Mental time travel for self and other in three- and four-year-old children

Affective forecasting and psychopathology: A scoping review

Affective forecasting - estimations of future emotional reactions - is an important aspect of future thinking that informs judgement and decision making. Biases in affective forecasting have been noted generally and with people with emotional disturbances specifically. Still, the role of affective forecasting within models of psychopathology has received little attention. Given the state of the literature, a scoping review method was adopted to summarize and synthesize the methodological approaches used in measuring affective forecasting within the context of psychopathology and the scope of the evidence on this association. Three databases were searched for research published on or before November 13th, 2023. Original quantitative research that examined affective forecasting and its association with psychopathology was reviewed. Data were charted using a form designed for this study. Overall, the review highlights the heterogeneity in operationalization of affective forecasting. The majority of the evidence supports an association between severity of psychopathology and intensity of affective forecasts, with notable exceptions, which are discussed within the scope of methodology and operationalization of affective forecasting. This remains an important process to investigate in information processing models of psychopathology to elucidate its role in the development and maintenance of psychopathology and potential as a target for intervention.

Self- and other-focused autobiographical memories of life story events across cultures

Autobiographical memory and personal life stories are typically conceived as memories about the self. However, personal life stories often contain information about important events from other people's lives. Sometimes those memories become an important part of our own life stories, illuminating the role that other people play in remembering our personal past. In this study, we examined the extent to which memories of important life story events are self-focused (e.g., I moved to Japan) or other-focused (e.g., My child graduated from college). Participants from Mexico, Greenland, China, Denmark and the United States recalled and dated seven autobiographical memories of important personal life story events. Participants also rated the memories for importance and emotional valence. The memories were coded as self- or other-focused. Participants recalled mainly self-focused memories. However, Danish and Chinese participants recalled about 20% other-focused memories. Danish participants recalled negative events about their parents, whereas Chinese participants recalled positive events about their children. Self-focused and other-focused memories differed in their emotional valence and lifespan distribution, but not in importance. The findings show that individuals remember other-focused memories and also incorporate them into their own personal life stories. Conceptual implications for autobiographical memory are discussed.

Evolution of Self-Awareness and the Cultural Emergence of Academic and Non-academic Self-Concepts

Schooling is ubiquitous in the modern world and academic development is now a critical aspect of preparation for adulthood. A step back in time to pre-modern societies and an examination of life in remaining traditional societies today reveals that universal formal schooling is an historically recent phenomenon. This evolutionary and historical recency has profound implications for understanding academic development, including how instructional practices modify evolved or biological primary abilities (e.g., spoken language) to create evolutionarily novel or biologically secondary academic competencies (e.g., reading). We propose the development of secondary abilities promotes the emergence of academic self-concepts that in turn are supported by evolved systems for self-awareness and self-knowledge. Unlike some forms of self-knowledge (e.g., relative physical abilities) that appear to be universal and central to many people's overall self-concept, the relative importance of academic self-concepts are expected to be dependent on explicit social and cultural supports for their valuation. These culturally contingent self-concepts are contrasted with universal social and physical self-concepts, with implications for understanding variation students' relative valuation of academic competencies and their motivations to engage in academic learning.

Young children's future-oriented reasoning for self and other: Effects of conflict and perspective

Young children reason more adaptively about the future (e.g., predicting preferences and delaying gratification) when they are asked to think about another person's perspective versus their own perspective. An explanation for this "other-over-self" advantage is that in contexts where current (e.g., small reward now) and future (e.g., larger reward later) desires conflict, adopting the perspective of another person provides psychological distance and hence more adaptive decision making by reducing conflict. We tested this hypothesis in 158 preschoolers using a battery of representative future-oriented reasoning tasks (Preferences, Delay of Gratification, Picture Book, and "Spoon") in which we varied the perspective children adopted (self or other) and the level of conflict between current and future desires (high or low). We predicted that perspective and conflict would interact such that children would benefit most from taking the perspective of "other" when conflict was high. Although results did not support this hypothesis, we found significant effects of conflict; children reasoned more optimally on our low-conflict task condition than on our high-conflict task condition, and these differences did not appear to be related to inhibitory control. The effect of conflict was most marked in younger preschoolers, resulting in Age × Conflict interactions on two of our four tasks. An other-over-self advantage (i.e., perspective effect) was detected on the Preferences task only. These results add to the growing body of literature on children's future thinking by showing the important role of conflict (and its interaction with age) in the accuracy with which children reason about the future.

A novel test of flexible planning in relation to executive function and language in young children

In adult humans, decisions involving the choice and use of tools for future events typically require episodic foresight. Previous studies suggest some non-human species are capable of future planning; however, these experiments often cannot fully exclude alternative learning explanations. Here, we used a novel tool-use paradigm aiming to address these critiques to test flexible planning in 3- to 5-year-old children, in relation to executive function and language abilities. In the flexible planning task, children were not verbally cued during testing, single trials avoided consistent exposure to stimulus-reward relationships, and training trials provided experience of a predictable return of reward. Furthermore, unlike most standard developmental studies, we incorporated short delays before and after tool choice. The critical test choice included two tools with equal prior reward experience-each only functional in one apparatus. We tested executive function and language abilities using several standardized tasks. Our results echoed standard developmental research: 4- and 5-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds on the flexible planning task, and 5-year-old children outperformed younger children in most executive function and language tasks. Flexible planning performance did not correlate with executive function and language performance. This paradigm could be used to investigate flexible planning in a tool-use context in non-human species.

Efficacy of a computer-based cognitive training program to enhance planning skills in 5 to 7-year-old normally-developing children

We designed and evaluated the efficacy of a computer-based cognitive training program (Executive Function Enhancement Program [EFEP]) to stimulate executive functions through enhancing planning in normally-developing children. A total of 111 Colombian children participated in the study. Fifty-nine (53%) of the children were assigned to the experimental condition (application of the EFEP program) with two levels of planning performance, and fifty-two (47%) to the waiting list control condition with the same two levels of planning. The training program was applied three times a week over six weeks, with post-intervention assessment two weeks after the end of training. A follow-up assessment was carried out three months later. Results showed that the intervention program was particularly effective in the children with lower pre-intervention performance in planning, demonstrating that the program is an efficient therapeutic instrument for enhancing the executive function of planning in children between 5 and 7 years old.

Reflections on the spoon test

In this paper, we shall use Tulving's seminal empirical and theoretical research including the 'Spoon Test' to explore memory and mental time travel and its origins and role in planning for the future. We will review the comparative research on future planning and episodic foresight in pre-verbal children and non-verbal animals to explore how this may be manifest as wordless thoughts.

What is the role of episodic foresight in planning for future needs? Theory and two experiments

Considerable evidence suggests that episodic memory and foresight rely on the same underlying cognitive processes. Some theorists have suggested that the key role of episodic foresight is to allow an individual to disengage from current states to plan for future needs. However, the contribution of episodic cognition to this type of planning has not been investigated. We present two experiments exploring future-state planning in 3-6-year-old children and healthy young adults, finding that both groups were consistently biased towards current states. We further found that there were few relationships between episodic memory ability and future-state planning. Where there was a relationship, the degree of bias was positively related to episodic memory ability, such that those with better episodic were more biased by their current motivational state. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that episodic cognition is particularly vulnerable to bias from current feelings. We propose an account in which episodic cognition allows for cross-talk between current and future motivational states, and that while this can aid prospective decision-making in some scenarios, it may hinder it in others.

Children's behavior and spontaneous talk in a future thinking task

We explored 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds' (N = 120) "explicit" and "spontaneous" future-oriented cognition. Specifically, children had to think ahead to meet a future physiological need (desire for food) or psychological need (avoiding boredom). One group of children alternated between a room with candy and a room without candy, spending 3 min per visit. Children were explicitly asked which room they wanted to put extra candy in for a future visit to the lab (correct answer: room without candy). A second group of children underwent the same procedure but with toys as the resource instead of food (a replication of Atance et al. in J Exp Child Psychol 129:98-109, 2015). In the food condition, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds all placed candy in the correct room above chance, but only 4- and 5-year-olds were above chance in the toy condition. Overall, 4- and 5-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds, and children performed better in the food condition than the toy condition. Children's spontaneous (or "involuntary") future thinking was assessed by coding their utterances while in the two rooms. Children who solved the explicit task uttered more task-relevant future and past statements than children who failed. Examining spontaneous talk also allowed us to explore children's spontaneous "solving" of the task before being asked an explicit test question. This research highlights the importance of varying stimuli in future thinking tasks and developing methods to capture spontaneous/involuntary future thinking in young children.

Young children's capacity to imagine and prepare for certain and uncertain future outcomes

The current study used a minimalist paradigm to examine young children's capacity to imagine and prepare for certain and uncertain immediate future outcomes. In a counterbalanced order, 2.5-year-old children (N = 32) completed twelve trials each of two tasks: (1) the forked tube task, which assessed their ability to cover two possible tube exits to ensure they would catch a single target with an uncertain future trajectory, and (2) the double tube task, which assessed their ability to cover two separate tube exits to ensure they would catch two targets with certain future trajectories. Even though the optimal preparatory action was the same across both tasks, children were much more likely to spontaneously and consistently demonstrate this action in the double tube task than the forked tube task. Children's responses were unaffected by the number of targets seen in the demonstration phase, and instead appeared to be based on the particular contingencies of each apparatus. These results are consistent with the possibility that young children specifically struggle to imagine and prepare for mutually exclusive versions of uncertain future events.

Preschoolers' Saving Behavior: The Role of Planning and Self-Control

Planning and self-control were examined in relation to preschoolers' (41- to 74-months) saving behavior. Employing a marble run paradigm, 54 children participated in two trials in which they could use their marbles immediately on a less desirable run, or save for a more desirable run. Twenty-nine children received the opportunity to create a budget. On Trial 1, children in the budgeting condition saved significantly more than did children in the control condition, and their planning ability related to saving (after controlling for age and language). Those who consistently budgeted at least one marble for the more desirable run were more likely to save. Control children's performance improved across trials, with no between-condition differences on Trial 2. Self-control was not related to saving.

"What" and "where" was when? Memory for the temporal order of episodic events in children

In the past, researchers have shown that the individual components of episodic memory (i.e "what," "where," and "when") may emerge at different points in development. Specifically, while children as young as three can accurately report the "what" and "where" of an event, they struggle to accurately report when the event occurred. One explanation for children's difficulty in reporting when an event took place is a rudimentary understanding, and ability to use, temporal terms. In the current experiment, we employed a physical timeline to aid children's reporting of the order in which a series of episodic events occurred. Overall, while 4-, 5-, and 6-year olds performed above chance, 3-year olds did not. Our findings suggest that 3-year olds' limited ability to produce temporal terms may not be the rate-limiting step preventing them from identifying when events occurred in their recent past.

Episodic foresight beyond the very next event in 3- and 4-year-old children

Testing episodic foresight in children generally involves presenting them with a problem in one location (e.g., Room A) and, after a spending a delay in a different location, telling them they will be returning to Room A. Before they go, children are presented with a number of items, one of which will allow them to solve the problem in Room A. At around 3 to 4 years of age children display episodic foresight, selecting the item that will allow them to solve the problem. To date, however, no study has assessed whether 3- and 4-year-old children can plan beyond the very next event, selecting the correct item when there is a delay before returning to Room A. Here, we show that 3- and 4-year-old children can pass when a delay is imposed but that their performance is significantly worse than when they are planning for an immediate event.

'Will I want these stickers tomorrow?' Preschoolers' ability to predict current and future needs

Between 3 and 5 years of age, children develop the ability to plan for their own and others' future needs; however, they have great difficulty predicting future needs that conflict with current ones. Importantly, this ability has only been tested in the domain of physiological states (e.g., thirst). Therefore, it is still an open question whether in a different context preschoolers can disengage from their current needs to secure a different future one. In a Resource Allocation task, 4- and 5-year-olds had to distribute three types of rewards between themselves and another child for either 'right now' or 'tomorrow'. Children's current needs were manipulated by providing them (or not) with their preferred reward at beginning of the task. Only 5-year-olds could predict future needs that conflict with their current ones and act accordingly. Younger children's performance is discussed in the context of temporal and social distance. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? By the age of 4, children can plan for their own and others' future needs. Seven-year-old children still have difficulty predicting future physiological needs that conflict with their current ones. What does this study add? In a Resource Allocation task, preschoolers had to share rewards with another child for 'right now' or 'tomorrow'. Children's current needs were manipulated by providing them (or not) with their preferred reward. This study shows that 5-year-olds can predict future (non-physiological) needs that conflict with their current ones.

A new approach to measuring patience in preschoolers

Patience in children has usually been studied using delay of gratification paradigms. However, another important aspect of patience that has not been well documented is the ability to adjust one's behavior while waiting without an explicit reward as a motivator (e.g., sitting in the doctor's waiting room). To examine this aspect of patience, video-recordings of sixty-one 3- and 4-year olds waiting for two separate 3-min periods were examined and coded for children's spontaneous behaviors. We found that 4-year olds displayed more patient (i.e., staying still) behaviors than 3-year olds during this "waiting paradigm." Interestingly, we also found that children who displayed less patient behaviors during the waiting paradigm were also those who succeeded on a future-thinking task. These findings have important implications for measuring patience in young children and highlight the potential impact of spontaneous behaviors on children's performance in cognitive tasks such as those assessing future-oriented cognition.

I want it all and I want it now: Delay of gratification in preschool children

On the delay-of-gratification choice paradigm, 4-year-olds typically choose the larger, delayed reward, exhibiting delay of gratification, whereas 3-year-olds typically choose the small, immediate reward. Despite this highly replicated finding, the cognitive mechanism(s) underlying 3-year-olds' failure on the choice paradigm remain unclear. Recently, several researchers have proposed the involvement of the "hot" affective system and the "cool" cognitive system in pre-schoolers' performance on the choice paradigm. Using this "hot" and "cool" systems framework, we tested 112 3- and 4-year-olds on a modified choice paradigm that was designed to help young children better utilize their "cool" system, allowing them to make more mindful and future-oriented decisions. In the modified paradigm, 3-year-olds made choices consistent with those of 4-year-olds, exhibiting delay of gratification. These findings have important implications for previous theoretical accounts of 3-year-old children's failure to delay gratification. Additionally, they highlight the critical role that the method plays in young children's performance on cognitive paradigms.

A spoon full of studies helps the comparison go down: a comparative analysis of Tulving's spoon test

Mental time travel refers to the ability to cast one’s mind back in time to re-experience a past event and forward in time to pre-experience events that may occur in the future. Tulving (2005), an authority on mental time travel, holds that this ability is unique to humans. Anticipating that comparative psychologists would challenge this claim, Tulving (2005) proposed his spoon test, a test specifically designed to assess whether non-human animals are capable of mental time travel. A number of studies have now employed the spoon test to assess mental time travel in non-human animals. Here, we review the evidence for mental time travel in primates. To provide a benchmark, we also review studies that have employed the spoon test with preschool children. The review demonstrates that if we compare the performance of great apes to that of preschool children, and hold them to the same criteria, the data suggest mental travel is present but not ubiquitous in great apes.