Heuristics and optimal solutions to the breadth-depth dilemma

Gaze-centered gating, reactivation, and reevaluation of economic value in orbitofrontal cortex

During economic choice, options are often considered in alternation, until commitment. Nonetheless, neuroeconomics typically ignores the dynamic aspects of deliberation. We trained two male macaques to perform a value-based decision-making task in which two risky offers were presented in sequence at the opposite sides of the visual field, each followed by a delay epoch where offers were invisible. Surprisingly, during the two delays, subjects tend to look at empty locations where the offers had previously appeared, with longer fixations increasing the probability of choosing the associated offer. Spiking activity in orbitofrontal cortex reflects the value of the gazed offer, or of the offer associated with the gazed empty spatial location, even if it is not the most recent. This reactivation reflects a reevaluation process, as fluctuations in neural spiking correlate with upcoming choice. Our results suggest that look-at-nothing gazing triggers the reactivation of a previously seen offer for further evaluation.

Developmental changes in exploration resemble stochastic optimization

Human development is often described as a 'cooling off' process, analogous to stochastic optimization algorithms that implement a gradual reduction in randomness over time. Yet there is ambiguity in how to interpret this analogy, due to a lack of concrete empirical comparisons. Using data from n = 281 participants ages 5 to 55, we show that cooling off does not only apply to the single dimension of randomness. Rather, human development resembles an optimization process of multiple learning parameters, for example, reward generalization, uncertainty-directed exploration and random temperature. Rapid changes in parameters occur during childhood, but these changes plateau and converge to efficient values in adulthood. We show that while the developmental trajectory of human parameters is strikingly similar to several stochastic optimization algorithms, there are important differences in convergence. None of the optimization algorithms tested were able to discover reliably better regions of the strategy space than adult participants on this task.

Beyond simple laboratory studies: Developing sophisticated models to study rich behavior

Psychology and neuroscience are concerned with the study of behavior, of internal cognitive processes, and their neural foundations. However, most laboratory studies use constrained experimental settings that greatly limit the range of behaviors that can be expressed. While focusing on restricted settings ensures methodological control, it risks impoverishing the object of study: by restricting behavior, we might miss key aspects of cognitive and neural functions. In this article, we argue that psychology and neuroscience should increasingly adopt innovative experimental designs, measurement methods, analysis techniques and sophisticated computational models to probe rich, ecologically valid forms of behavior, including social behavior. We discuss the challenges of studying rich forms of behavior as well as the novel opportunities offered by state-of-the-art methodologies and new sensing technologies, and we highlight the importance of developing sophisticated formal models. We exemplify our arguments by reviewing some recent streams of research in psychology, neuroscience and other fields (e.g., sports analytics, ethology and robotics) that have addressed rich forms of behavior in a model-based manner. We hope that these "success cases" will encourage psychologists and neuroscientists to extend their toolbox of techniques with sophisticated behavioral models - and to use them to study rich forms of behavior as well as the cognitive and neural processes that they engage.

Deep imagination is a close to optimal policy for planning in large decision trees under limited resources

Many decisions involve choosing an uncertain course of action in deep and wide decision trees, as when we plan to visit an exotic country for vacation. In these cases, exhaustive search for the best sequence of actions is not tractable due to the large number of possibilities and limited time or computational resources available to make the decision. Therefore, planning agents need to balance breadth-considering many actions in the first few tree levels-and depth-considering many levels but few actions in each of them-to allocate optimally their finite search capacity. We provide efficient analytical solutions and numerical analysis to the problem of allocating finite sampling capacity in one shot to infinitely large decision trees, both in the time discounted and undiscounted cases. We find that in general the optimal policy is to allocate few samples per level so that deep levels can be reached, thus favoring depth over breadth search. In contrast, in poor environments and at low capacity, it is best to broadly sample branches at the cost of not sampling deeply, although this policy is marginally better than deep allocations. Our results can provide a theoretical foundation for why human reasoning is pervaded by imagination-based processes.

Optimal Allocation of Finite Sampling Capacity in Accumulator Models of Multialternative Decision Making

When facing many options, we narrow down our focus to very few of them. Although behaviors like this can be a sign of heuristics, they can actually be optimal under limited cognitive resources. Here, we study the problem of how to optimally allocate limited sampling time to multiple options, modeled as accumulators of noisy evidence, to determine the most profitable one. We show that the effective sampling capacity of an agent increases with both available time and the discriminability of the options, and optimal policies undergo a sharp transition as a function of it. For small capacity, it is best to allocate time evenly to exactly five options and to ignore all the others, regardless of the prior distribution of rewards. For large capacities, the optimal number of sampled accumulators grows sublinearly, closely following a power law as a function of capacity for a wide variety of priors. We find that allocating equal times to the sampled accumulators is better than using uneven time allocations. Our work highlights that multialternative decisions are endowed with breadth–depth tradeoffs, demonstrates how their optimal solutions depend on the amount of limited resources and the variability of the environment, and shows that narrowing down to a handful of options is always optimal for small capacities.

Monkey plays Pac-Man with compositional strategies and hierarchical decision-making

Humans can often handle daunting tasks with ease by developing a set of strategies to reduce decision-making into simpler problems. The ability to use heuristic strategies demands an advanced level of intelligence and has not been demonstrated in animals. Here, we trained macaque monkeys to play the classic video game Pac-Man. The monkeys’ decision-making may be described with a strategy-based hierarchical decision-making model with over 90% accuracy. The model reveals that the monkeys adopted the take-the-best heuristic by using one dominating strategy for their decision-making at a time and formed compound strategies by assembling the basis strategies to handle particular game situations. With the model, the computationally complex but fully quantifiable Pac-Man behavior paradigm provides a new approach to understanding animals’ advanced cognition.

The whole prefrontal cortex is premotor cortex

We propose that the entirety of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) can be seen as fundamentally premotor in nature. By this, we mean that the PFC consists of an action abstraction hierarchy whose core function is the potentiation and depotentiation of possible action plans at different levels of granularity. We argue that the apex of the hierarchy should revolve around the process of goal-selection, which we posit is inherently a form of optimization over action abstraction. Anatomical and functional evidence supports the idea that this hierarchy originates on the orbital surface of the brain and extends dorsally to motor cortex. Accordingly, our viewpoint positions the orbitofrontal cortex in a key role in the optimization of goal-selection policies, and suggests that its other proposed roles are aspects of this more general function. Our proposed perspective will reframe outstanding questions, open up new areas of inquiry and align theories of prefrontal function with evolutionary principles. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Decision prioritization and causal reasoning in decision hierarchies

From cooking a meal to finding a route to a destination, many real life decisions can be decomposed into a hierarchy of sub-decisions. In a hierarchy, choosing which decision to think about requires planning over a potentially vast space of possible decision sequences. To gain insight into how people decide what to decide on, we studied a novel task that combines perceptual decision making, active sensing and hierarchical and counterfactual reasoning. Human participants had to find a target hidden at the lowest level of a decision tree. They could solicit information from the different nodes of the decision tree to gather noisy evidence about the target's location. Feedback was given only after errors at the leaf nodes and provided ambiguous evidence about the cause of the error. Despite the complexity of task (with 107 latent states) participants were able to plan efficiently in the task. A computational model of this process identified a small number of heuristics of low computational complexity that accounted for human behavior. These heuristics include making categorical decisions at the branching points of the decision tree rather than carrying forward entire probability distributions, discarding sensory evidence deemed unreliable to make a choice, and using choice confidence to infer the cause of the error after an initial plan failed. Plans based on probabilistic inference or myopic sampling norms could not capture participants' behavior. Our results show that it is possible to identify hallmarks of heuristic planning with sensing in human behavior and that the use of tasks of intermediate complexity helps identify the rules underlying human ability to reason over decision hierarchies.

Fixation patterns in simple choice reflect optimal information sampling

Simple choices (e.g., eating an apple vs. an orange) are made by integrating noisy evidence that is sampled over time and influenced by visual attention; as a result, fluctuations in visual attention can affect choices. But what determines what is fixated and when? To address this question, we model the decision process for simple choice as an information sampling problem, and approximate the optimal sampling policy. We find that it is optimal to sample from options whose value estimates are both high and uncertain. Furthermore, the optimal policy provides a reasonable account of fixations and choices in binary and trinary simple choice, as well as the differences between the two cases. Overall, the results show that the fixation process during simple choice is influenced dynamically by the value estimates computed during the decision process, in a manner consistent with optimal information sampling.