Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes

The vividness of imagery varies between individuals. However, the existence of people in whom conscious, wakeful imagery is markedly reduced, or absent entirely, was neglected by psychology until the recent coinage of 'aphantasia' to describe this phenomenon. 'Hyperphantasia' denotes the converse - imagery whose vividness rivals perceptual experience. Around 1% and 3% of the population experience extreme aphantasia and hyperphantasia, respectively. Aphantasia runs in families, often affects imagery across several sense modalities, and is variably associated with reduced autobiographical memory, face recognition difficulty, and autism. Visual dreaming is often preserved. Subtypes of extreme imagery appear to be likely but are not yet well defined. Initial results suggest that alterations in connectivity between the frontoparietal and visual networks may provide the neural substrate for visual imagery extremes.

Differences in the neural correlates of schizophrenia with positive and negative formal thought disorder in patients with schizophrenia in the ENIGMA dataset

Formal thought disorder (FTD) is a clinical key factor in schizophrenia, but the neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. In particular, the relationship between FTD symptom dimensions and patterns of regional brain volume loss in schizophrenia remains to be established in large cohorts. Even less is known about the cellular basis of FTD. Our study addresses these major obstacles by enrolling a large multi-site cohort acquired by the ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group (752 schizophrenia patients and 1256 controls), to unravel the neuroanatomy of FTD in schizophrenia and using virtual histology tools on implicated brain regions to investigate the cellular basis. Based on the findings of previous clinical and neuroimaging studies, we decided to separately explore positive, negative and total formal thought disorder. We used virtual histology tools to relate brain structural changes associated with FTD to cellular distributions in cortical regions. We identified distinct neural networks positive and negative FTD. Both networks encompassed fronto-occipito-amygdalar brain regions, but positive and negative FTD demonstrated a dissociation: negative FTD showed a relative sparing of orbitofrontal cortical thickness, while positive FTD also affected lateral temporal cortices. Virtual histology identified distinct transcriptomic fingerprints associated for both symptom dimensions. Negative FTD was linked to neuronal and astrocyte fingerprints, while positive FTD also showed associations with microglial cell types. These results provide an important step towards linking FTD to brain structural changes and their cellular underpinnings, providing an avenue for a better mechanistic understanding of this syndrome.

Revisiting the blind mind: Still no evidence for sensory visual imagery in individuals with aphantasia

The inability to visualise was given the name aphantasia in 2015 by Zeman and colleagues. In 2018 we published research showing that fifteen individuals who self-identified as having aphantasia also demonstrated a lack of sensory visual imagery when undergoing the binocular rivalry imagery paradigm, suggesting more than just a metacognitive difference. Here we update these findings with over fifty participants with aphantasia and show that there is evidence for a lack of sensory imagery in aphantasia. How the binocular rivalry paradigm scores relate to the vividness of visual imagery questionnaire (VVIQ) and how aphantasia can be confirmed is discussed.

Multisensory subtypes of aphantasia: Mental imagery as supramodal perception in reverse

Cognitive neuroscience research on mental imagery has largely focused on the visual imagery modality in unimodal task contexts. Recent studies have uncovered striking individual differences in visual imagery capacity, with some individuals reporting a subjective absence of conscious visual imagery ability altogether ("aphantasia"). However, naturalistic mental imagery is often multi-sensory, and preliminary findings suggest that many individuals with aphantasia also report a subjective lack of mental imagery in other sensory domains (such as auditory or olfactory imagery). In this paper, we perform a series of cluster analyses on the multi-sensory imagery questionnaire scores of two large groups of aphantasic subjects, defining latent sub-groups in this sample population. We demonstrate that aphantasia is a heterogenous phenomenon characterised by dominant sub-groups of individuals with visual aphantasia (those who report selective visual imagery absence) and multi-sensory aphantasia (those who report an inability to generate conscious mental imagery in any sensory modality). We replicate our findings in a second large sample and show that more unique aphantasia sub-types also exist, such as individuals with selectively preserved mental imagery in only one sensory modality (e.g. intact auditory imagery). We outline the implications of our findings for network theories of mental imagery, discussing how unique aphantasia aetiologies with distinct self-report patterns might reveal alterations to various levels of the sensory processing hierarchy implicated in mental imagery.

Working memory signals in early visual cortex are present in weak and strong imagers

It has been suggested that visual images are memorized across brief periods of time by vividly imagining them as if they were still there. In line with this, the contents of both working memory and visual imagery are known to be encoded already in early visual cortex. If these signals in early visual areas were indeed to reflect a combined imagery and memory code, one would predict them to be weaker for individuals with reduced visual imagery vividness. Here, we systematically investigated this question in two groups of participants. Strong and weak imagers were asked to remember images across brief delay periods. We were able to reliably reconstruct the memorized stimuli from early visual cortex during the delay. Importantly, in contrast to the prediction, the quality of reconstruction was equally accurate for both strong and weak imagers. The decodable information also closely reflected behavioral precision in both groups, suggesting it could contribute to behavioral performance, even in the extreme case of completely aphantasic individuals. Our data thus suggest that working memory signals in early visual cortex can be present even in the (near) absence of phenomenal imagery.

Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences

Visual illusions and mental imagery are non-physical sensory experiences that involve cortical feedback processing in the primary visual cortex. Using laminar functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in two studies, we investigate if information about these internal experiences is visible in the activation patterns of different layers of primary visual cortex (V1). We find that imagery content is decodable mainly from deep layers of V1, whereas seemingly 'real' illusory content is decodable mainly from superficial layers. Furthermore, illusory content shares information with perceptual content, whilst imagery content does not generalise to illusory or perceptual information. Together, our results suggest that illusions and imagery, which differ immensely in their subjective experiences, also involve partially distinct early visual microcircuits. However, overlapping microcircuit recruitment might emerge based on the nuanced nature of subjective conscious experience.

Predicting the subjective intensity of imagined experiences from electrophysiological measures of oscillatory brain activity

Most people can conjure images and sounds that they experience in their minds. There are, however, marked individual differences. Some people report that they cannot generate imagined sensory experiences at all (aphantasics) and others report that they have unusually intense imagined experiences (hyper-phantasics). These individual differences have been linked to activity in sensory brain regions, driven by feedback. We would therefore expect imagined experiences to be associated with specific frequencies of oscillatory brain activity, as these can be a hallmark of neural interactions within and across regions of the brain. Replicating a number of other studies, relative to a Resting-State we find that the act of engaging in auditory or in visual imagery is linked to reductions in the power of oscillatory brain activity across a broad range of frequencies, with prominent peaks in the alpha band (8-12 Hz). This oscillatory activity, however, did not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. For audio imagery, these were rather predicted by reductions within the theta (6-9 Hz) and gamma (33-38 Hz) bands, and by increases in beta (15-17 Hz) band activity. For visual imagery these were predicted by reductions in lower (14-16 Hz) and upper (29-32 Hz) beta band activity, and by an increase in mid-beta band (24-26 Hz) activity. Our data suggest that there is sufficient ground truth in the subjective reports people use to describe the intensity of their imagined sensory experiences to allow these to be linked to the power of distinct rhythms of brain activity. In future, we hope to combine this approach with better measures of the subjective intensity of imagined sensory experiences to provide a clearer picture of individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences, and of why these eventuate.

Noun imageability and the processing of sensory-based information

The aim of this study was to test whether the availability of internal imagery elicited by words is related to ratings of word imageability. Participants are presented with target words and, after a delay allowing for processing of the word, answer questions regarding the size or weight of the word referents. Target words differ with respect to imageability. Results show faster responses to questions for high imageability words than for low imageability words. The type of question (size/weight) modulates reaction times suggesting a dominance of the visual domain over the physical-experience domain in concept representation. Results hold across two different languages (Czech/German). These findings provide further insights into the representations underlying word meaning and the role of word imageability in language acquisition and processing.

Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative Formal Thought Disorder in Individuals with Schizophrenia: An ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group Study

Formal thought disorder (FTD) is a key clinical factor in schizophrenia, but the neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. In particular, relationship between FTD symptom dimensions and patterns of regional brain volume deficiencies in schizophrenia remain to be established in large cohorts. Even less is known about the cellular basis of FTD. Our study addresses these major obstacles based on a large multi-site cohort through the ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group (752 individuals with schizophrenia and 1256 controls), to unravel the neuroanatomy of positive, negative and total FTD in schizophrenia and their cellular bases. We used virtual histology tools to relate brain structural changes associated with FTD to cellular distributions in cortical regions. We identified distinct neural networks for positive and negative FTD. Both networks encompassed fronto-occipito-amygdalar brain regions, but negative FTD showed a relative sparing of orbitofrontal cortical thickness, while positive FTD also affected lateral temporal cortices. Virtual histology identified distinct transcriptomic fingerprints associated for both symptom dimensions. Negative FTD was linked to neuronal and astrocyte fingerprints, while positive FTD was also linked to microglial cell types. These findings relate different dimensions of FTD to distinct brain structural changes and their cellular underpinnings, improve our mechanistic understanding of these key psychotic symptoms.

Construction of Meta-Thinking Educational Program Based on Mental-Brain Simulation (MTMBS) and Evaluating its Effectiveness on Executive Functions, Emotion Regulation, and Impulsivity in Children With ADHD: A Resting-State Functional MRI Study

OBJECTIVE

The aim of present research was to make a Meta-Thinking educational program based on mental-brain simulation and to evaluate its effectiveness on executive functions, emotion regulation and impulsivity in children with ADHD.

METHODS

The research method was Embedded Design: Embedded Experimental Model. The research sample included 32 children with ADHD who were randomly assigned to two experimental and control groups. The intervention was implemented for eight sessions of 1.5 hr for the experimental group, and fMRI images were taken from them, while the control group didn't receive any treatment. Finally, using semi-structured interviews, coherent information was collected from the parents of the experimental group about the changes made. Data were analyzed with SPSS-24, MAXQDA, fMRIprep, and FSL software.

RESULTS

The Meta-Thinking Educational Program had effect on performance of ADHD children and suppressed brain regions related to DMN.

CONCLUSION

The Implementation of this educational program plays a vital role in improving psychological problems of children with ADHD.

Measuring imagery strength in schizophrenia: no evidence of enhanced mental imagery priming

INTRODUCTION

Recent research shows ambivalent results regarding the relationship between mental imagery and schizophrenia. The role of voluntary visual imagery in schizophrenic hallucinations remains unclear. The aim of the study was to investigate the association between visual imagery, schizophrenia, and the occurrence of schizophrenic hallucinations using an objective visual imagery task.

METHODS

The sample consisted of 16 participants with schizophrenia (59.1% female; MAge  = 45.55) and 44 participants without schizophrenia (62.5% female; MAge  = 43.94). Visual imagery was measured using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) as well as the well-validated Binocular Rivalry Task (BRT). Occurrences of hallucinations were assessed using the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale.

RESULTS

Participants with schizophrenia showed more hallucinatory experiences but did not score higher on either the VVIQ or the BRT than participants without schizophrenia. A correlation between the VVIQ and the BRT was found, validating the measurement of visual imagery and enabling the interpretation that visual imagery vividness is not enhanced in people with schizophrenia.

CONCLUSION

The association between mental imagery vividness and schizophrenia found in previous studies may be based on other facets of mental imagery than visual imagery.

Vividness as the similarity between generated imagery and an internal model

Vividness in visual mental imagery has been relatively under-explored compared to imagery's representational format and neural mechanisms. In this paper, we take a deeper look at vividness and suggest that in re-framing it, we can potentially reconcile disparate findings regarding visual cortex activation during imagery. Unlike traditional views of vividness that define the concept in terms of perception, we frame vividness in terms of imagery's relation to an internal model; the closer the generated imagery is to this model, the more vivid it is. This view is considered alongside existing neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical research, as well as directions for future research.

Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative Formal Thought Disorder in Individuals with Schizophrenia: An ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group Study

Formal thought disorder (FTD) is a key clinical factor in schizophrenia, but the neurobiological underpinnings remain unclear. In particular, relationship between FTD symptom dimensions and patterns of regional brain volume deficiencies in schizophrenia remain to be established in large cohorts. Even less is known about the cellular basis of FTD. Our study addresses these major obstacles based on a large multi-site cohort through the ENIGMA Schizophrenia Working Group (752 individuals with schizophrenia and 1256 controls), to unravel the neuroanatomy of positive, negative and total FTD in schizophrenia and their cellular bases. We used virtual histology tools to relate brain structural changes associated with FTD to cellular distributions in cortical regions. We identified distinct neural networks for positive and negative FTD. Both networks encompassed fronto-occipito-amygdalar brain regions, but negative FTD showed a relative sparing of orbitofrontal cortical thickness, while positive FTD also affected lateral temporal cortices. Virtual histology identified distinct transcriptomic fingerprints associated for both symptom dimensions. Negative FTD was linked to neuronal and astrocyte fingerprints, while positive FTD was also linked to microglial cell types. These findings relate different dimensions of FTD to distinct brain structural changes and their cellular underpinnings, improve our mechanistic understanding of these key psychotic symptoms.

What do you have in mind? ERP markers of visual and auditory imagery

This study aimed to investigate the psychophysiological markers of imagery processes through EEG/ERP recordings. Visual and auditory stimuli representing 10 different semantic categories were shown to 30 healthy participants. After a given interval and prompted by a light signal, participants were asked to activate a mental image corresponding to the semantic category for recording synchronized electrical potentials. Unprecedented electrophysiological markers of imagination were recorded in the absence of sensory stimulation. The following peaks were identified at specific scalp sites and latencies, during imagination of infants (centroparietal positivity, CPP, and late CPP), human faces (anterior negativity, AN), animals (anterior positivity, AP), music (P300-like), speech (N400-like), affective vocalizations (P2-like) and sensory (visual vs auditory) modality (PN300). Overall, perception and imagery conditions shared some common electro/cortical markers, but during imagery the category-dependent modulation of ERPs was long latency and more anterior, with respect to the perceptual condition. These ERP markers might be precious tools for BCI systems (pattern recognition, classification, or A.I. algorithms) applied to patients affected by consciousness disorders (e.g., in a vegetative or comatose state) or locked-in-patients (e.g., spinal or SLA patients).

Remembrance of things perceived: Adding thalamocortical function to artificial neural networks

Recent research has illuminated the complexity and importance of the thalamocortical system but it has been difficult to identify what computational functions it performs. Meanwhile, deep-learning artificial neural networks (ANNs) based on bio-inspired models of purely cortical circuits have achieved surprising success solving sophisticated cognitive problems associated historically with human intelligence. Nevertheless, the limitations and shortcomings of artificial intelligence (AI) based on such ANNs are becoming increasingly clear. This review considers how the addition of thalamocortical connectivity and its putative functions related to cortical attention might address some of those shortcomings. Such bio-inspired models are now providing both testable theories of biological cognition and improved AI technology, much of which is happening outside the usual academic venues.

A generative adversarial model of intrusive imagery in the human brain

The mechanisms underlying the subjective experiences of mental disorders remain poorly understood. This is partly due to long-standing over-emphasis on behavioral and physiological symptoms and a de-emphasis of the patient's subjective experiences when searching for treatments. Here, we provide a new perspective on the subjective experience of mental disorders based on findings in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Specifically, we propose the subjective experience that occurs in visual imagination depends on mechanisms similar to generative adversarial networks that have recently been developed in AI. The basic idea is that a generator network fabricates a prediction of the world, and a discriminator network determines whether it is likely real or not. Given that similar adversarial interactions occur in the two major visual pathways of perception in people, we explored whether we could leverage this AI-inspired approach to better understand the intrusive imagery experiences of patients suffering from mental illnesses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and acute stress disorder. In our model, a nonconscious visual pathway generates predictions of the environment that influence the parallel but interacting conscious pathway. We propose that in some patients, an imbalance in these adversarial interactions leads to an overrepresentation of disturbing content relative to current reality, and results in debilitating flashbacks. By situating the subjective experience of intrusive visual imagery in the adversarial interaction of these visual pathways, we propose testable hypotheses on novel mechanisms and clinical applications for controlling and possibly preventing symptoms resulting from intrusive imagery.

The multisensory nature of human action imagery

Imagination can appeal to all our senses and may, therefore, manifest in very different qualities (e.g., visual, tactile, proprioceptive, or kinesthetic). One line of research addresses action imagery that refers to a process by which people imagine the execution of an action without actual body movements. In action imagery, visual and kinesthetic aspects of the imagined action are particularly important. However, other sensory modalities may also play a role. The purpose of the paper will be to address issues that include: (i) the creation of an action image, (ii) how the brain generates images of movements and actions, (iii) the richness and vividness of action images. We will further address possible causes that determine the sensory impression of an action image, like task specificity, instruction and experience. In the end, we will outline open questions and future directions.

Experimental evidence for involvement of monocular channels in mental rotation

According to the prevailing view, cognitive processes of mental rotation are carried out by visuospatial perceptual circuits located primarily in high cortical areas. Here, we examined the functional involvement of (mostly subcortical) monocular channels in mental rotation tasks. Images of two rotated objects (0°, 50°, 100°, or 150°; identical or mirrored) were presented either to one eye (monocular) or segregated between the eyes (interocular). The results indicated a causal role for low monocular visual channels in mental rotation: Response times for identical ("same") objects at high angular disparities (100°, 150°) were shorter when both objects were presented to a single eye than when each object was presented to a different eye. We suggest that mental rotation processes rely on cortico-subcortical loops that support visuospatial perception. More generally, the findings highlight the potential contribution of lower-level mechanisms to what are typically considered to be high-level cognitive functions, such as mental representation.

Fear in the Theater of the Mind: Differential Fear Conditioning With Imagined Stimuli

Many symptoms of anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder are elicited by fearful mental imagery. Yet little is known about how visual imagery of conditioned stimuli (CSs) affects the acquisition of differential fear conditioning. Across three experiments with younger human adults (Experiment 1: n = 33, Experiment 2: n = 27, Experiment 3: n = 26), we observed that participants acquired differential fear conditioning to both viewed and imagined percepts serving as the CSs, as measured via self-reported fear and skin conductance responses. Additionally, this differential conditioning generalized across CS-percept modalities such that differential conditioning acquired in response to visual percepts generalized to the corresponding imagined percepts and vice versa. This is novel evidence that perceived and imagined stimuli engage learning processes in very similar ways and is consistent with the theory that mental imagery is depictive and recruits neural resources shared with visual perception. Our findings also provide new insight into the mechanisms of anxiety and related disorders.

Linking individual differences in human primary visual cortex to contrast sensitivity around the visual field

A central question in neuroscience is how the organization of cortical maps relates to perception, for which human primary visual cortex (V1) is an ideal model system. V1 nonuniformly samples the retinal image, with greater cortical magnification (surface area per degree of visual field) at the fovea than periphery and at the horizontal than vertical meridian. Moreover, the size and cortical magnification of V1 varies greatly across individuals. Here, we used fMRI and psychophysics in the same observers to quantify individual differences in V1 cortical magnification and contrast sensitivity at the four polar angle meridians. Across observers, the overall size of V1 and localized cortical magnification positively correlated with contrast sensitivity. Moreover, greater cortical magnification and higher contrast sensitivity at the horizontal than the vertical meridian were strongly correlated. These data reveal a link between cortical anatomy and visual perception at the level of individual observer and stimulus location.

The pupillary light response as a physiological index of aphantasia, sensory and phenomenological imagery strength

The pupillary light response is an important automatic physiological response which optimizes light reaching the retina. Recent work has shown that the pupil also adjusts in response to illusory brightness and a range of cognitive functions, however, it remains unclear what exactly drives these endogenous changes. Here, we show that the imagery pupillary light response correlates with objective measures of sensory imagery strength. Further, the trial-by-trial phenomenological vividness of visual imagery is tracked by the imagery pupillary light response. We also demonstrated that a group of individuals without visual imagery (aphantasia) do not show any significant evidence of an imagery pupillary light response, however they do show perceptual pupil light responses and pupil dilation with larger cognitive load. Our results provide evidence that the pupillary light response indexes the sensory strength of visual imagery. This work also provides the first physiological validation of aphantasia.

Imagery adds stimulus-specific sensory evidence to perceptual detection

Internally generated imagery and externally triggered perception rely on overlapping sensory processes. This overlap poses a challenge for perceptual reality monitoring: determining whether sensory signals reflect reality or imagination. In this study, we used psychophysics to investigate how imagery and perception interact to determine visual experience. Participants were instructed to detect oriented gratings that gradually appeared in noise while simultaneously either imagining the same grating, a grating perpendicular to the to-be-detected grating, or nothing. We found that, compared to both incongruent imagery and no imagery, congruent imagery caused a leftward shift of the psychometric function relating stimulus contrast to perceptual threshold. We discuss how this effect can best be explained by a model in which imagery adds sensory signal to the perceptual input, thereby increasing the visibility of perceived stimuli. These results suggest that, in contrast to changes in sensory signals caused by self-generated movement, the brain does not discount the influence of self-generated sensory signals on perception.

Vividness of visual imagery questionnaire scores and their relationship to visual short-term memory performance

Mechanisms underlying visual imagery, the ability to create vivid mental representations of a scene in the absence of sensory input, remain to be fully understood. Some previous studies have proposed that visual imagery might be related to visual short-term memory (STM), with a common mechanism involving retention of visual information over short periods of time. Other observations have shown a strong relationship between visual imagery and functional activity in the hippocampus and primary visual cortex, both regions also associated with visual STM. Here we examined the relationship of visual imagery to STM and hippocampal and primary visual cortex volumes, first in a large sample of healthy people across a large age range (N = 229 behavioural data; N = 56 MRI data in older participants) and then in patients with Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease (N = 19 in each group compared to 19 age-matched healthy controls). We used a variant of the "What was where?" visual object-location binding task to assess the quality of remembered information over short delays. In healthy people, no evidence of a relationship between the vividness of visual imagery and any visual STM performance parameter was found. However, there was a significant positive correlation between visual imagery and the volumes of the hippocampus and primary visual cortex. Although visual STM performance was significantly impaired in patients with Alzheimer's disease, their vividness of visual imagery scores were comparable to those of age-matched elderly controls and patients with Parkinson's disease. Despite hippocampal volumes also being reduced in Alzheimer's patients, there appeared to be no impact on their self-reported visual imagery. In conclusion, visual imagery was not significantly related to visual STM performance, either in healthy controls or Alzheimer's or Parkinson's disease but it was related to hippocampal and visual cortex volume in healthy people.

Imagining one experience to be another

I can imagine a banana to be a phone receiver. I can also imagine the flapping of my arms to be flying. So it is possible to imagine one thing to be another-at least for some types of 'things'. I will argue that although it is possible to imagine an object to be another object and it is also possible to imagine an activity to be a different activity, one cannot imagine one's present sensory experience to be a different sensory experience with different qualitative character. This claim will have some important consequences beyond the philosophy of imagination, for example, for some accounts of depiction.

Neurofunctional Symmetries and Asymmetries during Voluntary out-of- and within-Body Vivid Imagery Concurrent with Orienting Attention and Visuospatial Detection

We explored whether two visual mental imagery experiences may be differentiated by electroencephalographic (EEG) and performance interactions with concurrent orienting external attention (OEA) to stimulus location and subsequent visuospatial detection. We measured within-subject (N = 10) event-related potential (ERP) changes during out-of-body imagery (OBI)—vivid imagery of a vertical line outside of the head/body—and within-body imagery (WBI)—vivid imagery of the line within one’s own head. Furthermore, we measured ERP changes and line offset Vernier acuity (hyperacuity) performance concurrent with those imagery, compared to baseline detection without imagery. Relative to OEA baseline, OBI yielded larger N200 and P300, whereas WBI yielded larger P50, P100, N400, and P800. Additionally, hyperacuity dropped significantly when concurrent with both imagery types. Partial least squares analysis combined behavioural performance, ERPs, and/or event-related EEG band power (ERBP). For both imagery types, hyperacuity reduction correlated with opposite frontal and occipital ERP amplitude and polarity changes. Furthermore, ERP modulation and ERBP synchronizations for all EEG frequencies correlated inversely with hyperacuity. Dipole Source Localization Analysis revealed unique generators in the left middle temporal gyrus (WBI) and in the right frontal middle gyrus (OBI), whereas the common generators were in the left precuneus and middle occipital cortex (cuneus). Imagery experiences, we conclude, can be identified by symmetric and asymmetric combined neurophysiological-behavioural patterns in interactions with the width of attentional focus.

Cross-modal auditory priors drive the perception of bistable visual stimuli with reliable differences between individuals

It is a widely held assumption that the brain performs perceptual inference by combining sensory information with prior expectations, weighted by their uncertainty. A distinction can be made between higher- and lower-level priors, which can be manipulated with associative learning and sensory priming, respectively. Here, we simultaneously investigate priming and the differential effect of auditory vs. visual associative cues on visual perception, and we also examine the reliability of individual differences. Healthy individuals (N = 29) performed a perceptual inference task twice with a one-week delay. They reported the perceived direction of motion of dot pairs, which were preceded by a probabilistic visuo-acoustic cue. In 30% of the trials, motion direction was ambiguous, and in half of these trials, the auditory versus the visual cue predicted opposing directions. Cue-stimulus contingency could change every 40 trials. On ambiguous trials where the visual and the auditory cue predicted conflicting directions of motion, participants made more decisions consistent with the prediction of the acoustic cue. Increased predictive processing under stimulus uncertainty was indicated by slower responses to ambiguous (vs. non-ambiguous) stimuli. Furthermore, priming effects were also observed in that perception of ambiguous stimuli was influenced by perceptual decisions on the previous ambiguous and unambiguous trials as well. Critically, behavioural effects had substantial inter-individual variability which showed high test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) > 0.78). Overall, higher-level priors based on auditory (vs. visual) information had greater influence on visual perception, and lower-level priors were also in action. Importantly, we observed large and stable differences in various aspects of task performance. Computational modelling combined with neuroimaging could allow testing hypotheses regarding the potential mechanisms causing these behavioral effects. The reliability of the behavioural differences implicates that such perceptual inference tasks could be valuable tools during large-scale biomarker and neuroimaging studies.

Anomalous visual experience is linked to perceptual uncertainty and visual imagery vividness

An imbalance between top-down and bottom-up processing on perception (specifically, over-reliance on top-down processing) can lead to anomalous perception, such as illusions. One factor that may be involved in anomalous perception is visual mental imagery, which is the experience of "seeing" with the mind's eye. There are vast individual differences in self-reported imagery vividness, and more vivid imagery is linked to a more sensory-like experience. We, therefore, hypothesized that susceptibility to anomalous perception is linked to individual imagery vividness. To investigate this, we adopted a paradigm that is known to elicit the perception of faces in pure visual noise (pareidolia). In four experiments, we explored how imagery vividness contributes to this experience under different response instructions and environments. We found strong evidence that people with more vivid imagery were more likely to see faces in the noise, although removing suggestive instructions weakened this relationship. Analyses from the first two experiments led us to explore confidence as another factor in pareidolia proneness. We, therefore, modulated environment noise and added a confidence rating in a novel design. We found strong evidence that pareidolia proneness is correlated with uncertainty about real percepts. Decreasing perceptual ambiguity abolished the relationship between pareidolia proneness and both imagery vividness and confidence. The results cannot be explained by incidental face-like patterns in the noise, individual variations in response bias, perceptual sensitivity, subjective perceptual thresholds, viewing distance, testing environments, motivation, gender, or prosopagnosia. This indicates a critical role of mental imagery vividness and perceptual uncertainty in anomalous perceptual experience.

Enhanced Sensitivity to Optimistic Cues is Manifested in Brain Structure: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study

Recent research shows that congruent outcomes are more rapidly (and incongruent less rapidly) detected when individuals receive optimistic rather than pessimistic cues, an effect that was termed optimism robustness. In the current voxel-based morphometry study, we examined whether optimism robustness has a counterpart in brain structure. The participants' task was to detect two different letters (symbolizing monetary gain or loss) in a visual search matrix. Prior to each onset of the search matrix, two different verbal cues informed our participants about a high probability to gain (optimistic expectancy) or lose (pessimistic expectancy) money. The target presented was either congruent or incongruent with these induced expectancies. Optimism robustness revealed in the participants' reaction times correlated positively with gray matter volume (GMV) in brain regions involved in selective attention (medial visual association area, intraparietal sulcus), emphasizing the strong intertwinement of optimistic expectancies and attention deployment. In addition, GMV in the primary visual cortex diminished with increasing optimism robustness, in line with the interpretation of optimism robustness arising from a global, context-oriented perception. Future studies should address the malleability of these structural correlates of optimism robustness. Our results may assist in the identification of treatment targets in depression.

Behavioral and Neural Signatures of Visual Imagery Vividness Extremes: Aphantasia versus Hyperphantasia

Although Galton recognized in the 1880s that some individuals lack visual imagery, this phenomenon was mostly neglected over the following century. We recently coined the terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" to describe visual imagery vividness extremes, unlocking a sustained surge of public interest. Aphantasia is associated with subjective impairment of face recognition and autobiographical memory. Here we report the first systematic, wide-ranging neuropsychological and brain imaging study of people with aphantasia (n = 24), hyperphantasia (n = 25), and midrange imagery vividness (n = 20). Despite equivalent performance on standard memory tests, marked group differences were measured in autobiographical memory and imagination, participants with hyperphantasia outperforming controls who outperformed participants with aphantasia. Face recognition difficulties and autistic spectrum traits were reported more commonly in aphantasia. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory highlighted reduced extraversion in the aphantasia group and increased openness in the hyperphantasia group. Resting state fMRI revealed stronger connectivity between prefrontal cortices and the visual network among hyperphantasic than aphantasic participants. In an active fMRI paradigm, there was greater anterior parietal activation among hyperphantasic and control than aphantasic participants when comparing visualization of famous faces and places with perception. These behavioral and neural signatures of visual imagery vividness extremes validate and illuminate this significant but neglected dimension of individual difference.

Harnessing Visual Imagery and Oculomotor Behaviour to Understand Prospection

Much of the rich internal world constructed by humans is derived from, and experienced through, visual mental imagery. Despite growing appreciation of visual exploration in guiding episodic memory processes, extant theories of prospection have yet to accommodate the precise role of visual mental imagery in the service of future-oriented thinking. We propose that the construction of future events relies on the assimilation of perceptual details originally experienced, and subsequently reinstantiated, predominantly in the visual domain. Individual differences in the capacity to summon discrete aspects of visual imagery can therefore account for the diversity of content generated by humans during future simulation. Our integrative framework provides a novel testbed to query alterations in future thinking in health and disease.

Reduced visual acuity is mirrored in low vision imagery

Research has examined the nature of visual imagery in normally sighted and blind subjects, but not in those with low vision. Findings with normally sighted subjects suggest that imagery involves primary visual areas of the brain. Since the plasticity of visual cortex appears to be limited in adulthood, we might expect imagery of those with adult-onset low vision to be relatively unaffected by these losses. But if visual imagery is based on recent and current experience, we would expect images of those with low vision to share some properties of impaired visual perception. We examined key parameters of mental images reported by normally sighted subjects, compared to those with early- and late-onset low vision, and with a group of subjects with restricted visual fields using an imagery questionnaire. We found evidence that those with reduced visual acuity report the imagery distances of objects to be closer than those with normal acuity and also depict objects in imagery with lower resolution than those with normal visual acuity. We also found that all low vision groups, like the normally sighted, image objects at a substantially greater distance than when asked to place them at a distance that 'just fits' their imagery field (overflow distance). All low vision groups, like the normally sighted, showed evidence of a limited visual field for imagery, but our group with restricted visual fields did not differ from the other groups in this respect. We conclude that imagery of those with low vision is similar to that of those with normal vision in being dependent on the size of objects or features being imaged, but that it also reflects their reduced visual acuity. We found no evidence for a dependence on imagery of age of onset or number of years of vision impairment.

Eye movements during visual imagery and perception show spatial correspondence but have unique temporal signatures

Eye fixation patterns during mental imagery are similar to those during perception of the same picture, suggesting that oculomotor mechanisms play a role in mental imagery (i.e., the "looking at nothing" effect). Previous research has focused on the spatial similarities of eye movements during perception and mental imagery. The primary aim of this study was to assess whether the spatial similarity translates to the temporal domain. We used recurrence quantification analysis (RQA) to assess the temporal structure of eye fixations in visual perception and mental imagery and we compared the temporal as well as the spatial characteristics in mental imagery with perception by means of Bayesian hierarchical regression models. We further investigated how person and picture-specific characteristics contribute to eye movement behavior in mental imagery. Working memory capacity and mental imagery abilities were assessed to either predict gaze dynamics in visual imagery or to moderate a possible correspondence between spatial or temporal gaze dynamics in perception and mental imagery. We were able to show the spatial similarity of fixations between visual perception and imagery and we provide first evidence for its moderation by working memory capacity. Interestingly, the temporal gaze dynamics in mental imagery were unrelated to those in perception and their variance between participants was not explained by variance in visuo-spatial working memory capacity or vividness of mental images. The semantic content of the imagined pictures was the only meaningful predictor of temporal gaze dynamics. The spatial correspondence reflects shared spatial structure of mental images and perceived pictures, while the unique temporal gaze behavior could be driven by generation, maintenance and protection processes specific to visual imagery. The unique temporal gaze dynamics offer a window to new insights into the genuine process of mental imagery independent of its similarity to perception.

Aphantasia: The science of visual imagery extremes

Visual imagery allows us to revisit the appearance of things in their absence and to test out virtual combinations of sensory experience. Visual imagery has been linked to many cognitive processes, such as autobiographical and visual working memory. Imagery also plays symptomatic and mechanistic roles in neurologic and mental disorders and is utilized in treatment. A large network of brain activity spanning frontal, parietal, temporal, and visual cortex is involved in generating and maintain images in mind. The ability to visualize has extreme variations, ranging from completely absent (aphantasia) to photo-like (hyperphantasia). The anatomy and functionality of visual cortex, including primary visual cortex, have been associated with individual differences in visual imagery ability, pointing to a potential correlate for both aphantasia and hyperphantasia. Preliminary evidence suggests that lifelong aphantasia is associated with prosopagnosia and reduction in autobiographical memory; hyperphantasia is associated with synesthesia. Aphantasic individuals can also be highly imaginative and are able to complete many tasks that were previously thought to rely on visual imagery, demonstrating that visualization is only one of many ways of representing things in their absence. The study of extreme imagination reminds us how easily invisible differences can escape detection.

Knowing what you need to know in advance: The neural processes underpinning flexible semantic retrieval of thematic and taxonomic relations

Semantic retrieval is flexible, allowing us to focus on subsets of features and associations that are relevant to the current task or context: for example, we use taxonomic relations to locate items in the supermarket (carrots are a vegetable), but thematic associations to decide which tools we need when cooking (carrot goes with peeler). We used fMRI to investigate the neural basis of this form of semantic flexibility; in particular, we asked how retrieval unfolds differently when participants have advanced knowledge of the type of link to retrieve between concepts (taxonomic or thematic). Participants performed a semantic relatedness judgement task: on half the trials, they were cued to search for a taxonomic or thematic link, while on the remaining trials, they judged relatedness without knowing which type of semantic relationship would be relevant. Left inferior frontal gyrus showed greater activation when participants knew the trial type in advance. An overlapping region showed a stronger response when the semantic relationship between the items was weaker, suggesting this structure supports both top-down and bottom-up forms of semantic control. Multivariate pattern analysis further revealed that the neural response in left inferior frontal gyrus reflects goal information related to different conceptual relationships. Top-down control specifically modulated the response in visual cortex: when the goal was unknown, there was greater deactivation to the first word, and greater activation to the second word. We conclude that top-down control of semantic retrieval is primarily achieved through the gating of task-relevant 'spoke' regions.

Perceptual Representations and the Vividness of Stimulus-Triggered and Stimulus-Independent Experiences

In recent years, researchers from independent subfields have begun to engage with the idea that the same cortical regions that contribute to on-line perception are recruited during and underlie off-line activities such as information maintenance in working memory, mental imagery, hallucinations, dreaming, and mind wandering. Accumulating evidence suggests that in all of these cases the activity of posterior brain regions provides the contents of experiences. This article is intended to move one step further by exploring specific links between the vividness of experiences, which is a characteristic feature of consciousness regardless of its actual content, and certain properties of the content-specific neural-activity patterns. Investigating the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and its relation to working memory and the processes responsible for mind wandering and its similarities to dreaming form two clusters of research that are in the forefront of the recent scientific study of mental phenomena, yet communication between these two clusters has been surprisingly sparse. Here our aim is to foster such information exchange by articulating a hypothesis about the fine-grained phenomenological structure determining subjective vividness and its possible neural basis that allows us to shed new light on these mental phenomena by bringing them under a common framework.

Cortical excitability controls the strength of mental imagery

Mental imagery provides an essential simulation tool for remembering the past and planning the future, with its strength affecting both cognition and mental health. Research suggests that neural activity spanning prefrontal, parietal, temporal, and visual areas supports the generation of mental images. Exactly how this network controls the strength of visual imagery remains unknown. Here, brain imaging and transcranial magnetic phosphene data show that lower resting activity and excitability levels in early visual cortex (V1-V3) predict stronger sensory imagery. Further, electrically decreasing visual cortex excitability using tDCS increases imagery strength, demonstrating a causative role of visual cortex excitability in controlling visual imagery. Together, these data suggest a neurophysiological mechanism of cortical excitability involved in controlling the strength of mental images.

Stronger perceptual filling-in of spatiotemporal information in the blind spot compared with artificial gaps

Complete visual information about a scene and the objects within it is often not available to us. For example, objects may be partly occluded by other objects or have sections missing. In the retinal blind spot, there are no photoreceptors and visual input is not detected. However, owing to perceptual filling-in by the visual system we often do not perceive these gaps. There is a lack of consensus on how much of the mechanism for perceptual filling-in is similar in the case of a natural scotoma, such as the blind spot, and artificial scotomata, such as sections of the stimulus being physically removed. Part of the difficulty in assessing this relationship arises from a lack of direct comparisons between the two cases, with artificial scotomata being tested in different locations in the visual field compared with the blind spot. The peripheral location of the blind spot may explain its enhanced filling-in compared with artificial scotomata, as reported in previous studies. In the present study, we directly compared perceptual filling-in of spatiotemporal information in the blind spot and artificial gaps of the same size and eccentricity. We found stronger perceptual filling-in in the blind spot, suggesting improved filling-in for the blind spot reported in previous studies cannot be simply attributed to its peripheral location.

The Architect Who Lost the Ability to Imagine: The Cerebral Basis of Visual Imagery

While the loss of mental imagery following brain lesions was first described more than a century ago, the key cerebral areas involved remain elusive. Here we report neuropsychological data from an architect (PL518) who lost his ability for visual imagery following a bilateral posterior cerebral artery (PCA) stroke. We compare his profile to three other patients with bilateral PCA stroke and another architect with a large PCA lesion confined to the right hemisphere. We also compare structural images of their lesions, aiming to delineate cerebral areas selectively lesioned in acquired aphantasia. When comparing the neuropsychological profile and structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for the aphantasic architect PL518 to patients with either a comparable background (an architect) or bilateral PCA lesions, we find: (1) there is a large overlap of cognitive deficits between patients, with the very notable exception of aphantasia which only occurs in PL518, and (2) there is large overlap of the patients' lesions. The only areas of selective lesion in PL518 is a small patch in the left fusiform gyrus as well as part of the right lingual gyrus. We suggest that these areas, and perhaps in particular the region in the left fusiform gyrus, play an important role in the cerebral network involved in visual imagery.

Between-subject variability in the influence of mental imagery on conscious perception

Mental imagery and visual perception rely on similar neural mechanisms, but the function of this overlap remains unclear. One idea is that imagery can influence perception. Previous research has shown that imagining a stimulus prior to binocular presentation of rivalling stimuli increases the chance of perceiving the imagined stimulus. In this study we investigated how this effect interacts with bottom-up sensory input by comparing psychometric response curves for congruent and incongruent imagery in humans. A Bayesian hierarchical model was used, allowing us to simultaneously study group-level effects as well as effects for individual participants. We found strong effects of both imagery as well as its interaction with sensory evidence within individual participants. However, the direction of these effects were highly variable between individuals, leading to weak effects at the group level. This highlights the heterogeneity of conscious perception and emphasizes the need for individualized investigation of such complex cognitive processes.

Towards an intuitive communication-BCI: decoding visually imagined characters from the early visual cortex using high-field fMRI

Brain-computer interfaces aim to provide people with paralysis with the possibility to use their neural signals to control devices. For communication, most BCIs are based on the selection of letters from a (digital) letter board to spell words and sentences. Visual mental imagery of letters could offer a new, fast and intuitive way to spell in a BCI-communication solution. Here we provide a proof of concept for the decoding of visually imagined characters from the early visual cortex using 7 Tesla functional MRI. Sixteen healthy participants visually imagined three different characters for 3, 5 and 7 s in a slow event-related design. Using single-trial classification, we were able to decode the characters with an average accuracy of 54%, which is significantly above chance level (33%). Furthermore, the imagined characters were classifiable shortly after cue onset and remained classifiable with prolonged imagery. These properties, combined with the cortical location of the early visual cortex and its decodable activity, encourage further research on intracranial interfacing using surface electrodes to bring us closer to such a visual imagery based BCI communication solution.

Inferior parietal lobule and early visual areas support elicitation of individualized meanings during narrative listening

INTRODUCTION

When listening to a narrative, the verbal expressions translate into meanings and flow of mental imagery. However, the same narrative can be heard quite differently based on differences in listeners' previous experiences and knowledge. We capitalized on such differences to disclose brain regions that support transformation of narrative into individualized propositional meanings and associated mental imagery by analyzing brain activity associated with behaviorally assessed individual meanings elicited by a narrative.

METHODS

Sixteen right-handed female subjects were instructed to list words that best described what had come to their minds while listening to an eight-minute narrative during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The fMRI data were analyzed by calculating voxel-wise intersubject correlation (ISC) values. We used latent semantic analysis (LSA) enhanced with Wordnet knowledge to measure semantic similarity of the produced words between subjects. Finally, we predicted the ISC with the semantic similarity using representational similarity analysis.

RESULTS

We found that semantic similarity in these word listings between subjects, estimated using LSA combined with WordNet knowledge, predicting similarities in brain hemodynamic activity. Subject pairs whose individual semantics were similar also exhibited similar brain activity in the bilateral supramarginal and angular gyrus of the inferior parietal lobe, and in the occipital pole.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results demonstrate, using a novel method to measure interindividual differences in semantics, brain mechanisms giving rise to semantics and associated imagery during narrative listening. During listening to a captivating narrative, the inferior parietal lobe and early visual cortical areas seem, thus, to support elicitation of individual meanings and flow of mental imagery.

Redefining Visual Working Memory: A Cognitive-Strategy, Brain-Region Approach

The ability to remember and manipulate visual information is pervasive and is associated with many cognitive abilities. Yet despite the importance of visual working memory (VWM), there is little consensus among researchers in the field as to which neural areas are necessary and sufficient and which models best describe its capacity. Here, we propose that an assumption that all people remember visual information in the same way has led to much contention and inconsistencies in the field. By accepting that there are multiple cognitive strategies and methods to perform a VWM task, we introduce an individual “precision” approach to the study of memory. We propose that VWM should be redefined, not by the type of stimuli used (e.g., visual) but rather by the specific mental processes (e.g., visual imagery, semantic, propositional, spatial) and the corresponding brain regions used to complete the mnemonic task. We further provide a short how-to guide for measuring different mnemonic strategies used for working memory.

White dreams are made of colours: What studying contentless dreams can teach about the neural basis of dreaming and conscious experiences

Reports of white dreams, the feeling of having had a dream experience without being able to specify this experience any further, make up almost one third of all dream reports, yet this phenomenon-until very recently-had not yet been in the focus of targeted investigations. White dreams are typically interpreted as forgotten dreams, and are sidelined as not being particularly informative with regard to the nature of dreaming. In this review article, we propose a paradigm shift with respect to the status of white dreams arguing that focusing on this phenomenon can reveal fundamental insights about the neural processes that occur in the dreaming brain. As part of this paradigm shift, we propose a novel interpretation of what white dreams are. This new interpretation is made possible by recent advancements in three different though interrelated fields focusing on dreaming, mental imagery, and wakeful perception. In this paper, we bring these different threads together to show how the latest findings from these fields fit together and point towards a general framework regarding the neural underpinnings of conscious experiences that might turn out to be highly relevant not just for dream research but for all aspects of studying consciousness.

Primary Interoceptive Cortex Activity during Simulated Experiences of the Body

Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch) consistently demonstrate that vividly imagining a sensory experience of the world-simulating it-is associated with increased activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex. We hypothesized, analogously, that simulating internal bodily sensations would be associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive cortex. An immersive, language-based mental imagery paradigm was used to test this hypothesis (e.g., imagine your heart pounding during a roller coaster ride, your face drenched in sweat during a workout). During two neuroimaging experiments, participants listened to vividly described situations and imagined "being there" in each scenario. In Study 1, we observed significantly heightened activity in primary interoceptive cortex (of dorsal posterior insula) during imagined experiences involving vivid internal sensations. This effect was specific to interoceptive simulation: It was not observed during a separate affect focus condition in Study 1 nor during an independent Study 2 that did not involve detailed simulation of internal sensations (instead involving simulation of other sensory experiences). These findings underscore the large-scale predictive architecture of the brain and reveal that words can be powerful drivers of bodily experiences.

Visual imagery of faces and cars in face-selective visual areas

Neuroimaging provides a unique tool to investigate otherwise difficult-to-access mental processes like visual imagery. Prior studies support the idea that visual imagery is a top-down reinstatement of visual perception, and it is likely that this extends to object processing. Here we use functional MRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis to ask if mental imagery of cars engages the fusiform face area, similar to what is found during perception. We test only individuals who we assumed could imagine individual car models based on their above-average perceptual abilities with cars. Our results provide evidence that cars are represented differently from common objects in face-selective visual areas, at least in those with above-average car recognition ability. Moreover, pattern classifiers trained on data acquired during imagery can decode the neural response pattern acquired during perception, suggesting that the tested object categories are represented similarly during perception and visual imagery. The results suggest that, even at high-levels of visual processing, visual imagery mirrors perception to some extent, and that face-selective areas may in part support non-face object imagery.