The Conscious Id

Freud's 1926 conjecture is confirmed: evidence from the dorsal periaqueductal gray in mice that human psychological defense against internal instinctual threat evolved from animal motor defense against external predatory threat

In 1926, Freud famously conjectured that the human ego defense of repression against an internal instinctual threat evolved from the animal motor defense of flight from an external predatory threat. Studies over the past 50 years mainly in rodents have investigated the neurobiology of the fight-or-flight reflex to external threats, which activates the emergency alarm system in the dorsal periaqueductal gray (dPAG), the malfunction of which appears likely in panic and post-traumatic stress disorders, but perhaps also in some "non-emergent" conditions like social anxiety and "hysterical" conversion disorder. Computational neuroscience studies in mice by Reis and colleagues have revealed unprecedented insights into the dPAG-related neural mechanisms underlying these evolutionarily honed emergency vertebrate defensive functions (e.g., explore, risk assessment, escape, freeze). A psychoanalytic interpretation of the Reis studies demonstrates that Freud's 1926 conjecture is confirmed, and that internal instinctual threats alone can also set off the dPAG emergency alarm system, which is regulated by 5-HT1A and CRF-1 receptors. Consistent with current psychoanalytic and neurobiologic theories of panic, several other of the primitive components of the dPAG alarm system may also have relevance for understanding of the unconscious determinants of impaired object relationships (e.g., avoidance distance). These dPAG findings reveal (1) a process of "evolution in situ," whereby a more sophisticated dPAG ego defense is seen evolving out of a more primitive dPAG motor defense, (2) a dPAG location for the phylogenetically ancient kernel of Freud's Ego and Id, and (3) a Conscious Id theory that has been conclusively invalidated.

The Persistent Paradox of Rapid Eye Movement Sleep (REMS): Brain Waves and Dreaming

The original conceptualization of REM sleep as paradoxical sleep was based on its EEG resembling wakefulness and its association with dreaming. Over time, the concept of paradox was expanded to include various associations with REM sleep, such as dream exclusivity, high recall, and pathophysiology. However, none of these associations are unique to REM sleep; they can also occur in other sleep states. Today, after more than fifty years of focused research, two aspects of REMS clearly retain paradoxical exclusivity. Despite the persistent contention that the EEG of human REMS consists of wake-like, low-voltage, non-synchronous electrical discharges, REMS is based on and defined by the intracranial electrical presence of 5-8 Hz. theta, which has always been the marker of REMS in other animals. The wake-like EEG used to define REMS on human polysomnography is secondary to a generalized absence of electrophysiological waveforms because the strong waves of intracranial theta do not propagate to scalp electrodes placed outside the skull. It is a persistent paradox that the theta frequency is restricted to a cyclical intracranial dynamic that does not extend beyond the lining of the brain. REMS has a persistent association with narratively long and salient dream reports. However, the extension of this finding to equate REMS with dreaming led to a foundational error in neuroscientific logic. Major theories and clinical approaches were built upon this belief despite clear evidence that dreaming is reported throughout sleep in definingly different physiologic and phenomenological forms. Few studies have addressed the differences between the dreams reported from the different stages of sleep so that today, the most paradoxical aspect of REMS dreaming may be how little the state has actually been studied. An assessment of the differences in dreaming between sleep stages could provide valuable insights into how dreaming relates to the underlying brain activity and physiological processes occurring during each stage. The brain waves and dreams of REMS persist as being paradoxically unique and different from waking and the other states of sleep consciousness.

Playfulness and adolescence: mentalization and neuropsychoanalysis perspective

The article attempts at conceptualizing the basic principles of how adolescents develop, getting out of childhood and proceeding to enter young adulthood. The age period of adolescence is marked with intense emotional states, lines of thinking, beliefs and transitions that caregivers often face challenges making sense of or mirroring. Combining mentalization-based approaches with neuropsychoanalytic findings about how basic emotional systems governing playful behavior work can shed additional light into the communication channels and specificities therapists might consider when engaging in such endeavor.

Originalbeiträge (Originals). Primäremotionen und Bindung bei psychischer Störung

Primaryemotions and attachment in mental disorder Objectives: There is increasing evidence for associations between primary emotions and attachment with mental illness. This study illuminates the mediation relationship of these psychodynamic constructs in relation to psychiatric disorders.

METHODS

921 subjects (69.9 % female) were examined, who completed the questionnaires Brief Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales including a LUST Scale, Experiences in Close Relationships - Revised 8, and ICD-10 Symptom Rating online. A path analysis was conducted to evaluate the mediation effects of attachment anxiety.

RESULTS

A disease-specific pattern of direct associations between primary emotions, attachment anxiety, and psychological impairment emerged (all p < .01). Attachment exerted mediating effects primarily for SADNESS (p < .01), and to a lesser extent for LUST and CARE (p > .01).The model provided variance resolution ranging from7%(eating disorders) to 47%(depression).

CONCLUSION

The results demonstrate the relevance of affective explanations regarding the development of psychological symptoms, as well as therapeutic implications.

Converging theories on dreaming: Between Freud, predictive processing, and psychedelic research

Dreams are still an enigma of human cognition, studied extensively in psychoanalysis and neuroscience. According to the Freudian dream theory and Solms' modifications of the unconscious derived from it, the fundamental task of meeting our emotional needs is guided by the principle of homeostasis. Our innate value system generates conscious feelings of pleasure and unpleasure, resulting in the behavior of approaching or withdrawing from the world of objects. Based on these experiences, a hierarchical generative model of predictions (priors) about the world is constantly created and modified, with the aim to optimize the meeting of our needs by reducing prediction error, as described in the predictive processing model of cognition. Growing evidence from neuroimaging supports this theory. The same hierarchical functioning of the brain is in place during sleep and dreaming, with some important modifications like a lack of sensual and motor perception and action. Another characteristic of dreaming is the predominance of primary process thinking, an associative, non-rational cognitive style, which can be found in similar altered states of consciousness like the effect of psychedelics. Mental events that do not successfully fulfill an emotional need will cause a prediction error, leading to conscious attention and adaptation of the priors that incorrectly predicted the event. However, this is not the case for repressed priors (RPs), which are defined by the inability to become reconsolidated or removed, despite ongoing error signal production. We hypothesize that Solms' RPs correspond with the conflictual complexes, as described by Moser in his dream formation theory. Thus, in dreams and dream-like states, these unconscious RPs might become accessible in symbolic and non-declarative forms that the subject is able to feel and make sense of. Finally, we present the similarities between dreaming and the psychedelic state. Insights from psychedelic research could be used to inform dream research and related therapeutic interventions, and vice versa. We propose further empirical research questions and methods and finally present our ongoing trial "Biological Functions of Dreaming" to test the hypothesis that dreaming predicts intact sleep architecture and memory consolidation, via a lesion model with stroke patients who lost the ability to dream.

Hyperactivity of the default mode network in schizophrenia and free energy: A dialogue between Freudian theory of psychosis and neuroscience

The economic conceptualization of Freudian metapsychology, based on an energetics model of the psyche's workings, offers remarkable commonalities with some recent discoveries in neuroscience, notably in the field of neuroenergetics. The pattern of cerebral activity at resting state and the identification of a default mode network (DMN), a network of areas whose activity is detectable at baseline conditions by neuroimaging techniques, offers a promising field of research in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. In this article we study one significant clinical application of this interdisciplinary dialogue by looking at the role of the DMN in the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Anomalies in the functioning of the DMN have been observed in schizophrenia. Studies have evidenced the existence of hyperactivity in this network in schizophrenia patients, particularly among those for whom a positive symptomatology is dominant. These data are particularly interesting when considered from the perspective of the psychoanalytic understanding of the positive symptoms of psychosis, most notably the Freudian hypothesis of delusions as an "attempt at recovery." Combining the data from research in neuroimaging of schizophrenia patients with the Freudian hypothesis, we propose considering the hyperactivity of the DMN as a consequence of a process of massive reassociation of traces occurring in schizophrenia. This is a process that may constitute an attempt at minimizing the excess of free energy present in psychosis. Modern models of active inference and the free energy principle (FEP) may shed some light on these processes.

The complexity of the stream of consciousness

Typical consciousness can be defined as an individual-specific stream of experiences. Modern consciousness research on dynamic functional connectivity uses clustering techniques to create common bases on which to compare different individuals. We propose an alternative approach by combining modern theories of consciousness and insights arising from phenomenology and dynamical systems theory. This approach enables a representation of an individual's connectivity dynamics in an intrinsically-defined, individual-specific landscape. Given the wealth of evidence relating functional connectivity to experiential states, we assume this landscape is a proxy measure of an individual's stream of consciousness. By investigating the properties of this landscape in individuals in different states of consciousness, we show that consciousness is associated with short term transitions that are less predictable, quicker, but, on average, more constant. We also show that temporally-specific connectivity states are less easily describable by network patterns that are distant in time, suggesting a richer space of possible states. We show that the cortex, cerebellum and subcortex all display consciousness-relevant dynamics and discuss the implication of our results in forming a point of contact between dynamical systems interpretations and phenomenology.

Like a rolling stone: Psychotherapy without (episodic) memory

People with profound amnesia still retain the capacity to learn about the emotional value of experiences, which is crucial in developing and sustaining interpersonal relationships. In a 2017 paper, we demonstrated for the first time (with patient JL) that transferential feelings develop across the therapeutic process, despite profound episodic memory impairment after medial temporal lesions. This paper reports a second case (GA) of a profoundly amnesic patient in psychotherapy, this time after lesions to the anterior fornix. The work with GA opens issues such as the differences and similarities to the previous case, counter-transference phenomena, and the effects of hyperphagia. The findings make it clear that many phenomena are common to both GA and JL, such as forgetfulness, various types of repetition, the importance of the therapeutic alliance, and the ability to make therapeutic gain. However, there were differences between the cases, for example as regards confabulation, which may relate to either pre-morbid personality or lesion site. The paper also discusses the way in which patients of this type bear the very status of psychotherapeutic work with profoundly amnesic patients. Where others have seen barriers and in principle problems in working with such patients, we see many opportunities.

An economic model of the drives from Friston's free energy perspective

This paper is focused on the theory of drives, particularly on its economic model, which was an integral part of Freud's original formulation. Freud was aiming to make a link between the psychic energy of drives and the biophysical rules of nature. However, he was not able to develop this model into a comprehensive system linking the body and the mind. The further development of psychoanalytic theory, in various attempts to comprehend the theory of drives, can be described as taking different approaches. Some of them equate drives with bodily impulses, others abandon the economic model, a few stay with Freud's original model. I believe that the Friston notion of free energy and the hierarchical model of the brain allows us to develop this model and to integrate the economic model into some contemporary theories of drives. I argue against those theories equating drives with biological impulses. My arguments are supported by Freud's project itself but also by recent developments within neuro-psychoanalysis describing the process of mentalizing homeostasis, interoceptive signals and relations with caregivers. I argue for those theories which see the drives as psychic forces, which through developmental processes and cathexes acquire aims and objects, and become intertwined with impulses originating internally and externally, such as affect, interoceptive impulses, perception of the external world, and impulses from erotogenic zones in particular. Here, I present my analysis of the compatibility and consistency of free energy and the hierarchical model perspective, and two psychoanalytical traditions of thoughts: French psychoanalysis and the post-Kleinian school of British psychoanalysis. In particular, my analysis focuses on the contemporary Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasies, especially Bronstein's description of their semiotic aspects. Secondly, I look at Segal's view of drives as dialectic forces of adaptation vs. conservatism. Analyzing the French tradition, I focus on Green's perspective on the drives, Lacan's distinction between drives and desire, and Penot's description of the process of subjectivation. I conclude that free energy, as described by Friston, can be seen as a source of the drives' energy and the process of minimizing it is an equivalent of what Freud described as binding the free energy, in which psychic unbound energy acquires distinctive features and becomes bound.

Drive, instinct, reflex—Applications to treatment of anxiety, depressive and addictive disorders

The neuropsychoanalytic approach solves important aspects of how to use our understanding of the brain to treat patients. We describe the neurobiology underlying motivation for healthy behaviors and psychopathology. We have updated Freud’s original concepts of drive and instinct using neuropsychoanalysis in a way that conserves his insights while adding information that is of use in clinical treatment. Drive (Trieb) is a pressure to act on an internal stimulus. It has a motivational energic source, an aim, an object, and is terminated by the satisfaction of a surge of serotonin. An instinct (Instinkt) is an inherited pattern of behavior that varies little from species to species. Drives are created by internal/ventral brain factors. Instincts require input from the outside that arrive through dorsal brain structures. In our model unpleasure is the experience of unsatisfied drives while pleasure if fueled by a propitious human environment. Motivational concepts can be used guide clinical work. Sometimes what had previously described psychoanalytically as, “Internal conflict,” can be characterized neurobiologically as conflicts between different motivational systems. These motivational systems inform treatment of anxiety and depression, addiction in general and specific problems of opioid use disorder. Our description of motivation in addictive illness shows that the term, “reward system,” is incorrect, eliminating a source of stigmatizing addiction by suggesting that it is hedonistic. Understanding that motivational systems that have both psychological and brain correlates can be a basis for treating various disorders. Over many papers the authors have described the biology of drives, instincts, unpleasure and pleasure. We will start with a summary of our work, then show its clinical application.

Interventi sull'articolo di Mark Solms. La rivisitazione del concetto di pulsione dalle neuroscienze affettive (Panksepp) alla neuropsicoanalisi (Solms): commento all'articolo di Mark Solms

La revisione da parte di Mark Solms del concetto di pulsione rappresenta l'ultimo di una serie di suoi approfondimenti dei più fondamentali concetti freudiani. Il movimento della neuropsicoanali-si è sorto nel 2000 con il primo Congresso incentrato proprio su una definizione neuroscientifica degli affetti e delle emozioni. Nel 2013 Solms propone una sostanziale e profonda modifica del modello strutturale di Freud motivando le sue tesi che sostengono che l'Es pulsionale non possa che essere conscio. In questo ultimo articolo, Solms (2021a) ribadisce e rivalorizza la centralità della teoria pulsionale in psicoanalisi e nelle neuroscienze come punto di partenza per comprende-re i fenomeni consci e inconsci, nella normalità e nella patologia.

Una revisione della teoria delle pulsioni

Questo contributo propone profonde revisioni della teoria freudiana delle pulsioni. Le principali revisioni sono le seguenti: (1) Le pulsioni sono coscienti e sono in effetti la fonte di tutta la co-scienza. (2) L'energia pulsionale è equiparata all'energia libera variazionale (variational free energy) ed è quindi quantificabile in linea di principio. (3) Non esistono solo due pulsioni: ve ne sono tante di cui, per la precisione, sette possono essere categorizzate come pulsioni "emotive"; tutte le altre possono essere descritte come pulsioni "corporee". (4) Tutte le pulsioni sono o auto-conservative o in funzione della preservazione della specie; non esiste invece una pulsione di mor-te all'opera nella mente. Ciò significa che, dal punto di vista del meccanismo funzionale, tutte le pulsioni sono omeostatiche e anti-entropiche. (5) Il grande compito dello sviluppo mentale è quel-lo di aggiungersi alle predizioni istintuali innate, permettendo così non solo di gratificare le nostre più diverse esigenze pulsionali ma anche di armonizzarle tra loro. Questo lavoro viene svolto apprendendo dall'esperienza, principalmente attraverso un comportamento volontario, che è gover-nato da sentimenti coscienti.

Una nota sull'articolo di Mark Solms

Viene brevemente commentato l'articolo di Mark Solms (2021a) "Una revisione della teoria delle pulsioni" (Psicoterapia e Scienze Umane, 2022, 56, 3: 363-422), di cui viene condivisa la princi-pale tesi: le forze motivazionali di base dell'essere umano sono costituite da sistemi affettivi attivati dai princìpi omeostatici che regolano i processi biologici deputati alla sopravvivenza e alla riproduzione. Viene però argomentato che la teoria psicoanalitica delle relazioni oggettuali concepisce le pulsioni come due sistemi motivazionali affettivi sovra-ordinati affiliativi e contro-affiliativi (che Freud chiamò libido e aggressività) che descrivono il conflitto intrapsichico inconscio e sono rilevanti per la clinica.

The Self and alien self in psyche and soma

This paper compares presentations of disorders of the sense of body ownership and agency from psychoanalytic and neurological perspectives to demonstrate similarities in symptomatology proposing these similarities arise from adjustments in Friston's generative model of self-organization and selfhood. The implications for the analytic model of the Self, for clinical practice and for neuroscience research are considered. Patients with narcissistic disorders use projective defences resulting in a disordered sense of what belongs to whom. This applies to mind and body of self and other and is central to understanding transference and countertransference. Clinical observations of this disordered sense of ownership and agency mirror findings in neurological disorders. This paper proposes that in both neurological and psychological disorders Friston's 'internal generative model' of selfhood is adjusted. Further to this whilst this adjustment may be either neurogenic or psychogenic, the final neural mechanism and symptomatic outcome are similar. On the basis of these observations the paper compares the concept of the Self from Jungian and psychoanalytic perspectives. Finally, the implications for the concept of the death instinct and Britton's concept of Xenophobia are explored along with the implications of these observations for clinical practice.

Network dynamics scale with levels of awareness

Small world topologies are thought to provide a valuable insight into human brain organisation and consciousness. However, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies in consciousness have not yielded consistent results. Given the importance of dynamics for both consciousness and cognition, here we investigate how the diversity of small world dynamics (quantified by sample entropy; dSW-E¹) scales with decreasing levels of awareness (i.e., sedation and disorders of consciousness). Paying particular attention to result reproducibility, we show that dSW-E is a consistent predictor of levels of awareness even when controlling for the underlying functional connectivity dynamics. We find that dSW-E of subcortical and cortical areas are predictive, with the former showing higher and more robust effect sizes across analyses. We find that the network dynamics of intermodular communication in the cerebellum also have unique predictive power for levels of awareness. Consequently, we propose that the dynamic reorganisation of the functional information architecture, in particular of the subcortex, is a characteristic that emerges with awareness and has explanatory power beyond that of the complexity of dynamic functional connectivity.

Revision of Drive Theory

Several deep revisions of Freud's theory of the drives are proposed: (1) Drives are conscious and are in fact the source of all consciousness. (2) Drive energy is equated with variational free energy and is therefore quantifiable in principle. (3) There are not two drives but many, seven of which may be described as "emotional" as opposed to "bodily" drives. (4) All drives are self-preservative or preservative of the species; there is no death drive at work in the mind. This means, at the mechanistic level, that all drives are homeostatic and anti-entropic. (5) The great task of mental development is to supplement instinctual predictions about how our multiple drive demands may be met and reconciled with each other. This work is done by learning from experience, mainly through voluntary behavior, which is governed by conscious feelings.

Affect-Logic, Embodiment, Synergetics, and the Free Energy Principle: New Approaches to the Understanding and Treatment of Schizophrenia

This theoretical paper explores the affect-logic approach to schizophrenia in light of the general complexity theories of cognition: embodied cognition, Haken's synergetics, and Friston's free energy principle. According to affect-logic, the mental apparatus is an embodied system open to its environment, driven by bioenergetic inputs of emotions. Emotions are rooted in goal-directed embodied states selected by evolutionary pressure for coping with specific situations such as fight, flight, attachment, and others. According to synergetics, nonlinear bifurcations and the emergence of new global patterns occur in open systems when control parameters reach a critical level. Applied to the emergence of psychotic states, synergetics and the proposed energetic understanding of emotions lead to the hypothesis that critical levels of emotional tension may be responsible for the transition from normal to psychotic modes of functioning in vulnerable individuals. In addition, the free energy principle through learning suggests that psychotic symptoms correspond to alternative modes of minimizing free energy, which then entails distorted perceptions of the body, self, and reality. This synthetic formulation has implications for novel therapeutic and preventive strategies in the treatment of psychoses, among these are milieu-therapeutic approaches of the Soteria type that focus on a sustained reduction of emotional tension and phenomenologically oriented methods for improving the perception of body, self, and reality.

Clinical Applications of Neuropsychoanalysis: Hypotheses Toward an Integrative Model

Neuropsychoanalysis has been established as a field based on the dialog between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. Freud was a neurologist for 20 years and used the neuroscientific knowledge of his time as the foundation of his metapsychology. Psychoanalysis has predominantly relied on its own method to develop techniques for the different psychoanalytic treatments. It rarely uses contributions from fields outside psychoanalysis that could enrich its understanding of the mind. Neuropsychoanalysis has informed and revised several topics in psychoanalysis, for example consciousness and the unconscious, dreams, and affect amongst many others. Clear clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis can be appreciated in the work with neurological patients. However, a constant question from clinicians is whether neuropsychoanalytic findings can contribute to psychoanalytic treatments with non-neurological patients. This paper explores clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis mainly based on affective neuroscience to propose an analysis of emotions that may contribute to the gradual development of a neuropsychoanalytically informed psychotherapy. The task of integrating neuroscientific knowledge into psychoanalytic technique is still considered a challenge of accentuated complexity, but it is at the same time a necessary and promising endeavor that aims at improving the quality of the treatments available for human suffering and psychopathology.

The Emergence of Psychoanalytic Metaneuropsychology: A Neuropsychoanalytically Informed Reconsideration of Early Psychic Development

This paper is principally concerned with reappraising some of the major disagreements that separated the Viennese and the London Kleinians during the British Psychoanalytical Society's Controversial Discussions. Of particular focus are questions pertaining to the genesis of ego development, the beginnings of object-relating, and the role of unconscious phantasy in respect of these phenomena. The aim of the investigation is to inquire into the light that may be shed on the once intractable conflicts surrounding these questions by bringing to bear more recent developments from psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. First, various key issues from the Controversial Discussions are outlined, before the paper turns to work by Jaak Panksepp and Mark Solms that bears on these older arguments and the Freudian theories that underpinned them. With these conceptual foundations established, three questions are posed and discussed with a view to understanding the implications of recent neuropsychoanalytic thinking for some of the entrenched conflicts that divided the British Society. These questions include: (1) what does it mean for the ego if the id is conscious? (2) What does recent neuroscientific knowledge tell us about whether the ego should be thought of as present from birth? (3) How can we understand and locate unconscious phantasy if the main part of the mind that Freud thought of as unconscious is not so? Research from the arena of infant development-particularly the material and analysis of infant observation-is drawn on to illustrate various conclusions. The paper ultimately concludes that taking such an interdisciplinary approach can reveal renewed justification for aspects of the Kleinian metapsychology.

The Neuropsychology of Emotion and Emotion Regulation: The Role of Laterality and Hierarchy

Over the last few decades, work in affective neuroscience has increasingly investigated the neural basis of emotion. A central debate in the field, when studying individuals with brain damage, has been whether emotional processes are lateralized or not. This review aims to expand this debate, by considering the need to include a hierarchical dimension to the problem. The historical journey of the diverse literature is presented, particularly focusing on the need to develop a research program that explores the neural basis of a wide range of emotional processes (perception, expression, experience, regulation, decision making, etc.), and also its relation to lateralized cortical and deep-subcortical brain structures. Of especial interest is the study of the interaction between emotional components; for example, between emotion generation and emotion regulation. Finally, emerging evidence from lesion studies is presented regarding the neural basis of emotion-regulation strategies, for which the issue of laterality seems most relevant. It is proposed that, because emotion-regulation strategies are complex higher-order cognitive processes, the question appears to be not the lateralization of the entire emotional process, but the lateralization of the specific cognitive tools we use to manage our feelings, in a range of different ways.

Sex and Prediction Error, Part 1: The Metapsychology of Jouissance

Jouissance is one of Jacques Lacan's most impenetrable concepts. Yet it is essential to Lacan's view of sex. The term is sometimes translated as "enjoyment," but this misses key features of the concept, notably its "traumatic," excessive character. This excess points to a structural negativity within the subject (i.e., the real), an original split that cannot be remedied. In this first of a series of three papers, it is proposed that "surplus prediction error"-as understood within contemporary neuropsychoanalysis-is a neural correlate for jouissance. In part 1, jouissance is explicated within Lacanian metapsychology, primarily in reference to Lacan's real and symbolic registers. Jouissance is an excess enjoyment, outside of the binding, representational capacities of language. The real is the negativity or antagonism within the symbolic, the limit of language and meaning, the point where jouissance emerges. To clarify the relationships among these terms, their positions are traced in some of Freud's major concepts, including drive, infantile sexuality, repetition, and the unconscious. A basic understanding of jouissance is necessary for the rest of this Lacanian neuropsychoanalytic project.

Sex and Prediction Error, Part 2: Jouissance and The Free Energy Principle in Neuropsychoanalysis

Jouissance refers to an excess enjoyment beyond (yet tied to) speech and representation. From the perspective of some Lacanian analysts, jouissance is precisely what testifies against any relationship to the brain-jouissance "slips" out of cognition. On the contrary, it is argued here that jouissance has a central place in contemporary neuropsychoanalysis. In part 1 of this series the metapsychology of jouissance was presented in relation to the real and symbolic registers. Here, in part 2, Mark Solms's neuropsychoanalytic model of Karl Friston's free energy principle is summarized. In this model, "predictions" aim to resolve prediction errors-most notably, those signaled by affective consciousness. "Surplus prediction error"-prediction error that arises at the point where the predictive model fails-is proposed to be a neural correlate of jouissance. This limit within prediction is analogous to the real as a structural negativity within the symbolic.

Neuroscience of Object Relations in Health and Disorder: A Proposal for an Integrative Model

Recent advances in the neuroscience of episodic memory provide a framework to integrate object relations theory, a psychoanalytic model of mind development, with potential neural mechanisms. Object relations are primordial cognitive-affective units of the mind derived from survival- and safety-level experiences with caretakers during phase-sensitive periods of infancy and toddlerhood. Because these are learning experiences, their neural substrate likely involves memory, here affect-enhanced episodic memory. Inaugural object relations are encoded by the hippocampus-amygdala synaptic plasticity, and systems-consolidated by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Self- and object-mental representations, extracted from these early experiences, are at first dichotomized by contradictory affects evoked by frustrating and rewarding interactions ("partial object relations"). Such affective dichotomization appears to be genetically hardwired the amygdala. Intrinsic propensity of mPFC to form schematic frameworks for episodic memories may pilot non-conscious integration of dichotomized mental representations in neonates and infants. With the emergence of working memory in toddlers, an activated self- and object-representation of a particular valence can be juxtaposed with its memorized opposites creating a balanced cognitive-affective frame (conscious "integration of object relations"). Specific events of object relations are forgotten but nevertheless profoundly influence the mental future of the individual, acting (i) as implicit schema-affect templates that regulate attentional priorities, relevance, and preferential assimilation of new information based on past experience, and (ii) as basic units of experience that are, under normal circumstances, integrated as attractors or "focal points" for interactive self-organization of functional brain networks that underlie the mind. A failure to achieve integrated object relations is predictive of poor adult emotional and social outcomes, including personality disorder. Cognitive, cellular-, and systems-neuroscience of episodic memory appear to support key postulates of object relations theory and help elucidate neural mechanisms of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Derived through the dual prism of psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the gained insights may offer new directions to enhance mental health and improve treatment of multiple forms of psychopathology.

The Circularity of the Embodied Mind

From an embodied and enactive point of view, the mind-body problem has been reformulated as the relation between the lived or subject body on the one hand and the physiological or object body on the other ("body-body problem"). The aim of the paper is to explore the concept of circularity as a means of explaining the relation between the phenomenology of lived experience and the dynamics of organism-environment interactions. This concept of circularity also seems suitable for connecting enactive accounts with ecological psychology. It will be developed in a threefold way: (1) As the circular structure of embodiment, which manifests itself (a) in the homeostatic cycles between the brain and body and (b) in the sensorimotor cycles between the brain, body, and environment. This includes the interdependence of an organism's dispositions of sense-making and the affordances of the environment. (2) As the circular causality, which characterizes the relation between parts and whole within the living organism as well as within the organism-environment system. (3) As the circularity of process and structure in development and learning. Here, it will be argued that subjective experience constitutes a process of sense-making that implies (neuro-)physiological processes so as to form modified neuronal structures, which in turn enable altered future interactions. On this basis, embodied experience may ultimately be conceived as the integration of brain-body and body-environment interactions, which has a top-down, formative, or ordering effect on physiological processes. This will serve as an approach to a solution of the body-body problem.

Unconscious Emotion and Free-Energy: A Philosophical and Neuroscientific Exploration

Unconscious emotions are of central importance to psychoanalysis. They do, however, raise conceptual problems. The most pertinent concerns the intuition, shared by Freud, that consciousness is essential to emotion, which makes the idea of unconscious emotion seem paradoxical. In this paper, I address this paradox from the perspective of the philosopher R. C. Roberts' account of emotions as concern-based construals. I provide an interpretation of this account in the context of affective neuroscience and explore the form of Freudian repression that emotions may be subject to under such an interpretation. This exploration draws on evidence from research on alexithymia and utilises ideas from free-energy neuroscience. The free-energy framework, moreover, facilitates an account of repression that avoids the homunculus objection and coheres with recent work on hysteria.

Entropy, Free Energy, and Symbolization: Free Association at the Intersection of Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience

Both a method of therapy and an exploration of psychic reality, free association is a fundamental element of psychoanalytical practices that refers to the way a patient is asked to describe what comes spontaneously to mind in the therapeutic setting. This paper examines the role of free association from the point of view of psychoanalysis and neuroscience in order to improve our understanding of therapeutic effects induced by psychoanalytic therapies and psychoanalysis. In this regard, we first propose a global overview of the historical origins of the concept of free association in psychoanalysis and examine how Freud established its principles. Then, from Freud's distinction between primary and secondary processes, we proceed to compare the psychoanalytic model with research originating from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The notions of entropy and free energy appear particularly relevant at the intersection of these different domains. Finally, we propose the notion of symbolizing transmodality to describe certain specificities of symbolization processes within free association and we summarize the main functions of free association in psychoanalytic practices.

Affective Features Underlying Depression in Addiction: Understanding What It Feels Like

Addiction poses a complex challenge in spite of all the progress made toward understanding and treating it. A multidisciplinary approach is needed and this paper attempts to integrate relevant neurobiological, behavioral, and subjective data under a common denominator described as a latent type of depression. It is called latent because it remains a silent syndrome due to two main reasons. The first one relates to the natural use of defenses against a predominant effect of chronic subjective pain, which arises from an ambivalent type of separation distress that compromises opioid regulation (PANIC system). Furthermore, it provokes a neurochemical cascade that impacts several neuromodulatory systems. The second reason is that such chronic subjective pain usually exhausts the natural defensive system, frequently leading the person to look for other resources such as the neurochemical manipulation of psychic pain. Thus, both the use of defenses and of psychotoxic drugs make the underlying depression hard to assess, even for the very person suffering from it. The causes, course and treatment of this type of affective configuration are discussed in this paper as an attempt to explain some of the difficulties so far encountered and to contribute to potential alternative lines of treatment.

Re-enacting the Bodily Self on Stage: Embodied Cognition Meets Psychoanalysis

The embodied approach to cognition consists in a range of theoretical proposals sharing the idea that our concepts are constitutively shaped by the physical and social constraints of our body and environment. Still far from a mutually enriching interplay, in recent years embodied and psychoanalytic approaches are converging on similar constructs as the ones of intersubjectivity, bodily self, and affective quality of verbal communication. Some efforts to cope with the sentient subject were already present in classical cognitivism: having expunged desires and conflicts from the cognitive harmony, bodily emotions re-emerged but only as a noisy dynamic friction. In contrast, the new, neural, embodied cognitive science with its focus on bodily effects/affects has enabled a dialogue between neuro-cognitive perspectives and clinic-psychological ones, through shared conceptual frameworks. I will address crucial issues that should be faced on this reconciling path. With reference to two kinds of contemporary addictions - internet addiction disorder and eating disorders - I will introduce a possible therapeutic approach that is built upon the core role of the acting-sentient bodily self in a dynamic-social and affective environment. In Psychoanalytic Psychodrama, the spontaneous re-enactment of a past (socially and physically constrained) experience is actualized by means of the other, the Auxiliary Ego. This allows homeostatic and social-emotional affects, i.e., drives and instincts, to be re-experienced by the agent, the Protagonist, in a safe scenario. The director-psychoanalyst smoothly traces back this simulation to the motivated, and constrained, early proximal embodied interactions with significant others, and to the related instinctual conflicting aims. The psychoanalytic reframing of classical psychodrama does not merely exploit its original cathartic function, rather stands out for exploring the interpersonal constitution of the self, through an actual "re-somatization" of psychoanalytic therapy. Unspoken/unspeakable feelings pop up on stage: the strength of this treatment mainly rests on re-establishing the priority of the embodied Self over the narrative Self. By pointing out the possible conflicts between these two selves, this method can broaden the embodied cognition perspective. The psychodramatic approach will be briefly discussed in light of connectionist models, to finally address linguistic and methodological pivotal issues.

"Surprise" and the Bayesian Brain: Implications for Psychotherapy Theory and Practice

The free energy principle (FEP) has gained widespread interest and growing acceptance as a new paradigm of brain function, but has had little impact on the theory and practice of psychotherapy. The aim of this paper is to redress this. Brains rely on Bayesian inference during which “bottom-up” sensations are matched with “top-down” predictions. Discrepancies result in “prediction error.” The brain abhors informational “surprise,” which is minimized by (1) action enhancing the statistical likelihood of sensory samples, (2) revising inferences in the light of experience, updating “priors” to reality-aligned “posteriors,” and (3) optimizing the complexity of our generative models of a capricious world. In all three, free energy is converted to bound energy. In psychopathology energy either remains unbound, as in trauma and inhibition of agency, or manifests restricted, anachronistic “top-down” narratives. Psychotherapy fosters client agency, linguistic and practical. Temporary uncoupling bottom-up from top-down automatism and fostering scrutinized simulations sets a number of salutary processes in train. Mentalising enriches Bayesian inference, enabling experience and feeling states to be “metabolized” and assimilated. “Free association” enhances more inclusive sensory sampling, while dream analysis foregrounds salient emotional themes as “attractors.” FEP parallels with psychoanalytic theory are outlined, including Freud’s unpublished project, Bion’s “contact barrier” concept, the Fonagy/Target model of sexuality, Laplanche’s therapist as “enigmatic signifier,” and the role of projective identification. The therapy stimulates patients to become aware of and revise the priors’ they bring to interpersonal experience. In the therapeutic “duet for one,” the energy binding skills and non-partisan stance of the analyst help sufferers face trauma without being overwhelmed by psychic entropy. Overall, the FEP provides a sound theoretical basis for psychotherapy practice, training, and research.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

This article applies the free energy principle to the hard problem of consciousness. After clarifying some philosophical issues concerning functionalism, it identifies the elemental form of consciousness as affect and locates its physiological mechanism (an extended form of homeostasis) in the upper brainstem. This mechanism is then formalized in terms of free energy minimization (in unpredicted contexts) where decreases and increases in expected uncertainty are felt as pleasure and unpleasure, respectively. Emphasis is placed on the reasons why such existential imperatives feel like something to and for an organism.

The Neurobiological Underpinnings of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy

This paper sets out the neurobiological underpinnings of the core theoretical claims of psychoanalysis. These claims concern (1) innate emotional needs, (2) learning from experience, and (3) unconscious mental processing. The paper also considers the neurobiological underpinnings of the mechanisms of psychoanalytic treatment-a treatment which is based on the aforementioned claims. Lastly, it reviews the available empirical evidence concerning the therapeutic efficacy of this form of treatment.

The Affective Core of the Self: A Neuro-Archetypical Perspective on the Foundations of Human (and Animal) Subjectivity

Psychologists usually considered the "Self" as an object of experience appearing when the individual perceives its existence within the conscious field. In accordance with such a view, the self-representing capacity of the human mind has been related to corticolimbic learning processes taking place within individual development. On the other hand, Carl Gustav Jung considered the Self as the core of our personality, in its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as in its actual and potential forms. According to Jung, the Self originates from an inborn dynamic structure integrating the essential drives of our "brain-mind," and leading both to instinctual behavioral actions and to archetypal psychological experiences. Interestingly, recent neuroethological studies indicate that our subjective identity rests on ancient neuropsychic processes that humans share with other animals as part of their inborn constitutional repertoire. Indeed, brain activity within subcortical midline structures (SCMSs) is intrinsically related to the emergence of prototypical affective states, that not only influence our behavior in a flexible way, but alter our conscious field, giving rise to specific feelings or moods, which constitute the first form of self-orientation in the world. Moreover, such affective dynamics play a central role in the organization of individual personality and in the evolution of all other (more sophisticated) psychological functions. Therefore, on the base of the convergence between contemporary cutting-edge scientific research and some psychological intuitions of Jung, we intend here to explore the first neuroevolutional layer of human mind, that we call the affective core of the Self.

The role of conviction and narrative in decision-making under radical uncertainty

We propose conviction narrative theory (CNT) to broaden decision-making theory in order to better understand and analyse how subjectively means-end rational actors cope in contexts in which the traditional assumptions in decision-making models fail to hold. Conviction narratives enable actors to draw on their beliefs, causal models, and rules of thumb to identify opportunities worth acting on, to simulate the future outcome of their actions, and to feel sufficiently convinced to act. The framework focuses on how narrative and emotion combine to allow actors to deliberate and to select actions that they think will produce the outcomes they desire. It specifies connections between particular emotions and deliberative thought, hypothesising that approach and avoidance emotions evoked during narrative simulation play a crucial role. Two mental states, Divided and Integrated, in which narratives can be formed or updated, are introduced and used to explain some familiar problems that traditional models cannot.

What is "the unconscious," and where is it located in the brain? A neuropsychoanalytic perspective

This is a brief overview of my "neuropsychoanalytic" perspective on the unconscious. It should make clear how much psychoanalysis has to gain from incorporating the findings of neuroscientific disciplines studying the same part of nature-the workings of the human mind. I hope it makes equally clear what useful new perspectives can be cast on current issues in cognitive neuroscience, if they, in turn, incorporate the findings of psychoanalysis.

Alpha synchronization as a brain model for unconscious defense: An overview of the work of Howard Shevrin and his team

Howard Shevrin and his team have developed a stringent subliminal priming methodology, which experimentally approximates a situation of an internal, mental triggering of unconscious defense. Through a series of four studies they thus are able to bring evidence for this type of unconscious defense. With event-related potentials, three clinical studies show how synchronization of a specific brain wave, the alpha wave, known for its inhibitory function, is also induced by subliminally presented conflictual subject-specific stimuli. Therefore, alpha synchronization could serve as the brain mechanism of unconscious defense. The results only make sense if we suppose the existence of a dynamic unconscious, which has inherited childhood conflicts, and with privileged connections to neurotic symptom characteristics. Moreover, by showing that the unconscious conflict phrases, inferred by clinicians from clinical interviews, have a similar brain behavior, Shevrin and his team provide evidence that these inferences are not simply clinician-dependent subjective interpretations but also imply some form of independent mental reality. Finally, interpretation of the results has led us to propose two distinct physiological mechanisms for defense: one, unconscious defense, by alpha synchronization in connection with the drive derivatives, and another, repression, based on the indications of reality in connection with the ego.

On Dreams and Motivation: Comparison of Freud's and Hobson's Views

The merits of Freudian dream theory continue to be debated and both supporters and critics appeal to empirical evidence to support their respective positions. What receives much less attention is the theoretical coherency of either Freudian dream theory or alternative perspectives. This paper examines Freudian dream theory and J. Allan Hobson's alternative position by addressing the role of motivation in dreams. This paper first discusses motivation in Freudian theory and its relation to dreams and disguise-censorship. The role of motivation in Hobson's theory is then considered. Hobson's claim that dream plot and content selection is random and based on design error and functional imbalance is then discussed in relation to the protoconsciousness theory proposal that dreams serve an adaptive function. While there are apparent inconsistencies in Hobson's position, his appeal to emotions and instincts provides a preliminary platform for understanding the role of motivation in dreams that is consonant with the Freudian position.

The Neuropsychoanalytic Approach: Using Neuroscience as the Basic Science of Psychoanalysis

Neuroscience was the basic science behind Freud's psychoanalytic theory and technique. He worked as a neurologist for 20 years before being aware that a new approach to understand complex diseases, namely the hysterias, was needed. Solms coined the term neuropsychoanalysis to affirm that neuroscience still belongs in psychoanalysis. The neuropsychoanalytic field has continued Freud's original ideas as stated in 1895. Developments in psychoanalysis that have been created or revised by the neuropsychoanalysis movement include pain/relatedness/opioids, drive, structural model, dreams, cathexis, and dynamic unconscious. Neuroscience has contributed to the development of new psychoanalytic theory, such as Bazan's (2011) description of anxiety driven by unconscious intentions or “phantoms.” Results of adopting the “dual aspect monism” approach of idiographic psychoanalytic clinical observation combined with nomothetic investigation of related human phenomena include clarification and revision of theory, restoration of the scientific base of psychoanalysis, and improvement of clinical treatments. By imbricating psychoanalytic thinking with neuroscience, psychoanalysts are also positioned to make contributions to neuroscience research. Freud's original Project for a Scientific Psychology/Psychology for Neurologists can be carried forward in a way that moves psychoanalysis into the twenty-first century as a core contemporary science (Kandel, 1999). Neuroscience as the basic science of psychoanalysis both improves the field, and enhances its scientific and cultural status.