Decoupling beliefs from reality in the brain: an ERP study of theory of mind

Brain mechanisms involved in the perception of emotional gait: A combined magnetoencephalography and virtual reality study

Brain processes associated with emotion perception from biological motion have been largely investigated using point-light displays that are devoid of pictorial information and not representative of everyday life. In this study, we investigated the brain signals evoked when perceiving emotions arising from body movements of virtual pedestrians walking in a community environment. Magnetoencephalography was used to record brain activation in 21 healthy young adults discriminating the emotional gaits (neutral, angry, happy) of virtual male/female pedestrians. Event-related responses in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), fusiform body area (FBA), extrastriate body area (EBA), amygdala (AMG), and lateral occipital cortex (Occ) were examined. Brain signals were characterized by an early positive peak (P1;∼200ms) and a late positive potential component (LPP) comprising of an early (400-600ms), middle (600-1000ms) and late phase (1000-1500ms). Generalized estimating equations revealed that P1 amplitude was unaffected by emotion and gender of pedestrians. LPP amplitude showed a significant emotion X phase interaction in all regions of interest, revealing i) an emotion-dependent modulation starting in pSTS and Occ, followed by AMG, FBA and EBA, and ii) generally enhanced responses for angry vs. other gait stimuli in the middle LPP phase. LPP also showed a gender X phase interaction in pSTS and Occ, as gender affected the time course of the response to emotional gait. Present findings show that brain activation within areas associated with biological motion, form, and emotion processing is modulated by emotional gait stimuli rendered by virtual simulations representative of everyday life.

Animacy Processing in Autism: Event-Related Potentials Reflect Social Functioning Skills

Though previous studies with autistic individuals have provided behavioral evidence of animacy perception difficulties, the spatio-temporal dynamics of animacy processing in autism remain underexplored. This study investigated how animacy is neurally encoded in autistic adults, and whether potential deficits in animacy processing have cascading deleterious effects on their social functioning skills. We employed a picture naming paradigm that recorded accuracy and response latencies to animate and inanimate pictures in young autistic adults and age- and IQ-matched healthy individuals, while also employing high-density EEG analysis to map the spatio-temporal dynamics of animacy processing. Participants' social skills were also assessed through a social comprehension task. The autistic adults exhibited lower accuracy than controls on the animate pictures of the task and also exhibited altered brain responses, including larger and smaller N100 amplitudes than controls on inanimate and animate stimuli, respectively. At late stages of processing, there were shorter slow negative wave latencies for the autistic group as compared to controls for the animate trials only. The autistic individuals' altered brain responses negatively correlated with their social difficulties. The results suggest deficits in brain responses to animacy in the autistic group, which were related to the individuals' social functioning skills.

P300 as a correlate of false beliefs and false statements

INTRODUCTION

This study investigates P300 as a component for false belief and false statement processing with and without a communicative context. The purpose is to understand why P300 has been shown to be commonly involved in false belief and lie processing.

METHODS

Participants were presented with a story in which the protagonist holds a true belief and makes a true statement of it (true belief), holds a false belief and makes a true statement (false belief), or holds a true belief and makes a false statement (false statement) while electroencephalograms were recorded.

RESULTS

In Experiment 1, featuring a solitary protagonist, stronger posterior P300 was shown in the false belief condition than the true belief and false statement condition. With the installation of a communicative context by including a second character listening to the protagonist, Experiment 2 showed enhanced frontal P300 in the false statement condition compared to the true belief and false belief condition. A late slow wave was more prominent in the false belief condition than in the other two conditions in Experiment 2.

CONCLUSION

The present results suggest a situation-dependent nature of P300. The signal captures the discrepancy between belief and reality more readily than that between belief and words under a noncommunicative context. It becomes more sensitive to the discrepancy between belief and words than that between belief and reality in a communicative situation with an audience, which makes any false statement practically a lie.

Artificial scaffolding: Augmenting social cognition by means of robot technology

The concept of scaffolding refers to the support that the environment provides in the acquisition and consolidation of new abilities. Technological advancements allow for support in the acquisition of cognitive capabilities, such as second language acquisition using simple smartphone applications There is, however, one domain of cognition that has been scarcely addressed in the context of technologically assisted scaffolding: social cognition. We explored the possibility of supporting the acquisition of social competencies of a group of children with autism spectrum disorder engaged in a rehabilitation program (age = 5.8 ± 1.14, 10 females, 33 males) by designing two robot-assisted training protocols tailored to Theory of Mind competencies. One protocol was performed with a humanoid robot and the other (control) with a non-anthropomorphic robot. We analyzed changes in NEPSY-II scores before and after the training using mixed effects models. Our results showed that activities with the humanoid significantly improved NEPSY-II scores on the ToM scale. We claim that the motor repertoire of humanoids makes them ideal platforms for artificial scaffolding of social skills in individuals with autism, as they can evoke similar social mechanisms to those elicited in human-human interaction, without providing the same social pressure that another human might exert.

Semantic systems are mentalistically activated for and by social partners

A recently discovered electrophysiological response, the social N400, suggests that we use our language system to track how social partners comprehend language. Listeners show an increased N400 response, when themselves not, only a communicative partner experiences a semantic incongruity. Does the N400 reflect purely semantic or mentalistic computations as well? Do we attribute language comprehension to communicative partners using our semantic systems? In five electrophysiological experiments we identified two subcomponents of the social N400. First, we manipulated the presence-absence of an Observer during object naming: the semantic memory system was activated by the presence of a social partner in addition to semantic predictions for the self. Next, we induced a false belief—and a consequent miscomprehension—in the Observer. Participants showed the social N400, over and above the social presence effect, to labels that were incongruent for the Observer, even though they were congruent for them. This effect appeared only if participants received explicit instructions to track the comprehension of the Observer. These findings suggest that the semantic systems of the brain are not merely sensitive to social information and contribute to the attribution of comprehension, but they appear to be mentalistic in nature.

An Electrocortical Measure Associated with Metarepresentation Mediates the Relationship between Autism Symptoms and Theory of Mind

Impairments in theory of mind (ToM) - long considered common among individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) - are in fact highly heterogeneous across this population. While such heterogeneity should be reflected in differential recruitment of neural mechanisms during ToM reasoning, no research has yet uncovered a mechanism that explains these individual differences. In this study, 78 (48 ASD) adolescents viewed ToM vignettes and made mental state inferences about characters' behavior while participant electrophysiology was concurrently recorded. Two candidate event-related potentials (ERPs) - the Late Positive Complex (LPC) and the Late Slow Wave (LSW) - were successfully elicited. LPC scores correlated positively with ToM accuracy and negatively with ASD symptom severity. Notably, the LPC partially mediated the relationship between ASD symptoms and ToM accuracy, suggesting this ERP component, thought to represent cognitive metarepresentation, may help explain differences in ToM performance in some individuals with ASD.

The neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning: Electrophysiological evidence from ERPs

Intention is a typical mental state in the theory of mind. However, to date, there have been theoretical debates on the conceptual structure of intention. The neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning remains unclear. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two purposes: first, to investigate the neural correlates of intention reasoning based on a differentiated conceptual structure distinguishing desire and intention; second, to investigate the neural basis of intention reasoning for different agents. Thus, we compared the neural activity elicited by intention reasoning for self and for others when the intention matched or mismatched the desire of the agent. The results revealed that three ERP components distinguished among different types of intention reasoning. A negative-going ERP deflection with right frontal distribution between 400 and 500 ms might reflect the cognitive conflict involved in intention reasoning, a right frontal late positive component might be associated with the categorisation of agents, and a centro-parietal late slow wave might indicate the conceptual mental operations associated with decoupling mechanisms in intention processing. These findings implied the neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning and provided neural evidence for the differentiated conception of intention.

The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study

Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, contra a standard attitude taken by philosophers. Instead, observed differences in P3b amplitude indicate that knowledge attribution doesn't recruit the strong self-perspective inhibition characteristic of belief attribution. However, both belief and knowledge attribution were observed to display a late slow wave widely associated with mental state attribution, indicating that knowledge attribution also shares in more general processing of others' mental states. These results provide a new perspective both on how we think about knowledge attribution, as well as Theory of Mind processes generally.

Electrophysiological dynamics of false belief understanding and complementation syntax in school-aged children: Oscillatory brain activity and event-related potentials

A large body of research in developmental psychology has been devoted to the ongoing debate over which aspects of language are fundamental to false belief understanding (FBU). A key proposal from de Villiers and colleagues proposes the essential role of complementation syntax in FBU development. The current study, using scalp electroencephalography (EEG), addressed one opposing hypothesis purporting that complementation is redundant to FBU by characterizing the electrophysiological correlates of FBU and complementation syntax in school-age children. Time-frequency decomposition showed robust parieto-occipital low beta (12-16 Hz) power reduction in the belief versus complementation conditions. This divergence was also supported by event-related potentials (ERPs), with parieto-occipital late slow waves around 600 to 900 ms distinguishing belief and complementation conditions. The false belief condition generated the lowest behavioral response accuracy, suggesting that it is the most challenging condition. Together, the current findings provide evidence showing that complementation is not redundant to FBU.

Love at First Glance but Not After Deep Consideration: The Impact of Sexually Appealing Advertising on Product Preferences

In advertising studies, the impact of sexually appealing advertisements (hereafter “ads”) on consumers’ product preferences is highly controversial. This paper explores (1) how such ads affect consumers’ product preferences at the gazing stage (initial stage of exposure to the ad) and evaluation stage (final product preference), and (2) which type of product (utilitarian vs. hedonic) is more suited to such ads. We used an electroencephalogram to record participants’ product preferences at the gazing stage and self-reported product preferences at the evaluation stage. The results indicated that participants preferred ads with high sex appeal at the gazing stage and ads with low sex appeal at the evaluation stage. Further, compared to utilitarian products, hedonic products were more suited to sexually appealing ads. The findings suggest that the effect of such ads on consumers’ product preferences varies depending on their cognitive stage and the type of product advertised.

Electrophysiological indexes of ToM and non-ToM humor in healthy adults

The cognitive processes involved in humor comprehension were analyzed by directly comparing the time course of brain activity associated with the perception of slapstick humor and that associated with the comprehension of humor requiring theory of mind (ToM). Four different comic strips (strips containing humorous scenes that required ToM, non-ToM humorous strips, non-humorous semantically coherent strips and non-humorous semantically incoherent strips) were presented to participants, while their EEG response was recorded. Results showed that both of the humorous comic strips and the semantically incongruent strip elicited an N400 effect, suggesting similar cognitive mechanisms underlying the processing of incongruent and humorous comic strips. The results also showed that the humorous ToM strips elicited a frontal late positive (LP) response, possibly reflecting the active deployment of ToM abilities such as perspective-taking and empathy that allow for the resolution and interpretation of apparently incongruent situations. In addition, the LP response was positively correlated with ratings of perceived amusement as well as individual empathy scores, suggesting that the increased LP response to ToM humorous strips reflects the combined activation of neural mechanisms involved in the experience of amusement and ToM abilities. Overall, humor comprehension appears to demand distinct cognitive steps such as the detection of incongruent semantic components, the construction of semantic coherence, and the appreciation of humoristic elements such as maladaptive emotional reactions. Our results show that the deployment of these distinct cognitive steps is at least partially dependent on individual empathic abilities.

The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect

The current study examined how social cognition – specifically, belief-state processing – changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10–86 years. Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the character's actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200–400 msec post-stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400–600 msec post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to accommodate the character's perspective. In a final 600–1000 msec time window, this age modulation was no longer present. Interestingly, results suggested that this extended egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory control and working memory).

Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.

Dissociating neural signatures of mental state retrodiction and classification based on facial expressions

Posed facial expressions of actors have often been used as stimuli to induce mental state inferences, in order to investigate ‘Theory of Mind’ processes. However, such stimuli make it difficult to determine whether perceivers are using a basic or more elaborated mentalizing strategy. The current study used as stimuli covert recordings of target individuals who viewed various emotional expressions, which caused them to spontaneously mimic these expressions. Perceivers subsequently judged these subtle emotional expressions of the targets: in one condition (‘classification’) participants were instructed to classify the target’s expression (i.e. match it to a sample) and in another condition (‘retrodicting’) participants were instructed to retrodict (i.e. infer which emotional expression the target was viewing). When instructed to classify, participants showed more prevalent activations in event-related brain potentials (ERPs) at earlier and mid-latency ERP components N170, P200 and P300–600. By contrast, when instructed to retrodict participants showed enhanced late frontal and fronto-temporal ERPs (N800–1000), with more sustained activity over the right than the left hemisphere. These findings reveal different cortical processes involved when retrodicting about a facial expression compared to merely classifying it, despite comparable performance on the behavioral task.

Age-related decline in emotional perspective-taking: Its effect on the late positive potential

Aging is associated with changes in cognitive and affective functioning, which likely shape older adults' social cognition. As the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying age differences in social abilities remain poorly understood, the present study aims to extend the research in this field. To this purpose, younger (n = 30; M_age = 26.6), middle-aged (n = 30; M_age = 48.4), and older adults (n = 29; M_age = 64.5) performed a task designed to assess affective perspective-taking, during an EEG recording. In this task, participants decided whether a target facial expression of emotion (FEE) was congruent or incongruent with that of a masked intervener of a previous scenario, which portrayed a neutral or an emotional scene. Older adults showed worse performance in comparison to the other groups. Regarding electrophysiological results, while younger and middle-aged adults showed higher late positive potentials (LPPs) after FEEs congruent with previous scenarios than after incongruent FEEs, older adults had similar amplitudes after both. This insensitivity of older adults' LPPs in differentiating congruent from incongruent emotional context-target FEE may be related to their difficulty in generating information about others' inner states and using that information in social interactions.

Fourteen-month-old infants track the language comprehension of communicative partners

Infants employ sophisticated mechanisms to acquire their first language, including some that rely on taking the perspective of adults as speakers or listeners. When do infants first show awareness of what other people understand? We tested 14‐month‐old infants in two experiments measuring event‐related potentials. In Experiment 1, we established that infants produce the N400 effect, a brain signature of semantic violations, in a live object naming paradigm in the presence of an adult observer. In Experiment 2, we induced false beliefs about the labeled objects in the adult observer to test whether infants keep track of the other person's comprehension. The results revealed that infants reacted to the semantic incongruity heard by the other as if they encountered it themselves: they exhibited an N400‐like response, even though labels were congruous from their perspective. This finding demonstrates that infants track the linguistic understanding of social partners.

Perception of social synchrony induces mother-child gamma coupling in the social brain

The recent call to move from focus on one brain’s functioning to two-brain communication initiated a search for mechanisms that enable two humans to coordinate brain response during social interactions. Here, we utilized the mother–child context as a developmentally salient setting to study two-brain coupling. Mothers and their 9-year-old children were videotaped at home in positive and conflictual interactions. Positive interactions were microcoded for social synchrony and conflicts for overall dialogical style. Following, mother and child underwent magnetoencephalography while observing the positive vignettes. Episodes of behavioral synchrony, compared to non-synchrony, increased gamma-band power in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), hub of social cognition, mirroring and mentalizing. This neural pattern was coupled between mother and child. Brain-to-brain coordination was anchored in behavioral synchrony; only during episodes of behavioral synchrony, but not during non-synchronous moments, mother’s and child's STS gamma power was coupled. Importantly, neural synchrony was not found during observation of unfamiliar mother-child interaction Maternal empathic/dialogical conflict style predicted mothers’ STS activations whereas child withdrawal predicted attenuated STS response in both partners. Results define a novel neural marker for brain-to-brain synchrony, highlight the role of rapid bottom-up oscillatory mechanisms for neural coupling and indicate that behavior-based processes may drive synchrony between two brains during social interactions.

Agent-specific learning signals for self-other distinction during mentalising

Humans have a remarkable ability to simulate the minds of others. How the brain distinguishes between mental states attributed to self and mental states attributed to someone else is unknown. Here, we investigated how fundamental neural learning signals are selectively attributed to different agents. Specifically, we asked whether learning signals are encoded in agent-specific neural patterns or whether a self–other distinction depends on encoding agent identity separately from this learning signal. To examine this, we tasked subjects to learn continuously 2 models of the same environment, such that one was selectively attributed to self and the other was selectively attributed to another agent. Combining computational modelling with magnetoencephalography (MEG) enabled us to track neural representations of prediction errors (PEs) and beliefs attributed to self, and of simulated PEs and beliefs attributed to another agent. We found that the representational pattern of a PE reliably predicts the identity of the agent to whom the signal is attributed, consistent with a neural self–other distinction implemented via agent-specific learning signals. Strikingly, subjects exhibiting a weaker neural self–other distinction also had a reduced behavioural capacity for self–other distinction and displayed more marked subclinical psychopathological traits. The neural self–other distinction was also modulated by social context, evidenced in a significantly reduced decoding of agent identity in a nonsocial control task. Thus, we show that self–other distinction is realised through an encoding of agent identity intrinsic to fundamental learning signals. The observation that the fidelity of this encoding predicts psychopathological traits is of interest as a potential neurocomputational psychiatric biomarker.

In order for people to have meaningful social interactions, they need to infer each other’s beliefs. Converging evidence from humans and nonhuman primates suggests that a person’s brain can represent a second person’s beliefs by simulating that second person’s brain activity. However, it is not known how the outputs of those simulations are identified as ‘yours and not mine’. This ability to distinguish self from other is required for social cognition, and it may be impaired in mental health disorders with social cognitive deficits. We investigated self–other distinction in healthy adults learning about an environment both from their own point of view and the point of view of another person. We used computationally identified learning variables and then detected how these variables are represented by measuring magnetic fields in the brain. We found that the human brain can distinguish self from other by expressing these signals in dissociable activity patterns. Subjects who showed the largest difference between self signals and other signals were better at distinguishing self from other in the task and also showed fewer traits of mental health disorders.

Neural correlates of children's emotion understanding

This study aimed to develop an EEG paradigm to identify neural correlates of emotion understanding in children. In Experiment 1, children took part in an emotional story task. In Experiment 2, children completed an emotional task and a physical story task Late Positive Potentials (LPP) were demonstrated in response to emotional content in both studies. Together, The study demonstrates the potential value of the LPP as a flexible probe for studying children's emotion understanding and encourages further work into the specificity versus generality of cognitive processes underpinning the LPP in social information processing.

Oscillatory brain activity differentially reflects false belief understanding and complementation syntax processing

False belief understanding (FBU) enables people to consider conflicting beliefs about the same situation. While language has been demonstrated to be a correlate of FBU, there is still controversy about the extent to which a specific aspect of language, complementation syntax, is a necessary condition for FBU. The present study tested an important notion from the debate proposing that complementation syntax task is redundant to FBU measures. Specifically, we examined electrophysiological correlates of false belief, false complementation, and their respective true conditions in adults using electroencephalography (EEG), focusing on indices of oscillatory brain activity and large-scale connectivity. The results showed strong modulation of parieto-occipital alpha (8-12 Hz) and beta (13-20 Hz) power by the experimental manipulations, with heightened sustained alpha power reflective of effortful internal processing observed in the false compared to the true conditions and reliable beta power reductions sensitive to mentalizing and/or syntactic demands in the belief versus the complementation conditions. In addition, higher coupling between parieto-occipital regions and widespread frontal sites in the beta band was found for the false-belief condition selectively. The result of divergence in beta oscillatory activity and in connectivity between false belief and false complementation does not support the redundancy hypothesis.

Neural correlates of "Theory of Mind" in very preterm born children

Very preterm (VPT) birth (<32 weeks' gestational age) has been implicated in social-cognitive deficits including Theory of Mind (ToM); the ability to attribute mental states to others and understand that those beliefs can differ from one's own or reality. The neural bases for ToM deficits in VPT born children have not been examined. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) for its excellent spatial and temporal resolution to determine the neural underpinnings of ToM in 24 VPT and 24 full-term born (FT) children (7-13 years). VPT children performed more poorly on neuropsychological measures of ToM but not inhibition. In the MEG task, both FT children and VPT children recruited regions involved in false belief processing such as the rIFG (VPT: 275-350 ms, FT: 250-375 ms) and left inferior temporal gyrus (VPT: 375-450 ms, FT: 325-375 ms) and right fusiform gyrus (VPT: 150-200 ms, FT: 175-250 ms). The rIPL (included in the temporal-parietal junction) was recruited in FT children (475-575 ms) and the lTPJ in VPT children (500-575 ms). However, activations in all regions were reduced in the VPT compared to the FT group. We suggest that with increasing social-cognitive demands such as varying the type of scenarios in the standardized measure of ToM, reduced activations in the rIFG and TPJ in the VPT group may reflect the decreased performance. With access to both spatial and temporal information, we discuss the role of domain general and specific regions of the ToM network in both groups. Hum Brain Mapp 38:5577-5589, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The Neural Correlates Underlying Belief Reasoning for Self and for Others: Evidence from ERPs

Belief reasoning is typical mental state reasoning in theory of mind (ToM). Although previous studies have explored the neural bases of belief reasoning, the neural correlates of belief reasoning for self and for others are rarely addressed. The decoupling mechanism of distinguishing the mental state of others from one’s own is essential for ToM processing. To address the electrophysiological bases underlying the decoupling mechanism, the present event-related potential study compared the time course of neural activities associated with belief reasoning for self and for others when the belief belonging to self was consistent or inconsistent with others. Results showed that during a 450–600 ms period, belief reasoning for self elicited a larger late positive component (LPC) than for others when beliefs were inconsistent with each other. The LPC divergence is assumed to reflect the categorization of agencies in ToM processes.

Thinking about the thoughts of others; temporal and spatial neural activation during false belief reasoning

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand the perspectives, mental states and beliefs of others in order to anticipate their behaviour and is therefore crucial to social interactions. Although fMRI has been widely used to establish the neural networks implicated in ToM, little is known about the timing of ToM-related brain activity. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure the neural processes underlying ToM, as MEG provides very accurate timing and excellent spatial localization of brain processes. We recorded MEG activity during a false belief task, a reliable measure of ToM, in twenty young adults (10 females). MEG data were recorded in a 151 sensor CTF system (MISL, Coquitlam, BC) and data were co-registered to each participant's MRI (Siemens 3T) for source reconstruction. We found stronger right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) activations in the false belief condition from 150ms to 225ms, in the right precuneus from 275ms to 375ms, in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 200ms to 300ms and the superior frontal gyrus from 300ms to 400ms. Our findings extend the literature by demonstrating the timing and duration of neural activity in the main regions involved in the "mentalizing" network, showing that activations related to false belief in adults are predominantly right lateralized and onset around 100ms. The sensitivity of MEG will allow us to determine spatial and temporal differences in the brain processes in ToM in younger populations or those who demonstrate deficits in this ability.

The neural basis of desire reasoning for self and others: an event-related potential study

Theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to self and others, and predict actions in terms of mental states. It is still unclear how certain kinds of processing occur in theory of mind operation. The present study compared neural activities elicited by desire reasoning for self and for others under consistent or inconsistent conditions using the event-related potential method. The results showed that the late positive component (LPC) associated with desire reasoning was larger during the 450-550 ms time period in the condition of reasoning for self than that for others when desires were inconsistent. A left hemisphere effect on the scalp distribution was observed for the LPC component. The present study showed that a left frontal LPC component might reflect the subjective categorization process in desire reasoning.

On the Role of Mentalizing Processes in Aesthetic Appreciation: An ERP Study

We used event-related brain potentials to explore the impact of mental perspective taking on processes of aesthetic appreciation of visual art. Participants (non-experts) were first presented with information about the life and attitudes of a fictitious artist. Subsequently, they were cued trial-wise to make an aesthetic judgment regarding an image depicting a piece of abstract art either from their own perspective or from the imagined perspective of the fictitious artist [i.e., theory of mind (ToM) condition]. Positive self-referential judgments were made more quickly and negative self-referential judgments were made more slowly than the corresponding judgments from the imagined perspective. Event-related potential analyses revealed significant differences between the two tasks both within the preparation period (i.e., during the cue-stimulus interval) and within the stimulus presentation period. For the ToM condition we observed a relative centro-parietal negativity during the preparation period (700-330 ms preceding picture onset) and a relative centro-parietal positivity during the stimulus presentation period (700-1100 ms after stimulus onset). These findings suggest that different subprocesses are involved in aesthetic appreciation and judgment of visual abstract art from one's own vs. from another person's perspective.

Electrophysiological and Kinematic Correlates of Communicative Intent in the Planning and Production of Pointing Gestures and Speech

In everyday human communication, we often express our communicative intentions by manually pointing out referents in the material world around us to an addressee, often in tight synchronization with referential speech. This study investigated whether and how the kinematic form of index finger pointing gestures is shaped by the gesturer's communicative intentions and how this is modulated by the presence of concurrently produced speech. Furthermore, we explored the neural mechanisms underpinning the planning of communicative pointing gestures and speech. Two experiments were carried out in which participants pointed at referents for an addressee while the informativeness of their gestures and speech was varied. Kinematic and electrophysiological data were recorded online. It was found that participants prolonged the duration of the stroke and poststroke hold phase of their gesture to be more communicative, in particular when the gesture was carrying the main informational burden in their multimodal utterance. Frontal and P300 effects in the ERPs suggested the importance of intentional and modality-independent attentional mechanisms during the planning phase of informative pointing gestures. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the complex interplay between action, attention, intention, and language in the production of pointing gestures, a communicative act core to human interaction.

Characterizing an ERP correlate of intentions understanding using a sequential comic strips paradigm

Chronometric properties of theory of mind and intentions understanding more specifically are well documented. Notably, it was demonstrated using magnetoencephalography that the brain regions involved were recruited as soon as 200 ms post-stimulus. We used event-related potentials (ERPs) to characterize an electrophysiological marker of attribution of intentions. We also explored the robustness of this ERP signature under two conditions corresponding to either explicit instructions to focus on others' intentions or implicit instructions with no reference to mental states. Two matched groups of 16 healthy volunteers each received either explicit or no instructions about intentions and performed a nonverbal attribution of intentions task based on sequential four-image comic strips depicting either intentional or physical causality. A bilateral posterior positive component, ranging from 250 to 650 ms post-stimulus, showed greater amplitude in intentional than in physical condition (the intention ERP effect). This effect occurs during the third image only, suggesting that it reflects the integration of information depicted in the third image to the contextual cues given by the first two. The intention effect was similar in the two groups of subjects. Overall, our results identify a clear ERP marker of the first hundreds of milliseconds of intentions processing probably related to a contextual integrative mechanism and suggest its robustness by showing its blindness to task demands manipulation.

Empathy predicts false belief reasoning ability: evidence from the N400

Interpreting others' actions relies on an understanding of their current mental state. Emerging research has begun to identify a number of factors that give rise to individual differences in this ability. We report an event-related brain potential study where participants (N = 28) read contexts that described a character having a true belief (TB) or false belief (FB) about an object's location. A second sentence described where that character would look for the object. Critically, this sentence included a sentence-final noun that was either consistent or inconsistent with the character's belief. Participants also completed the Empathy Quotient questionnaire. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a TB about the object's location, the N400 waveform was more negative-going for belief inconsistent vs belief consistent critical words. However, when the character held an FB about the object's location the opposite pattern was found. Intriguingly, correlations between the N400 inconsistency effect and individuals' empathy scores showed a significant correlation for FB but not TB. This suggests that people who are high in empathy can successfully interpret events according to the character's FB, while low empathizers bias their interpretation of events to their own egocentric view.

Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning

For a long time, a controversy has been proposed that whether the process of theory of mind is a result of domain-specific or domain-general changes (Wellman in The handbook of childhood cognitive development. Blackwell Publication, New Jersey, 2011). This event-related potential study explored the neural time course of domain-general and domain-specific components in belief reasoning. Fourteen participants completed location transfer false belief (FB), true belief (TB), false sign (FS) and true sign (TS) tasks, in which two pictures told a story related to a dog that ran from a green into a red box. In the TB and FB tasks, a boy saw or did not see the transfer of the dog, respectively. In the FS and TS tasks, an arrow that pointed to the green box either altered its direction to the red box or did not alter following the transfer of the dog. Participants then inferred where the boy thought of, or the arrow indicated the location of the dog. FB and TB reasoning elicited lower N2 amplitudes than FS and TS reasoning, which is associated with domain-general components, the detection, and classification. The late slow wave (LSW) for FB was more positive at frontal, central, and parietal sites than FS because of the domain-specific component involved in FB reasoning. However, the LSW was less positive for TB than for FB but did not differ from the TS condition, which implies that mental representation might not be involved in TB reasoning.

A nexus model of the temporal-parietal junction

The temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) has been proposed to support either specifically social functions or non-specific processes of cognition such as memory and attention. To account for diverse prior findings, we propose a nexus model for TPJ function: overlap of basic processes produces novel secondary functions at their convergence. We present meta-analytic evidence that is consistent with the anatomical convergence of attention, memory, language, and social processing in the TPJ, leading to a higher-order role in the creation of a social context for behavior. The nexus model accounts for recent examples of TPJ contributions specifically to decision making in a social context and provides a potential reconciliation for competing claims about TPJ function.

Distinct neural correlates underlying pretense and false belief reasoning: evidence from ERPs

Two important milestones characterize the development of a theory of mind (ToM): The emergence of pretend play (PT) in which infants as young as 18 months separate the real world from fictional or imagined worlds. And the explicit understanding of false beliefs (FB) which develops around the age of about 4 years and demands a differentiation between mental states and reality. Although there is an outstanding debate about whether or not PT play involves metarepresentation understanding, to date, the neural correlates of FB and PT reasoning have not been investigated within one paradigm. The present study investigated PT and FB in comparison to reality understanding (RE) in an ERP paradigm presenting cartoon stories to 24 healthy adults. Results revealed a sequence of ERP components that distinguished between the conditions. PT compared to FB and RE was associated with a higher P2-amplitude at parieto-occipital sites and a late slow wave divergence (270-600 ms) at left frontal and left posterior positions. These components may indicate the processing of incongruity between the protagonist's knowledge and behavior and the identifying of the intentional character of the pretended action. In accordance with previous ERP studies on FB reasoning, we found late anterior activation (600-900 ms) for FB reasoning, probably indicating the decoupling mechanism involved in metarepresentation. These temporal and topographic differences indicate distinct underlying neural substrates for FB and PT processing, and do not support metarepresentational interpretations of PT.

Do false belief and verb non-factivity share similar neural circuits?

The present study investigates whether the complement falsity elicited by strong non-factive verbs and the false belief activated by a standard nonverbal false belief task produce similar electrophysiological activities in the brain. The hypothesis is based on the notion that both complement falsity and false belief involve decoupling a false mental representation from reality. Some previous studies have reported a behavioral correlation between children's false belief reasoning and interpretation of strong non-factive verbs together with their false complements, but a neural basis for this correlation has not been found. Our event-related potential (ERP) results with normal adults showed that both nonverbal false belief and strong non-factive verb comprehension elicited a negative late slow waveform divergence compared to their respective baselines. Although these slow waves due to the two types of stimuli had slightly different scalp distributions, both were regarded as reflecting primarily frontal activation. Such ERP similarity provides evidence for a common neural basis shared by nonverbal false belief reasoning and comprehension of strong non-factive verbs.

The neural correlates of passively viewed sequences of true and false beliefs

The ability to infer other people's mental states such as desires, emotions, intentions and beliefs is essential for successful social interactions, and it is usually referred to as theory of mind (ToM). In particular, the ability to detect and understand that people have beliefs about reality that may be false is considered an important hallmark of ToM. This experiment reports on the results of 18 participants who viewed photographic sequences of an actress performing actions as a consequence of true and false beliefs. Consistent with prior work, results from the passive viewing of stimuli depicting true belief indicated an increased response over frontal, central and parietal regions when compared with the amplitude for the false belief condition. These results show that (i) frontal activity is required for processing false belief tasks and (ii) parietal effects reported in previous studies to reflect specific cognitive process of monitoring others' beliefs can be elicited in the absence of an explicit instruction for mentalizing.

Social skills and behavioral problems in schizophrenia: the role of mental state attribution, neurocognition and clinical symptomatology

Poor social skills and abnormal behaviors are key features of schizophrenia and comprise important aspects of social functioning. Previous studies have shown that impairment of a social cognitive capacity for mental state attribution may be predictive of poor social skills. Poor social skills also seem to be related to the presence of negative symptoms, whereas the association with other symptom domains seems less clear. The contribution of nonsocial cognition, particularly executive functioning, to functional outcome in schizophrenia, and the relationships between social and nonsocial cognition, continue to be debated. To examine the relationships of mental state attribution with social skills, neurocognition and clinical symptomatology, we pooled data from two previous independent studies into one sample of 69 patients with schizophrenia. The sample was stratified for IQ, age range, and attention deficits. We also used a novel five-factor model of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. A combined verbal and non-verbal score of mental state attribution was the best cognitive predictor of social skills, whereas neurocognition (i.e., executive planning skills) did not mediate this effect. When measures of psychopathology were included, levels of disorganized and negative symptoms predicted large proportions of variance in social functioning. Nevertheless, mental state attribution remained the sole, significant cognitive predictor variable in the equation. In conclusion, a capacity for mental state attribution is uniquely important for social skills in schizophrenia. As such, training to target social cognitive skills, including mental state attribution, may be particularly beneficial for patients' social functioning.

Electrophysiological correlates of reading the single- and interactive-mind

Understanding minds is the cognitive basis of successful social interaction. In everyday life, human mental activity often happens at the moment of social interaction among two or multiple persons instead of only one-person. Understanding the interactive mind of two- or multi-person is more complex and higher than understanding the single-person mind in the hierarchical structure of theory of mind. Understanding the interactive mind maybe differentiate from understanding the single mind. In order to examine the dissociative electrophysiological correlates of reading the single mind and reading the interactive mind, the 64 channels event-related potentials were recorded while 16 normal adults were observing three kinds of Chinese idioms depicted physical scenes, one-person with mental activity, and two- or multi-person with mental interaction. After the equivalent N400, in the 500- to 700-ms epoch, the mean amplitudes of late positive component (LPC) over frontal for reading the single mind and reading the interactive mind were significantly more positive than for physical representation, while there was no difference between the former two. In the 700- to 800-ms epoch, the mean amplitudes of LPC over frontal-central for reading the interactive mind were more positive than for reading the single mind and physical representation, while there was no difference between the latter two. The present study provides electrophysiological signature of the dissociations between reading the single mind and reading the interactive mind.

In the blink of an eye: neural responses elicited to viewing the eye blinks of another individual

Facial movements have the potential to be powerful social signals. Previous studies have shown that eye gaze changes and simple mouth movements can elicit robust neural responses, which can be altered as a function of potential social significance. Eye blinks are frequent events and are usually not deliberately communicative, yet blink rate is known to influence social perception. Here, we studied event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited to observing non-task relevant blinks, eye closure, and eye gaze changes in a centrally presented natural face stimulus. Our first hypothesis (H1) that blinks would produce robust ERPs (N170 and later ERP components) was validated, suggesting that the brain may register and process all types of eye movement for potential social relevance. We also predicted an amplitude gradient for ERPs as a function of gaze change, relative to eye closure and then blinks (H2). H2 was only partly validated: large temporo-occipital N170s to all eye change conditions were observed and did not significantly differ between blinks and other conditions. However, blinks elicited late ERPs that, although robust, were significantly smaller relative to gaze conditions. Our data indicate that small and task-irrelevant facial movements such as blinks are measurably registered by the observer's brain. This finding is suggestive of the potential social significance of blinks which, in turn, has implications for the study of social cognition and use of real-life social scenarios.

Anatomical and temporal architecture of theory of mind: a MEG insight into the early stages

Representation of others' actions and mental states leads to the activation of several brain networks: the mentalizing and the "mirror neuron" systems as well as a "low level" social perception component. However, respective activations of the regions belonging to these networks remain unknown with respect to chronometrical data when static drawing stimuli are presented. To determine anatomical and temporal characteristics of theory of mind processes, magnetic signals were measured in 21 subjects during a validated nonverbal attribution of intentions task. Minimum norm estimation provides chronometric and localization data showing that regions known to be involved in the mentalizing, "mirror neuron" and social perception networks have simultaneous activations between 100 and 700 ms post-stimulus, a period which may be thought as corresponding to early stages of social processes. Among some regions, different profiles as well as modulations regarding experimental conditions suggest functional distinctions between these structures, pleading for a cooperative nature of these networks. While the left temporo-parietal area and superior temporal sulcus seem more specialized in social cues coding, we demonstrate that their right homologues, as well as the right inferior parietal cortex, are preferentially recruited during attribution of intentions stimuli compared to scenarios based on physical causality from 200 to 600 ms.

True- and false-belief reasoning in children and adults: an event-related potential study of theory of mind

The understanding that another person's belief can differ from reality and that behaviour is guided by beliefs and not by reality reflects an important cornerstone in the development of a Theory of Mind. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two aims: first, to reveal ERPs that distinguish between false- and true-belief reasoning and second, to investigate the neural changes in the development of false- and true-belief reasoning from childhood to adulthood. True- and false-belief cartoon stories were presented to adults and 6-8-year-old children. Results revealed two waveforms that differentiated between the two conditions: a late positive complex (LPC) associated with the reorientation from external stimuli to internal mental representations and a late anterior slow wave (LSW) associated with stimulus-independent processing of internal mental representations, a process that might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally, we found developmental effects at an ERP level. Children showed a more posterior localization of the LPC and a broader frontal distribution of the LSW. The results may reflect developmental progress in conceptualizing the mental domain and support the idea that the cortical mentalizing network continues to develop even after children are able to master false beliefs.

Neural correlates of belief- and desire-reasoning

Theory of mind requires an understanding of both desires and beliefs. Moreover, children understand desires before beliefs. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this developmental lag. Additionally, previous neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have neglected the direct comparison of these developmentally critical mental-state concepts. Event-related brain potentials were recorded as participants (N = 24; mean age = 22 years) reasoned about diverse-desires, diverse-beliefs, and parallel physical situations. A mid-frontal late slow wave (LSW) was associated with desire and belief judgments. A right-posterior LSW was only associated with belief judgments. These findings demonstrate neural overlap and critical differences in reasoning explicitly about desires and beliefs, and they suggest children recruit additional neural processes for belief judgments beyond a common, more general, mentalizing neural system.

Inhibiting one's own knowledge in false belief reasoning: an ERP study

Inhibiting one's own knowledge is one of the preconditions of successfully inferring other's false belief (FB). To investigate the neural correlates of such inhibition, event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by FB reasoning in the standard unexpected location FB tasks were compared with those in the adapted unexpected location FB tasks. In both kinds of tasks, participants firstly read the stories depicting by four pictures and then inferred the puppet's FB. The story was following, a puppet put a ball at location A and then left; after his leaving, the ball was carried to location B in the standard condition; in the adapted condition, the ball was carried to certain place that participants did not know. Following the stories, participants were asked FB question (where will the puppet think the ball is after he come back). To infer FB, participants need inhibit their own knowledge about ball's current location in the standard condition while they need not in the adapted condition. Results showed that participants' average response time in the standard condition was significantly longer than that in the adapted condition; the ERP component elicited by FB reasoning in the standard tasks was more positive at 470-520 ms than that in the adapted tasks; and this late positive component (LPC) divergence was located in the left middle frontal gyrus (LMFG). The results confirm the on-line influence of inhibitory control to FB reasoning and imply that inhibition process in FB reasoning is earlier than the operation of FB conception.

Neural correlates of children's theory of mind development

Young children show significant changes in their mental-state understanding as marked by their performance on false-belief tasks. This study provides evidence for activity in the prefrontal cortex associated with the development of this ability. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded as adults (N = 24) and 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children (N = 44) reasoned about reality and the beliefs of characters in animated vignettes. In adults, a late slow wave (LSW), with a left-frontal scalp distribution, was associated with reasoning about beliefs. This LSW was also observed for children who could correctly reason about the characters' beliefs but not in children who failed false-belief questions. These findings have several implications, including support for the critical role of the prefrontal cortex for theory of mind development.

Gamma-band activity in the human superior temporal sulcus during mentalizing from nonverbal social cues

The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is a key structure for our ability to infer others' mental states based on social cues including facial expressions, body posture, and gestures ("mentalizing"), but the neural mechanisms of this ability remain largely unknown. We recorded electrocorticogram directly from the pSTS in humans to show that enhanced neural oscillations in the gamma frequency range (35-55 Hz) accompany mentalizing. One patient with a lesion in pSTS was tested behaviorally on this task; he was unable to infer a virtual character's preferences from nonverbal social cues. Enhanced coherent gamma oscillations in the patients with intact pSTS may reflect a process by which social signals are bound into a unified representation to support mentalizing. This may be relevant for other social cognitive processes, as well as to the study of autism spectrum disorders, for which both mentalizing deficits and abnormal gamma activity have been reported.

False belief reasoning in the brain: an ERP study

Understanding others mind and interpersonal interaction are the cognitive basis of successful social interactions. People's mental states and behaviors rely on their holding beliefs for self and others. To investigate the neural substrates of false belief reasoning, the 32 channels event-related potentials (ERP) of 14 normal adults were measured while they understood false-belief and true belief used deceptive appearance task. After onset of the false-belief or true-belief questions, N100, P200 and late negative component (LNC) were elicited at centro-frontal sites. Compared with true belief, false belief reasoning elicited significant declined LNC in the time window from 400 to 800 ms. The source analysis of difference wave (False minus True) showed a dipole located in the middle cingulated cortex. These findings show that false belief reasoning probably included inhibitive process.