Risk of Healthcare-Associated Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Hospitalized Cancer Patients

Factors associated with extent of COVID-19 outbreaks: A prospective study in a large hospital network

BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated numerous hospital outbreaks. This study aimed to identify factors related to the extent of nosocomial COVID-19 outbreaks in the largest French public health institution.

METHODS

An observational study was conducted from July 2020 to September 2021. Outbreaks were defined as at least 2 cases, patients and/or health care workers (HCWs), linked by time and geographic location. Logistic regression was performed to identify risk factors for large outbreaks among nine variables: variant, medical ward, COVID-19 vaccination rate and incidence among HCWs and Paris population, number of weekly COVID-19 tests among HCWs and the positivity rate, epidemic waves.

RESULTS

Within 14 months, 799 outbreaks were identified: 450 small ones (≤6 cases) and 349 large ones (≥7 cases), involving 3,260 patients and 3,850 HCWs. In univariate analysis, large outbreaks were positively correlated to geriatrics wards, COVID-19 incidence, and rate of weekly positive tests among HCWs; and negatively correlated to intensive care units, variant Delta, fourth wave, vaccination rates of the Paris region's population and that of the HCWs. In multivariate analysis, factors that remained significant were the type of medical ward and the vaccination rate among HCWs.

CONCLUSIONS

Intensive care unit and high vaccination rates among HCWs were associated with a lower risk of large COVID-19 outbreaks, as opposed to geriatric wards, which are associated with a higher risk.

Overestimation of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Household Transmission in Settings of High Community Transmission: Insights From an Informal Settlement Community in Salvador, Brazil

Background

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant has spread globally. However, the contribution of community versus household transmission to the overall risk of infection remains unclear.

Methods

Between November 2021 and March 2022, we conducted an active case-finding study in an urban informal settlement with biweekly visits across 1174 households with 3364 residents. Individuals displaying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)-related symptoms were identified, interviewed along with household contacts, and defined as index and secondary cases based on reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and symptom onset.

Results

In 61 households, we detected a total of 94 RT-PCR-positive cases. Of 69 sequenced samples, 67 cases (97.1%) were attributed to the Omicron BA.1* variant. Among 35 of their households, the secondary attack rate was 50.0% (95% confidence interval [CI], 37.0%-63.0%). Women (relative risk [RR], 1.6 [95% CI, .9-2.7]), older individuals (median difference, 15 [95% CI, 2-21] years), and those reporting symptoms (RR, 1.73 [95% CI, 1.0-3.0]) had a significantly increased risk for SARS-CoV-2 secondary infection. Genomic analysis revealed substantial acquisition of viruses from the community even among households with other SARS-CoV-2 infections. After excluding community acquisition, we estimated a household secondary attack rate of 24.2% (95% CI, 11.9%-40.9%).

Conclusions

These findings underscore the ongoing risk of community acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 among households with current infections. The observed high attack rate necessitates swift booster vaccination, rapid testing availability, and therapeutic options to mitigate the severe outcomes of COVID-19.

Initial and 5-day positivity rate of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in exposed inpatients within shared rooms during the omicron-variant dominant period

In this observational study conducted in 2022, 12.3% of patients who shared a room with a patient positive for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) also had a positive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test, either at initial screening or during a 5-day quarantine. Therefore, screening and quarantine are still necessary within hospitals for close-contact inpatients during the SARS-CoV-2 omicron-variant dominant period.

In Support of Universal Admission Testing for SARS-CoV-2 During Significant Community Transmission

Many hospitals have stopped or are considering stopping universal admission testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We discuss reasons why admission testing should still be part of a layered system to prevent hospital-acquired SARS-CoV-2 infections during times of significant community transmission. These include the morbidity of SARS-CoV-2 in vulnerable patients, the predominant contribution of presymptomatic and asymptomatic people to transmission, the high rate of transmission between patients in shared rooms, and data suggesting surveillance testing is associated with fewer nosocomial infections. Preferences of diverse patient populations, particularly the hardest-hit communities, should be surveyed and used to inform prevention measures. Hospitals' ethical responsibility to protect patients from serious infections should predominate over concerns about costs, labor, and inconvenience. We call for more rigorous data on the incidence and morbidity of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infections and more research to help determine when to start, stop, and restart universal admission testing and other prevention measures.

Predictors of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron breakthrough infection after receipt of AZD7442 (tixagevimab-cilgavimab) for pre-exposure prophylaxis among hematologic malignancy patients

AZD7442 (tixagevimab-cilgavimab) is a combination of two human monoclonal antibodies for pre-exposure prophylaxis of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among high-risk patients who do not mount a reliable vaccine response. Foremost among these are hematologic malignancy patients with limited clinical trial or realworld experience to assess the effectiveness of this combination treatment since the emergence of Omicron and its subvariants. We performed a retrospective study of 892 high-risk hematologic malignancy patients who received AZD7442 at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York City from January 1, 2022 to July 31, 2022. We evaluated demographic, clinical, and laboratory characteristics and performed regression analyses to evaluate risk factors for breakthrough infection. We also evaluated the impact of updated AZD7442 dosing regimens on the risk of breakthrough infection. Among 892 patients, 98 (10.9%) had a breakthrough infection during the study period. A majority received early outpatient treatment (82%) and eventually eight (8.2%) required hospitalization for management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), with a single instance of severe COVID-19 and death. Patients who received a repeat dose or a higher firsttime dose of AZD7442 had a lower incidence of breakthrough infection. Univariate analyses did not reveal any significant predictors of breakthrough infection. While AZD7442 is effective at reducing SARS-CoV-2 breakthrough infection in patients with hematologic malignancies, no risk factors reliably predicted risk of infection. Patients who received updated dosing regimens as per Food and Drug Administration guidelines had better protection against breakthrough infection.

High technology and low technology measures to reduce risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission

During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, a variety of low technology and high technology measures have been proposed to reduce the risk for transmission. Identifying those measures likely to be useful in reducing viral transmission without undue expense or potential for adverse effects has been a challenge for infection control programs. The challenge has been compounded by the lack of tools that can be used to assess the risk for viral transmission in different settings. This review discusses practical tools that can be used to assess ventilation and airflow and evaluates some of the low technology and high technology measures that have been proposed as control measures for COVID-19. Some typical questions posed to infection control programs during the pandemic are presented to illustrate real-world application of the concepts being discussed.

Whole-genome sequencing to investigate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the acute healthcare setting: a systematic review

BACKGROUND

Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has been used widely to elucidate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in acute healthcare settings, and to guide infection, prevention, and control (IPC) responses.

AIM

To systematically appraise available literature, published between January 1st, 2020 and June 30th, 2022, describing the implementation of WGS in acute healthcare settings to characterize nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

METHODS

Searches of the PubMed, Embase, Ovid MEDLINE, EBSCO MEDLINE, and Cochrane Library databases identified studies in English reporting the use of WGS to investigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission in acute healthcare environments. Publications involved data collected up to December 31st, 2021, and findings were reported in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statement.

FINDINGS

In all, 3088 non-duplicate records were retrieved; 97 met inclusion criteria, involving 62 outbreak analyses and 35 genomic surveillance studies. No publications from low-income countries were identified. In 87/97 (90%), WGS supported hypotheses for nosocomial transmission, while in 46 out of 97 (47%) suspected transmission events were excluded. An IPC intervention was attributed to the use of WGS in 18 out of 97 (18%); however, only three (3%) studies reported turnaround times ≤7 days facilitating near real-time IPC action, and none reported an impact on the incidence of nosocomial COVID-19 attributable to WGS.

CONCLUSION

WGS can elucidate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in acute healthcare settings to enhance epidemiological investigations. However, evidence was not identified to support sequencing as an intervention to reduce the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 in hospital or to alter the trajectory of active outbreaks.

Ventilation strategies based on an aerodynamic analysis during a large-scale SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in an acute-care hospital

BACKGROUND

This study aimed to investigate ventilation strategies to prevent nosocomial transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).

METHODS

We conducted a retrospective epidemiological investigation of a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreak in a teaching hospital (February-March 2021). The largest outbreak ward was studied, and measurements were taken to determine the pressure difference and air change per hour (ACH) of the rooms. Airflow dynamics were assessed using an oil droplet generator, indoor air quality sensor, and particle image velocimetry in the index patient's room, corridor, and opposite rooms, by varying the opening and closing of windows and doors.

RESULTS

During the outbreak, 283 COVID-19 cases were identified. The SARS-CoV-2 spread occurred sequentially from the index room to the nearest room, especially the opposite. The aerodynamic study demonstrated that droplet-like particles in the index room diffused through the corridor and the opposite room through the opening door. The mean ACH of the rooms was 1.44; the air supply volume was 15.9% larger than the exhaust volume, forming a positive pressure. Closing the door prevented diffusion between adjacent rooms facing each other, and natural ventilation reduced the concentration of particles within the ward and minimised their spread to adjacent rooms.

CONCLUSIONS

Spread of droplet-like particles between rooms could be attributed to the pressure difference between the rooms and corridor. To prevent spread of SARS-CoV-2 between rooms, increasing the ACH in the room by maximising ventilation and minimising the positive pressure through supply/exhaust control and closing the room door are essential.

Nosocomial COVID-19 at a comprehensive cancer center during the first year of the pandemic: Lessons learned

BACKGROUND

The spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in health care settings endangers patients with cancer. As knowledge of the transmission of COVID-19 emerged, strategies for preventing nosocomial COVID-19 were updated. We describe our early experience with nosocomial respiratory viral infections (RVIs) at a cancer center in the first year of the pandemic (March 2020-March 2021).

METHODS

Nosocomial RVIs were identified through our infection control prospective surveillance program, which conducted epidemiologic investigations of all microbiologically documented RVIs. Data was presented as frequencies and percentages or medians and ranges.

RESULTS

A total of 35 of 3944 (0.9%) documented RVIs were determined to have been nosocomial acquired. Majority of RVIs were due to SARS CoV-2 (13/35; 37%) or by rhinovirus/enterovirus (12/35; 34%). A cluster investigation of the first 3 patients with nosocomial COVID-19 determined that transmission most likely occurred from employees to patients. Five patients (38%) required mechanical ventilation and 4 (31%) died during the same hospital encounter.

CONCLUSIONS

Our investigation of the cluster led to enhancement of our infection control measures. The implications of COVID-19 vaccination on infection control policies is still unclear and further studies are needed to delineate its impact on the transmission of COVID-19 in a hospital setting.

A systematic outbreak investigation of SARS-CoV-2 transmission clusters in a tertiary academic care center

BACKGROUND

We sought to decipher transmission pathways in healthcare-associated infections with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) within our hospital by epidemiological work-up and complementary whole genome sequencing (WGS). We report the findings of the four largest epidemiologic clusters of SARS-CoV-2 transmission occurring during the second wave of the pandemic from 11/2020 to 12/2020.

METHODS

At the University Hospital Basel, Switzerland, systematic outbreak investigation is initiated at detection of any nosocomial case of SARS-CoV-2 infection, as confirmed by polymerase chain reaction, occurring more than five days after admission. Clusters of nosocomial infections, defined as the detection of at least two positive patients and/or healthcare workers (HCWs) within one week with an epidemiological link, were further investigated by WGS on respective strains.

RESULTS

The four epidemiologic clusters included 40 patients and 60 HCWs. Sequencing data was available for 70% of all involved cases (28 patients and 42 HCWs), confirmed epidemiologically suspected in house transmission in 33 cases (47.1% of sequenced cases) and excluded transmission in the remaining 37 cases (52.9%). Among cases with identical strains, epidemiologic work-up suggested transmission mainly through a ward-based exposure (24/33, 72.7%), more commonly affecting HCWs (16/24, 66.7%) than patients (8/24, 33.3%), followed by transmission between patients (6/33, 18.2%), and among HCWs and patients (3/33, 9.1%, respectively two HCWs and one patient).

CONCLUSIONS

Phylogenetic analyses revealed important insights into transmission pathways supporting less than 50% of epidemiologically suspected SARS-CoV-2 transmissions. The remainder of cases most likely reflect community-acquired infection randomly detected by outbreak investigation. Notably, most transmissions occurred between HCWs, possibly indicating lower perception of the risk of infection during contacts among HCWs.

Predictors of Coronavirus Disease 2019 Hospitalization After Sotrovimab in Patients With Hematologic Malignancy During the BA.1 Omicron Surge

BACKGROUND

Sotrovimab is an anti-spike neutralization monoclonal antibody developed to reduce the risk of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) progression and advancement to hospitalization in high-risk patients. Currently, there is limited research describing the association of sotrovimab treatment in patients with hematologic malignancy and the predictive factors of hospitalization.

METHODS

We performed an observational study of 156 consecutive cancer patients who received sotrovimab at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York City during the BA.1 Omicron surge. We evaluated the demographic, clinical, and laboratory characteristics of the patients who had subsequent COVID-19-related hospitalization(s) compared to those who did not.

RESULTS

Among the 156 study patients, 17 (11%) were hospitalized, of whom 4 were readmitted for COVID-19-related complications; 3 deaths were attributed to COVID-19. Results from multivariable logistic regression show that significant factors associated with hospitalization include patients on anti-CD20 therapy (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 5.59 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 1.73-18.12]; P = .004) and with relapse/refractory disease (aOR, 5.69 [95% CI, 1.69-19.16]; P = .005). Additionally, whole genome sequencing of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 detected high occurrences of mutations in the spike gene associated with treatment-related resistance longitudinal samples from 11 patients treated with sotrovimab.

CONCLUSIONS

While sotrovimab is effective at reducing COVID-19 hospitalization and disease severity in patients with hematologic malignancy when administered early, patients who received anti-CD20 antibodies showed substantial morbidity. Due to the high potential for resistance mutation to sotrovimab and increased morbidity in patients on anti-CD20 therapy, combination treatment should be explored to determine whether it provides added benefits compared to monotherapy.

Investigation of a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in a hospital administration building

OBJECTIVE

To investigate a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in employees working on 1 floor of a hospital administration building.

METHODS

Contact tracing was performed to identify potential exposures and all employees were tested for SARS-CoV-2. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from infected personnel and from control cases in the healthcare system with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) during the same period. Carbon dioxide levels were measured during a workday to assess adequacy of ventilation; readings >800 parts per million (ppm) were considered an indication of suboptimal ventilation. To assess the potential for airborne transmission, DNA-barcoded aerosols were released, and real-time polymerase chain reaction was used to quantify particles recovered from air samples in multiple locations.

RESULTS

Between December 22, 2020, and January 8, 2021, 17 coworkers tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, including 13 symptomatic and 4 asymptomatic individuals. Of the 5 cluster SARS-CoV-2 samples sequenced, 3 were genetically related, but these employees denied higher-risk contacts with one another. None of the sequences from the cluster were genetically related to the 17 control sequences of SARS-CoV-2. Carbon dioxide levels increased during a workday but never exceeded 800 ppm. DNA-barcoded aerosol particles were dispersed from the sites of release to locations throughout the floor; 20% of air samples had >1 log₁₀ particles.

CONCLUSIONS

In a hospital administration building outbreak, sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 confirmed transmission among coworkers. Transmission occurred despite the absence of higher-risk exposures and in a setting with adequate ventilation based on monitoring of carbon dioxide levels.

The spike gene target failure (SGTF) genomic signature is highly accurate for the identification of Alpha and Omicron SARS-CoV-2 variants

The Alpha (B.1.1.7) and Omicron (B.1.1.529, BA.1, BA.4 and BA.5) variants of concern (VOC) share several mutations in their spike gene, including mutations resulting in the deletion of two amino acids at position 69 and 70 (del 69-70) in the Spike protein. Del 69-70 causes failure to detect the S gene target on a widely used, commercial test, the TaqPath SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR (Thermo Fisher). The S gene target failure (SGTF) signature has been used to preliminarily infer the presence of Alpha and Omicron VOC. We evaluated the accuracy of the SGTF signature in identifying these two variants through analysis of all positive SARS-CoV-2 samples tested on the TaqPath RT-PCR and sequenced by next generation sequencing between December 2020 to July 2022. 2324 samples were successfully sequenced including 914 SGTF positive samples. The sensitivity and specificity of the SGTF signature was 99.6% (95% CI 96.1-99.9%) and 98.6% (95% CI 99.2-99.8%) for the Alpha variant and 99.6% (95% CI 98.9-99.9%) and 99.8% (95% CI 99.4-99.9%) for the Omicron variant. At the peak of their corresponding wave, the positive predictive value of the SGTF was 98% for Alpha and 100% for Omicron. The accuracy of the SGTF signature was high, making this genomic signature a rapid and accurate proxy for identification of these variants in real-world laboratory settings.

Nosocomial COVID-19 Incidence and Secondary Attack Rates among Patients of Tertiary Care Center, Zurich, Switzerland

Of 1,118 patients with COVID-19 at a university hospital in Switzerland during October 2020-June 2021, we found 83 (7.4%) had probable or definite healthcare-associated COVID-19. After in-hospital exposure, we estimated secondary attack rate at 23.3%. Transmission was associated with longer contact times and with lower cycle threshold values among index patients.

Factors contributing to a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak on a mixed medical-surgical unit in a Canadian acute-care hospital

OBJECTIVE

To identify preventable factors that contribute to the cross transmission of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) to patients in healthcare facilities.

DESIGN

A case-control study was conducted among inpatients on a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak unit.

SETTING

This study was conducted in a medical-surgical unit of a tertiary-care hospital in Nova Scotia in May 2021.

PATIENTS

Patients hospitalized on the unit for at least 12 hours and healthcare workers (HCW) working on the unit within 2 weeks of outbreak declaration were included.

METHODS

Risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection were analyzed using simple and multiple logistic regression. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was performed to identify SARS-CoV-2 strain relatedness. Network analysis was used to describe patient accommodation.

RESULTS

SARS-CoV-2 infections were identified in 21 patients (29.6%) and 11 HCWs (6.6%). WGS data revealed 4 distinct clades of related sequences. Several factors likely contributed to the outbreak, including failure to identify SARS-CoV-2, a largely incomplete or unvaccinated population, and patient wandering behaviors. The most significant risk factor for SARS-CoV-2 infection was room sharing with an infectious patient, which was the only factor that remained statistically significant following multivariate analysis (odds ratio [OR], 9.2l; 95% confidence interval [CI], 2.04-41.67; P = .004).

CONCLUSIONS

This outbreak likely resulted from admission of 2 patients with COVID-19, with subsequent transmissions to 17 patients and 11 staff. WGS and bioinformatics analyses were critical to identifying previously unrecognized nosocomial transmissions of SARS-CoV-2. This study supports strategies to reduce nosocomial transmissions of SARS-CoV-2, such as single-patient rooms, promotion of COVID-19 vaccination, and infection prevention and control measures including management of wandering behaviors.

Prevention of SARS-CoV-2 and respiratory viral infections in healthcare settings: current and emerging concepts

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

COVID-19 has catalyzed a wealth of new data on the science of respiratory pathogen transmission and revealed opportunities to enhance infection prevention practices in healthcare settings.

RECENT FINDINGS

New data refute the traditional division between droplet vs airborne transmission and clarify the central role of aerosols in spreading all respiratory viruses, including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), even in the absence of so-called 'aerosol-generating procedures' (AGPs). Indeed, most AGPs generate fewer aerosols than talking, labored breathing, or coughing. Risk factors for transmission include high viral loads, symptoms, proximity, prolonged exposure, lack of masking, and poor ventilation. Testing all patients on admission and thereafter can identify early occult infections and prevent hospital-based clusters. Additional prevention strategies include universal masking, encouraging universal vaccination, preferential use of N95 respirators when community rates are high, improving native ventilation, utilizing portable high-efficiency particulate air filters when ventilation is limited, and minimizing room sharing when possible.

SUMMARY

Multifaceted infection prevention programs that include universal testing, masking, vaccination, and enhanced ventilation can minimize nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infections in patients and workplace infections in healthcare personnel. Extending these insights to other respiratory viruses may further increase the safety of healthcare and ready hospitals for novel respiratory viruses that may emerge in the future.

Partial ORF1ab Gene Target Failure with Omicron BA.2.12.1

Mutations in the genome of SARS-CoV-2 can affect the performance of molecular diagnostic assays. In some cases, such as S-gene target failure, the impact can serve as a unique indicator of a particular SARS-CoV-2 variant and provide a method for rapid detection. Here, we describe partial ORF1ab gene target failure (pOGTF) on the cobas SARS-CoV-2 assays, defined by a ≥2-thermocycle delay in detection of the ORF1ab gene compared to that of the E-gene. We demonstrate that pOGTF is 98.6% sensitive and 99.9% specific for SARS-CoV-2 lineage BA.2.12.1, an emerging variant in the United States with spike L452Q and S704L mutations that may affect transmission, infectivity, and/or immune evasion. Increasing rates of pOGTF closely mirrored rates of BA.2.12.1 sequences uploaded to public databases, and, importantly, increasing local rates of pOGTF also mirrored increasing overall test positivity. Use of pOGTF as a proxy for BA.2.12.1 provides faster tracking of the variant than whole-genome sequencing and can benefit laboratories without sequencing capabilities.

Infection Prevention and Control of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in Health Care Settings

The authors describe infection prevention and control approaches to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in the health care setting, including a review of the chain of transmission and the hierarchy of controls, which are cornerstones of infection control and prevention. The authors also discuss lessons learned from nosocomial transmission events.

Partial ORF1ab Gene Target Failure with Omicron BA.2.12.1

Mutations in the viral genome of SARS-CoV-2 can impact the performance of molecular diagnostic assays. In some cases, such as S gene target failure, the impact can serve as a unique indicator of a particular SARS-CoV-2 variant and provide a method for rapid detection. Here we describe partial ORF1ab gene target failure (pOGTF) on the cobas ^® SARS-CoV-2 assays, defined by a ≥2 thermocycles delay in detection of the ORF1ab gene compared to the E gene. We demonstrate that pOGTF is 97% sensitive and 99% specific for SARS-CoV-2 lineage BA.2.12.1, an emerging variant in the United States with spike L452Q and S704L mutations that may impact transmission, infectivity, and/or immune evasion. Increasing rates of pOGTF closely mirrored rates of BA.2.12.1 sequences uploaded to public databases, and, importantly increasing local rates of pOGTF also mirrored increasing overall test positivity. Use of pOGTF as a proxy for BA.2.12.1 provides faster tracking of the variant than whole-genome sequencing and can benefit laboratories without sequencing capabilities.

Use of carbon dioxide measurements to assess ventilation in an acute care hospital

Poorly ventilated indoor spaces pose a risk for airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We measured carbon dioxide levels in a multiple areas in an acute care hospital to assess the adequacy of ventilation. Carbon dioxide levels remained below 800 parts per million in most areas but exceeded this level in a small conference room with 8 occupants, an office with 3 occupants, and a bathroom with 2 occupants. Measuring carbon dioxide levels could provide a simple means for healthcare facilities to assess the adequacy of ventilation.

New Insights into the Prevention of Hospital-Acquired Pneumonia/Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia Caused by Viruses

A fifth or more of hospital-acquired pneumonias may be attributable to respiratory viruses. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has clearly demonstrated the potential morbidity and mortality of respiratory viruses and the constant threat of nosocomial transmission and hospital-based clusters. Data from before the pandemic suggest the same can be true of influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, and other respiratory viruses. The pandemic has also helped clarify the primary mechanisms and risk factors for viral transmission. Respiratory viruses are primarily transmitted by respiratory aerosols that are routinely emitted when people exhale, talk, and cough. Labored breathing and coughing increase aerosol generation to a much greater extent than intubation, extubation, positive pressure ventilation, and other so-called aerosol-generating procedures. Transmission risk is proportional to the amount of viral exposure. Most transmissions take place over short distances because respiratory emissions are densest immediately adjacent to the source but then rapidly dilute and diffuse with distance leading to less viral exposure. The primary risk factors for transmission then are high viral loads, proximity, sustained exposure, and poor ventilation as these all increase net viral exposure. Poor ventilation increases the risk of long-distance transmission by allowing aerosol-borne viruses to accumulate over time leading to higher levels of exposure throughout an enclosed space. Surgical and procedural masks reduce viral exposure but do not eradicate it and thus lower but do not eliminate transmission risk. Most hospital-based clusters have been attributed to delayed diagnoses, transmission between roommates, and staff-to-patient infections. Strategies to prevent nosocomial respiratory viral infections include testing all patients upon admission, preventing healthcare providers from working while sick, assuring adequate ventilation, universal masking, and vaccinating both patients and healthcare workers.

Outcomes of hospital-acquired SARS-CoV-2 infection in the Canadian first wave epicentre: a retrospective cohort study

BACKGROUND

During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, a substantial number of Quebec hospitals were hit by hospital-acquired (HA) SARS-CoV-2 infections. Our objective was to assess whether mortality is higher in HA cases than in non-hospital-acquired (NHA) cases and determine the prevalence of HA-SARS-CoV-2 infection in our hospital.

METHODS

This retrospective single-centre cohort study included all adults (≥ 18 yr) who had COVID-19, admitted to Hôpital Maisonneuve-Rosemont (Montréal, Canada) from Mar. 1 to June 30, 2020. We collected data on demographic characteristics, comorbidities, treatment, admission to the intensive care unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilation requirements from electronic health records. We adjudicated hospital acquisition based on the timing of symptom onset, and polymerase chain reaction testing for and exposures to SARS-CoV-2. To evaluate the association between HA-SARS-CoV-2 infection and in-hospital mortality, we computed a multivariable logistic regression analysis including known risk factors for death in patients with COVID-19 as covariates.

RESULTS

Among 697 patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection, 253 (36.3%) were classified as HA. The mortality rate was higher in the HA group than in the NHA group (38.2% v. 26.4%, p = 0.001), while the rates of ICU admission (8.3% v. 19.1%, p = 0.001) and requirement for mechanical ventilation (3.6% v. 13.0%, p = 0.001) were lower. Multivariable logistic regression analysis showed that HA-SARS-CoV-2 infection in patients younger than 75 years is an independent risk factor for death (odds ratio 2.78, 95% confidence interval 1.44-5.38).

INTERPRETATION

Our results show that HA-SARS-CoV-2 infection in younger patients was associated with higher mortality. Future studies need to evaluate relevant patient-centred long-term outcomes in this population.