A comparative analysis of risk management strategies in European Union and United States pharmaceutical regulation

COVID-19 off-label uses of medicines: the role of civil liability and regulation

Physicians can prescribe medicines for different indications than the tested and authorised ones. Such 'off-label' uses expand therapeutic options but also create uncertainties. The COVID-19 pandemic triggered new off-label uses and, despite issues being reported in the literature, these have not resulted in substantial personal injury litigation in the EU. Against this backdrop, this article argues that civil liability plays, in fact, a limited role in off-label uses. In particular, civil liability may incentivise health actors to follow and react to the development of the evidence basis for off-label uses. However, it is ultimately unable to incentivise the conduct of additional research on off-label uses. This is problematic, as off-label research is key to protecting patients and is recommended by international medical ethics. The article concludes by critically discussing proposed mechanisms to incentivise off-label research. It argues that extending civil liability for unknown risks may have undesired effects on insurability and innovation, and most regulatory proposals seem ineffective. Building on the 2014 Italian reform of off-label uses, the article proposes the establishment of a fund financed by mandatory contributions from the industry, which should be used by pharmaceutical regulators to promote off-label research and develop guidelines for prescribers.

Postmarket Safety Communication for Protection of Public Health: A Comparison of Regulatory Policy in Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States

In the wake of the withdrawal of the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug rofecoxib, regulators worldwide reconsidered their approach to postmarket safety. Many have since adopted a "life cycle" approach to regulation of medicines, facilitating faster approval of new medicines while planning for potential postmarket safety issues. A crucial aspect of postmarket safety is the effective and timely communication of emerging risk information using postmarket safety advisories, commonly issued as letters to healthcare professionals, drug safety bulletins, media alerts, and website announcements. Yet regulators differ in their use of postmarket safety advisories. We examined the capacity of regulators in the United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia to warn about postmarket safety issues through safety advisories by assessing their governance, legislative authority, risk communication capabilities, and transparency.

The will of Congress? Permissive regulation and the strategic use of labeling for the anti-influenza drug Relenza

Through an analysis of the FDA's approval of the controversial anti-influenza drug Relenza (zanamivir), we interrogate distinct social scientific theories of pharmaceutical regulation. We investigate why, despite internal negative opinions and an Advisory Committee's non-approval recommendation, the FDA approved Relenza in the late 1990s. Based on a close reading of FDA documents, we show how agency officials guided the manufacturer's analyses and participated in constructing a tenuous argument for approval. We show how regulators may strategically design drug labels that can justify their permissive regulation. We consider the explanatory power of official accounts and alternative, partially overlapping, theories of pharmaceutical regulation in the Relenza case, and develop new insights into the institutional dynamics of regulator-industry relations. We find little or no evidence that the FDA was primarily driven by public health concerns, pressure from disease-based patient activism, or a consumerist and neoliberal regulatory logic, although some of these explanations provided managers with convenient rhetoric to rationalize their actions. Rather, we argue that the Relenza case highlights contradictions between a scientific culture at FDA, conducive to rigorous product evaluations, and the agency's attempts to accommodate higher-level political (i.e. Congress) and industry demands conducive of permissive regulation - consistent with some aspects of reputational and capture theories, as well as with corporate bias theory.

Complaints, complainants, and rulings regarding drug promotion in the United Kingdom and Sweden 2004-2012: a quantitative and qualitative study of pharmaceutical industry self-regulation

BACKGROUND

In many European countries, medicines promotion is governed by voluntary codes of practice administered by the pharmaceutical industry under its own system of self-regulation. Involvement of industry organizations in policing promotion has been proposed to deter illicit conduct, but few detailed studies on self-regulation have been carried out to date. The objective of this study was to examine the evidence for promotion and self-regulation in the UK and Sweden, two countries frequently cited as examples of effective self-regulation.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

We performed a qualitative content analysis of documents outlining the constitutions and procedures of these two systems. We also gathered data from self-regulatory bodies on complaints, complainants, and rulings for the period 2004-2012. The qualitative analysis revealed similarities and differences between the countries. For example, self-regulatory bodies in both countries are required to actively monitor promotional items and impose sanctions on violating companies, but the range of sanctions is greater in the UK where companies may, for instance, be audited or publicly reprimanded. In total, Swedish and UK bodies ruled that 536 and 597 cases, respectively, were in breach, equating to an average of more than one case/week for each country. In Sweden, 430 (47%) complaints resulted from active monitoring, compared with only two complaints (0.2%) in the UK. In both countries, a majority of violations concerned misleading promotion. Charges incurred on companies averaged €447,000 and €765,000 per year in Sweden and the UK, respectively, equivalent to about 0.014% and 0.0051% of annual sales revenues, respectively. One hundred cases in the UK (17% of total cases in breach) and 101 (19%) in Sweden were highlighted as particularly serious. A total of 46 companies were ruled in breach of code for a serious offence at least once in the two countries combined (n = 36 in the UK; n = 27 in Sweden); seven companies were in serious violation more than ten times each. A qualitative content analysis of serious violations pertaining to diabetes drugs (UK, n = 15; Sweden, n = 6; 10% of serious violations) and urologics (UK, n = 6; Sweden, n = 13; 9%) revealed various types of violations: misleading claims (n = 23; 58%); failure to comply with undertakings (n = 9; 23%); pre-licensing (n = 7; 18%) or off-label promotion (n = 2; 5%); and promotion of prescription drugs to the public (n = 6; 15%). Violations that go undetected or unpunished by self-regulatory bodies are the main limitation of this study, since they are likely to lead to an underestimate of industry misconduct.

CONCLUSIONS

The prevalence and severity of breaches testifies to a discrepancy between the ethical standard codified in industry Codes of Conduct and the actual conduct of the industry. We discuss regulatory reforms that may improve the quality of medicines information, such as pre-vetting and intensified active monitoring of promotion, along with larger fines, and giving greater publicity to rulings. But despite the importance of improving regulatory arrangements in an attempt to ensure unbiased medicines information, such efforts alone are insufficient because simply improving oversight and increasing penalties fail to address additional layers of industry bias.