Supplementary Eye Field Encodes Confidence in Decisions Under Risk

Population Representation of the Confidence in a Decision in the Lateral Intraparietal Area of the Macaque

Confidence in a decision is the belief, prior to feedback, that one's choice is correct. In the brain, many decisions are implemented as a race between competing evidence-accumulation processes. We ask whether the neurons that represent evidence accumulation also carry information about whether the choice is correct (i.e., confidence). Monkeys performed a reaction time version of the random dot motion task. Neuropixels probes were used to record from neurons in the lateral intraparietal (LIP) area. LIP neurons with response fields that overlap the choice-target contralateral to the recording site (Tin neurons) represent the accumulation of evidence in favor of contralateral target selection. We demonstrate that shortly before a contralateral choice is reported, the population of Tin neurons contains information about the accuracy of the choice (i.e., whether the choice is correct or incorrect). This finding is unexpected because, on average, Tin neurons exhibit a level of activity before the report that is independent of reaction time and evidence strength-both strong predictors of accuracy. This apparent contradiction is resolved by examining the variability in neuronal responses across the population of Tin neurons. While on average, Tin neurons exhibit a stereotyped level of activity before a contralateral choice, many neurons depart from this average in a consistent manner. From these neurons, the accuracy of the choice can be predicted using a simple logistic decoder. The accuracy of the choice predicted from neural activity reproduces the hallmarks of confidence identified in human behavioral experiments. Therefore, neurons that represent evidence accumulation can also inform the monkey's confidence.

Neural Representations of Post-Decision Accuracy and Reward Expectation in the Caudate Nucleus and Frontal Eye Field

Performance monitoring that supports ongoing behavioral adjustments is often examined in the context of either choice confidence for perceptual decisions (i.e., "did I get it right?") or reward expectation for reward-based decisions (i.e., "what reward will I receive?"). However, our understanding of how the brain encodes these distinct evaluative signals remains limited because they are easily conflated, particularly in commonly used two-alternative tasks with symmetric rewards for correct choices. Previously we used a motion-discrimination task with asymmetric rewards to identify neural substrates of forming reward-biased perceptual decisions in the caudate nucleus (part of the striatum in the basal ganglia) and the frontal eye field (FEF, in prefrontal cortex). Here we leveraged this task design to partially decouple estimates of accuracy and reward expectation and examine their impacts on subsequent decisions and their representations in those two brain areas. We identified distinguishable representations of these two evaluative signals in individual caudate and FEF neurons, with regional differences in their distribution patterns and time courses. We observed that well-trained monkeys (both sexes) used both evaluative signals, infrequently but consistently, to adjust their subsequent decisions. We found further that these behavioral adjustments had reliable relationships with the neural representations of both evaluative signals in caudate, but not FEF. These results suggest that the cortico-striatal decision network may use diverse evaluative signals to monitor and adjust decision-making behaviors, adding to our understanding of the different roles that the FEF and caudate nucleus play in a diversity of decision-related computations.

Studying the neural representations of uncertainty

The study of the brain's representations of uncertainty is a central topic in neuroscience. Unlike most quantities of which the neural representation is studied, uncertainty is a property of an observer's beliefs about the world, which poses specific methodological challenges. We analyze how the literature on the neural representations of uncertainty addresses those challenges and distinguish between 'code-driven' and 'correlational' approaches. Code-driven approaches make assumptions about the neural code for representing world states and the associated uncertainty. By contrast, correlational approaches search for relationships between uncertainty and neural activity without constraints on the neural representation of the world state that this uncertainty accompanies. To compare these two approaches, we apply several criteria for neural representations: sensitivity, specificity, invariance and functionality. Our analysis reveals that the two approaches lead to different but complementary findings, shaping new research questions and guiding future experiments.

Altered Effective Connectivity within an Oculomotor Control Network in Unaffected Relatives of Individuals with Schizophrenia

The ability to rapidly stop or change a planned action is a critical cognitive process that is impaired in schizophrenia. The current study aimed to examine whether this impairment reflects familial vulnerability to schizophrenia across two experiments comparing unaffected first-degree relatives to healthy controls. First, we examined performance on a saccadic stop-signal task that required rapid inhibition of an eye movement. Then, in a different sample, we investigated behavioral and neural responses (using fMRI) during a stop-signal task variant that required rapid modification of a prepared eye movement. Here, we examined differences between relatives and healthy controls in terms of activation and effective connectivity within an oculomotor control network during task performance. Like individuals with schizophrenia, the unaffected relatives showed behavioral evidence for more inefficient inhibitory processes. Unlike previous findings in individuals with schizophrenia, however, the relatives showed evidence for a compensatory waiting strategy. Behavioral differences were accompanied by more activation among the relatives in task-relevant regions across conditions and group differences in effective connectivity across the task that were modulated differently by the instruction to exert control over a planned saccade. Effective connectivity parameters were related to behavioral measures of inhibition efficiency. The results suggest that individuals at familial risk for schizophrenia were engaging an oculomotor control network differently than controls and in a way that compromises inhibition efficiency.

Neural correlates of visual attention during risky decision evidence integration

Value-based decision-making is presumed to involve a dynamic integration process that supports assessing the potential outcomes of different choice options. Decision frameworks assume the value of a decision rests on both the desirability and risk surrounding an outcome. Previous work has highlighted neural representations of risk in the human brain, and their relation to decision choice. Key neural regions including the insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have been implicated in encoding the effects of risk on decision outcomes, including approach and avoidance. Yet, it remains unknown whether these regions are involved in the dynamic integration processes that precede and drive choice, and their relationship with ongoing attention. Here, we used concurrent fMRI and eye-tracking to discern neural activation related to visual attention preceding choice between sure-thing (i.e. safe) and risky gamble options. We found activation in both dorsal ACC (dACC) and posterior insula (PI) scaled in opposite directions with the difference in attention to risky rewards relative to risky losses. PI activation also differentiated foveations on both risky options (rewards and losses) relative to a sure-thing option. These findings point to ACC involvement in ongoing evaluation of risky but higher value options. The role of PI in risky outcomes points to a more general evaluative role in the decision-making that compares both safe and risky outcomes, irrespective of potential for gains or losses.

Overlapping and unique neural circuits are activated during perceptual decision making and confidence

The period of making a perceptual decision is often followed by a period of rating confidence where one evaluates the likely accuracy of the initial decision. However, it remains unclear whether the same or different neural circuits are engaged during periods of perceptual decision making and confidence report. To address this question, we conducted two functional MRI experiments in which we dissociated the periods related to perceptual decision making and confidence report by either separating their respective regressors or asking for confidence ratings only in the second half of the experiment. We found that perceptual decision making and confidence reports gave rise to activations in large and mostly overlapping brain circuits including frontal, parietal, posterior, and cingulate regions with the results being remarkably consistent across the two experiments. Further, the confidence report period activated a number of unique regions, whereas only early sensory areas were activated for the decision period across the two experiments. We discuss the possible reasons for this overlap and explore their implications about theories of perceptual decision making and visual metacognition.

Segregated Co-activation Patterns in the Emergence of Decision Confidence During Visual Perception

Visual metacognition-the introspection and evaluation of one's own visual perceptual processes-is measured through both decision confidence and "metacognitive efficiency." Metacognitive efficiency refers to an individual's ability to accurately judge incorrect and correct decisions through confidence ratings given their task performance. Previous imaging studies in humans and nonhuman primates reported widely distributed brain regions being involved in decision confidence and metacognition. However, the neural correlates of metacognition are remarkably inconsistent across studies concerning spatial outline. Therefore, this study investigates the neural correlates of visual metacognition by examining co-activation across regions that scale with visual decision confidence. We hypothesized that interacting processes of perceptual and metacognitive performance contribute to the arising decision confidence in distributed, but segregable co-activating brain regions. To test this hypothesis, we performed task-fMRI in healthy humans during a visual backward masking task with four-scale, post-decision confidence ratings. We measured blood oxygenation covariation patterns, which served as a physiological proxy for co-activation across brain regions. Decision confidence ratings and an individual's metacognitive efficiency served as behavioral measures for metacognition. We found three distinct co-activation clusters involved in decision confidence: the first included right-centered fronto-temporal-parietal regions, the second included left temporal and parietal regions, and the left basal forebrain (BF), and the third included cerebellar regions. The right fronto-temporal-parietal cluster including the supplementary eye field and the right basal forebrain showed stronger co-activation in subjects with higher metacognitive efficiency. Our results provide novel evidence for co-activation of widely distributed fronto-parieto-temporal regions involved in visual confidence. The supplementary eye field was the only region that activated for both decision confidence and metacognitive efficiency, suggesting the supplementary eye field plays a key role in visual metacognition. Our results link findings in electrophysiology studies and human fMRI studies and provide evidence that confidence estimates arise from the integration of multiple information processing pathways.

Inactivation of Medial Frontal Cortex Changes Risk Preference

Humans and other animals need to make decisions under varying degrees of uncertainty. These decisions are strongly influenced by an individual's risk preference; however, the neuronal circuitry by which risk preference shapes choice is still unclear [1]. Supplementary eye field (SEF), an oculomotor area within primate medial frontal cortex, is thought to be an essential part of the neuronal circuit underlying oculomotor decision making, including decisions under risk [2-5]. Consistent with this view, risk-related action value and monitoring signals have been observed in SEF [6-8]. However, such activity has also been observed in other frontal areas, including orbitofrontal [9-11], cingulate [12-14], and dorsal-lateral frontal cortex [15]. It is thus unknown whether the activity in SEF causally contributes to risky decisions, or whether it is merely a reflection of neural processes in other cortical regions. Here, we tested a causal role of SEF in risky oculomotor choices. We found that SEF inactivation strongly reduced the frequency of risky choices. This reduction was largely due to a reduced attraction to reward uncertainty and high reward gain, but not due to changes in the subjective estimation of reward probability or average expected reward. Moreover, SEF inactivation also led to increased sensitivity to differences between expected and actual reward during free choice. Nevertheless, it did not affect adjustments of decisions based on reward history.

Focal optogenetic suppression in macaque area MT biases direction discrimination and decision confidence, but only transiently

Insights from causal manipulations of brain activity depend on targeting the spatial and temporal scales most relevant for behavior. Using a sensitive perceptual decision task in monkeys, we examined the effects of rapid, reversible inactivation on a spatial scale previously achieved only with electrical microstimulation. Inactivating groups of similarly tuned neurons in area MT produced systematic effects on choice and confidence. Behavioral effects were attenuated over the course of each session, suggesting compensatory adjustments in the downstream readout of MT over tens of minutes. Compensation also occurred on a sub-second time scale: behavior was largely unaffected when the visual stimulus (and concurrent suppression) lasted longer than 350 ms. These trends were similar for choice and confidence, consistent with the idea of a common mechanism underlying both measures. The findings demonstrate the utility of hyperpolarizing opsins for linking neural population activity at fine spatial and temporal scales to cognitive functions in primates.

Neuronal Correlates of Serial Decision-Making in the Supplementary Eye Field

Human behavior is influenced by serial decision-making: past decisions affect choices that set the context for selecting future options. A primate brain region that may be involved in linking decisions across time is the supplementary eye field (SEF), which, in addition to its well known visual responses and saccade-related activity, also signals the rules that govern flexible decisions and the outcomes of those decisions. Our hypotheses were that SEF neurons encode events during serial decision-making and link the sequential decisions with sustained activity. We recorded from neurons in the SEF of two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta, one male, one female) that performed a serial decision-making task. The monkeys used saccades to select a rule that had to be applied later in the same trial to discriminate between visual stimuli. We found, first, that SEF neurons encoded the spatial parameters of saccades during rule selection but not during visual discrimination, suggesting a malleability to their movement-related tuning. Second, SEF activity linked the sequential decisions of rule selection and visual discrimination, but not continuously. Instead, rule-encoding activity appeared in a "just-in-time" manner before the visual discrimination. Third, SEF neurons encoded trial outcomes both prospectively, before decisions within a trial, and retrospectively, across multiple trials. The results thus identify neuronal correlates of rule selection and application in the SEF, including transient signals that link these sequential decisions. Its activity patterns suggest that the SEF participates in serial decision-making in a contextually dependent manner as part of a broader network.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Much research has gone into studying the neurobiological basis of single, isolated decisions. An important next step is to understand how the brain links multiple decisions to generate a coherent stream of thought and behavior. We studied neural activity related to serial decision-making in an area of frontal cortex known as the supplementary eye field (SEF). Neural recordings were conducted in monkeys that performed a serial decision-making task in which they selected and applied rules. We found that SEF neurons convey signals for serial decision-making, including transient encoding of one decision at the time it is needed for the next one and longer-term representations of trial outcomes, suggesting that the region plays a role in continuity of cognition and behavior.

Top-Down Control of Perceptual Decision Making by the Prefrontal Cortex

Although most work on perceptual decision making has focused on the processing within the visual, temporal, and parietal lobes, recent research points to an underappreciated but critical role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). PFC provides high-level control of perception, but it is unclear whether this control can be subdivided into different processes and whether different PFC regions have different roles. Here I review evidence that prefrontal top-down control is organized in the processes of selection control, decision control, and evaluation. These three processes overlap and interact with each other while at the same time maintaining a temporal hierarchy. Further, these different stages are supported by dissociable regions within the PFC that control hierarchically organized cognition. The current proposal for PFC’s role in perceptual control can serve as the basis for a deeper understanding of both the functional organization of PFC and the processes underlying perceptual decision making.

Cortical control and performance monitoring of interrupting and redirecting movements

Voluntary behaviour requires control mechanisms that ensure our ability to act independently of habitual and innate response tendencies. Electrophysiological experiments, using the stop-signal task in humans, monkeys and rats, have uncovered a core network of brain structures that is essential for response inhibition. This network is shared across mammals and seems to be conserved throughout their evolution. Recently, new research building on these earlier findings has started to investigate the interaction between response inhibition and other control mechanisms in the brain. Here we describe recent progress in three different areas: selectivity of movement inhibition across different motor systems, re-orientation of motor actions and action evaluation.This article is part of the themed issue 'Movement suppression: brain mechanisms for stopping and stillness'.

Causal evidence for frontal cortex organization for perceptual decision making

Although recent research has shown that the frontal cortex has a critical role in perceptual decision making, an overarching theory of frontal functional organization for perception has yet to emerge. Perceptual decision making is temporally organized such that it requires the processes of selection, criterion setting, and evaluation. We hypothesized that exploring this temporal structure would reveal a large-scale frontal organization for perception. A causal intervention with transcranial magnetic stimulation revealed clear specialization along the rostrocaudal axis such that the control of successive stages of perceptual decision making was selectively affected by perturbation of successively rostral areas. Simulations with a dynamic model of decision making suggested distinct computational contributions of each region. Finally, the emergent frontal gradient was further corroborated by functional MRI. These causal results provide an organizational principle for the role of frontal cortex in the control of perceptual decision making and suggest specific mechanistic contributions for its different subregions.