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Lizza JP, Lazaridis C, Nowak PG. Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS : AJOB 2024:1-12. [PMID: 39018166 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2024.2371124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/19/2024]
Abstract
Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..
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Kataoka M, Lee TL, Sawai T. Human Brain Organoid Research and Applications: Where and How to Meet Legal Challenges? JOURNAL OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 2024:10.1007/s11673-024-10349-9. [PMID: 38969917 DOI: 10.1007/s11673-024-10349-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2023] [Accepted: 02/23/2024] [Indexed: 07/07/2024]
Abstract
An ethical and legal framework is needed to regulate the rapidly developing human brain organoid research field properly. However, considering the legal issues involved in human brain organoid research remains underdeveloped and scattered. This article reviews the legal issues of human brain organoid research, grouping them into the following five broad themes: (1) consciousness, (2) legal status, (3) consent, (4) ownership, and (5) transplantation. The issues in each topic include both the urgent (e.g., appropriate forms of consent) and the speculative (e.g., protection of conscious human brain organoids). Therefore, we have attempted to be as explicit as possible about the timescale within which each issue will be realized and to prioritize each. Examining these issues has revealed legal issues specific to human brain organoid research and issues common to research in other fields. Further discussion of human brain organoid research from a legal perspective is needed in the future, considering discussions in related fields.
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Affiliation(s)
- M Kataoka
- Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan
| | - T-L Lee
- Graduate Institute of Health and Biotechnology Law, Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan
| | - T Sawai
- Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan.
- Institute for the Advanced Study of Human Biology, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan.
- Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore.
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Bernat JL. The Unified Brain-Based Determination of Death Conceptually Justifies Death Determination in DCDD and NRP Protocols. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS : AJOB 2024; 24:4-15. [PMID: 38829591 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2024.2337392] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/05/2024]
Abstract
Organ donation after the circulatory determination of death requires the permanent cessation of circulation while organ donation after the brain determination of death requires the irreversible cessation of brain functions. The unified brain-based determination of death connects the brain and circulatory death criteria for circulatory death determination in organ donation as follows: permanent cessation of systemic circulation causes permanent cessation of brain circulation which causes permanent cessation of brain perfusion which causes permanent cessation of brain function. The relevant circulation that must cease in circulatory death determination is that to the brain. Eliminating brain circulation from the donor ECMO organ perfusion circuit in thoracoabdominal NRP protocols satisfies the unified brain-based determination of death but only if the complete cessation of brain circulation can be proved. Despite its medical and physiologic rationale, the unified brain-based determination of death remains inconsistent with the Uniform Determination of Death Act.
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Mikhailov A, Sankai Y. Apoptosis in Postmortal Tissues of Goat Spinal Cords and Survival of Resident Neural Progenitors. Int J Mol Sci 2024; 25:4683. [PMID: 38731901 PMCID: PMC11083117 DOI: 10.3390/ijms25094683] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2024] [Revised: 04/07/2024] [Accepted: 04/23/2024] [Indexed: 05/13/2024] Open
Abstract
Growing demand for therapeutic tissue repair recurrently focusses scientists' attention on critical assessment of postmortal collection of live cells, especially stem cells. Our study aimed to assess the survival of neuronal progenitors in postmortal spinal cord and their differentiation potential. Postmortal samples of spinal cords were obtained from human-sized animals (goats) at 6, 12, 24, 36, and 54 h after slaughter. Samples were studied by immunohistology, differentiation assay, Western blot and flow cytometry for the presence and location of GD2-positive neural progenitors and their susceptibility to cell death. TUNEL staining of the goat spinal cord samples over 6-54 h postmortem revealed no difference in the number of positive cells per cross-section. Many TUNEL-positive cells were located in the gray commissure around the central canal of the spinal cord; no increase in TUNEL-positive cells was recorded in either posterior or anterior horns of the gray matter where many GD2-positive neural progenitors can be found. The active caspase 3 amount as measured by Western blot at the same intervals was moderately increasing over time. Neuronal cells were enriched by magnetic separation with antibodies against CD24; among them, the GD2-positive neural progenitor subpopulation did not overlap with apoptotic cells having high pan-caspase activity. Apoptotic cell death events are relatively rare in postmortal spinal cords and are not increased in areas of the neural progenitor cell's location, within measured postmortal intervals, or among the CD24/GD2-positive cells. Data from our study suggest postmortal spinal cords as a valuable source for harvesting highly viable allogenic neural progenitor cells.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrey Mikhailov
- Center for Cybernics Research, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba 305-8573, Japan
| | - Yoshiyuki Sankai
- Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba 305-8573, Japan;
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Nowak PG. Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2024; 45:109-131. [PMID: 38332427 PMCID: PMC10959770 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09656-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/27/2023] [Indexed: 02/10/2024]
Abstract
In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piotr Grzegorz Nowak
- Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044, Kraków, Poland.
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Shewmon DA. The Fundamental Concept of Death-Controversies and Clinical Relevance: The UDDA Revision Series. Neurology 2024; 102:e209196. [PMID: 38408293 DOI: 10.1212/wnl.0000000000209196] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2023] [Accepted: 12/18/2023] [Indexed: 02/28/2024] Open
Abstract
When the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) was recently in the process of revising the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), Neurology® ran a series of debates over certain controversial issues being deliberated. Omitted was a debate over the fundamental concept underlying brain death. In his introductory article, Bernat offered reasons for this omission: "It is not directly relevant to practicing neurologists who largely accept brain death, do not question its conceptual basis, …." In this article I argue the opposite: the fundamental concept of death is highly relevant to the clinical criteria and tests used to diagnose it. Moreover, most neurologists in fact disagree with the conceptual basis articulated by Bernat. Basically, there are 3 competing concepts of death: (1) biological: cessation of the integrative unity of the organism as a whole (endorsed by Bernat and the 1981 President's Commission), (2) psychological: cessation of the person, equated with a self-conscious mind (endorsed by half of neurologists), and (3) the vital work concept proposed by the 2008 President's Council on Bioethics. The first actually corresponds to a circulatory, not a neurologic, criterion. The second corresponds to a "higher brain" criterion. The third corresponds loosely to the UK's "brainstem death" criterion. In terms of the biological concept, current diagnostic guidelines entail a high rate of false-positive declarations of death, whereas in terms of the psychological concept, the same guidelines entail a high rate of false-negative declarations. Brainstem reflexes have nothing to do with any death concept (their role is putatively to guarantee irreversibility). By shining a spotlight on the deficiencies of the UDDA through attempting to revise it, the ULC may have unwittingly opened a Pandora's box of fresh scrutiny of the concept of death underlying the neurologic criterion-particularly on the part of state legislatures with irreconcilably opposed worldviews.
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Affiliation(s)
- D Alan Shewmon
- From the Departments of Neurology and Pediatrics, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA
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Nowak PG. Death as the Cessation of an Organism and the Moral Status Alternative. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2023; 48:504-518. [PMID: 37134311 PMCID: PMC10501183 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhad018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/05/2023] Open
Abstract
The mainstream concept of death-the biological one-identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death-one similar to that of Robert Veatch-overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies death with the irreversible cessation of a patient's moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch's original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status.
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Sulmasy DP, DeCock CA. Rethinking Brain Death-Why "Dead Enough" Is Not Good Enough: The UDDA Revision Series. Neurology 2023; 101:320-325. [PMID: 37429707 PMCID: PMC10437022 DOI: 10.1212/wnl.0000000000207407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2023] [Accepted: 03/28/2023] [Indexed: 07/12/2023] Open
Abstract
The emergence of cases of so-called "chronic brain death" seems to undermine the biophilosophical justification of brain death as true death, which was grounded in the idea that death entails the loss of integration of the organism. Severely neurologically damaged patients who can persist for years with proper support seem to be integrated organisms, and common sense suggests that they are not dead. We argue, however, that mere integration is not enough for an organism to be alive, but that living beings must be substantially self-integrating (i.e., a living organism must itself be the primary source of its integration and not an external agent such as a scientist or physician). We propose that irreversible apnea and unresponsiveness are necessary but not sufficient to judge that a human being has lost enough capacity for self-integration to be considered dead. To be declared dead, the patient must also irrevocably have lost either (1) cardiac function or (2) cerebrosomatic homeostatic control. Even if such bodies can be maintained with sufficient technological support, one may reasonably judge that the locus of integration effectively has passed from the patient to the treatment team. While organs and cells may be alive, one may justifiably declare that there is no longer a substantially autonomous, whole, living human organism. This biophilosophical conception of death implies that the notion of brain death remains viable, but that additional testing will be required to ensure that the individual is truly brain dead by virtue of having irrevocably lost not only the capacity for spontaneous respiration and conscious responsiveness but also the capacity for cerebrosomatic homeostatic control.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel P Sulmasy
- From the The Kennedy Institute of Ethics (D.P.S.), Georgetown University, Washington, DC; and Essentia Health and The University of North Dakota School of Medicine and Health Sciences (C.A.D.), Fargo.
| | - Christopher A DeCock
- From the The Kennedy Institute of Ethics (D.P.S.), Georgetown University, Washington, DC; and Essentia Health and The University of North Dakota School of Medicine and Health Sciences (C.A.D.), Fargo
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Vacca MA. The Moral Illicitness of Relying Solely on Neurological Criteria for the Determination of Death: A Catholic Response to "Brain Death". LINACRE QUARTERLY 2023; 90:260-272. [PMID: 37841373 PMCID: PMC10566484 DOI: 10.1177/00243639231189330] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2023]
Abstract
This paper presents the biological, philosophical, and theological arguments against "brain death" or death determined strictly through neurological criteria. It is rooted in a realistic, Thomistic metaphysical and anthropological view of the human person and the objective reality of death. Part I of the paper reviews the medical evidence that the bodies of those declared brain death are alive and makes clear that the bodies of "brain dead" patients are not biologically analogous to severed body parts. Part II presents the philosophical and theological argument that it is impossible to be a live human being and not a person. Since then those declared brain dead are somatically alive, they are live human persons with the right to life and cannot be subject to the extraction of vital, unpaired organs, since this would violate the dead donor rule. Part III reviews why the Magisterium has not unconditionally approved the determination of death through neurological criteria, and why it would be within the competence of the Magisterium to preclude medical professionals from determining death strictly through neurological criteria. The paper argues that there should be a ban on all vital, unpaired organ donation from "brain dead" donors.
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Scherz P. How the Body Became Integrated: Cybernetics in the History of the Brain Death Debate. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2022; 47:387-406. [PMID: 35926173 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhac003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Although the term integration is central to the definition of brain death, there is little agreement on what it means. Through a genealogical analysis, this essay argues that there have been two primary ways of understanding integration in regard to organismal wholeness. One stems from neuroscience, focusing on the role of the brain in responding to external stimuli, which was taken up in phenomenological accounts of life. A second, arising out of cybernetics, focuses on the brain's role in homeostasis. Recent debates over brain death are largely over this cybernetic understanding of integration. However, the phenomenological understanding of organismal wholeness can be seen in arguments by the President's Council on Bioethics in favor of brain death. This essay argues that the cybernetic understanding of life is problematic and should be discarded. A phenomenological understanding of life can provide a better basis for arguments over definitions of life and death.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paul Scherz
- The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., USA
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Nowak PG, Stencel A. How many ways can you die? Multiple biological deaths as a consequence of the multiple concepts of an organism. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2022; 43:127-154. [PMID: 35859085 PMCID: PMC9477939 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-022-09583-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/03/2022] [Indexed: 05/13/2023]
Abstract
According to the mainstream position in the bioethical definition of death debate, death is to be equated with the cessation of an organism. Given such a perspective, some bioethicists uphold the position that brain-dead patients are dead, while others claim that they are alive. Regardless of the specific opinion on the status of brain-dead patients, the mere bioethical concept of death, according to many bioethicists, has the merit of being unanimous and univocal, as well as grounded in biology. In the present article, we challenge such a thesis. We provide evidence that theoretical biology operates with a plurality of equally valid organismic concepts, which imply different conclusions regarding the organismal status of a brain-dead patient. Moreover, the theoretical biology concepts of an organism are very distant from the view on an organism that appears by way of bioethicists theorizing on death. We conclude that if death is to be understood as the cessation of an organism, there is no single correct answer to the question of whether a brain-dead patient is alive or dead.
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Affiliation(s)
- Piotr Grzegorz Nowak
- Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
| | - Adrian Stencel
- Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
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Iltis A. Heads, Bodies, Brains, and Selves: Personal Identity and the Ethics of Whole-Body Transplantation. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2022; 47:257-278. [PMID: 35543469 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhab049] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Plans to attempt what has been called a head transplant, a body transplant, and a head-to-body transplant in human beings raise numerous ethical, social, and legal questions, including the circumstances, if any, under which it would be ethically permissible to attempt whole-body transplantation (WBT) in human beings, the possible effect of WBT on family relationships, and how families should shape WBT decisions. Our assessment of many of these questions depends partially on how we respond to sometimes centuries-old philosophical thought experiments about personal identity. As with so much in bioethics, it is impossible to escape, or at least inadvisable to try to bypass, the relevant foundational philosophical concerns.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ana Iltis
- Department of Philosophy and Center for Bioethics, Health and Society, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA
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Iltis A. (Re)-Emerging Challenges in Christian Bioethics: Leading Voices in Christian Bioethics. CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 2022; 28:1-10. [PMID: 35992505 PMCID: PMC9383548 DOI: 10.1093/cb/cbab017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
This is the third installment in a Christian Bioethics series that gathers leading voices in Christian bioethics to examine the themes and issues they find most pressing. The papers address fundamental theoretical questions about the nature of Christian bioethics itself, long-standing ethical issues that remain significant today, including physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, the definition of death, the allocation of scarce resources, and finally, more futuristic questions regarding transhumanism. The contributions underscore the enduring significance of Christian engagement in bioethics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ana Iltis
- Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,USA
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Omelianchuk A. Brain Death as the End of a Human Organism as a Self-moving Whole. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2021; 46:530-560. [PMID: 34596228 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhab021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
The biophilosophic justification for the idea that "brain death" (or total brain failure) is death needs to support two claims: (1) that what dies in human death is a human organism, not merely a psychological entity distinct from it; (2) that total brain failure signifies the end of the human organism as a whole. Defenders of brain death typically assume without argument that the first claim is true and argue for the second by defending the "integrative unity" rationale. Yet the integrative unity rationale has fallen on hard times. In this article, I give reasons for why we should think of ourselves as organisms, and why the "fundamental work" rationale put forward by the 2008 President's Council is better than the integrative unity rationale, despite persistent objections to it.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Omelianchuk
- Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, Stanford, California, USA
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Hawking MK. Principles, Paradigms, and Protections. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2021. [DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhab018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Abstract
The breadth of themes addressed in this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy is striking. These articles brim with some of the most foundational questions one can ask in bioethics and the philosophy of medicine: Under what circumstances might we risk some harm in pursuit of a greater good? In the setting of experimental therapies, how should we weigh the potential risk and benefit for an individual patient against the broader potential benefit realized for society as a whole? How might we consistently differentiate health from pathology? Under what circumstances might we say that a human being has died? Does acknowledging particular things (such as play) as good generate duties? Duties for whom and enforced by whom? These articles share a preoccupation with foundational questions that must be addressed in any sound bioethics curriculum, and they make clear that our answers to these questions are not simply theoretical but manifest in policy and in practice.
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Carrasco MA, Valera L. Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2021; 42:1-24. [PMID: 33851346 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-021-09541-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/03/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg's claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the "fuzzy area" between a healthy (living) organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper-a relatively late stage of decomposition-to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return.
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Affiliation(s)
- María A Carrasco
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
| | - Luca Valera
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile.
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Machin LL, Cooper J, Dixon H, Wilkinson M. Organ donation in principle and in practice: tensions and healthcare professionals’ troubled consciences. BIOSOCIETIES 2021. [DOI: 10.1057/s41292-020-00219-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
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Huang AP, Bernat JL. The Organism as a Whole in an Analysis of Death. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2019; 44:712-731. [PMID: 31586180 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhz025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Although death statutes permitting physicians to declare brain death are relatively uniform throughout the United States, academic debate persists over the equivalency of human death and brain death. Alan Shewmon showed that the formerly accepted integration rationale was conceptually incomplete by showing that brain-dead patients demonstrated a degree of integration. We provide a more complete rationale for the equivalency of human death and brain death by defending a deeper understanding of the organism as a whole (OaaW) and by using a novel strategy with shared objectives to justify death determination criteria. Our OaaW account describes different types of OaaW, defining human death as the loss of status as a human OaaW. We defend human death as similar to nonhuman death in terms of wakefulness, but also distinct in terms of the sui generis properties, particularly conscious awareness. We thereby defend the equivalency of brain death and human death using a resulting neurocentric rationale.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrew P Huang
- University of Rochester Strong Memorial Hospital, Rochester, New York, USA
| | - James L Bernat
- Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA
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Abstract
In this article, we provide an update to Catholic ethicists and clinicians about the current status of Catholic teaching and practice regarding brain death. We aim to challenge the notion that the question has been definitively settled, despite the widespread application of this concept in medical practice including at Catholic facilities. We first summarize some of the notable arguments for and against brain death in Catholic thought as well as the available magisterial teachings on this topic. Although Catholic bishops, theologians, and ethicists have generally signaled at least tentative approval of the neurological criteria for the determination of death, we contend that no definitive magisterial teaching on brain death currently exists; therefore, Catholics are not currently bound to uphold any position on these criteria. In the second part of the article, we describe how Catholics, particularly Catholic medical practitioners, must presently inform their consciences on this issue while awaiting a more definitive magisterial resolution. SUMMARY Some prominent Catholic theologians and physicians have argued against the validity of brain death; however, most Catholic ethicists and physicians accept the validity of brain death as true human death. In this paper, we argue that there is no definitive magisterial teaching on brain death, meaning that Catholics are not bound to uphold any position on brain death. Catholics in general, but especially Catholic medical practitioners, should inform their consciences on this intra-Catholic debate on brain death while awaiting more definitive magisterial teaching.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Kyle Karches
- Department of Internal Medicine, Saint Louis University, MO, USA
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Abstract
Death can be defined as the permanent cessation of the organism as a whole. Although the organism as a whole is a century-old concept, it remains better intuited than analyzed. Recent concepts in theoretical biology including hierarchies of organization, emergent functions, and mereology have informed the idea that the organism as a whole is the organism's critical emergent functions. Because the brain conducts the critical emergent functions including conscious awareness and control of respiration and circulation, the cessation of brain functions is death of the organism. A newer concept, the brain as a whole, may offer a superior criterion of death to the whole-brain criterion, because it more closely matches accepted clinical brain death tests and confirms the cessation of the organism's emergent functions. Although the concepts of organism as a whole and brain as a whole remain vague and in need of rigorous biophilosophical analysis, their future precision will be restricted by the categorical limitations intrinsic to theoretical biological models.
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Alexander I. Humility before New Scientific Evidence: We No Longer Have Moral Certainty that "Brain Death" Is True Death. LINACRE QUARTERLY 2019; 86:314-326. [PMID: 32431424 PMCID: PMC6880085 DOI: 10.1177/0024363919874606] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
In light of the current medical evidence, physicians and ethicists no longer have the moral certainty that Pope John Paul II deemed vital for vital organ transplantation. The current medical evidence suggests that some brain-dead patients do seem to exhibit signs of global integration. This article will analyze the interpretations of this evidence, both from ethicists for and against the neurological criteria. Even the strongest arguments in favor of the neurological criteria in light of the new evidence fail to prove that the patient with total brain failure (TBF) has died. Furthermore, the recent Jahi McMath case demonstrates a new and alarming reality that there is no way in practice to distinguish global ischemic penumbra from TBF. In the absence of the moral certainty required by Pope John Paul II, it is clear that the Catholic Church should immediately call for a halt on vital organ transplantation. SUMMARY This article analyzes the current medical evidence about brain death and argues that we have lost the moral certainty that Pope John Paul II deemed necessary for vital organ transplantation.
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Moschella M. The human organism is not a conductorless orchestra: a defense of brain death as true biological death. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:437-453. [PMID: 31564014 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09501-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/26/2023]
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that brain death is death because, despite the appearance of genuine integration, the brain-dead body does not in fact possess the unity that is proper to a human organism. A brain-dead body is not a single entity, but a multitude of organs and tissues functioning in a coordinated manner with the help of artificial life support. In order to support this claim, I first lay out Hoffmann and Rosenkrantz's ontological account of the requirements for organismal unity and summarize an earlier paper in which I apply this account to the brain death debate. I then further support this ontological argument by developing an analogy between the requirements for the unity of an organism and the requirements for the unity of an orchestra. To do so, I begin by examining the role that a conductor plays in unifying a traditional orchestra, and then go on to show that the human organism (at least in postnatal stages) functions like a traditional orchestra that relies upon a conductor (the brain) for its unity. Next, I consider the conditions required to achieve orchestral unity in conductorless orchestras and show that, in contrast to simpler organisms like plants, the postnatal human organism lacks those conditions. I argue, in other words, that although conductorless orchestras do exist, the human organism is not one of them. Like a traditional orchestra without a conductor, the brain-dead body is not a unified whole.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melissa Moschella
- School of Philosophy, Catholic University of America, 620 Michigan Ave NE, Washington, DC, 20064, USA.
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23
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Hershenov DB. Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:403-418. [PMID: 31741164 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09506-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist.
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Affiliation(s)
- David B Hershenov
- Philosophy Department, University at Buffalo, 135 Park Hall University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, 14260-4150, USA.
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Sulmasy DP. Whole-brain death and integration: realigning the ontological concept with clinical diagnostic tests. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:455-481. [PMID: 31696418 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09504-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/23/2023]
Abstract
For decades, physicians, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and the public considered brain death a settled issue. However, a series of recent cases in which individuals were declared brain dead yet physiologically maintained for prolonged periods of time has challenged the status quo. This signals a need for deeper reflection and reexamination of the underlying philosophical, scientific, and clinical issues at stake in defining death. In this paper, I consider four levels of philosophical inquiry regarding death: the ontological basis, actual states of affairs, epistemological standards, and clinical criteria for brain death. I outline several candidates for the states of affairs that may constitute death, arguing that we should strive for a single, unified ontological definition of death as a loss of integrated functioning as a unified organism, while acknowledging that two states of affairs (cardiopulmonary death and whole-brain death) may satisfy this concept. I argue that the clinical criteria for determining whole-brain death should be bolstered to meet the epistemic demand of sufficient certainty in defining death by adding indicators of cerebro-somatic dis-integration to the traditional triad of loss of consciousness, loss of brainstem function, and absence of confounding explanations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel P Sulmasy
- Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Healy 419, 3700 O Street NW, Washington, DC, 20057, USA.
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25
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den Hartogh G. When are you dead enough to be a donor? Can any feasible protocol for the determination of death on circulatory criteria respect the dead donor rule? THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2019; 40:299-319. [PMID: 31562590 PMCID: PMC6790209 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-019-09500-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/13/2023]
Abstract
The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term "death" nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death can be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of "irreversibility" need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty.
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Affiliation(s)
- Govert den Hartogh
- Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
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26
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Abstract
Humans often seek to improve themselves, whether through self-discipline or through the use of science and technology. At some point in the future, techniques might become available that will change humans to such a degree that they might have to be regarded as something other than human: posthuman. This essay tries to define the point at which such a human-to-posthuman metamorphosis may occur. This is achieved by discerning what is it that makes human substance distinct, i.e. what is the human essence. This is accomplished by examining the features of the human body, looking at the mode of human existence in society and trying to grasp the importance of the body-soul relationship. Throughout the process, humans are compared to animals as well as entities from literature, film, and the gaming world. These are used as case studies to shape and test the ideas developed throughout the essay. This essay's conclusions might become useful when decisions will have to be made as to the legal status of posthumans, by providing a tool for discerning when metamorphosis has occurred. Moreover, insights from this essay might also inform debates surrounding the ethical status of certain modalities of human enhancement.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michal Pruski
- a School of Healthcare Science, Faculty of Science and Engineering , Manchester Metropolitan University , Manchester , UK.,b Critical Care Laboratory, Critical Care Directorate , Manchester Royal Infirmary, Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust , Manchester , UK
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27
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Symons X, Chua RM. Organismal death, the dead-donor rule and the ethics of vital organ procurement. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2018; 44:868-871. [PMID: 29921617 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2018-104796] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/06/2018] [Revised: 05/06/2018] [Accepted: 05/31/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
Several bioethicists have recently discussed the complexity of defining human death, and considered in particular how our definition of death affects our understanding of the ethics of vital organ procurement. In this brief paper, we challenge the mainstream medical definition of human death-namely, that death is equivalent to total brain failure-and argue with Nair-Collins and Miller that integrated biological functions can continue even after total brain failure has occurred. We discuss the implications of Nair-Collins and Miller's argument and suggest that it may be necessary to look for alternative biological markers that reliably indicate the death of a human being. We reject the suggestion that we should abandon the dead-donor criteria for organ donation. Rather than weaken the ethical standards for vital organ procurement, it may be necessary to make them more demanding. The aim of this paper is not to justify the dead donor rule. Rather, we aim to explore the perspective of those who agree with critiques of the whole brain and cardiopulmonary definitions of death but yet disagree with the proposal that we should abandon the dead-donor rule. We will consider what those who want to retain the dead-donor rule must argue in light of Nair-Collins and Miller's critique.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xavier Symons
- Institute for Ethics and Society, University of Notre Dame Australia, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Reginald Mary Chua
- Philosophy, Catholic Theological College, East Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
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Walter U, Fernández-Torre JL, Kirschstein T, Laureys S. When is “brainstem death” brain death? The case for ancillary testing in primary infratentorial brain lesion. Clin Neurophysiol 2018; 129:2451-2465. [DOI: 10.1016/j.clinph.2018.08.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2018] [Revised: 06/20/2018] [Accepted: 08/25/2018] [Indexed: 12/19/2022]
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Pruski M, Saad TC. Reply: Conscientious objection to deceased organ donation by healthcare professionals. J Intensive Care Soc 2018; 19:NP1. [PMID: 30515246 DOI: 10.1177/1751143718765612] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Michal Pruski
- Critical Care Laboratory, Critical Care Directorate, Manchester Royal Infirmary, Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust, UK.,School of Healthcare Science, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
| | - Toni C Saad
- Cochrane Medical Education Centre, School of Medicine, Cardiff, UK
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Nair-Collins M, Miller FG. Do the 'brain dead' merely appear to be alive? JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2017; 43:747-753. [PMID: 28848063 PMCID: PMC5749302 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103867] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2016] [Revised: 04/19/2017] [Accepted: 05/14/2017] [Indexed: 05/20/2023]
Abstract
The established view regarding 'brain death' in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are (biologically) dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the 'brain dead' are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a 'brain dead' patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on 'brain death', though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Nair-Collins
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine, Florida State University College of Medicine, Tallahassee, Florida, USA
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Moschella M. Brain Death and Human Organismal Integration: A Symposium on the Definition of Death. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2016; 41:229-36. [PMID: 27107428 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhw007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/03/2023] Open
Abstract
Does the ability of some brain dead bodies to maintain homeostasis with the help of artificial life support actually imply that those bodies are living human organisms? Or might it be possible that a brain dead body on life support is a mere collection of still-living cells, organs and tissues which can coordinate with one another, but which lack the genuine integration that is the hallmark of a unified human organism as a whole? To foster further study of these difficult and timely questions, a Symposium on the Definition of Death was held at The Catholic University of America in June 2014. The Symposium brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines-law, medicine, biology, philosophy and theology-who all share a commitment to the dead donor rule and to a biological definition of death, but who have differing opinions regarding the validity of neurological criteria for human death. The papers found in this special issue are among the fruits of this Symposium.
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Moschella M, Condic ML. Symposium on the Definition of Death: Summary Statement. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2016; 41:351-61. [PMID: 27102243 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhw009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
This statement summarizes the conclusions of the Symposium on the Definition of Death, held at The Catholic University of America in June 2014. After providing the background and context for contemporary debates about brain death and describing the aims of the symposium, the statement notes points of unanimous and broad agreement among the participants, and highlights areas for further study.
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Affiliation(s)
- Melissa Moschella
- The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, USA University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA
| | - Maureen L Condic
- The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, USA University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA
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33
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Lee P. Total Brain Death and the Integration of the Body Required of a Human Being. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2016; 41:300-14. [PMID: 27097647 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhw005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
I develop and refine an argument for the total brain death criterion of death previously advanced by Germain Grisez and me: A human being is essentially a rational animal, and so must have a radical capacity for rational operations. For rational animals, conscious sensation is a pre-requisite for rational operation. But total brain death results in the loss of the radical capacity for conscious sensation, and so also for rational operations. Hence, total brain death constitutes a substantial change-the ceasing to be of the human being. Objections are considered, including the objection that total brain death need not result in the loss of capacity for sensation, and that damage to the brain less than total brain death can result in loss of capacity for rational operations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Patrick Lee
- Franciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, Ohio, USA
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Condic ML. Determination of Death: A Scientific Perspective on Biological Integration. THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2016; 41:257-78. [PMID: 27075193 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhw004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Human life is operationally defined by the onset and cessation of organismal function. At postnatal stages of life, organismal integration critically and uniquely requires a functioning brain. In this article, a distinction is drawn between integrated and coordinated biologic activities. While communication between cells can provide a coordinated biologic response to specific signals, it does not support the integrated function that is characteristic of a living human being. Determining the loss of integrated function can be complicated by medical interventions (i.e., "life support") that uncouple elements of the natural biologic hierarchy underlying our intuitive understanding of death. Such medical interventions can allow living human beings who are no longer able to function in an integrated manner to be maintained in a living state. In contrast, medical intervention can also allow the cells and tissues of an individual who has died to be maintained in a living state. To distinguish between a living human being and living human cells, two criteria are proposed: either the persistence of any form of brain function or the persistence of autonomous integration of vital functions. Either of these criteria is sufficient to determine a human being is alive.
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