Swine outbreak of pandemic influenza A virus on a Canadian research farm supports human-to-swine transmission

Risk assessment of influenza transmission between workers and pigs on US indoor hog growing units

On pig farms ample opportunity exists for pig-to-human and human-to-pig (cross-species) influenza transmission. The purpose of this study was to assess the risks of cross-species influenza transmission within an indoor pig grower unit in the United States and to prioritize data gaps. Using the World Organization for Animal Health risk assessment framework we evaluated influenza transmission across two risk pathways: 1. What is the likelihood that based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one hog becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with swine (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 1a] and that at least one worker becomes infected as a result [step 1b] and that the worker develops symptoms [step 1c]? And 2. What is the likelihood that, based on current conditions on a single typical hog grower-finisher facility in the Midwest (US), during a single production cycle, at least one worker becomes infected with an influenza virus associated with people (either H1N1, H3N2, or H1N2) [step 2a] and that at least one pig becomes infected as a result [step 2b] and that the pig(s) develop(s) symptoms [step 2c]? Semi-quantitative probability and uncertainty assessments were based on literature review including passive and active influenza surveillance data. We assumed a typical pig-grower farm has capacity for 4,000 pigs, two workers, and minimal influenza control measures. Probability and uncertainty categories were assessed for each risk step and the combined risk pathway. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway one was estimated to be Very Low for H1N1 and H1N2 with an overall High level of uncertainty. The combined risk assessment for risk pathway two was estimated to be Extremely Low for H1N1 and H3N2 with a High degree of uncertainty. Scenario analyses in which influenza control measures were assumed to be implemented separately (implementing vaccinating sows, mass vaccinating incoming pigs or improved personal protective equipment adherence) showed no reduction in the combined risk category. When implementing three influenza control methods altogether, the combined risk could be reduced to Extremely Low for risk pathway one and remained Extremely Low for risk pathway two. This work highlights that multiple influenza control methods are needed to reduce the risks of inter-species influenza transmission on swine farms.

Genetic Diversity of Type A Influenza Viruses Found in Swine Herds in Northwestern Poland from 2017 to 2019: The One Health Perspective

Influenza A viruses (IAV) are still a cause of concern for public health and veterinary services worldwide. With (-) RNA-segmented genome architecture, influenza viruses are prone to reassortment and can generate a great variety of strains, some capable of crossing interspecies barriers. Seasonal IAV strains continuously spread from humans to pigs, leading to multiple reassortation events with strains endemic to swine. Due to its high adaptability to humans, a reassortant strain based on "human-like" genes could potentially be a carrier of avian origin segments responsible for high virulence, and hence become the next pandemic strain with unseen pathogenicity. The rapid evolution of sequencing methods has provided a fast and cost-efficient way to assess the genetic diversity of IAV. In this study, we investigated the genetic diversity of swine influenza viruses (swIAVs) collected from Polish farms. A total of 376 samples were collected from 11 farms. The infection was confirmed in 112 cases. The isolates were subjected to next-generation sequencing (NGS), resulting in 93 full genome sequences. Phylogenetic analysis classified 59 isolates as genotype T (H1avN2g) and 34 isolates as genotype P (H1pdmN1pdm), all of which had an internal gene cassette (IGC) derived from the H1N1pdm09-like strain. These data are consistent with evolutionary trends in European swIAVs. The applied methodology proved to be useful in monitoring the genetic diversity of IAV at the human-animal interface.

A stochastic compartmental model to simulate intra- and inter-species influenza transmission in an indoor swine farm

Common in swine production worldwide, influenza causes significant clinical disease and potential transmission to the workforce. Swine vaccines are not universally used in swine production, due to their limited efficacy because of continuously evolving influenza viruses. We evaluated the effects of vaccination, isolation of infected pigs, and changes to workforce routine (ensuring workers moved from younger pig batches to older pig batches). A Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered model was used to simulate stochastic influenza transmission during a single production cycle on an indoor hog growing unit containing 4000 pigs and two workers. The absence of control practices resulted in 3,957 pigs [0-3971] being infected and a 0.61 probability of workforce infection. Assuming incoming pigs had maternal-derived antibodies (MDAs), but no control measures were applied, the total number of infected pigs reduced to 1 [0-3958] and the probability of workforce infection was 0.25. Mass vaccination (40% efficacious) of incoming pigs also reduced the total number of infected pigs to 2362 [0-2374] or 0 [0-2364] in pigs assumed to not have MDAs and have MDAs, respectively. Changing the worker routine by starting with younger to older pig batches, reduced the number of infected pigs to 996 [0-1977] and the probability of workforce infection (0.22) in pigs without MDAs. In pigs with MDAs the total number of infected pigs was reduced to 0 [0-994] and the probability of workforce infection was 0.06. All other control practices alone, showed little improvement in reducing total infected pigs and the probability of workforce infection. Combining all control strategies reduced the total number of infected pigs to 0 or 1 with a minimal probability of workforce infection (<0.0002-0.01). These findings suggest that non-pharmaceutical interventions can reduce the impact of influenza on swine production and workers when efficacious vaccines are unavailable.

Exploring Prime-Boost Vaccination Regimens with Different H1N1 Swine Influenza A Virus Strains and Vaccine Platforms

In a previous vaccination study in pigs, heterologous prime-boost vaccination with whole-inactivated H1N1 virus vaccines (WIV) induced superior antibody responses and protection compared to homologous prime-boost vaccination. However, no pan-H1 antibody response was induced. Therefore, to stimulate both local and systemic immune responses, we first vaccinated pigs intranasally with a pseudorabies vector vaccine expressing the pH1N1 hemagglutinin (prvCA09) followed by a homologous or heterologous WIV booster vaccine. Homologous and heterologous WIV-WIV vaccinated groups and mock-vaccinated or prvCA09 single-vaccinated pigs served as control groups. Five weeks after the second vaccination, pigs were challenged with a homologous pH1N1 or one of two heterologous H1N2 swine influenza A virus strains. A single prvCA09 vaccination resulted in complete protection against homologous challenge, and vector-WIV vaccinated groups were significantly better protected against heterologous challenge compared to the challenge control group or WIV-WIV vaccinated groups. Furthermore, vector-WIV vaccination resulted in broader hemagglutination inhibition antibody responses compared to WIV-WIV vaccination and higher numbers of antibody-secreting cells in peripheral blood, draining lymph nodes and nasal mucosa. However, even though vector-WIV vaccination induced stronger antibody responses and protection, we still failed to induce a pan-H1 antibody response.

Possible bidirectional human-swine and subsequent human-human transmission of influenza virus A(H1N1)/2009 in Japan

In 2019, sows at a swine farm in Japan showed influenza-like illness (ILI) shortly after contact with an employee that exhibited ILI. Subsequently, a veterinarian became sick shortly after examining the sows and was diagnosed with influenza A virus (IAV) infection. Then, her family also contracted the infection. Subsequently, Pandemic A(H1N1)2009 viruses were isolated from all samples obtained from the sows, veterinarian and her family. Whole-genome analysis of the isolates confirmed that the viruses belonged to the same lineage (6B.1A) and the genome sequences obtained from all of the isolates were almost identical to each other. Furthermore, an epidemiological survey revealed no contact between veterinarians or their families and influenza patients prior to the onset of illness. These results strongly indicated a case of bidirectional infection between humans and sows. At the same time, we found a few unique mutations in the IAV genomes corresponding to the host species. The mutations that occurred in the virus after it was transferred from the farm worker to the sows were not observed in the humans infected from the sows, probably as a result of the mutations reverting to the original nucleotides. These results demonstrate that the bidirectional transmission of IAV is a potential risk for the next pandemic outbreak due to the emergence of new mutant strains.

Metagenomic characterization of swine slurry in a North American swine farm operation

Modern day large-scale, high-density farming environments are inherently susceptible to viral outbreaks, inadvertently creating conditions that favor increased pathogen transmission and potential zoonotic spread. Metagenomic sequencing has proven to be a useful tool for characterizing the microbial burden in both people, livestock, and environmental samples. International efforts have been successful at characterizing pathogens in commercial farming environments, especially swine farms, however it is unclear whether the full extent of microbial agents have been adequately captured or is representative of farms elsewhere. To augment international efforts we performed metagenomic next-generation sequencing on nine swine slurry and three environmental samples from a United States of America (U.S.A.) farm operation, characterized the microbial composition of slurry, and identified novel viruses. We assembled a remarkable total of 1792 viral genomes, of which 554 were novel/divergent. We assembled 1637 Picobirnavirus genome segments, of which 538 are novel. In addition, we discovered 10 new viruses belonging to a novel taxon: porcine Statoviruses; which have only been previously reported in human, macaques, mouse, and cows. We assembled 3 divergent Posaviruses and 3 swine Picornaviruses. In addition to viruses described, we found other eukaryotic genera such as Entamoeba and Blastocystis, and bacterial genera such as Listeria, Treponema, Peptoclostridium and Bordetella in the slurry. Of these, two species Entamoeba histolytica and Listeria monocytogenes known to cause human disease were detected. Further, antimicrobial resistance genes such as tetracycline and MLS (macrolide, lincosamide, streptogramin) were also identified. Metagenomic surveillance in swine fecal slurry has great potential for novel and antimicrobial resistant pathogen detection.

Co-circulation of multiple influenza A reassortants in swine harboring genes from seasonal human and swine influenza viruses

Since the influenza pandemic in 2009, there has been an increased focus on swine influenza A virus (swIAV) surveillance. This paper describes the results of the surveillance of swIAV in Danish swine from 2011 to 2018. In total, 3800 submissions were received with a steady increase in swIAV-positive submissions, reaching 56% in 2018. Full-genome sequences were obtained from 129 swIAV-positive samples. Altogether, 17 different circulating genotypes were identified including six novel reassortants harboring human seasonal IAV gene segments. The phylogenetic analysis revealed substantial genetic drift and also evidence of positive selection occurring mainly in antigenic sites of the hemagglutinin protein and confirmed the presence of a swine divergent cluster among the H1pdm09Nx (clade 1A.3.3.2) viruses. The results provide essential data for the control of swIAV in pigs and emphasize the importance of contemporary surveillance for discovering novel swIAV strains posing a potential threat to the human population.

A cluster epidemic of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection in four captive cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus)

In January 2019, four cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus) kept at a Japanese zoo intermittently showed respiratory signs following the incidence of seasonal influenza in animal caregivers. Respiratory materials (saliva, sputum and food tray swabs) were non-invasively collected from the four cheetahs. Although we were unable to isolate the virus, the NP gene of influenza A virus was detected in three of the cheetahs but not in the fourth cheetah that had nearly recovered. From a food tray swab which tested weakly positive by a commercial influenza detection kit, we were able to obtain the whole-genome sequence of the influenza A virus. Analysis of the genome, A/cheetah/Kanagawa/2/2019(H1N1), revealed that the virus was closely related to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses isolated from humans in Japan in the 2018-2019 winter. Production of haemagglutinin inhibition (HI) antibodies (64-128 HI) against an A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in plasma samples confirmed infection of all four cheetahs. The animals continued to produce antibodies for at least 314 days after disease onset. These findings strongly suggest that reverse zoonotic transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus occurred from human to cheetah and subsequently from cheetah to cheetah in the zoo. We also show that specimens can be safely and non-invasively collected from non-domesticated animals and used to investigate respiratory infectious diseases.

Reverse Zoonosis of COVID-19: Lessons From the 2009 Influenza Pandemic

Over the past decade, pandemics caused by pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus in 2009 and severe acute respiratory syndrome virus type 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in 2019 have emerged. Both are high-impact respiratory pathogens originating from animals. Their wide distribution in the human population subsequently results in an increased risk of human-to-animal transmission: reverse zoonosis. Although there have only been rare reports of reverse zoonosis events associated with the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic from SARS-CoV-2 so far, comparison with the pH1N1 influenza pandemic can provide a better understanding of the possible consequences of such events for public and animal health. The results of our review suggest that similar factors contribute to successful crossing of the host species barriers in both pandemics. Specific risk factors include sufficient interaction between infected humans and recipient animals, suitability of the animal host factors for productive virus infection, and suitability of the animal host population for viral persistence. Of particular concern is virus spread to susceptible animal species, in which group housing and contact network structure could potentially result in an alternative virus reservoir, from which reintroduction into humans can take place. Virus exposure in high-density populations could allow sustained transmission in susceptible animal species. Identification of the risk factors and serological surveillance in SARS-CoV-2-susceptible animal species that are group-housed should help reduce the threat from reverse zoonosis of COVID-19.

Molecular epidemiology and glycomics of swine influenza viruses circulating in commercial swine farms in the southeastern and midwest United States

Tracking the genetic diversity and spread of swine influenza viruses (SIVs) in commercial swine farms is central for control and to reduce the potential emergence of SIV reassortants. We analyzed the diversity of SIVs in nasal washes or oral fluids from commercial swine farms in North Carolina using influenza M qRT-PCR and hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) subtyping. We found a predominance of H1 HAs and N2 NAs in the samples examined. The majority of the H1 HAs could be further classified into gamma and delta subclusters. We also identified HAs of the H1 alpha cluster, and those of human novel pandemic origin. Glycan binding profiles from a representative subset of these viruses revealed broad α2,6 sialylated glycan recognition, though some strains exhibited the ability to bind to α2,3 sialic acid. These data show that SIV surveillance can aid our understanding of viral transmission dynamics and help uncover the diversity at the human-swine interface.

A Systematic Review Analyzing the Prevalence and Circulation of Influenza Viruses in Swine Population Worldwide

The global anxiety and a significant threat to public health due to the current COVID-19 pandemic reiterate the need for active surveillance for the zoonotic virus diseases of pandemic potential. Influenza virus due to its wide host range and zoonotic potential poses such a significant threat to public health. Swine serve as a “mixing vessel” for influenza virus reassortment and evolution which as a result may facilitate the emergence of new strains or subtypes of zoonotic potential. In this context, the currently available scientific data hold a high significance to unravel influenza virus epidemiology and evolution. With this objective, the current systematic review summarizes the original research articles and case reports of all the four types of influenza viruses reported in swine populations worldwide. A total of 281 articles were found eligible through screening of PubMed and Google Scholar databases and hence were included in this systematic review. The highest number of research articles (n = 107) were reported from Asia, followed by Americas (n = 97), Europe (n = 55), Africa (n = 18), and Australia (n = 4). The H1N1, H1N2, H3N2, and A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were the most common influenza A virus subtypes reported in swine in most countries across the globe, however, few strains of influenza B, C, and D viruses were also reported in certain countries. Multiple reports of the avian influenza virus strains documented in the last two decades in swine in China, the United States, Canada, South Korea, Nigeria, and Egypt provided the evidence of interspecies transmission of influenza viruses from birds to swine. Inter-species transmission of equine influenza virus H3N8 from horse to swine in China expanded the genetic diversity of swine influenza viruses. Additionally, numerous reports of the double and triple-reassortant strains which emerged due to reassortments among avian, human, and swine strains within swine further increased the genetic diversity of swine influenza viruses. These findings are alarming hence active surveillance should be in place to prevent future influenza pandemics.

Evidence for Cross-species Influenza A Virus Transmission Within Swine Farms, China: A One Health, Prospective Cohort Study

Background

Our understanding of influenza A virus transmission between humans and pigs is limited.

Methods

Beginning in 2015, we used a One Health approach and serial sampling to prospectively study 299 swine workers and 100 controls, their 9000 pigs, and 6 pig farm environments in China for influenza A viruses (IAVs) using molecular, culture, and immunological techniques. Study participants were closely monitored for influenza-like illness (ILI) events.

Results

Upon enrollment, swine workers had higher serum neutralizing antibody titers against swine H1N1 and higher nasal wash total immunoglobulin A (IgA) and specific IgA titers against swine H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. Over a period of 12 months, IAVs were detected by quantitative reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction in 46 of 396 (11.6%) environmental swabs, 235 of 3300 (7.1%) pig oral secretion, 23 of 396 (5.8%) water, 20 of 396 (5.1%) aerosol, and 19 of 396 (4.8%) fecal-slurry specimens. Five of 32 (15.6%) participants with ILI events had nasopharyngeal swab specimens that were positive for IAV, and 17 (53.1%) demonstrated 4-fold rises in neutralization titers against a swine virus. Reassorted Eurasian avian-lineage H1N1, A(H1N1)pdm09-like, and swine-lineage H3N2 viruses were identified in pig farms. The A(H1N1)pdm09-like H1N1 viruses identified in swine were nearly genetically identical to the human H1N1 viruses isolated from the participants with ILI.

Conclusions

There was considerable evidence of A(H1N1)pdm09-like, swine-lineage H1N1, and swine-lineage H3N2 viruses circulating, likely reassorting, and likely crossing species within the pig farms. These data suggest that stronger surveillance for novel influenza virus emergence within swine farms is imperative.

Comparison of the efficacy of a commercial inactivated influenza A/H1N1/pdm09 virus (pH1N1) vaccine and two experimental M2e-based vaccines against pH1N1 challenge in the growing pig model

Swine influenza A viruses (IAV-S) found in North American pigs are diverse and the lack of cross-protection among heterologous strains is a concern. The objective of this study was to compare a commercial inactivated A/H1N1/pdm09 (pH1N1) vaccine and two novel subunit vaccines, using IAV M2 ectodomain (M2e) epitopes as antigens, in a growing pig model. Thirty-nine 2-week-old IAV negative pigs were randomly assigned to five groups and rooms. At 3 weeks of age and again at 5 weeks of age, pigs were vaccinated intranasally with an experimental subunit particle vaccine (NvParticle/M2e) or a subunit complex-based vaccine (NvComplex/M2e) or intramuscularly with a commercial inactivated vaccine (Inact/pH1N1). At 7 weeks of age, the pigs were challenged with pH1N1 virus or sham-inoculated. Necropsy was conducted 5 days post pH1N1 challenge (dpc). At the time of challenge one of the Inact/pH1N1 pigs had seroconverted based on IAV nucleoprotein-based ELISA, Inact/pH1N1 pigs had significantly higher pdm09H1N1 hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers compared to all other groups, and M2e-specific IgG responses were detected in the NvParticle/M2e and the NvComplex/M2e pigs with significantly higher group means in the NvComplex/M2e group compared to SHAMVAC-NEG pigs. After challenge, nasal IAV RNA shedding was significantly reduced in Inact/pH1N1 pigs compared to all other pH1N1 infected groups and this group also had reduced IAV RNA in oral fluids. The macroscopic lung lesions were characterized by mild-to-severe, multifocal-to-diffuse, cranioventral dark purple consolidated areas typical of IAV infection and were similar for NvParticle/M2e, NvComplex/M2e and SHAMVAC-IAV pigs. Lesions were significantly less severe in the SHAMVAC-NEG and the Inact/pH1N1pigs. Under the conditions of this study, a commercial Inact/pH1N1 specific vaccine effectively protected pigs against homologous challenge as evidenced by reduced clinical signs, virus shedding in nasal secretions and oral fluids and reduced macroscopic and microscopic lesions whereas intranasal vaccination with experimental M2e epitope-based subunit vaccines did not. The results further highlight the importance using IAV-S type specific vaccines in pigs.

A highly pathogenic avian-derived influenza virus H5N1 with 2009 pandemic H1N1 internal genes demonstrates increased replication and transmission in pigs

This study investigated the pathogenicity and transmissibility of a reverse-genetics-derived highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 lineage influenza A virus that was isolated from a human, A/Iraq/755/06. We also examined surface gene reassortant viruses composed of the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase from A/Iraq/755/06 and the internal genes of a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus, A/New York/18/2009 (2Iraq/06 : 6NY/09 H5N1), and haemagglutinin and neuraminidase from A/New York/18/2009 with the internal genes of A/Iraq/755/06 (2NY/09 : 6Iraq/06 H1N1). The parental A/Iraq/755/06 caused little to no lesions in swine, limited virus replication was observed in the upper respiratory and lower respiratory tracts and transmission was detected in 3/5 direct-contact pigs based on seroconversion, detection of viral RNA or virus isolation. In contrast, the 2Iraq/06 : 6NY/09 H5N1 reassortant caused mild lung lesions, demonstrated sustained virus replication in the upper and lower respiratory tracts and transmitted to all contacts (5/5). The 2NY/09 : 6Iraq/06 H1N1 reassortant also caused mild lung lesions, there was evidence of virus replication in the upper respiratory and lower respiratory tracts and transmission was detected in all contacts (5/5). These studies indicate that an HPAI-derived H5N1 reassortant with pandemic internal genes may be more successful in sustaining infection in swine and that HPAI-derived internal genes were marginally compatible with pandemic 2009 H1N1 surface genes. Comprehensive surveillance in swine is critical to identify a possible emerging HPAI reassortant in all regions with HPAI in wild birds and poultry and H1N1pdm09 in pigs or other susceptible hosts.

Serological study of influenza viruses in veterinarians working with swine in Mexico

Humans and swine are both affected by influenza viruses, and swine are considered a potential source of new influenza viruses. Transmission of influenza viruses across species is well documented. The aim of this study was to evaluate the seroprevalence of different influenza virus subtypes in veterinarians working for the Mexican swine industry, using a hemagglutination inhibition test. All sera tested were collected in July 2011. The data were analysed using a generalized linear model and a linear model to study the possible association of seroprevalence with the age of the veterinarian, vaccination status, and biosecurity level of the farm where they work. The observed seroprevalence was 12.3%, 76.5%, 46.9%, and 11.1% for the human subtypes of pandemic influenza virus (pH1N1), seasonal human influenza virus (hH1N1), the swine subtypes of classical swine influenza virus (swH1N1), and triple-reassortant swine influenza virus (swH3N2), respectively. Statistical analysis indicated that age was associated with hH1N1 seroprevalence (P < 0.05). Similarly, age and vaccination were associated with pH1N1 seroprevalence (P < 0.05). On the other hand, none of the studied factors were associated with swH1N1 and swH3N2 seroprevalence. All of the pH1N1-positive sera were from vaccinated veterinarians, whereas all of those not vaccinated tested negative for this subtype. Our findings suggest that, between the onset of the 2009 pandemic and July 2011, the Mexican veterinarians working in the swine industry did not have immunity to the pH1N1 virus; hence, they would have been at risk for infection with this virus if this subtype had been circulating in swine in Mexico prior to 2011.

Are People Living Near Modern Swine Production Facilities at Increased Risk of Influenza Virus Infection?

BACKGROUND

 Swine can harbor influenza viruses that are pathogenic to humans. Previous studies support an increased risk of human influenza cases among individuals with swine contact. North Carolina has the second-largest swine industry in the United States.

METHODS

 We investigated the spatiotemporal association between influenza-like illnesses (ILIs) and licensed swine operations from 2008 to 2012 in North Carolina. We determined the week in which ILI cases peaked and statistically estimated their week of onset. This was performed for all 100 North Carolina counties for 4 consecutive influenza seasons. We used linear models to correlate the number of permitted swine operations per county with the weeks of onset and peak ILI activity.

RESULTS

 We found that during the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 influenza seasons, both seasons in which the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus circulated, ILI peaked earlier in counties with a higher number of licensed swine operations. We did not observe this in 2008-2009 or 2011-2012, nor did we observe a relationship between ILI onset week and number of swine operations.

CONCLUSIONS

 Our findings suggest that concentrated swine feeding operations amplified transmission of influenza during years in which H1N1 was circulating. This has implications for vaccine strategies targeting swine workers, as well as virologic surveillance in areas with large concentrations of swine.

Effect of herd size on subclinical infection of swine in Vietnam with influenza A viruses

Background

Influenza A viruses of swine (IAV-S) cause acute and subclinical respiratory disease. To increase our understanding of the etiology of the subclinical form and thus help prevent the persistence of IAV-S in pig populations, we conducted active virologic surveillance in Vietnam, the second-largest pig-producing country in Asia, from February 2010 to December 2013.

Results

From a total of 7034 nasal swabs collected from clinically healthy pigs at 250 farms and 10 slaughterhouses, we isolated 172 IAV-S from swine at the weaning and early-fattening stages. The isolation rate of IAV-S was significantly higher among pigs aged 3 weeks to 4.5 months than in older and younger animals. IAV-S were isolated from 16 large, corporate farms and 6 family-operated farms from among the 250 farms evaluated. Multivariate logistic regression analysis revealed that “having more than 1,000 pigs” was the most influential risk factor for IAV-S positivity. Farms affected by reassortant IAV-S had significantly larger pig populations than did those where A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses were isolated, thus suggesting that large, corporate farms serve as sites of reassortment events.

Conclusions

We demonstrate the asymptomatic circulation of IAV-S in the Vietnamese pig population. Raising a large number of pigs on a farm has the strongest impact on the incidence of subclinical IAV-S infection. Given that only some of the corporate farms surveyed were IAV-S positive, further active monitoring is necessary to identify additional risk factors important in subclinical infection of pigs with IAV-S in Vietnam.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12917-016-0844-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Transmission dynamics of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in humans and swine in backyard farms in Tumbes, Peru

Objectives

We aimed to determine the frequency of pH1N1 transmission between humans and swine on backyard farms in Tumbes, Peru.

Design

Two‐year serial cross‐sectional study comprising four sampling periods: March 2009 (pre‐pandemic), October 2009 (peak of the pandemic in Peru), April 2010 (1st post‐pandemic period), and October 2011 (2nd post‐pandemic period).

Sample

Backyard swine serum, tracheal swabs, and lung sample were collected during each sampling period.

Main outcome measures

We assessed current and past pH1N1 infection in swine through serological testing, virus culture, and RT‐PCR and compared the results with human incidence data from a population‐based active surveillance cohort study in Peru.

Results

Among 1303 swine sampled, the antibody prevalence to pH1N1 was 0% pre‐pandemic, 8% at the peak of the human pandemic (October 2009), and 24% in April 2010 and 1% in October 2011 (post‐pandemic sampling periods). Trends in swine seropositivity paralleled those seen in humans in Tumbes. The pH1N1 virus was isolated from three pigs during the peak of the pandemic. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that these viruses likely represent two separate human‐to‐swine transmission events in backyard farm settings.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that human‐to‐swine pH1N1 transmission occurred during the pandemic among backyard farms in Peru, emphasizing the importance of interspecies transmission in backyard pig populations. Continued surveillance for influenza viruses in backyard farms is warranted.

Increased risk of A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza infection in UK pig industry workers compared to a general population cohort

BACKGROUND

Pigs are mixing vessels for influenza viral reassortment, but the extent of influenza transmission between swine and humans is not well understood.

OBJECTIVES

To assess whether occupational exposure to pigs is a risk factor for human infection with human and swine-adapted influenza viruses.

METHODS

UK pig industry workers were frequency-matched on age, region, sampling month, and gender with a community-based comparison group from the Flu Watch study. HI assays quantified antibodies for swine and human A(H1) and A(H3) influenza viruses (titres ≥ 40 considered seropositive and indicative of infection). Virus-specific associations between seropositivity and occupational pig exposure were examined using multivariable regression models adjusted for vaccination. Pigs on the same farms were also tested for seropositivity.

RESULTS

Forty-two percent of pigs were seropositive to A(H1N1)pdm09. Pig industry workers showed evidence of increased odds of A(H1N1)pdm09 seropositivity compared to the comparison group, albeit with wide confidence intervals (CIs), adjusted odds ratio after accounting for possible cross-reactivity with other swine A(H1) viruses (aOR) 25·3, 95% CI (1·4-536·3), P = 0·028.

CONCLUSION

The results indicate that A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was common in UK pigs during the pandemic and subsequent period of human A(H1N1)pdm09 circulation, and occupational exposure to pigs was a risk factor for human infection. Influenza immunisation of pig industry workers may reduce transmission and the potential for virus reassortment.

The global antigenic diversity of swine influenza A viruses

Swine influenza presents a substantial disease burden for pig populations worldwide and poses a potential pandemic threat to humans. There is considerable diversity in both H1 and H3 influenza viruses circulating in swine due to the frequent introductions of viruses from humans and birds coupled with geographic segregation of global swine populations. Much of this diversity is characterized genetically but the antigenic diversity of these viruses is poorly understood. Critically, the antigenic diversity shapes the risk profile of swine influenza viruses in terms of their epizootic and pandemic potential. Here, using the most comprehensive set of swine influenza virus antigenic data compiled to date, we quantify the antigenic diversity of swine influenza viruses on a multi-continental scale. The substantial antigenic diversity of recently circulating viruses in different parts of the world adds complexity to the risk profiles for the movement of swine and the potential for swine-derived infections in humans.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.12217.001

Influenza viruses, commonly called flu, infect millions of people and animals every year and occasionally causes pandemics in humans. The immune system can neutralise flu viruses by recognising the proteins on the virus surface, generically referred to as antigens. These antigens change as flu viruses evolve to escape detection by the immune system. These changes tend to be relatively small such that exposure to one flu virus generates immunity that is still effective against other related flu viruses. However, over time, the accumulation of these small changes can result in larger differences such that prior infections no longer provide protection against the new virus.

Influenza A viruses infect a wide variety of birds and mammals. Viruses can also transmit from one species to another, which may result in the introduction of viruses with antigens that are new to the recipient species and which have the potential to cause substantial outbreaks. Pig flu viruses have long been considered to be a potential risk for human pandemic viruses and were the source of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus. Importantly, humans often transmit flu viruses to pigs. Understanding the dynamics and consequences of this two-way transmission is important for designing effective strategies to detect and respond to new strains of flu.

Influenza A viruses of the H1 and H3 subtypes circulate widely in pigs. However, it was poorly understood how closely related swine and human viruses circulating in different regions were to one another and how much the antigens varied between the different viruses.

Lewis, Russell et al. have now analysed the antigenic variation of hundreds of H1 and H3 viruses from pigs on multiple continents. The antigenic diversity of recent swine flu viruses resembles the diversity of H1 and H3 viruses observed in humans over the last 40 years. A key factor driving the diversity of the H1 and H3 viruses in pigs is the frequent introduction of human viruses to pigs. In contrast, only one flu virus from a bird had contributed to the observed antigenic diversity in pigs in a substantial way.

Once in pigs, human-derived flu viruses continue to evolve their antigens. This results in a tremendous diversity of flu viruses that can be transmitted to other pigs and also to humans. These flu viruses could pose a serious risk to public health because they are no longer similar to the current human flu strains. These findings have important implications not only for developing flu vaccines for pigs but also for informing the development of more-effective surveillance and disease-control strategies to prevent the spread of new flu variants.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.12217.002

Characterization of Viral Load, Viability and Persistence of Influenza A Virus in Air and on Surfaces of Swine Production Facilities

Indirect transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) in swine is poorly understood and information is lacking on levels of environmental exposure encountered by swine and people during outbreaks of IAV in swine barns. We characterized viral load, viability and persistence of IAV in air and on surfaces during outbreaks in swine barns. IAV was detected in pigs, air and surfaces from five confirmed outbreaks with 48% (47/98) of oral fluid, 38% (32/84) of pen railing and 43% (35/82) of indoor air samples testing positive by IAV RT-PCR. IAV was isolated from air and oral fluids yielding a mixture of subtypes (H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2). Detection of IAV RNA from air was sustained during the outbreaks with maximum levels estimated between 7 and 11 days from reported onset. Our results indicate that during outbreaks of IAV in swine, aerosols and surfaces in barns contain significant levels of IAV potentially representing an exposure hazard to both swine and people.

Swine Influenza Virus and Association with the Porcine Respiratory Disease Complex in Pig Farms in Southern Brazil

Despite the putative endemic status of swine influenza A virus (swIAV) infections, data on the occurrence of swine influenza outbreaks are scarce in Brazil. The aim of this study was to detect and subtype swIAVs from six outbreaks of porcine respiratory disease complex (PRDC) in southern Brazil. Nasal swabs were collected from 66 piglets with signs of respiratory disease in six herds. Lung tissue samples were collected from six necropsied animals. Virus detection was performed by PCR screening and confirmed by virus isolation and hemagglutination (HA). Influenza A subtyping was performed by a real-time reverse transcriptase PCR (rRT-PCR) to detect the A(H1N1)pdm09; other swIAV subtypes were determined by multiplex RT-PCR. In lung tissues, the major bacterial and viral pathogens associated with PRDC (Pasteurella multocida, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, Haemophilus parasuis and PCV2) were investigated. In some affected pigs, clinico-pathological evaluations were conducted. Influenza A was detected by screening PCR in 46 of 66 swab samples and from five of six lungs. Virus was recovered from pigs of all six herds. Subtype A(H1N1)pdm09 was detected in four of six herds and H1N2 in the other two herds. In lung tissues, further agents involved in PRDC were detected in all cases; Pasteurella multocida was identified in five of six samples and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae in three of six. Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (1/6), Haemophilus parasuis (1/6) and PCV2 (1/6) were also detected. These findings indicate that subtypes A(H1N1)pdm09 and H1N2 were present in pigs in southern Brazil and were associated with PRDC outbreaks.

Analysis of Coinfections with A/H1N1 Strain Variants among Pigs in Poland by Multitemperature Single-Strand Conformational Polymorphism

Monitoring and control of infections are key parts of surveillance systems and epidemiological risk prevention. In the case of influenza A viruses (IAVs), which show high variability, a wide range of hosts, and a potential of reassortment between different strains, it is essential to study not only people, but also animals living in the immediate surroundings. If understated, the animals might become a source of newly formed infectious strains with a pandemic potential. Special attention should be focused on pigs, because of the receptors specific for virus strains originating from different species, localized in their respiratory tract. Pigs are prone to mixed infections and may constitute a reservoir of potentially dangerous IAV strains resulting from genetic reassortment. It has been reported that a quadruple reassortant, A(H1N1)pdm09, can be easily transmitted from humans to pigs and serve as a donor of genetic segments for new strains capable of infecting humans. Therefore, it is highly desirable to develop a simple, cost-effective, and rapid method for evaluation of IAV genetic variability. We describe a method based on multitemperature single-strand conformational polymorphism (MSSCP), using a fragment of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene, for detection of coinfections and differentiation of genetic variants of the virus, difficult to identify by conventional diagnostic.

Control of a Reassortant Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus Outbreak in an Intensive Swine Breeding Farm: Effect of Vaccination and Enhanced Farm Management Practices

Influenza A viruses in swine cause considerable economic losses and raise concerns about their zoonotic potential. The current paucity of thorough empirical assessments of influenza A virus infection levels in swine herds under different control interventions hinders our understanding of their effectiveness. Between 2012 and 2013, recurrent outbreaks of respiratory disease caused by a reassortant pandemic 2009 H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus were registered in a swine breeding farm in North-East Italy, providing the opportunity to assess an outbreak response plan based on vaccination and enhanced farm management. All sows/gilts were vaccinated with a H1N1pdm-specific vaccine, biosecurity was enhanced, weaning cycles were lengthened, and cross-fostering of piglets was banned. All tested piglets had maternally-derived antibodies at 30 days of age and were detectable in 5.3% of ~90 day-old piglets. There was a significant reduction in H1N1pdm RT-PCR detections after the intervention. Although our study could not fully determine the extent to which the observed trends in seropositivity or RT-PCR positivity among piglets were due to the intervention or to the natural course of the disease in the herd, we provided suggestive evidence that the applied measures were useful in controlling the outbreak, even without an all-in/all-out system, while keeping farm productivity at full.

Reassortant swine influenza viruses isolated in Japan contain genes from pandemic A(H1N1) 2009

In 2013, three reassortant swine influenza viruses (SIVs)-two H1N2 and one H3N2-were isolated from symptomatic pigs in Japan; each contained genes from the pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 virus and endemic SIVs. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the two H1N2 viruses, A/swine/Gunma/1/2013 and A/swine/Ibaraki/1/2013, were reassortants that contain genes from the following three distinct lineages: (i) H1 and nucleoprotein (NP) genes derived from a classical swine H1 HA lineage uniquely circulating among Japanese SIVs; (ii) neuraminidase (NA) genes from human-like H1N2 swine viruses; and (iii) other genes from pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 viruses. The H3N2 virus, A/swine/Miyazaki/2/2013, comprised genes from two sources: (i) hemagglutinin (HA) and NA genes derived from human and human-like H3N2 swine viruses and (ii) other genes from pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 viruses. Phylogenetic analysis also indicated that each of the reassortants may have arisen independently in Japanese pigs. A/swine/Miyazaki/2/2013 were found to have strong antigenic reactivities with antisera generated for some seasonal human-lineage viruses isolated during or before 2003, whereas A/swine/Miyazaki/2/2013 reactivities with antisera against viruses isolated after 2004 were clearly weaker. In addition, antisera against some strains of seasonal human-lineage H1 viruses did not react with either A/swine/Gunma/1/2013 or A/swine/Ibaraki/1/2013. These findings indicate that emergence and spread of these reassortant SIVs is a potential public health risk.

Reverse zoonosis of influenza to swine: new perspectives on the human-animal interface

The origins of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in swine are unknown, highlighting gaps in our understanding of influenza A virus (IAV) ecology and evolution. We review how recently strengthened influenza virus surveillance in pigs has revealed that influenza virus transmission from humans to swine is far more frequent than swine-to-human zoonosis, and is central in seeding swine globally with new viral diversity. The scale of global human-to-swine transmission represents the largest 'reverse zoonosis' of a pathogen documented to date. Overcoming the bias towards perceiving swine as sources of human viruses, rather than recipients, is key to understanding how the bidirectional nature of the human-animal interface produces influenza threats to both hosts.

Comparative virulence of wild-type H1N1pdm09 influenza A isolates in swine

In 2009, a novel swine-origin H1N1 (H1N1pdm09) influenza A virus (IAV) reached pandemic status and was soon after detected in pigs worldwide. The objective of this study was to evaluate whether differences in the HA protein can affect pathogenicity and antigenicity of H1N1pdm09 in swine. We compared lung pathology, viral replication and shedding and the antigenic relationships of four wild-type H1N1pdm09 viruses in pigs: one human (CA/09) and three isolated in swine after the pandemic (IL/09, IL/10, and MN/10). The swine strains were selected based upon unique amino acid substitutions in the HA protein. All selected viruses resulted in mild disease and viral shedding through nasal and oral fluids, however, viral replication and the degree of pathology varied between the isolates. A/Swine/IL/5265/2010 (IL/10), with substitutions I120M, S146G, S186P, V252M, had lower viral titers in the lungs and nasal secretions and fewer lung lesions. The other two swine viruses caused respiratory pathology and replicated to titers similar to the human CA/09, although MN/10 (with mutations D45Y, K304E, A425S) had lower nasal shedding. Swine-adapted H1N1pdm09 have zoonotic potential, and have reassorted with other co-circulating swine viruses, influencing the evolution of IAV in swine globally. Further, our results suggest that amino acid changes in the HA gene have the potential to alter the virulence of H1N1pdm09 in swine. Importantly, the limited clinical signs in pigs could result in continued circulation of these viruses with other endemic swine IAVs providing opportunities for reassortment.

Influenza A virus infection of healthy piglets in an abattoir in Brazil: animal-human interface and risk for interspecies transmission

Asymptomatic influenza virus infections in pigs are frequent and the lack of measures for controlling viral spread facilitates the circulation of different virus strains between pigs. The goal of this study was to demonstrate the circulation of influenza A virus strains among asymptomatic piglets in an abattoir in Brazil and discuss the potential public health impacts. Tracheal samples (n = 330) were collected from asymptomatic animals by a veterinarian that also performed visual lung tissue examinations. No slaughtered animals presented with any noticeable macroscopic signs of influenza infection following examination of lung tissues. Samples were then analysed by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction that resulted in the identification of 30 (9%) influenza A positive samples. The presence of asymptomatic pig infections suggested that these animals could facilitate virus dissemination and act as a source of infection for the herd, thereby enabling the emergence of influenza outbreaks associated with significant economic losses. Furthermore, the continuous exposure of the farm and abattoir workers to the virus increases the risk for interspecies transmission. Monitoring measures of swine influenza virus infections and vaccination and monitoring of employees for influenza infection should also be considered. In addition regulatory agencies should consider the public health ramifications regarding the potential zoonotic viral transmission between humans and pigs.

Swine worker awareness and behavior regarding prevention of zoonotic influenza transmission

ABSTRACT A convenience survey of swine workers on large and small commercial farms in the Northeast and Midwest United States regarding zoonotic influenza awareness and precautions was conducted. Workers reported low levels of concern regarding the risk of contracting influenza from swine, and were generally not aware of national guidelines for influenza prevention. Use of personal protective equipment (PPE) varied by task, N95 respirator use was rare, and no workers were enrolled in respirator programs. Reported influenza vaccination coverage was greater than the national average in 2009-2010, but declined in 2010-2011. Workers on large farms were more likely to use PPE in some tasks and to report using more precautions when pigs appeared ill. Although reporting low levels of concern regarding zoonotic influenza and low adherence to national influenza guidelines, swine workers reported making task-based and risk-based decisions about use of PPE, suggesting opportunities for enhanced prevention of zoonotic disease transmission.

Awareness and practices regarding zoonotic influenza prevention in Romanian swine workers

BACKGROUND

Swine workers may play a key role in transmission of zoonotic influenza viruses. At the same time, little is known about the extent and effectiveness of influenza prevention programs for these at-risk workers.

OBJECTIVES

To characterize practices and attitudes regarding zoonotic influenza transmission among swine workers in Romania.

METHODS

We conducted a convenience survey of swine workers in Romania. The confidential survey included questions about awareness of zoonotic influenza risk, work tasks performed, flu vaccination status, and reported influenza-like illness.

RESULTS

A total of 103 workers at seven farms completed the survey. The percentage of workers reporting concern about either contracting influenza from pigs or giving influenza to pigs was 78% and 70%, respectively. Although 60% of workers reported having a sick-leave policy at work, only 7% of workers reported receiving seasonal influenza vaccination during the past flu season. Only 5% of the workers reported flu-like illness during the past year while 3% of workers reported that pigs appeared sick with influenza over the same time period. The majority of workers reported using protective overalls and rubber boots during swine work, with lower rates of use of gloves. Reported use of respiratory protection was rare, and use of any personal protective equipment did not differ when pigs appeared ill.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite awareness and concern regarding zoonotic influenza, Romanian swine workers report low rates of influenza vaccine or respiratory protection. As part of global pandemic influenza preparedness, enhanced prevention programs for swine workers should address such gaps.

One-Health Simulation Modelling: A Case Study of Influenza Spread between Human and Swine Populations using NAADSM

The circulation of zoonotic influenza A viruses including pH1N1 2009 and H5N1 continue to present a constant threat to animal and human populations. Recently, an H3N2 variant spread from pigs to humans and between humans in limited numbers. Accordingly, this research investigated a range of scenarios of the transmission dynamics of pH1N1 2009 virus at the swine-human interface while accounting for different percentages of swine workers initially immune. Furthermore, the feasibility of using NAADSM (North American Animal Disease Spread Model) applied as a one-health simulation model was assessed. The study population included 488 swine herds and 29, 707 households of people within a county in Ontario, Canada. Households were categorized as follows: (i) rural households with swine workers, (ii) rural households without swine workers, and (iii) urban households without swine workers. Forty-eight scenarios were investigated, based on the combination of six scenarios around the transmissibility of the virus at the interface and four vaccination coverage levels of swine workers (0-60%), all under two settings of either swine or human origin of the virus. Outcomes were assessed in terms of stochastic 'die-out' fraction, size and time to peak epidemic day, overall size and duration of the outbreaks. The modelled outcomes indicated that minimizing influenza transmissibility at the interface and targeted vaccination of swine workers had significant beneficial effects. Our results indicate that NAADSM can be used as a framework to model the spread and control of contagious zoonotic diseases among animal and human populations, under certain simplifying assumptions. Further evaluation of the model is required. In addition to these specific findings, this study serves as a benchmark that can provide useful input to a future one-health influenza modelling studies. Some pertinent information gaps were also identified. Enhanced surveillance and the collection of high-quality information for more accurate parameterization of such models are encouraged.

Reverse zoonotic disease transmission (zooanthroponosis): a systematic review of seldom-documented human biological threats to animals

Background

Research regarding zoonotic diseases often focuses on infectious diseases animals have given to humans. However, an increasing number of reports indicate that humans are transmitting pathogens to animals. Recent examples include methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, influenza A virus, Cryptosporidium parvum, and Ascaris lumbricoides. The aim of this review was to provide an overview of published literature regarding reverse zoonoses and highlight the need for future work in this area.

Methods

An initial broad literature review yielded 4763 titles, of which 4704 were excluded as not meeting inclusion criteria. After careful screening, 56 articles (from 56 countries over three decades) with documented human-to-animal disease transmission were included in this report.

Findings

In these publications, 21 (38%) pathogens studied were bacterial, 16 (29%) were viral, 12 (21%) were parasitic, and 7 (13%) were fungal, other, or involved multiple pathogens. Effected animals included wildlife (n = 28, 50%), livestock (n = 24, 43%), companion animals (n = 13, 23%), and various other animals or animals not explicitly mentioned (n = 2, 4%). Published reports of reverse zoonoses transmission occurred in every continent except Antarctica therefore indicating a worldwide disease threat.

Interpretation

As we see a global increase in industrial animal production, the rapid movement of humans and animals, and the habitats of humans and wild animals intertwining with great complexity, the future promises more opportunities for humans to cause reverse zoonoses. Scientific research must be conducted in this area to provide a richer understanding of emerging and reemerging disease threats. As a result, multidisciplinary approaches such as One Health will be needed to mitigate these problems.

Detection and isolation of Influenza A virus subtype H1N1 from a small backyard swine herd in Colorado

Influenza A virus subtype H1N1 A(H1N1)pdm09 was first confirmed in pigs in the United States in October 2009. In November 2010, lungs and intestines from 2 York piglets from a small, privately owned herd were submitted to the Colorado State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. The submitting veterinarian reported rapid weight loss and signs of pneumonia in the piglets. Gross lesions included caudoventral pneumonia in both piglets, and histologic lesions in the lungs showed characteristics consistent with influenza virus and bacterial infection. Ribonucleic acid extracted from fresh lung homogenates from both piglets was positive for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 by a real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. Virus was isolated from lung homogenates from both piglets in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells, as well as in 10-day-old specific pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs. Sequence analysis showed 98% homology with 2009 H1N1 human isolates from across the United States and 98% homology against two 2009 and 2010 swine isolates from Nebraska and Minnesota. The current report documents the possible transmission of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus [A(H1N1)pdm09] from a human being to a small, privately owned backyard swine herd. The owner was employed as a pharmacist, making occupational exposure to the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 a possibility.

Pandemic influenza A H1N1 in Swine and other animals

Influenza A virus infection has been reported in a variety of mammalian and avian species. Wild waterfowl such as ducks and geese are considered the principal reservoir of many influenza A viruses. On May 2, 2009, the first confirmed case of pandemic 2009 H1N1 (pH1N1) in animals was reported in a small swine herd in Canada. A public health investigation concluded that transmission from people to pigs was the likely source of infection. Subsequently the pH1N1 virus has been reported in turkeys, cats, dogs, ferrets, and several wildlife species. Human to animal transmission has been confirmed or suspected in a number of cases. The naming of the virus as "swine flu" in the international media led to a drop in the demand for pork and subsequently a reduction in the price of pork paid to farmers. Estimates of losses to pork producers in North America run into hundreds of millions of dollars. Increased surveillance of swine populations for influenza viruses has been suggested as a control measure against the development of future pandemic viruses. In order to be successful, future surveillance and reporting policies must include provisions to protect the livelihoods of farmers.

Indirect Transmission of Influenza A Virus between Pig Populations under Two Different Biosecurity Settings

Respiratory disease due to influenza virus is common in both human and swine populations around the world with multiple transmission routes capable of transmitting influenza virus, including indirect routes. The objective of this study was to evaluate the role of fomites in influenza A virus (IAV) transmission between pig populations separated by two different biosecurity settings. Thirty-five pigs were divided into four experimental groups: 10 pigs (1 replicate) were assigned to the infected group (I), 10 pigs (2 replicates of 5 pigs) were assigned to the low biosecurity sentinel group (LB), 10 pigs (2 replicates of 5 pigs) were assigned to the medium biosecurity sentinel group (MB), and 5 pigs (1 replicate) were assigned to the negative control group (NC). Eight of 10 pigs in the infected group were inoculated with IAV and 36 hours following inoculation, personnel movement events took place in order to move potentially infectious clothing and personal protective equipment (PPE) to sentinel pig rooms. Following contact with the infected group, personnel moved to the MB group after designated hygiene measures while personnel moved directly to the LB group. Nasal swabs and blood samples were collected from pigs to assess IAV infection status and fomites were sampled and tested via RRT-PCR. All experimentally inoculated pigs were infected with IAV and 11 of the 144 fomite samples collected following contact with infected pigs were low level positive for IAV genome. One replicate of each sentinel groups LB and MB became infected with IAV and all five pigs were infected over time. This study provides evidence that fomites can serve as an IAV transmission route from infected to sentinel pigs and highlights the need to focus on indirect routes as well as direct routes of transmission for IAV.

The 2009 pandemic (H1N1) viruses isolated from pigs show enhanced pathogenicity in mice

Since the emergence of the 2009 pandemic (H1N1) virus (2009/H1N1) in April 2009, cases of transmission from humans to pigs have been reported frequently. In our previous studies, four 2009/H1N1 variants were isolated from pigs. To better understand the phenotypic differences of the pig isolates compared with the human isolate, in this study mice were inoculated intranasally with different 2009/H1N1 viruses, and monitored for morbidity, mortality, and viral replication, cytokine production and pathological changes in the lungs. The results show that all isolates show effective replication in lungs, but varying in their ability to cause morbidity. In particular, the strains of A/swine/Nanchang/3/2010 (H1N1) and A/swine/Nanchang/F9/2010 (H1N1) show the greatest virulence with a persisting replication in lungs and high lethality for mice, compared with the human isolate A/Liaoning /14/2009 (H1N1), which shows low virulence in mice. Furthermore, the lethal strains could induce more severe lung pathological changes and higher production of cytokines than that of other strains at an early stage. Amino acid sequence analysis illustrates prominent differences in viral surface glycoproteins and polymerase subunits between pig isolates and human strains that might correlate with their phenotypic differences. These studies demonstrate that the 2009/H1N1 pig isolates exhibit heterogeneous infectivity and pathogencity in mice, and some strains possess an enhanced pathogenicity compared with the human isolate.

Outbreak of influenza A (H3N2) variant virus infection among attendees of an agricultural fair, Pennsylvania, USA, 2011

Avoiding or limiting contact with swine at agricultural events may help prevent A(H3N2)v virus infections in such settings.

During August 2011, influenza A (H3N2) variant [A(H3N2)v] virus infection developed in a child who attended an agricultural fair in Pennsylvania, USA; the virus resulted from reassortment of a swine influenza virus with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. We interviewed fair attendees and conducted a retrospective cohort study among members of an agricultural club who attended the fair. Probable and confirmed cases of A(H3N2)v virus infection were defined by serology and genomic sequencing results, respectively. We identified 82 suspected, 4 probable, and 3 confirmed case-patients who attended the fair. Among 127 cohort study members, the risk for suspected case status increased as swine exposure increased from none (4%; referent) to visiting swine exhibits (8%; relative risk 2.1; 95% CI 0.2–53.4) to touching swine (16%; relative risk 4.4; 95% CI 0.8–116.3). Fairs may be venues for zoonotic transmission of viruses with epidemic potential; thus, health officials should investigate respiratory illness outbreaks associated with agricultural events.

Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection in Norwegian swine herds 2009/10: the risk of human to swine transmission

Influenza A viruses cause respiratory infection in humans and pigs, and some serotypes can be transmitted between these species. The emergence of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infections in the spring of 2009 quickly led to a worldwide pandemic in humans, with subsequent introduction of the virus to pig populations. Following a widespread infection in the human population in Norway, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was introduced to the influenza A naïve Norwegian pig population, and within a few months pigs in more than one third of Norwegian swine herds had antibodies against the virus. A cross-sectional study was performed on all swine nucleus and multiplier herds in Norway to analyze risk factors for introduction of infection, and the preventive effects of recommended biosecurity practices. A surveillance program provided information on infection status of the study herds, and a questionnaire was administered to all 118 nucleus and multiplier herds to collect information on herd variables. The surveillance program revealed that pigs in 42% of the herds had antibodies against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The incidence of serologically positive pigs was similar in both multiplier herds (41%) and closed nucleus herds (43%). Multivariable logistic regression showed that presence of farm staff with influenza-like illness (ILI) (OR = 4.15, CI 1.5–11.4, p = 0.005) and herd size (OR = 1.01, CI 1–1.02, p = 0.009) were risk factors for infection. The rapid and widespread seroconversion for antibodies against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in the Norwegian pig population can be explained by the emergence of a novel virus that is readily transmitted between people and swine in a largely susceptible population of humans, and an entirely naïve population of pigs.

Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus among healthy show pigs, United States

Because animals can transmit some diseases to people, it is wise to be cautious around animals that carry these diseases. But how do you know which animals are carrying disease? Sometimes they appear perfectly healthy. A study of 57 apparently healthy show pigs at a 2009 US state fair found that almost 20% were carrying influenza virus and at least 4 were carrying the 2009 pandemic virus. Of concern is the possibility that different types of influenza virus—pandemic, swine, avian—could combine in pigs and emerge as new viruses that then spread to humans. Swine workers, veterinarians, and other persons with pig contact may be at high risk for infection with pig influenza and should receive seasonal influenza vaccines, use personal protective equipment when working with healthy pigs, and limit their contact with sick pigs. Regular monitoring of influenza virus among pigs and testing of sick persons who have been exposed to pigs are needed.

Within 5 months after the earliest detection of human influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, we found molecular and culture evidence of the virus in healthy US show pigs. The mixing of humans and pigs at swine shows possibly could further the geographic and cross-species spread of influenza A viruses.

Infection dynamics of pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus in a two-site swine herd

Influenza A viruses are common causes of respiratory disease in pigs and can be transmitted among multiple host species, including humans. The current lack of published information on infection dynamics of influenza viruses within swine herds hinders the ability to make informed animal health, biosecurity and surveillance programme decisions. The objectives of this serial cross-sectional study were to describe the infection dynamics of influenza virus in a two-site swine system by estimating the prevalence of influenza virus in animal subpopulations at the swine breeding herd and describing the temporal pattern of infection in a selected cohort of growing pigs weaned from the breeding herd. Nasal swab and blood samples were collected at approximately 30-day intervals from the swine breeding herd (Site 1) known to be infected with pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus. Sows, gilts and neonatal pigs were sampled at each sampling event, and samples were tested for influenza virus genome using matrix gene RRT-PCR. Influenza virus was detected in neonatal pigs, but was not detected in sow or gilt populations via RRT-PCR. A virus genetically similar to that detected in the neonatal pig population at Site 1 was also detected at the wean-to-finish site (Site 2), presumably following transportation of infected weaned pigs. Longitudinal sampling of nasal swabs and oral fluids revealed that influenza virus persisted in the growing pigs at Site 2 for at least 69 days. The occurrence of influenza virus in neonatal pigs, but not breeding females, at Site 1 emphasizes the potential for virus maintenance in this dynamic subpopulation, the importance of including this subpopulation in surveillance programmes and the potential transport of influenza virus between sites via the movement of weaned pigs.

The impact of maternally derived immunity on influenza A virus transmission in neonatal pig populations

The commonality of influenza A virus (IAV) exposure and vaccination on swine farms in the United States ensures that the majority of neonatal pigs will have some degree of maternal immunity to IAV. The influence of maternal immunity on IAV transmission in neonatal pig populations will impact virus prevalence and infection dynamics across pig populations. The main objective of this study was to assess the impact of maternally derived immunity on IAV transmission in an experimental setting. Neonatal pigs suckled colostrum and derived maternal (passive) immunity from sows in one of three treatment groups: (a) non-vaccinated control (CTRL) or vaccinated with (b) homologous (PASSV-HOM) or (c) heterologous (PASSV-HET) inactivated experimental IAV vaccines. Sentinel neonatal pigs derived from the groups above were challenged with IAV via direct contact with an experimentally infected pig (seeder pig) and monitored for IAV infection daily via nasal swab sampling. A susceptible-infectious-recovered (SIR) experimental model was used to obtain and estimate transmission parameters in each treatment group via a generalized linear model. All sentinel pigs in the CTRL (30/30) and PASSV-HET (30/30) groups were infected with IAV following contact with the seeder pigs and the reproduction ratio estimates (95% confidence interval) were 10.4 (6.6-15.8) and 7.1 (4.2-11.3), respectively. In contrast, 1/20 sentinel pigs in the PASSV-HOM group was infected following contact with the seeder pigs and the reproduction ratio estimate was significantly lower compared to the CTRL and PASSV-HET groups at 0.8 (0.1-3.7). Under the conditions of this study, IAV transmission was reduced in neonatal pigs with homologous maternal immunity compared to seronegative neonatal pigs and pigs with heterologous maternal immunity as defined in this study. This study provides estimates for IAV transmission in pigs with differing types of maternal immunity which may describe the influence of maternal immunity on IAV prevalence and infection dynamics in pig populations.

Orientações para o diagnóstico de influenza em suínos

Este trabalho descreve a colheita adequada de amostras, as técnicas/procedimentos disponíveis para o diagnóstico de influenza A em suínos, assim como os resultados e suas respectivas interpretações, para auxiliar médicos veterinários de campo na identificação dessa doença. Em suínos vivos, as amostras adequadas são: secreção nasal, fluido oral e sangue (soro). Para suínos mortos, colher preferencialmente amostras de pulmão com consolidação cranioventral. Secreção nasal e fragmentos de pulmão refrigerado são utilizados para detectar partícula viral viável (isolamento viral - IV) ou ácido nucleico viral (RT-PCR convencional e RT-PCR em tempo real). As amostras não devem ser congeladas, pois o vírus é inativado a -20°C. A caracterização molecular dos isolados é feita pela análise filogenética obtida pelo sequenciamento de DNA. O soro é utilizado para a detecção de anticorpos (Acs) por meio do teste da inibição da hemaglutinação e ELISA. O fluido oral pode ser utilizado para detecção de anticorpo (ELISA) ou de vírus. Fragmentos de pulmão fixados em formol a 10% são examinados microscopicamente para identificar pneumonia broncointersticial e para detecção de antígeno viral pela imuno-histoquímica (IHQ). Para o sucesso do diagnóstico, as amostras devem ser colhidas de suínos que estão preferencialmente na fase aguda da doença, para aumentar as chances de detecção viral. As melhores opções para o diagnóstico de influenza A em suínos vivos são RT-PCR e isolamento viral de amostras de swab nasal ou fluido oral. Pulmão para análise por RT-PCR, isolamento viral ou IHQ é a amostra de escolha em suínos mortos. Testes sorológicos têm valor diagnóstico limitado e são utilizados apenas para determinar o estado imune do rebanho, não indicando doença clínica, pois os Acs são detectados 7-10 dias pós-infecção (fase subaguda). O diagnóstico de influenza é importante para avaliar o envolvimento desse agente no complexo de doença respiratória suína. Além disso, o isolamento do vírus influenza é essencial para o monitoramento dos principais subtipos circulantes em uma determinada região ou país, assim como para a detecção de novos rearranjos virais, já que influenza é considerada uma zoonose.

Molecular characterization of porcine SARM1 and its role in regulating TLRs signaling during highly pathogenic porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus infection in vivo

Toll-like receptors (TLRs) are important pattern-recognition receptors (PRRs) that trigger innate immune response and mediate acquired immunity. Evidence has shown that SARM1 (sterile-α and TIR motif containing protein 1) is one of five TIR domain-containing adaptor proteins involved in TLRs signaling transduction. In the present study, a full-length cDNA sequence was cloned for the porcine SARM1 gene, which contains nine exons. Using the radiation hybrid mapping approach, we assigned the porcine gene to SSC12 q13. Under the normal condition, porcine SARM1 was highly expressed in brain and spleen. Polyinosinic-polycytidylic acid (poly (I:C)) weakly induced the porcine SARM1 expression in the early stimulation. We found that porcine SARM1 protein is localized in mitochondria and attenuates NF-κB activation induced by stimulation and infection. The quantitative real-time PCR (Q-PCR) analysis showed that the expression of porcine SARM1 significantly decreased in several tissues of Tongcheng pigs infected with highly pathogenic porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (HP-PRRSV). Gene-interaction network analysis for porcine SARM1 in porcine alveolar macrophages (PAMs) showed that down-regulation of SARM1 gene in infected Tongcheng pig may modulate TRIF-depend TLRs signaling and regulate the expression of disease-resistant genes and inflammatory genes. Our findings provide evidence that porcine SARM1 may play an important role in immune regulation with PRRSV infection.

Estimating reassortment rates in co-circulating Eurasian swine influenza viruses

Swine have often been considered as a mixing vessel for different influenza strains. In order to assess their role in more detail, we undertook a retrospective sequencing study to detect and characterize the reassortants present in European swine and to estimate the rate of reassortment between H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes with Eurasian (avian-like) internal protein-coding segments. We analysed 69 newly obtained whole genome sequences of subtypes H1N1-H3N2 from swine influenza viruses sampled between 1982 and 2008, using Illumina and 454 platforms. Analyses of these genomes, together with previously published genomes, revealed a large monophyletic clade of Eurasian swine-lineage polymerase segments containing H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes. We subsequently examined reassortments between the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase segments and estimated the reassortment rates between lineages using a recently developed evolutionary analysis method. High rates of reassortment between H1N2 and H1N1 Eurasian swine lineages were detected in European strains, with an average of one reassortment every 2-3 years. This rapid reassortment results from co-circulating lineages in swine, and in consequence we should expect further reassortments between currently circulating swine strains and the recent swine-origin H1N1v pandemic strain.