Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures

Avian influenza viruses (AIV) remain prevalent among wild bird populations in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA), leading to significant illness in and death of birds. Transmission between bird and mammal species has been observed, particularly in fur animal farms, where outbreaks have been reported. While transmission from infected birds to humans is rare, there have been instances of exposure to these viruses since 2020 without any symptomatic infections reported in the EU/EEA. However, these viruses continue to evolve globally, and with the migration of wild birds, new strains carrying potential mutations for mammalian adaptation could be selected. If avian A(H5N1) influenza viruses acquire the ability to spread efficiently among humans, large-scale transmission could occur due to the lack of immune defences against H5 viruses in humans. The emergence of AIV capable of infecting mammals, including humans, can be facilitated by various drivers. Some intrinsic drivers are related to virus characteristics or host susceptibility. Other drivers are extrinsic and may increase exposure of mammals and humans to AIV thereby stimulating mutation and adaptation to mammals. Extrinsic drivers include the ecology of host species, such as including wildlife, human activities like farming practices and the use of natural resources, climatic and environmental factors. One Health measures to mitigate the risk of AIV adapting to mammals and humans focus on limiting exposure and preventing spread. Key options for actions include enhancing surveillance targeting humans and animals, ensuring access to rapid diagnostics, promoting collaboration between animal and human sectors, and implementing preventive measures such as vaccination. Effective communication to different involved target audiences should be emphasised, as well as strengthening veterinary infrastructure, enforcing biosecurity measures at farms, and reducing wildlife contact with domestic animals. Careful planning of poultry and fur animal farming, especially in areas with high waterfowl density, is highlighted for effective risk reduction.

Avian influenza overview December 2022 - March 2023

Between 3 December 2022 and 1 March 2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, was reported in Europe in domestic (522) and wild (1,138) birds over 24 countries. An unexpected number of HPAI virus detections in sea birds were observed, mainly in gull species and particularly in black-headed gulls (large mortality events were observed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy). The close genetic relationship among viruses collected from black-headed gulls suggests a southward spread of the virus. Moreover, the genetic analyses indicate that the virus persisted in Europe in residential wild birds during and after the summer months. Although the virus retained a preferential binding for avian-like receptors, several mutations associated to increased zoonotic potential were detected. The risk of HPAI virus infection for poultry due to the virus circulating in black-headed gulls and other gull species might increase during the coming months, as breeding bird colonies move inland with possible overlap with poultry production areas. Worldwide, HPAI A(H5N1) virus continued to spread southward in the Americas, from Mexico to southern Chile. The Peruvian pelican was the most frequently reported infected species with thousands of deaths being reported. The reporting of HPAI A(H5N1) in mammals also continued probably linked to feeding on infected wild birds. In Peru, a mass mortality event of sea lions was observed in January and February 2023. Since October 2022, six A(H5N1) detections in humans were reported from Cambodia (a family cluster with 2 people, clade 2.3.2.1c), China (2, clade 2.3.4.4b), Ecuador (1, clade 2.3.4.4b), and Vietnam (1, unspecified clade), as well as two A(H5N6) human infections from China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.

Avian influenza overview September - December 2022

Between October 2021 and September 2022 Europe has suffered the most devastating highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic with a total of 2,520 outbreaks in poultry, 227 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,867 HPAI virus detections in wild birds. The unprecedent geographical extent (37 European countries affected) resulted in 50 million birds culled in affected establishments. In the current reporting period, between 10 September and 2 December 2022, 1,163 HPAI virus detections were reported in 27 European countries in poultry (398), captive (151) and wild birds (613). A decrease in HPAI virus detections in colony-breeding seabirds species and an increase in the number of detections in waterfowl has been observed. The continuous circulation of the virus in the wild reservoir has led to the frequent introduction of the virus into poultry populations. It is suspected that waterfowl might be more involved than seabirds in the incursion of HPAI virus into poultry establishments. In the coming months, the increasing infection pressure on poultry establishments might increase the risk of incursions in poultry, with potential further spread, primarily in areas with high poultry densities. The viruses detected since September 2022 (clade 2.3.4.4b) belong to eleven genotypes, three of which have circulated in Europe during the summer months, while eight represent new genotypes. HPAI viruses were also detected in wild and farmed mammal species in Europe and North America, showing genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N1) detections in humans in Spain, one A(H5N1), one A(H5N6) and one A(H9N2) human infection in China as well as one A(H5) infection without NA-type result in Vietnam were reported, respectively. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Avian influenza overview June - September 2022

The 2021-2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest HPAI epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,467 outbreaks in poultry, 47.7 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 187 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,573 HPAI virus detections in wild birds with an unprecedent geographical extent reaching from Svalbard islands to South Portugal and Ukraine, affecting 37 European countries. Between 11 June and 9 September 2022, 788 HPAI virus detections were reported in 16 European countries in poultry (56), captive (22) and wild birds (710). Several colony-breeding seabird species exhibited widespread and massive mortality from HPAI A(H5N1) virus along the northwest coast of Europe. This resulted in an unprecedentedly high level of HPAI virus detections in wild birds between June and August 2022 and represents an ongoing risk of infection for domestic birds. HPAI outbreaks were still observed in poultry from June to September with five-fold more infected premises than observed during the same period in 2021 and mostly distributed along the Atlantic coast. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection in the different poultry production systems. The viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b with seven genotypes, three of which identified for the first time during this time period, being detected during summer. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Europe and North America and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and one A(H10N3) human infections were reported in China. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Avian influenza overview March - June 2022

The 2021-2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,398 outbreaks in poultry, 46 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 168 detections in captive birds, and 2,733 HPAI events in wild birds in 36 European countries. Between 16 March and 10 June 2022, 1,182 HPAI virus detections were reported in 28 EU/EEA countries and United Kingdom in poultry (750), and in wild (410) and captive birds (22). During this reporting period, 86% of the poultry outbreaks were secondary due to between-farm spread of HPAI virus. France accounted for 68% of the overall poultry outbreaks, Hungary for 24% and all other affected countries for less than 2% each. Most detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (158), followed by the Netherlands (98) and the United Kingdom (48). The observed persistence of HPAI (H5) virus in wild birds since the 2020-2021 epidemic wave indicates that it may have become endemic in wild bird populations in Europe, implying that the health risk from HPAI A(H5) for poultry, humans, and wildlife in Europe remains present year-round, with the highest risk in the autumn and winter months. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and the rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection measures in the different poultry production systems. Medium to long-term strategies for reducing poultry density in high-risk areas should also be considered. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Canada, USA and Japan, and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, four A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and two A(H3N8) human infections were reported in China and one A(H5N1) in USA. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Avian influenza overview December 2021 - March 2022

Between 9 December 2021 and 15 March 2022, 2,653 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 33 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (1,030), in wild (1,489) and in captive birds (133). The outbreaks in poultry were mainly reported by France (609), where two spatiotemporal clusters have been identified since October 2021, followed by Italy (131), Hungary (73) and Poland (53); those reporting countries accounted together for 12.8 of the 17.5 million birds that were culled in the HPAI affected poultry establishments in this reporting period. The majority of the detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (767), the Netherlands (293), the UK (118) and Denmark (74). HPAI A(H5) was detected in a wide range of host species in wild birds, indicating an increasing and changing risk for virus incursion into poultry farms. The observed persistence and continuous circulation of HPAI viruses in migratory and resident wild birds will continue to pose a risk for the poultry industry in Europe for the coming months. This requires the definition and the rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures, surveillance plans and early detection measures in the different poultry production systems. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. Some of these viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland and Ireland showing genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, the UK reported one human infection with A(H5N1), China 17 human infections with A(H5N6), and China and Cambodia 15 infections with A(H9N2) virus. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as low, and for occupationally exposed people, low to medium.

Avian influenza overview May - September 2021

The 2020-2021 avian influenza epidemic with a total of 3,777 reported highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) detections and approximately 22,900,000 affected poultry birds in 31 European Countries appears to be one of the largest HPAI epidemics that has ever occurred in Europe. Between 15 May and 15 September 2021, 162 HPAI virus detections were reported in 17 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (51), in wild (91) and captive birds (20). The detections in poultry were mainly reported by Kosovo (20), Poland (17) and Albania (6). HPAI virus was detected during the summer months in resident wild bird populations mainly in northern Europe. The data presented in this report indicates that HPAI virus is still circulating in domestic and wild bird populations in some European countries and that the epidemic is not over yet. Based on these observations, it appears that the persistence of HPAI A(H5) in Europe continues to pose a risk of further virus incursions in domestic bird populations. Furthermore, during summer, HPAI viruses were detected in poultry and several wild bird species in areas in Russia that are linked to key migration areas of wild waterbirds; this is of concern due to the possible introduction and spread of novel virus strains via wild birds migrating to the EU countries during the autumn from the eastern breeding to the overwintering sites. Nineteen different virus genotypes have been identified so far in Europe and Central Asia since July 2020, confirming a high propensity for this virus to undergo reassortment events. Since the last report, 15 human infections due to A(H5N6) HPAI and five human cases due to A(H9N2) low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus have been reported from China. Some of these cases were caused by a virus with an HA gene closely related to the A(H5) viruses circulating in Europe. The viruses characterised to date retain a preference for avian-type receptors; however, the reports of transmission events of A(H5) viruses to mammals and humans in Russia, as well as the recent A(H5N6) human cases in China may indicate a continuous risk of these viruses adapting to mammals. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as very low, and for occupationally exposed people low, with large uncertainty due to the high diversity of circulating viruses in the bird populations.

Avian influenza overview February - May 2021

The 2020-2021 epidemic with a total of 3,555 reported HPAI detections and around 22,400,000 affected poultry birds in 28 European Countries appears to be one of the largest and most devastating HPAI epidemics ever occurred in Europe. Between 24 February and 14 May 2021, 1,672 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 24 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (n=580), and in wild (n=1,051) and captive birds (n=41). The majority of the detections in poultry were reported by Poland that accounted for 297 outbreaks occurring in a densely populated poultry area over a short period of time, followed by Germany with 168 outbreaks. Germany accounted for 603 detections in wild birds, followed by Denmark and Poland with 167 and 56 detections, respectively. A second peak of HPAI-associated wild bird mortality was observed from February to April 2021 in north-west Europe. The observed longer persistence of HPAI in wild birds compared to previous years may result in a continuation of the risk for juveniles of wild birds and mammals, as well as for virus entry into poultry farms. Therefore, enhanced awareness among farmers to continue applying stringent biosecurity measures and to monitor and report increases in daily mortality and drops in production parameters, are recommended. Sixteen different genotypes were identified to date in Europe and Russia, suggesting a high propensity of these viruses to reassort. The viruses characterized to date retain a preference for avian-type receptors; however, transmission events to mammals and the identification of sporadic mutations of mammal adaptation, indicate ongoing evolution processes and possible increased ability of viruses within this clade to further adapt and transmit to mammals including humans. Since the last report, two human infections due to A(H5N6) HPAI were reported from China and Laos and 10 human cases due to A(H9N2) low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus identified in China and Cambodia. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as very low and for occupationally exposed people low. People exposed during avian influenza outbreaks should adhere to protection measures, strictly wear personal protective equipment and get tested immediately when developing respiratory symptoms or conjunctivitis within 10 days after exposure.

Avian influenza overview September - December 2021

Between 16 September and 8 December 2021, 867 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 27 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (316), in wild (523) and in captive birds (28). The detections in poultry were mainly reported by Italy (167) followed by Hungary and Poland (35 each). Tha majority of the detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (280), Netherlands (65) and United Kingdom (53). The observed persistence and continuous circulation of HPAI viruses in migratory and resident wild birds will continue to pose a risk for the poultry industry in Europe for the coming months. The frequent occurrence of HPAI A(H5) incursions in commercial farms (including poultry production types considered at low avian influenza risk) raises concern about the capacity of the applied biosecurity measures to prevent virus introduction. Short-term preparedness and medium- and long-term prevention strategies, including revising and reinforcing biosecurity measures, reduction of the density of commercial poultry farms and possible appropriate vaccination strategies, should be implemented. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses characterised during this reporting period belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. Some of the characterized HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in Sweden, Germany, Poland and United Kingdom are related to the viruses which have been circulating in Europe since October 2020; in North, Central, South and East Europe novel reassortant A(H5N1) virus has been introduced starting from October 2021. HPAI A(H5N1) was also detected in wild mammal species in Sweden, Estonia and Finland; some of these strains characterised so far present an adaptive marker that is associated with increased virulence and replication in mammals. Since the last report, 13 human infections due to HPAI A(H5N6) and two human cases due to LPAI A(H9N2) virus have been reported from China. Some of these A(H5N6) cases were caused by a reassortant virus of clade 2.3.4.4b, which possessed an HA gene closely related to the A(H5) viruses circulating in Europe. The risk of infection for the general population in the EU/EEA is assessed as low, and for occupationally exposed people, low to medium, with large uncertainty due to the high diversity of circulating viruses in the bird populations.

Avian influenza overview December 2020 - February 2021

Between 8 December 2020 and 23 February 2021, 1,022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detectionswere reported in 25 EU/EEA countries and the UK in poultry (n=592), wild (n=421) and captive birds (n=9).The majority of the detections were reported by Francethat accounted for 442 outbreaks in poultry,mostly located inthe Landes regionandaffecting the foie gras production industry,and six wild bird detections; Germany,who reported 207 detections in wild birds and 50 poultry outbreaks; Denmark,with 63 detections in wild birds and one poultry outbreak; and Poland,with 37 poultry outbreaks and 24 wild bird detections. Due to the continued presence of HPAI A(H5) viruses in wild birds and the environment,there is still a risk of avian influenza incursions with the potential further spread between establishments, primarily in areas with high poultry densities. As the currently circulating HPAI A(H5N8) virus cancause high mortality also in affected duck farms, mortality eventscan be seen as a good indicator of virus presence. However,also subclinical virusspread in this type of poultry production system have been reported.To improve early detection of infection in poultry within the surveillance zone, the clinical inspection of duck establishments should be complemented by encouraging farmers to collect dead birds to be pooled and tested weekly (bucket sampling).Six different genotypes were identified to date in Europe and Russia, suggesting a high propensity of these viruses to undergo multiple reassortment events. To date, no evidence of fixation of known mutations previously described as associated to zoonotic potential has been observed in HPAI viruses currently circulanting in Europe based on the available sequences.Seven cases due to A(H5N8) HPAI virus have been reported from Russia, all were poultry workerswith mild or no symptoms. Five human cases due to A(H5N6) HPAI and 10 cases due to A(H9N2) LPAI viruseshave been reported from China. The risk for the general population as well as travel-related imported human cases is assessed as very lowand the risk forpeople occupationally exposedpeople as low.Any human infections with avian influenza viruses are notifiablewithin 24 hoursthrough the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) notification system.

Spatiotemporal reconstruction and transmission dynamics during the 2016-17 H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic in Italy

Effective control of avian diseases in domestic populations requires understanding of the transmission dynamics facilitating viral emergence and spread. In 2016-17, Italy experienced a significant avian influenza epidemic caused by a highly pathogenic A(H5N8) virus, which affected domestic premises housing around 2.7 million birds, primarily in the north-eastern regions with the highest density of poultry farms (Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto). We perform integrated analyses of genetic, spatiotemporal and host data within a Bayesian phylogenetic framework. Using continuous and discrete phylogeography, we estimate the locations of movements responsible for the spread and persistence of the epidemic. The information derived from these analyses on rates of transmission between regions through time can be used to assess the success of control measures. Using an approach based on phylogenetic-temporal distances between domestic cases, we infer the presence of cryptic wild bird-mediated transmission, information that can be used to complement existing epidemiological methods for distinguishing transmission within the domestic population from incursions across the wildlife-domestic interface, a common challenge in veterinary epidemiology. Spatiotemporal reconstruction of the epidemic reveals a highly skewed distribution of virus movements with a high proportion of shorter distance local movements interspersed with occasional long-distance dispersal events associated with wild birds. We also show how such inference be used to identify possible instances of human-mediated movements where distances between phylogenetically linked domestic cases are unusually high.

Different environmental gradients associated to the spatiotemporal and genetic pattern of the H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in poultry in Italy

Comprehensive understanding of the patterns and drivers of avian influenza outbreaks is pivotal to inform surveillance systems and heighten nations' ability to quickly detect and respond to the emergence of novel viruses. Starting in early 2017, the Italian poultry sector has been involved in the massive H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic that spread in the majority of the European countries in 2016/2017. Eighty-three outbreaks were recorded in north-eastern Italy, where a densely populated poultry area stretches along the Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto regions. The confirmed cases, affecting both the rural and industrial sectors, depicted two distinct epidemic waves. We adopted a combination of multivariate statistics techniques and multi-model regression selection and inference, to investigate how environmental factors relate to the pattern of outbreaks diversity with respect to their spatiotemporal and genetic diversity. Results showed that a combination of eco-climatic and host density predictors were associated with the outbreaks pattern, and variation along gradients was noticeable among genetically and geographically distinct groups of avian influenza cases. These regional contrasts may be indicative of a different mechanism driving the introduction and spreading routes of the influenza virus in the domestic poultry population. This methodological approach may be extended to different spatiotemporal scale to foster site-specific, ecologically informed risk mitigating strategies.

Avian influenza overview August - December 2020

Between 15 August and 7 December 2020, 561highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus detections were reported in 15EU/EEA countries and UK in wild birds, poultry andcaptive birds, with Germany (n=370), Denmark (n=65), the Netherlands (n=57) being the most affected countries.The majority of the detections have been reported in wild birds(n=510), primarily in barnacle goose, greylag goose, andEurasian wigeon. Raptors have also been detected infected, particularly common buzzard. The majority of the birds had been found dead or moribund,however, there are also reports ofHPAI virus infection in apparently healthy ducks or geese.A total of 43 HPAI outbreaks were notified in poultry;with signs of avian influenza infection being observed in at least 33 outbreaks;the most likely source of infection was indirect contact with wild birds. Three HPAI virus subtypes, A(H5N8) (n=518), A(H5N5) (n=17) and A(H5N1) (n=6),and four different genotypes were identified, suggesting the occurrence of multiple virus introductions into Europe.The reassortant A(H5N1) virus identified in EU/EEA countries has acquired gene segments from low pathogenic viruses and is not related to A(H5N1) viruses of e.g. clade 2.3.2.1c causing human infections outside of Europe. As the autumn migration of wild waterbirds to their wintering areasin Europe continues, and given the expected local movements of these birds, there is still a high risk of introduction andfurther spread ofHPAI A(H5) viruses within Europe.The risk of virus spread from wild birds to poultry is high and Member States should enforce in 'high risk areas' of their territories the measures provided for in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1136.Detection of outbreaks in breeder farms in Denmark, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, highlight also the risk of introduction via contaminated materials (bedding/straw) and equipment.Maintaining high and sustainable surveillance and biosecurityparticularly in high-risk areas is of utmost importance. Two human cases due to zoonoticA(H5N1) and A(H9N2) avian influenza virus infection were reportedduring the reporting period. The risk for the general population as well as travel-related imported human cases are assessed as very low.

Avian influenza overview - update on 19 November 2020, EU/EEA and the UK

Since 16 October 2020, outbreaks ofhighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruseshavebeen reported inseveral EU/EEAcountries -Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Swedenas well asin the United Kingdom.As of 19 November,12pm, 302 HPAI A(H5) detections have been reported, with the majority of the detections referring to wild birds (n=281), and a few related to outbreaks in poultry (n=18) and captive birds (n=3). Most of the detections in wild birds were in wild waterbirds,being barnacle goose the most affected species (n=110), followed by greylag goose (n=47), Eurasian wigeon (n=32),mallard (n=14), and common buzzard (n=13).ThreeHPAI virus subtypes were identified, A(H5N8), A(H5N5) and A(H5N1), with A(H5N8) being the most reported subtype (n=284). Phylogenetic analysis indicated that the viruses evolved from a single progenitor virus thatwent through multiple reassortment events. Based on the ongoing autumn migration of wild waterbirds to their wintering areas in Europe, there is a continued risk of further introduction of HPAI A(H5) viruses into Europe. Furthermore, given the expected movements of both migratory, and resident wild birds in Europe during winter, there is a high risk of further spread of HPAI A(H5) viruses within Europe. No genetic markers indicating adaptation to mammals have been identified in the viruses analysed so far,andno human infection due to avian influenza viruses detected in the recent outbreakshas been reported. For that reason,the risk to the general population remains very low.However,following the precautionary principle, people should avoid touching sick or dead birds unprotected to minimise any potential risk.

Integration of genetic and epidemiological data to infer H5N8 HPAI virus transmission dynamics during the 2016-2017 epidemic in Italy

Between October 2016 and December 2017, several European Countries had been involved in a massive Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) epidemic sustained by H5N8 subtype virus. Starting on December 2016, also Italy was affected by H5N8 HPAI virus, with cases occurring in two epidemic waves: the first between December 2016 and May 2017, and the second in July-December 2017. Eighty-three outbreaks were recorded in poultry, 67 of which (80.72%) occurring in the second wave. A total of 14 cases were reported in wild birds. Epidemiological information and genetic analyses were conjointly used to get insight on the spread dynamics. Analyses indicated multiple introductions from wild birds to the poultry sector in the first epidemic wave, and noteworthy lateral spread from October 2017 in a limited geographical area with high poultry densities. Turkeys, layers and backyards were the mainly affected types of poultry production. Two genetic sub-groups were detected in the second wave in non-overlapping geographical areas, leading to speculate on the involvement of different wild bird populations. The integration of epidemiological data and genetic analyses allowed to unravel the transmission dynamics of H5N8 virus in Italy, and could be exploited to timely support in implementing tailored control measures.

Data distribution in public veterinary service: health and safety challenges push for context-aware systems

Background

Today’s globalised and interconnected world is characterized by intertwined and quickly evolving relationships between animals, humans and their environment and by an escalating number of accessible data for public health. The public veterinary services must exploit new modeling and decision strategies to face these changes. The organization and control of data flows have become crucial to effectively evaluate the evolution and safety concerns of a given situation in the territory. This paper discusses what is needed to develop modern strategies to optimize data distribution to the stakeholders.

Main text

If traditionally the system manager and knowledge engineer have been concerned with the increase of speed of data flow and the improvement of data quality, nowadays they need to worry about data overflow as well. To avoid this risk an information system should be capable of selecting the data which need to be shown to the human operator. In this perspective, two aspects need to be distinguished: data classification vs data distribution. Data classification is the problem of organizing data depending on what they refer to and on the way they are obtained; data distribution is the problem of selecting which data is accessible to which stakeholder. Data classification can be established and implemented via ontological analysis and formal logic but we claim that a context-based selection of data should be integrated in the data distribution application. Data distribution should provide these new features: (a) the organization of situation types distinguishing at least ordinary vs extraordinary scenarios (contextualization of scenarios); (b) the possibility to focus on the data that are really important in a given scenario (data contextualization by scenarios); and (c) the classification of which data is relevant to which stakeholder (data contextualization by users).

Short conclusion

Public veterinary services, to efficaciously and efficiently manage the information needed for today’s health and safety challenges, should contextualize and filter the continuous and growing flow of data by setting suitable frameworks to classify data, users’ roles and possible situations.

Genetic Diversity of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N8/H5N5) Viruses in Italy, 2016-17

In winter 2016-17, highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) and A(H5N5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 were identified in wild and domestic birds in Italy. We report the occurrence of multiple introductions and describe the identification in Europe of 2 novel genotypes, generated through multiple reassortment events.

Information and organization in public health institutes: an ontology-based modeling of the entities in the reception-analysis-report phases

BACKGROUND

Ontologies are widely used both in the life sciences and in the management of public and private companies. Typically, the different offices in an organization develop their own models and related ontologies to capture specific tasks and goals. Although there might be an overall coordination, the use of distinct ontologies can jeopardize the integration of data across the organization since data sharing and reusability are sensitive to modeling choices.

RESULTS

The paper provides a study of the entities that are typically found at the reception, analysis and report phases in public institutes in the life science domain. Ontological considerations and techniques are introduced and their implementation exemplified by studying the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSVe), a public veterinarian institute with different geographical locations and several laboratories. Different modeling issues are discussed like the identification and characterization of the main entities in these phases; the classification of the (types of) data; the clarification of the contexts and the roles of the involved entities. The study is based on a foundational ontology and shows how it can be extended to a comprehensive and coherent framework comprising the different institute's roles, processes and data. In particular, it shows how to use notions lying at the borderline between ontology and applications, like that of knowledge object. The paper aims to help the modeler to understand the core viewpoint of the organization and to improve data transparency.

CONCLUSIONS

The study shows that the entities at play can be analyzed within a single ontological perspective allowing us to isolate a single ontological framework for the whole organization. This facilitates the development of coherent representations of the entities and related data, and fosters the use of integrated software for data management and reasoning across the company.

First report outside Eastern Europe of West Nile virus lineage 2 related to the Volgograd 2007 strain, northeastern Italy, 2014

BACKGROUND

West Nile virus (WNV) is a Flavivirus transmitted to vertebrate hosts by mosquitoes, maintained in nature through an enzootic bird-mosquito cycle. In Europe the virus became of major public health and veterinary concern in the 1990s. In Italy, WNV re-emerged in 2008, ten years after the previous outbreak and is currently endemic in many areas of the country. In particular, the northeastern part of Italy experience continuous viral circulation, with human outbreaks caused by different genovariants of WNV lineage 1, Western-European and Mediterranean subcluster, and WNV lineage 2, Hungarian clade. Alongside the WNV National Surveillance Program that has been in place since 2002, regional surveillance plans were implemented after 2008 targeting mosquitoes, animals and humans.

FINDINGS

In July and September 2014, West Nile virus lineage 2 was detected in pools of Culex pipiens s.l. mosquitoes from northeastern Italy. Whole genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of two representative samples identified the presence of WNV lineage 2 related to the Volgograd 2007 strain (99.3 % nucleotide sequence identity), in addition to WNV lineage 2 Hungarian clade.

CONCLUSIONS

This is the first evidence of the circulation of a WNV lineage 2 strain closely related to the Volgograd 2007 outside Eastern Europe, where it has caused large human outbreaks. This strain may pose a new threat to animal and human health in Italy.

Control of a Reassortant Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus Outbreak in an Intensive Swine Breeding Farm: Effect of Vaccination and Enhanced Farm Management Practices

Influenza A viruses in swine cause considerable economic losses and raise concerns about their zoonotic potential. The current paucity of thorough empirical assessments of influenza A virus infection levels in swine herds under different control interventions hinders our understanding of their effectiveness. Between 2012 and 2013, recurrent outbreaks of respiratory disease caused by a reassortant pandemic 2009 H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus were registered in a swine breeding farm in North-East Italy, providing the opportunity to assess an outbreak response plan based on vaccination and enhanced farm management. All sows/gilts were vaccinated with a H1N1pdm-specific vaccine, biosecurity was enhanced, weaning cycles were lengthened, and cross-fostering of piglets was banned. All tested piglets had maternally-derived antibodies at 30 days of age and were detectable in 5.3% of ~90 day-old piglets. There was a significant reduction in H1N1pdm RT-PCR detections after the intervention. Although our study could not fully determine the extent to which the observed trends in seropositivity or RT-PCR positivity among piglets were due to the intervention or to the natural course of the disease in the herd, we provided suggestive evidence that the applied measures were useful in controlling the outbreak, even without an all-in/all-out system, while keeping farm productivity at full.

IFAT and ELISA phase I/phase II as tools for the identification of Q fever chronic milk shedders in cattle

Q fever is a widespread zoonotic disease caused by Coxiella burnetii. In cattle the bacterial shedding can persist without symptoms for several months and the shedders identification is a critical issue in the control of the infection at herd level. Following the example of the human protocols for the assessment of Q fever infection status, the aim of this study was the evaluation of the antibody response dynamics to phase I and phase II antigens in C. burnetii shedder dairy cows by means of a phase-specific serology, to verify the suitability of the investigated tools in recognising milk shedders. A total of 99 cows were monitored during time and classified on the basis of serological and PCR results in five groups identifying different shedding patterns. The 297 sera collected in three sampling times were tested by means of ELISA IgG for differential phase I and phase II antibodies detection, while a selection of 107 sera were tested by means of phase specific IgM and IgG IFAT. Both ELISA IgG and IFAT IgG highlighted a low reactivity in non-shedder seropositive animals compared to chronic milk shedder animals. ELISA IgG seemed to perform better than IFAT IgG-IgM, showing significant serological differences among groups that allowed recognising specific serological group patterns, in particular for chronic and occasional milk shedders. These results supported the hypothesis that an animal classification based on phase patterns is reasonable, although it needs to be further investigated.

2008-2011 sylvatic rabies epidemic in Italy: challenges and experiences

After more than 10 years of absence, in 2008 rabies re-emerged and spread in wild foxes in north-eastern Italy. In order to control the infection and to minimize the risk of human exposure, three oral foxes vaccination campaigns were first carried out by manual distribution of baits between January and September 2009, followed by four emergency oral rabies vaccination (ORV) campaigns by aerial distribution in the affected regions starting in December 2009. Ordinary aerial ORV campaigns followed in spring and fall 2011 and 2012, although no cases were reported after February 2011. In our paper, we describe the main characteristics of the rabies epidemic that occurred in north-eastern Italy in 2008-2011, with particular focus on the innovative systems that were implemented to manage and evaluate the efficacy of the aerial ORV. The Italian experience in containing and eliminating rabies in less than 3 years may provide information and suggestions for countries affected by rabies, and sharing a similar geomorphological conformation as Italy.

Further evidence of lineage 2 West Nile Virus in Culex pipiens of North-Eastern Italy

West Nile Virus lineage 1 (WNV lin1) emerged in North-Eastern Italy in 2008 and, since then, it has been detected in animals, humans and mosquitoes. Three years later, in the same area, a lineage 2 (lin2) strain of WNV was found in birds and vectors. On August the 21st, during the 2012 WNV entomological surveillance plan, a WNV lin2 strain was detected by RT-PCR in a pool of Culex pipiens mosquitoes captured in Veneto region. According to the alignment of the partial sequences of the NS5 and NS3 genes, no differences between this Italian lineage 2 strain and the Nea Santa-Greece-2010 WNV isolate (Gr-10) were observed. Similarly to the Gr-10 strain, the putative NS3 amino acid sequences of the Italian strain showed proline in position 249 instead of histidine (H249P). Although proline in position 249 has been suggested to increase the virulence of WNV strains, neither human nor veterinary cases associated to this strain have been reported in the region. A prompt mosquito disinfestation was organized to avoid the spread of this potential threatening virus. The simultaneous circulation of both WNV lineage 1 and 2 confirms North-Eastern Italy as a high risk area for WNV emergence and highlights the need for a continuous surveillance.

Sylvatic rabies epidemic in Italy: implementation of a data management system to assess the level of application of preventive dog vaccination

After 20 years of absence, rabies re-emerged in wild animals in north-eastern Italy in October 2008. Besides measures undertaken to fight the spread of infection in wildlife, vaccination against rabies was made compulsory for dogs living in the risk area. In the last 15 years, the veterinary authorities have focused on implementing computerized data collection systems in animal health, to serve as working tools for epidemiological surveillance activities and emergencies management. The prerequisite for implementing any data collection system is knowledge of the animal population. This also applies to the Canine Registry Data Bank, in which data on dogs and their movements, together with personal data on each owner and keeper, have been stored since 2003. The management information system has been updated and specific functions have been integrated in order to support the activity of both the veterinary services and the veterinary practitioners involved in the dog vaccination program. Vaccination became voluntary in February 2013. This paper describes implementation of the software and organization of data gathering, highlighting the benefits of computerized data compared to previously used paper-based data collection systems. The new functions, designed to centralize collection of uniform, updated vaccination data, have led to more efficient organization and better control of the vaccination plan. Automated information processing allowed vaccination operations to be supervised, incurred costs to be calculated, and vaccination coverage of the dog population to be monitored during the 3 years of compulsory vaccination.

A conceptual holding model for veterinary applications

Spatial references are required when geographical information systems (GIS) are used for the collection, storage and management of data. In the veterinary domain, the spatial component of a holding (of animals) is usually defined by coordinates, and no other relevant information needs to be interpreted or used for manipulation of the data in the GIS environment provided. Users trying to integrate or reuse spatial data organised in such a way, frequently face the problem of data incompatibility and inconsistency. The root of the problem lies in differences with respect to syntax as well as variations in the semantic, spatial and temporal representations of the geographic features. To overcome these problems and to facilitate the inter-operability of different GIS, spatial data must be defined according to a \"schema\" that includes the definition, acquisition, analysis, access, presentation and transfer of such data between different users and systems. We propose an application \"schema\" of holdings for GIS applications in the veterinary domain according to the European directive framework (directive 2007/2/EC--INSPIRE). The conceptual model put forward has been developed at two specific levels to produce the essential and the abstract model, respectively. The former establishes the conceptual linkage of the system design to the real world, while the latter describes how the system or software works. The result is an application \"schema\" that formalises and unifies the information-theoretic foundations of how to spatially represent a holding in order to ensure straightforward information-sharing within the veterinary community.

Environmental correlates of H5N2 low pathogenicity avian influenza outbreak heterogeneity in domestic poultry in Italy

Italy has experienced recurrent incursions of H5N2 avian influenza (AI) viruses in different geographical areas and varying sectors of the domestic poultry industry. Considering outbreak heterogeneity rather than treating all outbreaks of low pathogenicity AI (LPAI) viruses equally is important given their interactions with the environment and potential to spread, evolve and increase pathogenicity. This study aims at identifying potential environmental drivers of H5N2 LPAI outbreak occurrence in time, space and poultry populations. Thirty-four environmental variables were tested for association with the characteristics of 27 H5N2 LPAI outbreaks (i.e. time, place, flock type, number and species of birds affected) occurred among domestic poultry flocks in Italy in 2010-2012. This was done by applying a recently proposed analytical approach based on a combined non-metric multidimensional scaling, clustering and regression analysis. Results indicated that the pattern of (dis)similarities among the outbreaks entailed an underlying structure that may be the outcome of large-scale, environmental interactions in ecological dimension. Increased densities of poultry breeders, and increased land coverage by industrial, commercial and transport units were associated with increased heterogeneity in outbreak characteristics. In areas with high breeder densities and with many infrastructures, outbreaks affected mainly industrial turkey/layer flocks. Outbreaks affecting ornamental, commercial and rural multi-species flocks occurred mainly in lowly infrastructured areas of northern Italy. Outbreaks affecting rural layer flocks occurred mainly in areas with low breeder densities in south-central Italy. In savannah-like environments, outbreaks affected mainly commercial flocks of galliformes. Suggestive evidence that ecological ordination makes sense genetically was also provided, as virus strains showing high genetic similarity clustered into ecologically similar outbreaks. Findings were informed by hypotheses about how ecological interactions among poultry populations, viruses and their environments can be related to the observed patterns of H5N2 LPAI occurrence. This may prove useful in enhancing future interventions by developing site-specific, ecologically-grounded strategies.

Determinants of the population growth of the West Nile virus mosquito vector Culex pipiens in a repeatedly affected area in Italy

Background

The recent spread of West Nile Virus in temperate countries has raised concern. Predicting the likelihood of transmission is crucial to ascertain the threat to Public and Veterinary Health. However, accurate models of West Nile Virus (WNV) expansion in Europe may be hampered by limited understanding of the population dynamics of their primary mosquito vectors and their response to environmental changes.

Methods

We used data collected in north-eastern Italy (2009–2011) to analyze the determinants of the population growth rate of the primary WNV vector Culex pipiens. A series of alternative growth models were fitted to longitudinal data on mosquito abundance to evaluate the strength of evidence for regulation by intrinsic density-dependent and/or extrinsic environmental factors. Model-averaging algorithms were then used to estimate the relative importance of intrinsic and extrinsic variables in describing the variations of per-capita growth rates.

Results

Results indicate a much greater contribution of density-dependence in regulating vector population growth rates than of any environmental factor on its own. Analysis of an average model of Cx. pipiens growth revealed that the most significant predictors of their population dynamics was the length of daylight, estimated population size and temperature conditions in the 15 day period prior to sampling. Other extrinsic variables (including measures of precipitation, number of rainy days, and humidity) had only a minor influence on Cx. pipiens growth rates.

Conclusions

These results indicate the need to incorporate density dependence in combination with key environmental factors for robust prediction of Cx. pipiens population expansion and WNV transmission risk. We hypothesize that detailed analysis of the determinants of mosquito vector growth rate as conducted here can help identify when and where an increase in vector population size and associated WNV transmission risk should be expected.

Control of avian influenza infections in poultry with emphasis on vaccination

Avian influenza is a World Organization for Animal Heath-listed disease that has become of great importance both for animal and human health. The increased relevance of avian influenza in the fields of animal and human health has highlighted the lack of scientific information on several aspects of the disease, which has hampered the adequate management of some of the recent crises. Millions of animals have died and there is growing concern over the loss of human lives and over the management of the pandemic potential. This special report will review the control methods for avian influenza infections in poultry that are currently available. The application of control policies, ranging from stamping out to emergency and prophylactic vaccination, are discussed on the basis of data generated from recent outbreaks, in the light of new regulations and also in view of the maintenance of animal welfare. Poultry veterinarians working for the industry or for the public sector represent the first line of defense against the pandemic threat and for the prevention and control of this infection in poultry and in wild birds.

Tail docking and the rearing of heavy pigs: the role played by gender and the presence of straw in the control of tail biting. Blood parameters, behaviour and skin lesions

This study evaluated whether the specific heavy pig rearing context allowed the fattening of undocked pigs without an outbreak of tail biting. At the same time, gender and straw availability (small amounts) were considered to understand their possible interactions with tail presence in the display of tail biting. A 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design was adopted to test the effects of these factors on blood parameters, behaviour and tail/ear lesions. Few interactions among factors were detected. Undocked pigs showed lower cortisol (P<0.02), lying behaviour (P<0.001), and higher risk of tail/ear biting (weeks 3 and 9), but lower risk of tail lesions (week 14). Straw increased the motivation for exploring (P<0.001), reduced serum haptoglobin (P<0.001) and the risk for tail biting (weeks 3, 9, 18) and ear biting (weeks 3, 9). Results highlight the importance of straw as an environmental enrichment and seem to indicate that fattening undocked heavy pigs is possible.

Implementation of an information system for the traceability of live decoy birds

In the Veneto region (northern Italy), some geographic areas in the Po Valley have a large concentration of industrial poultry farms and are located close to wet areas with high populations of wild waterfowl. Live decoy birds belonging to the orders of Anseriformes and Charadriiformes can constitute a "bridge" for avian influenza (AI) viruses between the wild reservoir and the rural holdings where live decoy birds are usually kept, sometimes together with poultry. Thus, the use of live decoy birds during bird hunting could increase the risk of exposure of poultry farms to AI viruses. Since 2008, this kind of hunting has been strictly regulated with regard to the detection and use of live decoy birds. In order to guarantee the application of appropriate AI risk-modulating and monitoring measures in the management of the live decoys according to the European Union (EU) provisions, a solid and well-structured information system has been created. The Regional Data Bank (RDB) of farms and livestock, which has been operating since 1997, also contains data on farms and poultry movements. Therefore, the RDB management software was updated to collect data from the hunters who keep live decoy birds, and specific functions were integrated to ensure the traceability of these birds. Each live decoy bird has been identified by an irremovable ring. The individual code of each ring is recorded in the RDB and linked to both the holder's code and the hunting area. Transfers and death/slaughtering of the registered birds are recorded, too. The activation of a computerized data collection system has proven to be a prerequisite for the implementation of a control system for live decoy birds and provides an essential tool for the management of AI emergencies.

H7N1 avian influenza in Italy (1999 to 2000) in intensively reared chickens and turkeys

From the end of March to the beginning of December 1999, an epidemic of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) affected the industrial poultry population of northern Italy. The virus responsible for the epidemic was subtyped as H7N1 with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of 0.0, and a deduced amino acid sequence of the region coding for the cleavage site of the haemagglutinin molecule typical of low pathogenicity viruses. The circulation of the virus in a susceptible population for several months caused the emergence of a highly pathogenic virus with an IVPI of 3.0 and the presence of multiple basic amino acids in the deduced amino acid sequence for the cleavage site of the haemagglutinin molecule. Over 13 million birds were affected by the epidemic and, in the present paper, we report the results of the clinical, virological and histopathological investigations performed on affected chickens and turkeys. Clinical, gross and microscopic lesions caused by LPAI were more severe in turkeys than in chickens, while highly pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) caused similar mortality rates in both species. Current European legislation considers LPAI and HPAI as two completely distinct diseases, not requiring any compulsory eradication policy for LPAI but enforcing eradication for HPAI. In the Italian 1999 to 2000 epidemic, LPAI mutated to HPAI in a densely populated area, causing great economic losses. A reconsideration of the current European Union legislation on avian influenza, including LPAI of the H5 and H7 subtypes, could possibly be an aid to avoiding devastating epidemics for the poultry industry.

West Nile virus in north-eastern Italy, 2011: entomological and equine IgM-based surveillance to detect active virus circulation

Since 2008, West Nile Virus (WNV) has expanded its range in several Italian regions, and its yearly recurrence suggests the virus may have become endemic in some areas. In 2011, a new plan based also on the detection of IgM antibodies was implemented in the north-eastern Italian regions of Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia, aiming to early detect WNV infections in areas where the virus had already circulated during the previous summers, and in adjacent zones. From July to November 2011, 1880 sera from 521 equine premises were screened by a commercial IgM capture ELISA. Mosquitoes were captured by CDC-CO2 traps at 61 locations in the two regions. Collected mosquitoes were identified, pooled by species/date/location and examined by real-time RT-PCR and sequencing. Passive surveillance was carried out on clinically affected horses and non-migratory wild birds found dead. IgM sero-positive equines were detected in 19 holdings, five in the area with WNV circulation (AWC) and 14 in the surveillance area (SA); 10 more horse premises tested positive to further serological controls within 4 km of the positive holdings. A total of 85,398 mosquitoes of 15 species were collected and 2732 pools examined. Five Culex pipiens pools tested positive for the presence of WNV. Passive surveillance on non-migratory wild birds allowed detection of the virus only in one found dead collared dove (Streptopelia decaocto), of 82 birds sampled. The WNV belonged to the lineage 2, which had been isolated for the first time in Italy earlier in 2011. By the first week of October, nine human cases had been confirmed in the same area. The implementation of a protocol combining IgM screening of horses with surveillance on mosquito vectors proved to be valuable for early detecting WNV circulation.

Serological diagnosis of avian influenza in poultry: is the haemagglutination inhibition test really the 'gold standard'?

Background  The serological diagnosis of avian influenza (AI) can be performed using different methods, yet the haemagglutination inhibition (HI) test is considered the ‘gold standard’ for AI antibody subtyping. Although alternative diagnostic assays have been developed, in most cases, their accuracy has been evaluated in comparison with HI test results, whose performance for poultry has not been properly evaluated.

Objective  The objective of this study was to estimate the diagnostic sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) of the HI test and six other diagnostic assays for the detection of AI antibodies without assuming a gold standard.

Methods  We applied a Bayesian version of latent class analysis to compare the results of multiple tests from different study settings reported in the literature.

Results  The results showed that the HI test has nearly perfect accuracy (i.e. 98·8% sensitivity and 99·5% specificity). It performed well in both chickens and turkeys and yet was less accurate in experimentally infected poultry, compared to naturally infected. Blocking ELISA and the indirect immunofluorescence assay also performed very well.

Conclusions  Given its very high Se and Sp, the HI test may be effectively considered a gold standard. In the framework of LPAI surveillance, where large numbers of samples have to be processed, the blocking ELISA could be a valid alternative to the HI test, in that it is almost as sensitive and specific as the HI test yet quicker and easier to automate.

Evaluating surveillance strategies for the early detection of low pathogenicity avian influenza infections

In recent years, the early detection of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in poultry has become increasingly important, given their potential to mutate into highly pathogenic viruses. However, evaluations of LPAI surveillance have mainly focused on prevalence and not on the ability to act as an early warning system. We used a simulation model based on data from Italian LPAI epidemics in turkeys to evaluate different surveillance strategies in terms of their performance as early warning systems. The strategies differed in terms of sample size, sampling frequency, diagnostic tests, and whether or not active surveillance (i.e., routine laboratory testing of farms) was performed, and were also tested under different epidemiological scenarios. We compared surveillance strategies by simulating within-farm outbreaks. The output measures were the proportion of infected farms that are detected and the farm reproduction number (R_h). The first one provides an indication of the sensitivity of the surveillance system to detect within-farm infections, whereas R_h reflects the effectiveness of outbreak detection (i.e., if detection occurs soon enough to bring an epidemic under control). Increasing the sampling frequency was the most effective means of improving the timeliness of detection (i.e., it occurs earlier), whereas increasing the sample size increased the likelihood of detection. Surveillance was only effective in preventing an epidemic if actions were taken within two days of sampling. The strategies were not affected by the quality of the diagnostic test, although performing both serological and virological assays increased the sensitivity of active surveillance. Early detection of LPAI outbreaks in turkeys can be achieved by increasing the sampling frequency for active surveillance, though very frequent sampling may not be sustainable in the long term. We suggest that, when no LPAI virus is circulating yet and there is a low risk of virus introduction, a less frequent sampling approach might be admitted, provided that the surveillance is intensified as soon as the first outbreak is detected.

Transmission dynamics of low pathogenicity avian influenza infections in Turkey flocks

Low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes have the potential to mutate into highly pathogenic strains (HPAI), which can threaten human health and cause huge economic losses. The current knowledge on the mechanisms of mutation from LPAI to HPAI is insufficient for predicting which H5 or H7 strains will mutate into an HPAI strain, and since the molecular changes necessary for the change in virulence seemingly occur at random, the probability of mutation depends on the number of virus replicates, which is associated with the number of birds that acquire infection. We estimated the transmission dynamics of LPAI viruses in turkeys using serosurveillance data from past epidemics in Italy. We fitted the proportions of birds infected in 36 flocks into a hierarchical model to estimate the basic reproduction number (R₀) and possible variations in R₀ among flocks caused by differences among farms. We also estimated the distributions of the latent and infectious periods, using experimental infection data with outbreak strains. These were then combined with the R₀ to simulate LPAI outbreaks and characterise the resulting dynamics. The estimated mean within-flock R₀ in the population of infected flocks was 5.5, indicating that an infectious bird would infect an average of more than five susceptible birds. The results also indicate that the presence of seropositive birds does not necessarily mean that the virus has already been cleared and the flock is no longer infective, so that seropositive flocks may still constitute a risk of infection for other flocks. In light of these results, the enforcement of appropriate restrictions, the culling of seropositive flocks, or pre-emptive slaughtering may be useful. The model and parameter estimates presented in this paper provide the first complete picture of LPAI dynamics in turkey flocks and could be used for designing a suitable surveillance program.

GeoCREV: veterinary geographical information system and the development of a practical sub-national spatial data infrastructure

This paper illustrates and discusses the key issues of the geographical information system (GIS) developed by the Unit of Veterinary Epidemiology of the Veneto region (CREV), defined according to user needs, spatial data (availability, accessibility and applicability), development, technical aspects, inter-institutional relationships, constraints and policies. GeoCREV, the support system for decision-making, was designed to integrate geographic information and veterinary laboratory data with the main aim to develop a sub-national, spatial data infrastructure (SDI) for the veterinary services of the Veneto region in north-eastern Italy. Its implementation required (i) collection of data and information; (ii) building a geodatabase; and (iii) development of a WebGIS application. Tools for the management, collection, validation and dissemination of the results (public access and limited access) were developed. The modular concept facilitates the updating and development of the system according to user needs and data availability. The GIS management practices that were followed to develop the system are outlined, followed by a detailed discussion of the key elements of the GIS implementation process (data model, technical aspects, inter-institutional relationship, user dimension and institutional framework). Problems encountered in organising the non-spatial data and the future work directions are also described.

Geographical information systems in the management of the 2009-2010 emergency oral anti-rabies vaccination of foxes in north-eastern Italy

Emergency oral fox vaccination campaigns, targeting a recent rabies epidemic in wild foxes (Vulpes vulpes) in north-eastern Italy, were implemented twice, first in the winter of 2009 and then in the spring of 2010. Following on an unsuccessful manual bait distribution campaign, vaccine baits were aerially distributed by helicopters using a satellite-navigated, computer-supported, automatic bait drop system. The flight paths were traced with distance of 500-1,000 m from one another to optimise helicopter missions and guarantee homogeneous coverage of the vaccination area. The vaccine distribution was evaluated by superimposing a 1 km-step grid and weighing the number of baits per cell. The implementation of a geographical information system for the management of vaccine distribution proved to be useful, both for the planning and execution phases, of the campaigns. It supported effective management of the flights and allowed near real-time monitoring of the campaigns. In addition, it facilitated the identification of areas with suboptimal bait density that would require additional flights or supplementary, manual distribution.

Impact of emergency oral rabies vaccination of foxes in northeastern Italy, 28 December 2009-20 January 2010: preliminary evaluation

Fox rabies re-emerged in northeastern Italy in 2008, in an area bordering Slovenia. In 2009, the infection spread westward to Veneto region and in 2010 to the provinces of Trento and Bolzano. Aerial emergency oral fox vaccination was implemented in the winter 2009-10. Since this vaccination was performed at altitudes below the freezing level, a statistical analysis was conducted to evaluate its impact. Of the foxes sampled following the vaccination campaign, 77% showed a rabies antibody titre of >or=0.5 IU/ml.

Impact of emergency oral rabies vaccination of foxes in northeastern Italy, 28 December 2009–20 January 2010: preliminary evaluation

Fox rabies re-emerged in northeastern Italy in 2008, in an area bordering Slovenia. In 2009, the infection spread westward to Veneto region and in 2010 to the provinces of Trento and Bolzano. Aerial emergency oral fox vaccination was implemented in the winter 2009-10. Since this vaccination was performed at altitudes below the freezing level, a statistical analysis was conducted to evaluate its impact. Of the foxes sampled following the vaccination campaign, 77% showed a rabies antibody titre of ≥0.5 IU/ml.

The effects of control measures on the economic burden associated with epidemics of avian influenza in Italy

In 1999, Italy experienced a devastating epidemic of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) caused by an H7N1 virus subtype. After this epidemic, a ministerial decree was passed to implement control measures for low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) due to H5 and H7 subtypes. We investigated whether these control measures have decreased the public expenditure associated with epidemics of LPAI and HPAI by comparing the direct and consequential losses of the 1999 epidemic to the losses associated with successive epidemics. The estimated total economic burden of the epidemics was about euro650 million (euro217 million in direct losses and euro433 million in consequential losses). The 1999 epidemic accounted for most of these losses (euro507 million: euro112 million in direct losses and euro395 million in consequential losses), whereas the total economic burden for the 5 successive LPAI was euro143 million (euro105 million in direct losses and euro38 million in consequential losses). These results demonstrate that the implementation of a coordinated set of disease-control measures, which included both emergency and prophylactic vaccination, was able to reduce the overall costs associated with avian influenza epidemics. The results also show that the application of adequate LPAI control measures may limit the risk of emergence of an HPAI virus in an area with a high poultry density, allowing the complete disruption of the poultry market and its huge associated costs to be avoided.

Design and results of an intensive monitoring programme for avian influenza in meat-type turkey flocks during four epidemics in northern Italy

Surveillance programmes for low pathogenicity (LPAI) and high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) infections in poultry are compulsory for EU Member States; yet, these programmes have rarely been evaluated. In Italy, following a 1999 HPAI epidemic, control measures, including vaccination and monitoring, were implemented in the densely populated poultry area (DPPA) where all epidemics in Italy have been concentrated. We evaluated the monitoring system for its capacity to detect outbreaks rapidly in meat-type turkey flocks. The evaluation was performed in vaccination areas and high-risk areas in the DPPA, in 2000-2005, during which four epidemics occurred. Serum samples and cloacal swabs were taken from vaccinated birds and unvaccinated (sentinel) birds. We compared the detection rate of active, passive and targeted surveillance, by vaccination status, using multinomial logistic regression. A total of 13 275 samplings for serological testing and 4889 samplings for virological testing were performed; 6315 production cycles of different bird species were tested. The outbreaks detection rate in meat-type turkeys was 61% for active surveillance (n = 222/363 outbreaks), 32% for passive surveillance and 7% for targeted surveillance. The maximum likelihood predicted values for the detection rates differed by vaccination status: in unvaccinated flocks, it was 50% for active surveillance, 40% for passive surveillance and 10% for targeted surveillance, compared to respectively 79%, 17% and 4% for vaccinated flocks. Active surveillance seems to be most effective in detecting infection, especially when a vaccination programme is in place. This is the first evaluation of the effectiveness of different types of surveillance in monitoring LPAI infections in vaccinated poultry using field data.