Individual differences in anthropomorphic attributions and human brain structure

People with Autism Spectrum Disorder Could Interact More Easily with a Robot than with a Human: Reasons and Limits

Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder show deficits in communication and social interaction, as well as repetitive behaviors and restricted interests. Interacting with robots could bring benefits to this population, notably by fostering communication and social interaction. Studies even suggest that people with Autism Spectrum Disorder could interact more easily with a robot partner rather than a human partner. We will be looking at the benefits of robots and the reasons put forward to explain these results. The interest regarding robots would mainly be due to three of their characteristics: they can act as motivational tools, and they are simplified agents whose behavior is more predictable than that of a human. Nevertheless, there are still many challenges to be met in specifying the optimum conditions for using robots with individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

An examination of dispositional social needs, agent knowledge, and two dimensions of product anthropomorphism: A serial mediation model

Thriving attention has been paid to the process and concept of anthropomorphism in marketing literature, as the concept is considered to be a precursor of positive marketing outcomes. However, prior studies have not clarified the position or role of inductive reasoning and anthropomorphism or explained the relationship between anthropomorphism and consumers' individual dispositions. This paper aims to delve into the relationship between consumer psychological and dispositional motivational traits for a given product advertisement that has been personified and imbued with human body features. Building on the literature, a conceptual model has been proposed in which the psychological process-agent knowledge and dispositional motivation to meet social needs have been taken as independent variables positively related to one another and also related individually to the two distinct dimensions of anthropomorphism (i) physical anthropomorphism and (ii) anthropomorphic thinking. Furthermore, it was empirically tested if these two dimensions and these independent variables are linked in a sequential manner. The results show that the need for belonging is positively associated with agent knowledge acquisition, physical anthropomorphism, and anthropomorphic thinking for a given stimulus. Similarly, agent knowledge induced by a humanized stimulus was also positively associated with the two dimensions of anthropomorphism. Furthermore, the two dimensions had a positive relationship with one another. Finally, the need for belonging is also positively associated with agent knowledge and two dimensions of anthropomorphism in a sequential manner. Findings indicate that marketers need to take into account dispositional and psychological factors which might ultimately affect their anthropomorphic inferences in order to induce anthropomorphic thinking because of which positive marketing outcomes take place.

Neural correlates of product attachment to cosmetics

The neurobiological basis of brand and product attachment has received much attention in consumer neuroscience research, although it remains unclear. In this study, we conducted functional MRI experiments involving female users of famous luxury brand cosmetics as participants, based on the regions of interest involved in human attachment and object attachment. The results showed that the left ventral pallidum (VP), which is involved in positive reward, and the right posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), which is involved in self-concept, a key concept in object attachment, are the core regions in cosmetic attachment. Moreover, the performed psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that VP-temporoparietal junction connectivity positively correlated with activity in the dorsal raphe nucleus, and PCC-anterior hippocampus (aHC) connectivity positively correlated with subjective evaluation of attachment. The former suggests that object attachment is a human-like attachment and a stronger tendency of anthropomorphism is associated with stronger feelings of security. The latter suggests that the individual's concept of attachment as well as the relationships with the attached cosmetics are represented in the aHC, and the PCC-aHC associations produce subjective awareness of the attachment relationships. These associations between memory and reward systems have been shown to play critical roles in cosmetic attachment.

Anthropomorphizing Technology: A Conceptual Review of Anthropomorphism Research and How it Relates to Children's Engagements with Digital Voice Assistants

‘Anthropomorphism’ is a popular term in the literature on human-technology engagements, in general, and child-technology engagements, in particular. But what does it really mean to ‘anthropomorphize’ something in today’s world? This conceptual review article, addressed to researchers interested in anthropomorphism and adjacent areas, reviews contemporary anthropomorphism research, and it offers a critical perspective on how anthropomorphism research relates to today’s children who grow up amid increasingly intelligent and omnipresent technologies, particularly digital voice assistants (e.g., Alexa, Google Assistant, Siri). First, the article reviews a comprehensive body of quantitative as well as qualitative anthropomorphism research and considers it within three different research perspectives: descriptive, normative and explanatory. Following a brief excursus on philosophical pragmatism, the article then discusses each research perspective from a pragmatistic viewpoint, with a special emphasis on child-technology and child-voice-assistant engagements, and it also challenges some popular notions in the literature. These notions include descriptive ‘as if’ parallels (e.g., child behaves ‘as if’ Alexa was a friend), or normative assumptions that human-human engagements are generally superior to human-technology engagements. Instead, the article reviews different examples from the literature suggesting the nature of anthropomorphism may change as humans’ experiential understandings of humanness change, and this may particularly apply to today’s children as their social cognition develops in interaction with technological entities which are increasingly characterized by unprecedented combinations of human and non-human qualities.

Dissecting functional contributions of the social brain to strategic behavior

Social interactions routinely lead to neural activity in a "social brain network" comprising, among other regions, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). But what is the function of these areas? Are they specialized for behavior in social contexts or do they implement computations required for dealing with any reactive process, even non-living entities? Here, we use fMRI and a game paradigm separating the need for these two aspects of cognition. We find that most social-brain areas respond to both social and non-social reactivity rather than just to human opponents. However, the TPJ shows a dissociation from the dmPFC: its activity and connectivity primarily reflect context-dependent outcome processing and reactivity detection, while dmPFC engagement is linked to implementation of a behavioral strategy. Our results characterize an overarching computational property of the social brain but also suggest specialized roles for subregions of this network.

Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind in brain and behaviour

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism.

Do you see the “face”? Individual differences in face pareidolia

People tend to see faces from non-face objects or meaningless patterns. Such illusory face perception is called face pareidolia. Previous studies have revealed an interesting fact that there are huge individual differences in face pareidolia experience among the population. Here, we review previous findings on individual differences in face pareidolia experience from four categories: sex differences, developmental factors, personality traits and neurodevelopmental factors. We further discuss underlying cognitive or neural mechanisms to explain why some perceive the objects as faces while others do not. The individual differences in face pareidolia could not only offer scientific insights on how the brain works to process face information, but also suggest potential clinical applications.

Brain stimulation to left prefrontal cortex modulates attentional orienting to gaze cues

In social interactions, we rely on non-verbal cues like gaze direction to understand the behaviour of others. How we react to these cues is determined by the degree to which we believe that they originate from an entity with a mind capable of having internal states and showing intentional behaviour, a process called mind perception. While prior work has established a set of neural regions linked to mind perception, research has just begun to examine how mind perception affects social-cognitive mechanisms like gaze processing on a neuronal level. In the current experiment, participants performed a social attention task (i.e. attentional orienting to gaze cues) with either a human or a robot agent (i.e. manipulation of mind perception) while transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) was applied to prefrontal and temporo-parietal brain areas. The results show that temporo-parietal stimulation did not modulate mechanisms of social attention, neither in response to the human nor in response to the robot agent, whereas prefrontal stimulation enhanced attentional orienting in response to human gaze cues and attenuated attentional orienting in response to robot gaze cues. The findings suggest that mind perception modulates low-level mechanisms of social cognition via prefrontal structures, and that a certain degree of mind perception is essential in order for prefrontal stimulation to affect mechanisms of social attention. This article is part of the theme issue 'From social brains to social robots: applying neurocognitive insights to human-robot interaction'.

Social robotics and the modulation of social perception and bias

The field of social robotics offers an unprecedented opportunity to probe the process of impression formation and the effects of identity-based stereotypes (e.g. about gender or race) on social judgements and interactions. We present the concept of fair proxy communication-a form of robot-mediated communication that proceeds in the absence of potentially biasing identity cues-and describe how this application of social robotics may be used to illuminate implicit bias in social cognition and inform novel interventions to reduce bias. We discuss key questions and challenges for the use of robots in research on the social cognition of bias and offer some practical recommendations. We conclude by discussing boundary conditions of this new form of interaction and by raising some ethical concerns about the inclusion of social robots in psychological research and interventions. This article is part of the theme issue 'From social brains to social robots: applying neurocognitive insights to human-robot interaction'.

A Friendly Article: The Qualitative Investigation of Anthropomorphism in Autistic and Nonautistic Adults

Background

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman agents. This common tendency is thought to be driven by a heightened motivation for social connection and may therefore be expected to be reduced in autistic individuals given that this group has been claimed to demonstrate reduced social motivation in some settings. However, the subject of anthropomorphism in autism has not been studied extensively, and online forums, autobiographical accounts, and recent research on the topic suggest that, contrary to this expectation, anthropomorphism is commonly experienced by autistic individuals.

Methods

We conducted semi-structured interviews with eight autistic and eight nonautistic adults, all who reported a tendency to anthropomorphize. We recorded, transcribed, and analyzed the interviews according to the thematic analysis framework with the objective of identifying similarities and differences in the lived experiences of anthropomorphism in autistic and nonautistic individuals.

Results

Individuals in both groups described anthropomorphism as comforting, promoting a sense of safety and friendship with, and feelings of empathy and sympathy toward, nonhuman agents. Autistic individuals stressed the important role anthropomorphized agents played in their life, particularly when growing up: easing loneliness and helping develop an understanding of emotions and relationships. Participants also expressed negative aspects of the phenomenon, with both autistic and nonautistic individuals worrying about anthropomorphized agents' feelings and well-being. For some individuals, such thoughts and feelings caused distress and were experienced as intrusive due to their involuntary nature.

Conclusions

Autistic and nonautistic adults showed very similar anthropomorphic patterns. Although preliminary in nature, our findings highlight characteristics of anthropomorphic experiences for autistic and nonautistic individuals, furthering our understanding of individual differences in social cognition. By illustrating the important role nonhuman agents may play in the lives of autistic individuals, our findings may also guide future research and practice.

Lay summary

Why was this study done?: 'Anthropomorphism' is when you feel that non-human items have human characteristics, for example if you experience plants, animals, or household objects as having thoughts or feelings. Anthropomorphism is experienced by many people in many different ways. Researchers think it might happen when people have a strong desire for social connection. This has led some to suggest that autistic people will be less likely to anthropomorphise due to difficulties in social understanding and motivation. However, researchers have not examined this directly, and our prior research, together with comments in online forums and autobiographical accounts, indicated that autistic individuals may experience a special relationship with non-human items.What was the purpose of this study?: The purpose of the study was to speak directly to people who anthropomorphise and hear about their experiences. We could then compare patterns of anthropomorphism between autistic and non-autistic adults.What did the researchers do?: We interviewed 16 adults (8 autistic and 8 non-autistic) who told us they anthropomorphised, and asked about their personal experiences of anthropomorphism.What were the results of the study?: Autistic and non-autistic adults described very similar experiences of anthropomorphism. People in both groups described anthropomorphism as comforting, and said that it gave them a sense of safety and friendship. They also cared for, and experienced feelings of empathy toward, anthropomorphised items. Individuals in both groups worried about anthropomorphised items' feelings and well-being and this caused some people considerable distress. Autistic individuals stressed the important role anthropomorphised items played in their life, particularly when growing up: reducing loneliness and helping them develop an understanding of emotions and relationships.What do these findings add to what was already known?: Our findings show that there are many similarities in the experiences of anthropomorphism in autistic and non-autistic adults. The findings also show how, for some autistic adults, anthropomorphism was helpful in developing relationships with other people.What are potential weaknesses in the study?: The small number of participants means that we do not know whether the findings would apply to all people who experience anthropomorphism.How will these findings help autistic adults now or in the future?: By showing the various ways in which autistic individuals attach social meanings (such as feelings of caring or friendship) to anthropomorphised items, our findings add to a growing number of studies which challenge the commonly-held assumption that autistic individuals are less motivated to make social connections. Our work shows that autistic individuals may be highly motivated to connect socially, and that meaningful social connections and expressions of empathy need not be limited to human beings.

Seeing minds in others: Mind perception modulates low-level social-cognitive performance and relates to ventromedial prefrontal structures

In social interactions, we rely on nonverbal cues like gaze direction to understand the behavior of others. How we react to these cues is affected by whether they are believed to originate from an entity with a mind, capable of having internal states (i.e., mind perception). While prior work has established a set of neural regions linked to social-cognitive processes like mind perception, the degree to which activation within this network relates to performance in subsequent social-cognitive tasks remains unclear. In the current study, participants performed a mind perception task (i.e., judging the likelihood that faces, varying in physical human-likeness, have internal states) while event-related fMRI was collected. Afterwards, participants performed a social attention task outside the scanner, during which they were cued by the gaze of the same faces that they previously judged within the mind perception task. Parametric analyses of the fMRI data revealed that activity within ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was related to both mind ratings inside the scanner and gaze-cueing performance outside the scanner. In addition, other social brain regions were related to gaze-cueing performance, including frontal areas like the left insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus, as well as temporal areas like the left temporo-parietal junction and bilateral temporal gyri. The findings suggest that functions subserved by the vmPFC are relevant to both mind perception and social attention, implicating a role of vmPFC in the top-down modulation of low-level social-cognitive processes.

Anthropomorphism, social understanding, and imaginary companions

In two studies, we investigated the correlates of anthropomorphism, the attribution of unobservable mental states to inanimate entities and non-human animals. In Study 1, we investigated the relations between anthropomorphism, social understanding, empathy, prosocial attitudes, and history of childhood imaginary companions in a college sample (N = 264; M_age  = 19 years, 2 months). In Study 2, we explored the relations between two different measures of anthropomorphism, theory of mind, imaginary companions, and social preferences in 73 children (M_age  = 5 years, 5 months). Anthropomorphism was not strongly correlated with social understanding in adults or with theory of mind in children. There was, however, some evidence for links between anthropomorphism and reports of having imaginary companions and social preferences. Moreover, the two measures of anthropomorphism were not correlated with each other and yielded different patterns of results in Study 2, a finding that is discussed in relation to different forms of anthropomorphism. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? There are individual differences in anthropomorphism in both adults and children. There are two different methods to assess anthropomorphism: self-reports and narration of movies of geometric shapes. The two different methods that are used to assess anthropomorphism yield different developmental patterns. What does this study add? Individual differences in social understanding or theory of mind are not associated with individual differences in anthropomorphism. Having a childhood imaginary companion is linked with a tendency to anthropomorphize in both children and adults. Two measures of anthropomorphism are not correlated in children, consistent with the view that there are different forms of anthropomorphism.

Effects of primatological training on anthropomorphic valuations of emotions

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Anthropomorphism is a consequence of similarities between human and non-human animals.

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Primatologists use sensory and motor processes to infer primate emotional expressions.

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Training and experience influence anthropomorphic attributions made by primatologists.

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Experience is accompanied by functional plasticity of sensory and motor cortices.

Anthropomorphism implies the attribution of human like emotions and cognition to non-human animals. This tendency may be conditioned by similar morphologies between mammals and is particularly important in primatology. Some neurocognitive findings suggest that prefrontal brain activity associated to conceptual learning influences anthropomorphic judgments, nevertheless, individual differences are also presented indicating that training on primate behavior may influence anthropomorphism. We identified and interpreted brain activity registered by functional magnetic resonance imaging while seven trained primatologists (39.42 ± 10.86 yr.) inferred emotions in human primates, non-human primates and non-primate animals; comparisons were made with seven matched scholars with no primatological training (38.71 ± 9.34 yr.). Primatologists manifested cerebellar, occipital and frontal activity related to sensory and motor processes when valuating humans and non-human primates, but not for other animals. So, primatological training and experience may elicit brain plasticity processes allowing inner motor and sensory models through frontal and cerebellar interactions.

Social perspective taking is associated with self-reported prosocial behavior and regional cortical thickness across adolescence

Basic perspective taking and mentalizing abilities develop in childhood, but recent studies indicate that the use of social perspective taking to guide decisions and actions has a prolonged development that continues throughout adolescence. Here, we aimed to replicate this research and investigate the hypotheses that individual differences in social perspective taking in adolescence are associated with real-life prosocial and antisocial behavior and differences in brain structure. We used an experimental approach and a large cross-sectional sample (n = 293) of participants aged 7–26 years old to assess age-related improvement in social perspective taking usage during performance of a version of the director task. In subsamples, we then tested how individual differences in social perspective taking were related to self-reported prosocial behavior and peer relationship problems on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (n = 184) and to MRI measures of regional cortical thickness and surface area (n = 226). The pattern of results in the director task replicated previous findings by demonstrating continued improvement in use of social perspective taking across adolescence. The study also showed that better social perspective taking usage is associated with more self-reported prosocial behavior, as well as to thinner cerebral cortex in regions in the left hemisphere encompassing parts of the caudal middle frontal and precentral gyri and lateral parietal regions. These associations were observed independently of age and might partly reflect individual developmental variability. The relevance of cortical development was additionally supported by indirect effects of age on social perspective taking usage via cortical thickness.

From automata to animate beings: the scope and limits of attributing socialness to artificial agents

Understanding the mechanisms and consequences of attributing socialness to artificial agents has important implications for how we can use technology to lead more productive and fulfilling lives. Here, we integrate recent findings on the factors that shape behavioral and brain mechanisms that support social interactions between humans and artificial agents. We review how visual features of an agent, as well as knowledge factors within the human observer, shape attributions across dimensions of socialness. We explore how anthropomorphism and dehumanization further influence how we perceive and interact with artificial agents. Based on these findings, we argue that the cognitive reconstruction within the human observer is likely to be far more crucial in shaping our interactions with artificial agents than previously thought, while the artificial agent's visual features are possibly of lesser importance. We combine these findings to provide an integrative theoretical account based on the "like me" hypothesis, and discuss the key role played by the Theory-of-Mind network, especially the temporal parietal junction, in the shift from mechanistic to social attributions. We conclude by highlighting outstanding questions on the impact of long-term interactions with artificial agents on the behavioral and brain mechanisms of attributing socialness to these agents.

Seeing More Than Human: Autism and Anthropomorphic Theory of Mind

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the process of taking another's perspective. Anthropomorphism can be seen as the extension of ToM to non-human entities. This review examines the literature concerning ToM and anthropomorphism in relation to individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), specifically addressing the questions of how and why those on the spectrum both show an increased interest for anthropomorphism and may even show improved ToM abilities when judging the mental states of anthropomorphic characters. This review highlights that while individuals with ASD traditionally show deficits on a wide range of ToM tests, such as recognizing facial emotions, such ToM deficits may be ameliorated if the stimuli presented is cartoon or animal-like rather than in human form. Individuals with ASD show a greater interest in anthropomorphic characters and process the features of these characters using methods typically reserved for human stimuli. Personal accounts of individuals with ASD also suggest they may identify more closely with animals than other humans. It is shown how the social motivations hypothesized to underlie the anthropomorphizing of non-human targets may lead those on the spectrum to seek social connections and therefore gain ToM experience and expertise amongst unlikely sources.

Robots As Intentional Agents: Using Neuroscientific Methods to Make Robots Appear More Social

Robots are increasingly envisaged as our future cohabitants. However, while considerable progress has been made in recent years in terms of their technological realization, the ability of robots to interact with humans in an intuitive and social way is still quite limited. An important challenge for social robotics is to determine how to design robots that can perceive the user's needs, feelings, and intentions, and adapt to users over a broad range of cognitive abilities. It is conceivable that if robots were able to adequately demonstrate these skills, humans would eventually accept them as social companions. We argue that the best way to achieve this is using a systematic experimental approach based on behavioral and physiological neuroscience methods such as motion/eye-tracking, electroencephalography, or functional near-infrared spectroscopy embedded in interactive human-robot paradigms. This approach requires understanding how humans interact with each other, how they perform tasks together and how they develop feelings of social connection over time, and using these insights to formulate design principles that make social robots attuned to the workings of the human brain. In this review, we put forward the argument that the likelihood of artificial agents being perceived as social companions can be increased by designing them in a way that they are perceived as intentional agents that activate areas in the human brain involved in social-cognitive processing. We first review literature related to social-cognitive processes and mechanisms involved in human-human interactions, and highlight the importance of perceiving others as intentional agents to activate these social brain areas. We then discuss how attribution of intentionality can positively affect human-robot interaction by (a) fostering feelings of social connection, empathy and prosociality, and by (b) enhancing performance on joint human-robot tasks. Lastly, we describe circumstances under which attribution of intentionality to robot agents might be disadvantageous, and discuss challenges associated with designing social robots that are inspired by neuroscientific principles.

The neural basis of understanding the expression of the emotions in man and animals

Humans cannot help but attribute human emotions to non-human animals. Although such attributions are often regarded as gratuitous anthropomorphisms and held apart from the attributions humans make about each other's internal states, they may be the product of a general mechanism for flexibly interpreting adaptive behavior. To examine this, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans to compare the neural mechanisms associated with attributing emotions to humans and non-human animal behavior. Although undergoing fMRI, participants first passively observed the facial displays of human, non-human primate and domestic dogs, and subsequently judged the acceptability of emotional (e.g. 'annoyed') and facial descriptions (e.g. 'baring teeth') for the same images. For all targets, emotion attributions selectively activated regions in prefrontal and anterior temporal cortices associated with causal explanation in prior studies. These regions were similarly activated by both human and non-human targets even during the passive observation task; moreover, the degree of neural similarity was dependent on participants' self-reported beliefs in the mental capacities of non-human animals. These results encourage a non-anthropocentric view of emotion understanding, one that treats the idea that animals have emotions as no more gratuitous than the idea that humans other than ourselves do.

Minimal humanity cues induce neural empathic reactions towards non-human entities

The present study tested whether the attribution of humanness by means of a minimal humanity cue is sufficient for the occurrence of empathic neural reactions towards non-human entities that are painfully stimulated. Vegetables have been used as a control condition to explore empathy towards humans' pain before. In the context of the present study, they were given a minimal humanity cue (i.e., a human name) or not (i.e., an adjective). Human associations with these different types of vegetables were measured and where either represented: pricked by a needle (painful condition) or touched by a Q-tip (touch condition) while recording electroencephalographic activity from a sample of 18 healthy students. Event-related potentials (ERP) indicated that those participants classified as high humanizers, showed an increased neural reaction when vegetables with a name were painfully rather than neutrally stimulated compared to vegetables without a name. These reactions occurred both in an early (P2: 130-180 ms) and a later (P3: 360-540 ms) ERP time-window. Moreover, this differential reaction on the P3 significantly correlated with participants' explicit empathic tendencies. Overall, these findings suggest that empathy can be triggered for non-human entities as long as they are seen as minimally human.

Beliefs about human agency influence the neural processing of gaze during joint attention

The current study measured adults' P350 and N170 ERPs while they interacted with a character in a virtual reality paradigm. Some participants believed the character was controlled by a human ("avatar" condition, n = 19); others believed it was controlled by a computer program ("agent" condition, n = 19). In each trial, participants initiated joint attention in order to direct the character's gaze toward a target. In 50% of trials, the character gazed toward the target (congruent responses), and in 50% of trials the character gazed to a different location (incongruent response). In the avatar condition, the character's incongruent gaze responses generated significantly larger P350 peaks at centro-parietal sites than congruent gaze responses. In the agent condition, the P350 effect was strikingly absent. Left occipitotemporal N170 responses were significantly smaller in the agent condition compared to the avatar condition for both congruent and incongruent gaze shifts. These data suggest that beliefs about human agency may recruit mechanisms that discriminate the social outcome of a gaze shift after approximately 350 ms, and that these mechanisms may modulate the early perceptual processing of gaze. These findings also suggest that the ecologically valid measurement of social cognition may depend upon paradigms that simulate genuine social interactions.

A human tendency to anthropomorphize is enhanced by oxytocin

In the course of human evolution, the brain has evolved into a highly sensitive detector of social signals. As a consequence of this socially driven adaptation, humans display a tendency to anthropomorphize, that is they attribute social meaning to non-social agents. The evolutionarily highly conserved hypothalamic peptide oxytocin (OXT) has been identified as a key factor attaching salience to socially relevant cues, but whether it contributes to spontaneous anthropomorphism is still elusive. In the present study involving 60 healthy female participants, we measured salivary OXT concentrations and explored the effect of a single intranasal dose of synthetic OXT (24 IU) or placebo (PLC) on anthropomorphic tendencies during participants׳ verbal descriptions of short video clips depicting socially and non-socially moving geometric shapes. Our results show that endogenous OXT concentrations at baseline positively correlated with the attribution of animacy to social stimuli. While intranasal OXT had no modulatory effect on arousal ratings and did not make the participants more talkative, the treatment boosted anthropomorphic descriptions specifically for social stimuli. In conclusion, we here provide first evidence indicating that spontaneous anthropomorphism in women is facilitated by oxytocin, thereby enabling a context-specific upregulation of the propensity to anthropomorphize environmental cues.

In our own image? Emotional and neural processing differences when observing human-human vs human-robot interactions

Notwithstanding the significant role that human-robot interactions (HRI) will play in the near future, limited research has explored the neural correlates of feeling eerie in response to social robots. To address this empirical lacuna, the current investigation examined brain activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging while a group of participants (n = 26) viewed a series of human-human interactions (HHI) and HRI. Although brain sites constituting the mentalizing network were found to respond to both types of interactions, systematic neural variation across sites signaled diverging social-cognitive strategies during HHI and HRI processing. Specifically, HHI elicited increased activity in the left temporal-parietal junction indicative of situation-specific mental state attributions, whereas HRI recruited the precuneus and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) suggestive of script-based social reasoning. Activity in the VMPFC also tracked feelings of eeriness towards HRI in a parametric manner, revealing a potential neural correlate for a phenomenon known as the uncanny valley. By demonstrating how understanding social interactions depends on the kind of agents involved, this study highlights pivotal sub-routes of impression formation and identifies prominent challenges in the use of humanoid robots.

Is this car looking at you? How anthropomorphism predicts fusiform face area activation when seeing cars

Anthropomorphism encompasses the attribution of human characteristics to non-living objects. In particular the human tendency to see faces in cars has long been noticed, yet its neural correlates are unknown. We set out to investigate whether the fusiform face area (FFA) is associated with seeing human features in car fronts, or whether, the higher-level theory of mind network (ToM), namely temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) show a link to anthropomorphism. Twenty participants underwent fMRI scanning during a passive car-front viewing task. We extracted brain activity from FFA, TPJ and MPFC. After the fMRI session participants were asked to spontaneously list adjectives that characterize each car front. Five raters judged the degree to which each adjective can be applied as a characteristic of human beings. By means of linear mixed models we found that the implicit tendency to anthropomorphize individual car fronts predicts FFA, but not TPJ or MPFC activity. The results point to an important role of FFA in the phenomenon of ascribing human attributes to non-living objects. Interestingly, brain regions that have been associated with thinking about beliefs and mental states of others (TPJ, MPFC) do not seem to be related to anthropomorphism of car fronts.