Geographic Disparities in Domestic Pig Population Exposure to Ebola Viruses, Guinea, 2017-2019

Although pigs are naturally susceptible to Reston virus and experimentally to Ebola virus (EBOV), their role in Orthoebolavirus ecology remains unknown. We tested 888 serum samples collected from pigs in Guinea during 2017-2019 (between the 2013-16 epidemic and its resurgence in 2021) by indirect ELISA against the EBOV nucleoprotein. We identified 2 hotspots of possible pig exposure by IgG titer levels: the northern coast had 48.7% of positive serum samples (37/76), and Forest Guinea, bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia, where the virus emerged and reemerged, had 50% of positive serum samples (98/196). The multitarget Luminex approach confirms ELISA results against Ebola nucleoprotein and highlights cross-reactivities to glycoprotein of EBOV, Reston virus, and Bundibugyo virus. Those results are consistent with previous observations of the circulation of Orthoebolavirus species in pig farming regions in Sierra Leone and Ghana, suggesting potential risk for Ebola virus disease in humans, especially in Forest Guinea.

Pathogenicity of Lloviu and Bombali Viruses in Type I Interferon Receptor Knockout Mice

Type I interferon receptor knockout (IFNAR-/-) mice are not able to generate a complete innate immune response; therefore, these mice are often considered to assess the pathogenicity of emerging viruses. We infected IFNAR-/- mice with a low or high dose of Lloviu virus (LLOV) or Bombali virus (BOMV) by the intranasal (IN) or intraperitoneal (IP) route and compared virus loads at early and late time points after infection. No signs of disease and no viral RNA were detected after IN infection regardless of LLOV dose. In contrast, IP infections resulted in increased viral loads in the high-dose LLOV and BOMV groups at the early time point. The low-dose LLOV and BOMV groups achieved higher viral loads at the late time point. However, there was 100% survival in all groups and no signs of disease. In conclusion, our results indicate a limited value of the IFNAR-/- mouse model for investigation of the pathogenicity of LLOV and BOMV.

VP24 matrix proteins of eight filoviruses downregulate innate immune response by inhibiting the interferon-induced pathway

Filoviruses encode viral protein 24 (VP24) which effectively inhibit the innate immune responses in infected cells. Here we systematically analysed the effects of nine mammalian filovirus VP24 proteins on interferon (IFN)-induced immune response. We transiently expressed Ebola, Bombali, Bundibugyo, Reston, Sudan and Taï Forest ebolavirus (EBOV, BOMV, BDBV, RESTV, SUDV, TAFV, respectively), Lloviu virus (LLOV), Mengla dianlovirus (MLAV) and Marburgvirus (MARV) VP24 proteins and analysed their ability to inhibit IFN-α-induced activation of myxovirus resistance protein 1 (MxA) and interferon-induced transmembrane protein 3 (IFITM3) promoters. In addition, we analysed the expression of endogenous MxA protein in filovirus VP24-expressing cells. Eight filovirus VP24 proteins, including the VP24s of the recently discovered MLAV, BOMV and LLOV, inhibited IFN-induced MxA and IFITM3 promoter activation. MARV VP24 was the only protein with no inhibitory effect on the activation of either promoter. Endogenous MxA protein expression was impaired in cells transiently expressing VP24s with the exception of MARV VP24. We mutated nuclear localization signal (NLS) of two highly pathogenic filoviruses (EBOV and SUDV) and two putatively non-pathogenic filoviruses (BOMV and RESTV), and showed that the inhibitory effect on IFN-induced expression of MxA was dependent on functional cluster 3 of VP24 nuclear localization signal. Our findings suggest that filovirus VP24 proteins are both genetically and functionally conserved, and that VP24 proteins of most filovirus species are capable of inhibiting IFN-induced antiviral gene expression thereby efficiently downregulating the host innate immune responses.

Structural and Functional Aspects of Ebola Virus Proteins

Ebola virus (EBOV), member of genus Ebolavirus, family Filoviridae, have a non-segmented, single-stranded RNA that contains seven genes: (a) nucleoprotein (NP), (b) viral protein 35 (VP35), (c) VP40, (d) glycoprotein (GP), (e) VP30, (f) VP24, and (g) RNA polymerase (L). All genes encode for one protein each except GP, producing three pre-proteins due to the transcriptional editing. These pre-proteins are translated into four products, namely: (a) soluble secreted glycoprotein (sGP), (b) Δ-peptide, (c) full-length transmembrane spike glycoprotein (GP), and (d) soluble small secreted glycoprotein (ssGP). Further, shed GP is released from infected cells due to cleavage of GP by tumor necrosis factor α-converting enzyme (TACE). This review presents a detailed discussion on various functional aspects of all EBOV proteins and their residues. An introduction to ebolaviruses and their life cycle is also provided for clarity of the available analysis. We believe that this review will help understand the roles played by different EBOV proteins in the pathogenesis of the disease. It will help in targeting significant protein residues for therapeutic and multi-protein/peptide vaccine development.

Structural risk analysis of a potential Ebola outbreak with respect to infrastructural aspects amid the current COVID-19 pandemic

Due to the ease and increased volume of global interaction, it remains unclear whether the current coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic will be a one-off event or whether the world is at risk of recurrent pandemics as a result of globalization. To address this important issue, the present study assessed the risk of a possible future Ebola pandemic. The risk profile of Hubei province in China was compared with that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in terms of travel and infrastructure, since DRC is considered a major epicenter for Ebola outbreaks. Recurrence patterns of previous Ebola outbreaks were analyzed in a cumulative outbreak model. Internationally available data on air traffic, flight destinations, passenger numbers, population density, distribution and domestic traffic routes were all analyzed and compared between the DRC and Hubei province. DRC is a major epicenter for Ebola outbreaks, with 13 recorded outbreaks from 1976 until 2020. International airports at both Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC and Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province, are heavily frequented destinations and represent major transfer hubs on their respective continents. Volumes of flights to and from extracontinental destinations account for <25% of total flights at both airports with similar total international passenger volumes. However, the volume of domestic commuting by aviation is >30-fold higher at Hubei province compared with that of the DRC. This finding is also reflected by the higher population density and homogeneity in terms of population per square kilometer in Hubei. Following the analysis of decades of Ebola reports, it became evident that the DRC remains a hotspot for potential Ebola outbreaks in the future due to constantly recurrent local outbreaks. In terms of the international aviation network, numerous important similarities between Kinshasa and Hubei Province were observed as regards connectivity. The present comparative analysis extends beyond biological factors underlying Ebola and COVID-19 transmissions and confirms that the DRC, Kinshasa in particular, is not a remote location. Although internal commuting and population density may be lower in the DRC compared with those in Hubei province, integration into the international aviation network is similarly extensive. The international community must increase its focus and efforts in preventing another possible global pandemic commencing in Africa, and in particular the DRC.

Is the Bombali virus pathogenic in humans?

Motivation

The potential of the Bombali virus, a novel Ebolavirus, to cause disease in humans remains unknown. We have previously identified potential determinants of Ebolavirus pathogenicity in humans by analysing the amino acid positions that are differentially conserved (specificity determining positions; SDPs) between human pathogenic Ebolaviruses and the non-pathogenic Reston virus. Here, we include the many Ebolavirus genome sequences that have since become available into our analysis and investigate the amino acid sequence of the Bombali virus proteins at the SDPs that discriminate between human pathogenic and non-human pathogenic Ebolaviruses.

Results

The use of 1408 Ebolavirus genomes (196 in the original analysis) resulted in a set of 166 SDPs (reduced from 180), 146 (88%) of which were retained from the original analysis. This indicates the robustness of our approach and refines the set of SDPs that distinguish human pathogenic Ebolaviruses from Reston virus. At SDPs, Bombali virus shared the majority of amino acids with the human pathogenic Ebolaviruses (63.25%). However, for two SDPs in VP24 (M136L, R139S) that have been proposed to be critical for the lack of Reston virus human pathogenicity because they alter the VP24-karyopherin interaction, the Bombali virus amino acids match those of Reston virus. Thus, Bombali virus may not be pathogenic in humans. Supporting this, no Bombali virus-associated disease outbreaks have been reported, although Bombali virus was isolated from fruit bats cohabitating in close contact with humans, and anti-Ebolavirus antibodies that may indicate contact with Bombali virus have been detected in humans.

Availability and implementation

Data files are available from https://github.com/wasslab/EbolavirusSDPsBioinformatics2019.

Supplementary information

Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.

Herd Immunity to Ebolaviruses Is Not a Realistic Target for Current Vaccination Strategies

The recent West African Ebola virus pandemic, which affected >28,000 individuals increased interest in anti-Ebolavirus vaccination programs. Here, we systematically analyzed the requirements for a prophylactic vaccination program based on the basic reproductive number (R₀, i.e., the number of secondary cases that result from an individual infection). Published R₀ values were determined by systematic literature research and ranged from 0.37 to 20. R₀s ≥ 4 realistically reflected the critical early outbreak phases and superspreading events. Based on the R₀, the herd immunity threshold (I_c) was calculated using the equation I_c = 1 - (1/R₀). The critical vaccination coverage (V_c) needed to provide herd immunity was determined by including the vaccine effectiveness (E) using the equation V_c = I_c/E. At an R₀ of 4, the I_c is 75% and at an E of 90%, more than 80% of a population need to be vaccinated to establish herd immunity. Such vaccination rates are currently unrealistic because of resistance against vaccinations, financial/logistical challenges, and a lack of vaccines that provide long-term protection against all human-pathogenic Ebolaviruses. Hence, outbreak management will for the foreseeable future depend on surveillance and case isolation. Clinical vaccine candidates are only available for Ebola viruses. Their use will need to be focused on health-care workers, potentially in combination with ring vaccination approaches.