuals’ risk attitudes. Our experiments did not provide any evidence that neural adaptation on long timescales (~100 trials) contributes to context effects. Using post-hoc analyses we identified two groups of subjects with distinct patterns of responses to decoys, both of which depended on individuals’ risk aversion. Subjects in the first group exhibited strong, consistent decoy effects and became more risk averse due to decoy presentation. In contrast, subjects in the second group did not show consistent decoy effects and became more risk seeking. The degree of change in risk aversion due to decoy presentation was positively correlated with the original degrees of risk aversion. To explain these results and reveal underlying neural mechanisms, we developed new models incorporating both low- and high-level processes and used these models to fit individuals’ choice behavior. We found that observed distinct patterns of decoy effects can be explained by a combination of adjustments in neural representations and competitive weighting of reward attributes, both of which depend on risk aversion but in opposite directions. Altogether, our results demonstrate how a combination of low- and high-level processes shapes choice behavior in more naturalistic settings, modulates overall risk preference, and explains distinct behavioral phenotypes. A large body of experimental work has illustrated that the introduction of a new, and often irrelevant, option can influence preference among the existing options, a phenomenon referred to as context or decoy effects. For example, introducing a new option that is worse than one of the two existing options in all its attributes but better than the alternative option in some attributes (and thus should not ever be selected) can increase the preference for the former option. Context effects have been explained by high-level cognitive processes—such as comparisons and competitions between attributes—or low-level adjustments of neural representations. However, it is unclear how these processes interact to shape individuals’ responses to context. Here, we show that both high-level cognitive processes and low-level neural adjustments shift risk preference during choice between multiple risky options but in opposite directions. Moreover, we demonstrate that combinations of these processes can account for distinct patterns of context effects in human subjects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mehran Spitmaan
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hamphire, United States of America
| | - Oihane Horno
- Champalimaud Research, Champalimaud Centre for the Unknown, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Emily Chu
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hamphire, United States of America
| | - Alireza Soltani
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hamphire, United States of America
- * E-mail:
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45
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Learning Desire Is Predicted by Similar Neural Processing of Naturalistic Educational Materials. eNeuro 2019; 6:ENEURO.0083-19.2019. [PMID: 31427402 PMCID: PMC6776790 DOI: 10.1523/eneuro.0083-19.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2019] [Revised: 07/15/2019] [Accepted: 07/28/2019] [Indexed: 02/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Naturalistic stimuli can elicit highly similar brain activity across viewers. How do naturalistic educational materials engage human brains and evoke learning desire? Here, we presented 15 audiovisual course clips (each lasting ∼120 s) to university students and recorded their neural activity through electroencephalography. Upon finishing all the video viewings, subjects ranked 15 courses in order of learning desire and reported the reasons for high learning desire (i.e., “value” and “interest”). The brain activity during the video viewing was measured as the neural similarity via intersubject correlation (ISC), that is, correlation between each subject’s neural responses and those of others. Based on averaged learning desire rankings across subjects, course clips were classified with high versus medium versus low motivational effectiveness. We found that the ISC of high effective course clips was larger than that of low effective ones. The ISC difference (high vs low) was positively associated with subjects’ learning desire difference (high vs low). Such an association occurred when viewing time accumulated to ∼80 s. Moreover, ISC was correlated with “interest-based” rather than “value-based” learning desire. These findings advance our understanding of learning motivation via the neural similarity in the context of on-line education and provide potential neurophysiological suggestions for pedagogical practices.
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46
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Usher M, Tsetsos K, Glickman M, Chater N. Selective Integration: An Attentional Theory of Choice Biases and Adaptive Choice. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2019. [DOI: 10.1177/0963721419862277] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Human choice behavior shows a range of puzzling anomalies. Even simple binary choices are modified by accept/reject framing and by the presence of decoy options, and they can exhibit circular (i.e., intransitive) patterns of preferences. Each of these phenomena is incompatible with many standard models of choice but may provide crucial clues concerning the elementary mental processes underpinning our choices. One promising theoretical account proposes that choice-related information is selectively gathered through an attentionally limited window favoring goal-consistent information. We review research showing attentional-mediated choice biases and present a computationally explicit model—selective integration—that accounts for these biases.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marius Usher
- The School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University
| | - Konstantinos Tsetsos
- Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf
| | - Moshe Glickman
- The School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University
| | - Nick Chater
- Warwick Business School, University of Warwick
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47
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Abashidze D, Carminati MN, Knoeferle P. Anticipating a future versus integrating a recent event? Evidence from eye-tracking. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2019; 200:102916. [PMID: 31627034 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2019.102916] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/20/2018] [Revised: 08/06/2019] [Accepted: 08/06/2019] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
When comprehending a spoken sentence that refers to a visually-presented event, comprehenders both integrate their current interpretation of language with the recent event and develop expectations about future event possibilities. Tense cues can disambiguate this linking, but temporary ambiguity in these cues may lead comprehenders to also rely on further, experience-based (e.g., frequency or an actor's gaze) cues. How comprehenders reconcile these different cues in real time is an open issue. Extant results suggest that comprehenders preferentially relate their unfolding interpretation to a recent event by inspecting its target object. We investigated to what extent this recent-event preference could be overridden by short-term experiential and situation-specific cues. In Experiments 1-2 participants saw substantially more future than recent events and listened to more sentences about future-events (75% in Experiment 1 and 88% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 cued future target objects and event possibilities via an actor's gaze. The event frequency increase yielded a reduction in the recent event inspection preference early during sentence processing in Experiments 1-2 compared with Experiment 3 (where event frequency and utterance tense were balanced) but did not eliminate the overall recent-event preference. Actor gaze also modulated the recent-event preference, and jointly with future tense led to its reversal in Experiment 3. However, our results showed that people overall preferred to focus on recent (vs. future) events in their interpretation, suggesting that while two cues (actor gaze and short-term event frequency) can partially override the recent-event preference, the latter still plays a key role in shaping participants' interpretation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dato Abashidze
- Leibniz-Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS), Berlin, Germany.
| | | | - Pia Knoeferle
- Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Department of German Studies and Linguistics, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany; Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Einstein Center for Neurosciences Berlin, Germany.
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48
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Optimal policy for multi-alternative decisions. Nat Neurosci 2019; 22:1503-1511. [PMID: 31384015 DOI: 10.1038/s41593-019-0453-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 33] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2017] [Accepted: 06/19/2019] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
Everyday decisions frequently require choosing among multiple alternatives. Yet the optimal policy for such decisions is unknown. Here we derive the normative policy for general multi-alternative decisions. This strategy requires evidence accumulation to nonlinear, time-dependent bounds that trigger choices. A geometric symmetry in those boundaries allows the optimal strategy to be implemented by a simple neural circuit involving normalization with fixed decision bounds and an urgency signal. The model captures several key features of the response of decision-making neurons as well as the increase in reaction time as a function of the number of alternatives, known as Hick's law. In addition, we show that in the presence of divisive normalization and internal variability, our model can account for several so-called 'irrational' behaviors, such as the similarity effect as well as the violation of both the independence of irrelevant alternatives principle and the regularity principle.
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49
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Glickman M, Sharoni O, Levy DJ, Niebur E, Stuphorn V, Usher M. The formation of preference in risky choice. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1007201. [PMID: 31465438 PMCID: PMC6738658 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007201] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2018] [Revised: 09/11/2019] [Accepted: 06/20/2019] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
A key question in decision-making is how people integrate amounts and probabilities to form preferences between risky alternatives. Here we rely on the general principle of integration-to-boundary to develop several biologically plausible process models of risky-choice, which account for both choices and response-times. These models allowed us to contrast two influential competing theories: i) within-alternative evaluations, based on multiplicative interaction between amounts and probabilities, ii) within-attribute comparisons across alternatives. To constrain the preference formation process, we monitored eye-fixations during decisions between pairs of simple lotteries, designed to systematically span the decision-space. The behavioral results indicate that the participants' eye-scanning patterns were associated with risk-preferences and expected-value maximization. Crucially, model comparisons showed that within-alternative process models decisively outperformed within-attribute ones, in accounting for choices and response-times. These findings elucidate the psychological processes underlying preference formation when making risky-choices, and suggest that compensatory, within-alternative integration is an adaptive mechanism employed in human decision-making.
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Affiliation(s)
- Moshe Glickman
- The School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Orian Sharoni
- The School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Dino J. Levy
- Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
| | - Ernst Niebur
- Department of Neuroscience and Krieger Mind/Brain Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Veit Stuphorn
- Department of Neuroscience and Krieger Mind/Brain Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America
| | - Marius Usher
- The School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
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Glickman M, Usher M. Integration to boundary in decisions between numerical sequences. Cognition 2019; 193:104022. [PMID: 31369923 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2018] [Revised: 06/03/2019] [Accepted: 07/04/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Integration-to-boundary is a prominent normative principle used in evidence-based decisions to explain the speed-accuracy trade-off and determine the decision-time. Despite its prominence, however, the decision boundary is not directly observed, but rather is theoretically assumed, and there is still an ongoing debate regarding its form: fixed vs. collapsing. The aim of this study is to show that the integration-to-boundary process extends to decisions between rapid pairs of numerical sequences (2 Hz rate), and to determine the boundary type by directly monitoring the noisy accumulated evidence. In a set of two experiments (supplemented by computational modelling), we demonstrate that integration to a collapsing-boundary takes place in such tasks, ruling out non-integration heuristic strategies. Moreover, we show that participants can adaptively adjust their boundaries in response to reward contingencies. Finally, we discuss the implications to decision optimality and the nature of processes and representations in numerical cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Marius Usher
- School of Psychology, University of Tel Aviv, Israel; Sagol School of Neuroscience, University of Tel Aviv, Israel.
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