Electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness and selective attention

Neural signatures of visual awareness independent of postperceptual processing

What are the neural processes associated with perceptual awareness that are distinct from preconscious sensory encoding and postperceptual processes such as reporting an experience? Using electroencephalography and a no-report visual masking paradigm, we manipulated stimulus visibility by varying the time between stimuli and masks in linear steps (17, 33, 50, 67, and 83 ms). Awareness increased nonlinearly, with stimuli never seen at the two shortest intervals, always seen at the two longest, and 50% seen at the intermediate interval. Separate report and no-report conditions were used to isolate awareness from task performance. Our results revealed a neural signal closely linked to perceptual awareness, independent of the task: a fronto-central event-related potential that we refer to as the N2 (~250 to 300 ms). Earlier event-related potential signals reflected the linear manipulation of stimulus strength, while later signals like P3b and temporal generalization of decoding were tied to task performance, appearing only in the report condition. Taken together, these findings inform current debates regarding theories of consciousness and offer new avenues for exploring the neural mechanisms supporting conscious processing.

Attentional load leads to distinct changes in early and late cortical processing of target visibility under visual masking

Visual masking and attentional selection play important roles in controlling information processing for perception. Using an experimental design combining metacontrast with attentional load, we investigated the time course of changes in event-related potentials under different attentional load and masking conditions. The behavioral results indicated significant effects of attentional load on masking functions (i.e., masking strength as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony between target and mask). The analyses of neural activities revealed significant effects of masking and attentional load on early components located over occipital and parieto-occipital scalp sites. There were also significant modulations in the late positivity range centered over centro-parietal electrodes. However, the nature of modulations in early and late components was different. These findings overall highlight the diverse nature of masking and attentional influences on visual processing, particularly suggesting that attentional load in the visual field may have distinct effects at different stages of perceptual processing.

Bypassing input to V1 in visual awareness: A TMS-EROS investigation

Early visual cortex (V1-V3) is believed to be critical for normal visual awareness by providing the necessary feedforward input. However, it remains unclear whether visual awareness can occur without further involvement of early visual cortex, such as re-entrant feedback. It has been challenging to determine the importance of feedback activity to these areas because of the difficulties in dissociating this activity from the initial feedforward activity. Here, we applied single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the left posterior parietal cortex to elicit phosphenes in the absence of direct visual input to early visual cortex. Immediate neural activity after the TMS pulse was assessed using the event-related optical signal (EROS), which can measure activity under the TMS coil without artifacts. Our results show that: 1) The activity in posterior parietal cortex 50 ms after TMS was related to phosphene awareness, and 2) Activity related to awareness was observed in a small portion of V1 140 ms after TMS, but in contrast (3) Activity in V2 was a more robust correlate of awareness. Together, these results are consistent with interactive models proposing that sustained and recurrent loops of activity between cortical areas are necessary for visual awareness to emerge. In addition, we observed phosphene-related activations of the anteromedial cuneus and lateral occipital cortex, suggesting a functional network subserving awareness comprising these regions, the parietal cortex and early visual cortex.

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

The Effects of Spatial Attention Focus and Visual Awareness on the Processing of Fearful Faces: An ERP Study

Previous research on the relationship between attention and emotion processing have focused essentially on consciously-viewed, supraliminal stimuli, while the attention-emotion interplay remains unexplored in situations where visual awareness is restricted. Here, we presented participants with face pairs in a backward masking paradigm and examined the electrophysiological activity in response to fearful and neutral expressions under different conditions of attention (spatially attended vs. unattended) and stimulus visibility (subliminal vs. supraliminal). We found an enhanced N2 (visual awareness negativity -VAN-) and an enhanced P3 for supraliminal compared to subliminal faces. The VAN, indexing the early perceptual awareness, was enhanced when the faces were spatially attended compared to when they were unattended, showing that the VAN does not require spatial attention focus but can be enhanced by it. Fearful relative to neutral expressions enhanced the early neural activity (N2) regardless of spatial attention but only in the supraliminal viewing condition. However, fear-related enhancements on later neural activity (P3) were found when stimuli were both attended and presented supraliminally. These findings suggest that visual awareness is needed for emotion processing during both early and late stages. Spatial attention is required for emotion processing at the later stage but not at the early stage.

Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness

Much research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has focused on two evoked potentials, the P3b and the visual or auditory awareness negativity (VAN, AAN). Surveying a broad range of recent experimental evidence, we find that repeated failures to observe the P3b during conscious perception eliminate it as a putative NCC. Neither the VAN nor the AAN have been dissociated from consciousness; furthermore, a similar neural signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities can be maximal contralateral to the evoking stimulus, are likely generated in underlying sensory cortices, and point to the existence of a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) reflecting the onset of sensory consciousness.

Growing evidence for separate neural mechanisms for attention and consciousness

Our conscious experience of the world seems to go in lockstep with our attentional focus: We tend to see, hear, taste, and feel what we attend to, and vice versa. This tight coupling between attention and consciousness has given rise to the idea that these two phenomena are indivisible. In the late 1950s, the honoree of this special issue, Charles Eriksen, was among a small group of early pioneers that sought to investigate whether a transient increase in overall level of attention (alertness) in response to a noxious stimulus can be decoupled from conscious perception using experimental techniques. Recent years saw a similar debate regarding whether attention and consciousness are two dissociable processes. Initial evidence that attention and consciousness are two separate processes primarily rested on behavioral data. However, the past couple of years witnessed an explosion of studies aimed at testing this conjecture using neuroscientific techniques. Here we provide an overview of these and related empirical studies on the distinction between the neuronal correlates of attention and consciousness, and detail how advancements in theory and technology can bring about a more detailed understanding of the two. We argue that the most promising approach will combine ever-evolving neurophysiological and interventionist tools with quantitative, empirically testable theories of consciousness that are grounded in a mathematically formalized understanding of phenomenology.

ERP and MEG correlates of visual consciousness: The second decade

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness.

An Integrative Framework for Sensory, Motor, and Cognitive Functions of the Posterior Parietal Cortex

Throughout the history of modern neuroscience, the parietal cortex has been associated with a wide array of sensory, motor, and cognitive functions. The use of non-human primates as a model organism has been instrumental in our current understanding of how areas in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) modulate our perception and influence our behavior. In this Perspective, we highlight a series of influential studies over the last five decades examining the role of the PPC in visual perception and motor planning. We also integrate long-standing views of PPC functions with more recent evidence to propose a more general model framework to explain integrative sensory, motor, and cognitive functions of the PPC.

Later Positivity Reflects Post-perceptual Processes: Evidence From Immediate Detection and Delayed Detection Tasks

Electrophysiological recordings are usually used to study neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). The aim of our present study was to use two detection tasks to dissociate the electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness from the post-perceptual processes. In immediate detection task, participants had to quickly report whether the stimulus was presented after stimulus, whereas in delayed detection task, participants had to put off reporting whether the stimulus was presented after stimulus. The results showed that two previously frequently observed electrophysiological NCCs were observed: visual awareness negativity (VAN) and later positivity (LP). Importantly, the amplitude of VAN over posterior temporal and occipital areas was not influenced by the task manipulation. However, the amplitude of LP over parietal, posterior temporal and occipital areas was influenced by the task manipulation during 650–850 ms. These data suggest that VAN is an early electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness, and LP reflects post-perceptual processes required in reporting perceptual awareness.

The relationship between attention and consciousness: an expanded taxonomy and implications for 'no-report' paradigms

Tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory have sparked much debate in the field of consciousness research. Here, we focus on one of the key distinctions between these theories: the proposed relationship between attention and consciousness. By reviewing recent empirical evidence, we argue that both theories contain key insights and that certain aspects of each theory can be reconciled into a novel framework that may help guide future research. Alternative theories are also considered, including attended intermediate-level representations theory, integrated information theory and higher order thought theory. With the aim of offering a fresh and nuanced perspective to current theoretical debates, an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states is proposed. This framework maps a wider spectrum of conscious states by incorporating contemporary views from cognitive neuroscience regarding the variety of attentional mechanisms that are known to interact with sensory processing. Whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness is considered and incorporated into this extended taxonomy. To navigate this expanded space, we review recent 'no-report' paradigms and address several methodological misunderstandings in order to pave a clear path forward for identifying the neural basis of perceptual awareness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Visual mismatch negativity to vanishing parts of objects in younger and older adults

We investigated visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) to vanishing parts of continuously present objects by comparing the event-related potentials (ERPs) to infrequently (deviant) and frequently (standard) disappearing parts of the objects. This paradigm both excludes low-level stimulus-specific adaptation differences between the responses to deviants and standards, and increases the ecological validity of the stimuli. In comparison to frequently disappearing parts of the stimulus objects, infrequently vanishing parts elicited posterior negative event-related brain activity (vMMN). However, no vMMN emerged to the reappearance of the same parts of the objects. We compared the ERPs of an older and a younger sample of participants. In the 120-180 ms time period vMMN was similar in the two age groups, but in the 180-220 ms time period vMMN emerged only in the younger participants. We consider this difference as an index of more elaborate automatic processing of infrequent stimulus changes in younger adults.

Attentional Modulation of Change Detection ERP Components by Peripheral Retro-Cueing

Change detection is essential for visual perception and performance in our environment. However, observers often miss changes that should be easily noticed. A failure in any of the processes involved in conscious detection (encoding the pre-change display, maintenance of that information within working memory, and comparison of the pre and post change displays) can lead to change blindness. Given that unnoticed visual changes in a scene can be easily detected once attention is drawn to them, it has been suggested that attention plays an important role on visual awareness. In the present study, we used behavioral and electrophysiological (ERPs) measures to study whether the manipulation of retrospective spatial attention affects performance and modulates brain activity related to the awareness of a change. To that end, exogenous peripheral cues were presented during the delay period (retro-cues) between the first and the second array using a one-shot change detection task. Awareness of a change was associated with a posterior negative amplitude shift around 228–292 ms (“Visual Awareness Negativity”), which was independent of retrospective spatial attention, as it was elicited to both validly and invalidly cued change trials. Change detection was also associated with a larger positive deflection around 420–580 ms (“Late Positivity”), but only when the peripheral retro-cues correctly predicted the change. Present results confirm that the early and late ERP components related to change detection can be functionally dissociated through manipulations of exogenous retro-cueing using a change blindness paradigm.

Neural Signatures of Conscious Face Perception in an Inattentional Blindness Paradigm

Previous studies suggest that early stages of face-specific processing are performed preattentively and unconsciously, whereas conscious perception emerges with late-stage (>300 ms) neuronal activity. A conflicting view, however, posits that attention is necessary for face-specific processing and that early-to-mid latency neural responses (∼ 100-300 ms) correspond more closely with perceptual awareness. The current study capitalized on a recently developed method for manipulating attention and conscious perception during EEG recording (modified inattentional blindness paradigm) and used face stimuli that elicit a well known marker of early face processing, the N170 event-related potential (ERP). In Phase 1 of the experiment, subjects performed a demanding distracter task while line drawings of faces and matched control stimuli were presented in the center of their view. When queried, half of the subjects reported no awareness of the faces and were deemed inattentionally blind. In Phase 2, subjects performed the same distracter task, but now consciously perceived the face stimuli due to the intervening questioning. In Phase 3, subjects performed a discrimination task on the faces. Two primary contrasts were made: aware versus unaware (equally task irrelevant) and task-relevant versus task-irrelevant (equally aware). The N170 and a subsequent ERP component, the visual awareness negativity (∼ 260-300 ms), were absent during inattentional blindness and present in the aware conditions. The P3b (> 300 ms) was absent for task-irrelevant faces, even when consciously perceived, and present only when the faces were task relevant. These results inform contemporary theories of conscious face perception in particular and visual attention and perceptual awareness in general.

Processing of masked and unmasked emotional faces under different attentional conditions: an electrophysiological investigation

In order to investigate the interactions between non-spatial selective attention, awareness and emotion processing, we carried out an ERP study using a backward masking paradigm, in which angry, fearful, happy, and neutral facial expressions were presented, while participants attempted to detect the presence of one or the other category of facial expressions in the different experimental blocks. ERP results showed that negative emotions enhanced an early N170 response over temporal-occipital leads in both masked and unmasked conditions, independently of selective attention. A later effect arising at the P2 was linked to awareness. Finally, selective attention was found to affect the N2 and N3 components over occipito-parietal leads. Our findings reveal that (i) the initial processing of facial expressions arises prior to attention and awareness; (ii) attention and awareness give rise to temporally distinct periods of activation independently of the type of emotion with only a partial degree of overlap; and (iii) selective attention appears to be influenced by the emotional nature of the stimuli, which in turn impinges on unconscious processing at a very early stage. This study confirms previous reports that negative facial expressions can be processed rapidly, in absence of visual awareness and independently of selective attention. On the other hand, attention and awareness may operate in a synergistic way, depending on task demand.

Invisible collinear structures impair search

Visual attention and perceptual grouping both help us from being overloaded by the vast amount of information, and attentional search is delayed when a target overlaps with a snake-like collinear distractor (Jingling & Tseng, 2013). We assessed whether awareness of the collinear distractor is required for this modulation. We first identified that visible long (=9 elements), but not short (=3 elements) collinear distractor slowed observers' detection of an overlapping target. Then we masked part of a long distractor (=9 elements) with continuous flashing color patches (=6 elements) so that the combined dichoptic percept to observers' awareness was a short collinear distractor (=3 elements). We found that the invisible collinear parts, like visible ones, can form a continuous contour to impair search, suggesting that conscious awareness is not a pre-requisite for contour integration and its interaction with selective attention.

Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes responsible for accessing and reporting one's percept are difficult to distinguish from those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012) and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency posterior ERP negativity (~200–240 ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report (aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b (~380–480 ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240 ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based attention.

Gamma band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness

A primary goal in cognitive neuroscience is to identify neural correlates of conscious perception (NCC). By contrasting conditions in which subjects are aware versus unaware of identical visual stimuli, a number of candidate NCCs have emerged; among them are induced gamma band activity in the EEG and the P3 event-related potential. In most previous studies, however, the critical stimuli were always directly relevant to the subjects' task, such that aware versus unaware contrasts may well have included differences in post-perceptual processing in addition to differences in conscious perception per se. Here, in a series of EEG experiments, visual awareness and task relevance were manipulated independently. Induced gamma activity and the P3 were absent for task-irrelevant stimuli regardless of whether subjects were aware of such stimuli. For task-relevant stimuli, gamma and the P3 were robust and dissociable, indicating that each reflects distinct post-perceptual processes necessary for carrying-out the task but not for consciously perceiving the stimuli. Overall, this pattern of results challenges a number of previous proposals linking gamma band activity and the P3 to conscious perception.

Global workspace dynamics: cortical "binding and propagation" enables conscious contents

A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub of binding and propagation in a population of loosely coupled signaling elements. In computational applications, GW architectures recruit many distributed, specialized agents to cooperate in resolving focal ambiguities. In the brain, conscious experiences may reflect a GW function. For animals, the natural world is full of unpredictable dangers and opportunities, suggesting a general adaptive pressure for brains to resolve focal ambiguities quickly and accurately. GW theory aims to understand the differences between conscious and unconscious brain events. In humans and related species the cortico-thalamic (C-T) core is believed to underlie conscious aspects of perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing (FOK), felt emotions, visual imagery, working memory, and executive control. Alternative theoretical perspectives are also discussed. The C-T core has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are unitary and internally consistent at any given moment. Over time, conscious contents constitute a very large, open set. This suggests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be localized in a single anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a functional hub - a dynamic capacity for binding and propagation of neural signals over multiple task-related networks, a kind of neuronal cloud computing. In this view, conscious contents can arise in any region of the C-T core when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium. The resulting conscious gestalt may ignite an any-to-many broadcast, lasting ∼100-200 ms, and trigger widespread adaptation in previously established networks. To account for the great range of conscious contents over time, the theory suggests an open repertoire of binding coalitions that can broadcast via theta/gamma or alpha/gamma phase coupling, like radio channels competing for a narrow frequency band. Conscious moments are thought to hold only 1-4 unrelated items; this small focal capacity may be the biological price to pay for global access. Visuotopic maps in cortex specialize in features like color, retinal size, motion, object identity, and egocentric/allocentric framing, so that a binding coalition for the sight of a rolling billiard ball in nearby space may resonate among activity maps of LGN, V1-V4, MT, IT, as well as the dorsal stream. Spatiotopic activity maps can bind into coherent gestalts using adaptive resonance (reentry). Single neurons can join a dominant coalition by phase tuning to regional oscillations in the 4-12 Hz range. Sensory percepts may bind and broadcast from posterior cortex, while non-sensory FOKs may involve prefrontal and frontotemporal areas. The anatomy and physiology of the hippocampal complex suggest a GW architecture as well. In the intact brain the hippocampal complex may support conscious event organization as well as episodic memory storage.

Iconic memory requires attention

Two experiments investigated whether attention plays a role in iconic memory, employing either a change detection paradigm (Experiment 1) or a partial-report paradigm (Experiment 2). In each experiment, attention was taxed during initial display presentation, focusing the manipulation on consolidation of information into iconic memory, prior to transfer into working memory. Observers were able to maintain high levels of performance (accuracy of change detection or categorization) even when concurrently performing an easy visual search task (low load). However, when the concurrent search was made difficult (high load), observers' performance dropped to almost chance levels, while search accuracy held at single-task levels. The effects of attentional load remained the same across paradigms. The results suggest that, without attention, participants consolidate in iconic memory only gross representations of the visual scene, information too impoverished for successful detection of perceptual change or categorization of features.

Song listening does not affect pattern reversal visual evoked potentials

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE

The pattern reversal visual evoked response has been defined as a reproducible cortical response upon stimulation of the eyes. This response depends on the intensity of the light stimulus and its distance from the eyes and is not affected by simultaneous tactile or auditory stimulation. However, in some patients we observe different P100 latencies, at different intervals of testing, without lesions of the optic tracts. The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether a loud meaningful acoustic noise, simulated by song listening, during the testing of the visual evoked response, could alter the latency or amplitude of the cortical potentials.

DESIGN AND SETTING

The study was performed in the Clinical Neurophysiology Laboratory of the Medical Center by one technician trained to perform visual evoked potential analysis.

SUBJECTS AND METHODS

We performed pattern reversal visual evoked potentials on 40 eyes of normal individuals at rest and during auditory stimulation with loud meaningful acoustic noise in the form of songs familiar to the subject. We compared the latencies and amplitudes of the P100 wave during these two test conditions.

RESULTS

The latencies and amplitudes of the P100 waves evoked upon stimulation of the eyes of the subjects did not differ statistically during the test at rest and upon stimulation with songs simulating loud acoustic noise.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that loud song listening has no effect on the pattern reversal visual evoked potential latency or amplitude. Thus, it seems likely that the results are independent of environmental acoustic noise.

Early dissociation between neural signatures of endogenous spatial attention and perceptual awareness during visual masking

The relationship between spatial attention and conscious access has often been pictured as a single causal link: spatial attention would provide conscious access to weak stimuli by increasing their effective contrast during early visual processing. To test this hypothesis, we assessed whether the early attentional amplification of visual responses, around 100 ms following stimulus onset, had a decisive impact on conscious detection. We recorded magnetoencephalographic (MEG) signals while participants focused their attention toward or away from masked stimuli which were physically identical but consciously detected half of the time. Spatial attention increased the amplitude of early occipital responses identically for both detected and missed stimuli around 100 ms, and therefore, did not control conscious access. Accordingly, spatial attention did not increase the proportion of detected stimuli. The earliest neuromagnetic correlate of conscious detection, around 120 ms over the contralateral temporal cortex, was independent from the locus of attention. This early activation combined objective information about stimulus presence and subjective information about stimulus visibility, and was followed by a late correlate of conscious reportability, from 220 ms over temporal and frontal cortex, which correlated exclusively with stimulus visibility. This widespread activation coincided in time with the reorienting of attention triggered by masks presented at the uncued location. This reorienting was stronger and occurred earlier when the masked stimulus was detected, suggesting that the conscious detection of a masked stimulus at an unexpected location captures spatial attention. Altogether, these results support a double dissociation between the neural signatures of endogenous spatial attention and perceptual awareness.

Visual Processing of Contour Patterns under Conditions of Inattentional Blindness

An inattentional blindness paradigm was adapted to measure ERPs elicited by visual contour patterns that were or were not consciously perceived. In the first phase of the experiment, subjects performed an attentionally demanding task while task-irrelevant line segments formed square-shaped patterns or random configurations. After the square patterns had been presented 240 times, subjects' awareness of these patterns was assessed. More than half of all subjects, when queried, failed to notice the square patterns and were thus considered inattentionally blind during this first phase. In the second phase of the experiment, the task and stimuli were the same, but following this phase, all of the subjects reported having seen the patterns. ERPs recorded over the occipital pole differed in amplitude from 220 to 260 msec for the pattern stimuli compared with the random arrays regardless of whether subjects were aware of the patterns. At subsequent latencies (300–340 msec) however, ERPs over bilateral occipital-parietal areas differed between patterns and random arrays only when subjects were aware of the patterns. Finally, in a third phase of the experiment, subjects viewed the same stimuli, but the task was altered so that the patterns became task relevant. Here, the same two difference components were evident but were followed by a series of additional components that were absent in the first two phases of the experiment. We hypothesize that the ERP difference at 220–260 msec reflects neural activity associated with automatic contour integration whereas the difference at 300–340 msec reflects visual awareness, both of which are dissociable from task-related postperceptual processing.

On the neural mechanisms subserving consciousness and attention

Consciousness, as described in the experimental literature, is a multi-faceted phenomenon, that impinges on other well-studied concepts such as attention and control. Do consciousness and attention refer to different aspects of the same core phenomenon, or do they correspond to distinct functions? One possibility to address this question is to examine the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness and attention. If consciousness and attention pertain to the same concept, they should rely on shared neural mechanisms. Conversely, if their underlying mechanisms are distinct, then consciousness and attention should be considered as distinct entities. This paper therefore reviews neurophysiological facts arguing in favor or against a tight relationship between consciousness and attention. Three neural mechanisms that have been associated with both attention and consciousness are examined (neural amplification, involvement of the fronto-parietal network, and oscillatory synchrony), to conclude that the commonalities between attention and consciousness at the neural level may have been overestimated. Last but not least, experiments in which both attention and consciousness were probed at the neural level point toward a dissociation between the two concepts. It therefore appears from this review that consciousness and attention rely on distinct neural properties, although they can interact at the behavioral level. It is proposed that a “cumulative influence model,” in which attention and consciousness correspond to distinct neural mechanisms feeding a single decisional process leading to behavior, fits best with available neural and behavioral data. In this view, consciousness should not be considered as a top-level executive function but should rather be defined by its experiential properties.

Overt visual attention as a causal factor of perceptual awareness

Our everyday conscious experience of the visual world is fundamentally shaped by the interaction of overt visual attention and object awareness. Although the principal impact of both components is undisputed, it is still unclear how they interact. Here we recorded eye-movements preceding and following conscious object recognition, collected during the free inspection of ambiguous and corresponding unambiguous stimuli. Using this paradigm, we demonstrate that fixations recorded prior to object awareness predict the later recognized object identity, and that subjects accumulate more evidence that is consistent with their later percept than for the alternative. The timing of reached awareness was verified by a reaction-time based correction method and also based on changes in pupil dilation. Control experiments, in which we manipulated the initial locus of visual attention, confirm a causal influence of overt attention on the subsequent result of object perception. The current study thus demonstrates that distinct patterns of overt attentional selection precede object awareness and thereby directly builds on recent electrophysiological findings suggesting two distinct neuronal mechanisms underlying the two phenomena. Our results emphasize the crucial importance of overt visual attention in the formation of our conscious experience of the visual world.

Electrophysiological Evidence for Different Types of Change Detection and Change Blindness

Numerous studies have demonstrated that observers often fail to notice large changes in visual scenes, a phenomenon known as change blindness. Some experiments have suggested that phenomenological experience in change blindness experiments is more diverse than the common distinction between change detection and change blindness allows to resolve. Recently, it has been debated whether changes in visual scenes can be detected (“sensed”) without a corresponding perception of the changing object (“seeing”) and whether these phenomena build on fundamentally different perceptual processes. The present study investigated whether phenomenologically different perceptual processes such as sensing and seeing rely on different or similar neural processes. We studied ERP effects of visual change processing (as compared to change blindness) when observers merely detected the presence of a change (“sensing”) and when they identified the changing object in addition to detection (“seeing”). Although the visual awareness negativity (VAN)/selection negativity was similar for detection with and without identification, a change-related positivity and the N2pc contralateral to changes were found exclusively when the change was fully identified. This finding indicates that change identification requires perceptual and neural processes that are not involved in mere detection. In a second experiment, we demonstrated that the VAN and N2pc effects are similar to effects of selective attention in a visual search task. By contrast, the change-related positivity was specific for conscious processing of visual changes. The results suggest that changes can be detected (“sensed”) without perception of the changing object. Furthermore, sensing and seeing seem to rely on different neural processes and seem to constitute different types of visual perception. These findings bear implications for how different categories of visual awareness are related to different stages in visual processing.

Reversal negativity and bistable stimuli: Attention, awareness, or something else?

Ambiguous (or bistable) figures are visual stimuli that have two mutually exclusive perceptual interpretations that spontaneously alternate with each other. Perceptual reversals, as compared with non-reversals, typically elicit a negative difference called reversal negativity (RN), peaking around 250 ms from stimulus onset. The cognitive interpretation of RN remains unclear: it may reflect either bottom-up processes, attentional processes that select between the alternative views of the stimulus, or it may reflect the change in the contents of subjective awareness. In the present study, event-related potentials in response to endogenous unilateral and bilateral reversals of two Necker lattices were compared with exogenously induced reversals of unambiguous lattices. The RN neither resembled the attention-related N2pc response, nor did it correlate with the content of subjective visual awareness. Thus, we conclude that RN is a non-attentional ERP correlate of the changes in the perceptual configuration of the presented object.

Attention and consciousness

For the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In this paper we survey some of the most important recent findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first is descriptive: we provide a literature review for those seeking an understanding of the present debate. The second is editorial: we suggest that the evidence alleging dissociations between consciousness and attention is not decisive. Thus, this is an opinionated overview of the debate. By presenting our assessment, we hope to bring out both sides in the debate and to underscore that the issues here remain matters of intense controversy and ongoing investigation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Event-related brain potential correlates of visual awareness

Electrophysiological recordings during visual tasks can shed light on the temporal dynamics of the subjective experience of seeing, visual awareness. This paper reviews studies on electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness operationalized as the difference between event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to stimuli that enter awareness and stimuli that do not. There are three candidates for such a correlate: enhancement of P1 around 100 ms, enhancement of early posterior negativity around 200 ms (visual awareness negativity, VAN), and enhancement of late positivity (LP) in the P3 time window around 400 ms. Review of studies using different manipulations of awareness suggests that VAN is the correlate of visual awareness that most consistently emerges across different manipulations of visual awareness. VAN emerges also relatively independent of manipulations of nonspatial attention, but seems to be dependent on spatial attention. The results suggest that visual awareness emerges about 200 ms after the onset of visual stimulation as a consequence of the activation of posterior occipito-temporal and parietal networks.

Finding ERP-signatures of target awareness: puzzle persists because of experimental co-variation of the objective and subjective variables

Using masking techniques combined with electrophysiological recordings is a promising way to study neural correlates of visual awareness, as shown in recent studies. Here I comment on the following puzzling aspects typical for this endeavour that have made obstacles for a potentially even more impressive progress. First, the continuing practice of confounds between objective stimulus variables and subjective dependent measures. Second, complexity of timing the emergence of subjective conscious percept which is partly due to complex interactivity between target and mask. Third, the ambiguity of the concept of neural correlates of awareness.

Occipital EEG correlates of conscious awareness when subjective target shine-through and effective visual masking are compared: bifocal early increase in gamma power and speed-up of P1

Neural correlates of conscious awareness can be comfortably studied when awareness of the target stimuli is a varying dependent variable in the experimental conditions where the key independent variables are kept invariant. We presented vernier targets backward masked by an invariant grating with invariant SOA. EEG data recorded from occipital and parietal electrodes was analyzed for ERPs and time-frequency functions of oscillatory responses. Comparison of data from correct aware trials with data from correct unaware trials showed that conscious awareness of targets was associated with decrease in the latency of ERP/P1, increase in the amplitude of P300, and increase in the power of 70-Hz and 30-Hz gamma band oscillations from 50 ms before target onset up to 100 ms after target onset. Results are interpreted in the context of the well-known views about the role of brain-activity oscillations in conscious awareness and as related to the perceptual retouch theory.

Consciousness and hallucinations in schizophrenia: the role of synapse regression

Consciousness takes two forms, transitive and intransitive. Transitive consciousness is a matter of being conscious of something or other whereas intransitive consciousness has no object, as being conscious or awake. Of the different forms of transitive consciousness, perceptual, somatic, kinaesthetic and so on, cognitive neuroscience has concentrated on determining the neural concomitants of perceptual consciousness. To be conscious of a percept is to be aware of it and this requires attending to it. This work sets out a hypothesis as to what brain areas are involved in a schizophrenia subject attending and becoming aware of hallucinations. First, the different areas of cortex that support different visual and auditory illusions of percepts are considered. Next it is argued that endogenous activity in these areas of cortex give rise to hallucinations of percepts that are similar to the percepts that these same areas support during illusions. The basis of such endogenous activity, it is suggested, is to be found in the paucity of afferent synapses to these cortical areas. This may occur as a consequence of loss and regression of synapses due to a degenerative disease or because of abnormal synapse formation and regression during childhood and adolescence, as is likely to be the case in schizophrenia. Finally the neural basis of attention and awareness of these hallucinations are considered for subjects suffering from schizophrenia, and a set of important questions posed that await elucidation through future experimental studies.

The role of selective attention in visual awareness of stimulus features: electrophysiological studies

Attention and awareness are closely related, but the nature of their relationship is unclear. The present study explores the timing and temporal evolution of their interaction with event-related potentials. The participants attended to specific conjunctions of spatial frequency and orientation in masked (unaware) and unmasked (aware) visual stimuli. A correlate of awareness appeared 100-200 msec from stimulus onset similarly to both attended and unattended features. Selection negativity (SN), a correlate of attentional selection, emerged in response to both masked and unmasked stimuli after 200 msec. This double dissociation between correlates of awareness and SN suggests that the electrophysiological processes associated with feature-based attentional selection and visual awareness of features can be dissociated from each other at early stages of processing. In a passive task, requiring no attention to the stimuli, early electrophysiological responses (before 200 msec) related to awareness were attenuated, suggesting that focal attention modulates visual awareness earlier than does selective feature-based attention.

Neural dissociation between visual awareness and spatial attention

To what extent does what we consciously see depend on where we attend to? Psychologists have long stressed the tight relationship between visual awareness and spatial attention at the behavioral level. However, the amount of overlap between their neural correlates remains a matter of debate. We recorded magnetoencephalographic signals while human subjects attended toward or away from faint stimuli that were reported as consciously seen only half of the time. Visually identical stimuli could thus be attended or not and consciously seen or not. Although attended stimuli were consciously seen slightly more often than unattended ones, the factorial analysis of stimulus-induced oscillatory brain activity revealed distinct and independent neural correlates of visual awareness and spatial attention at different frequencies in the gamma range (30-150 Hz). Whether attended or not, consciously seen stimuli induced increased mid-frequency gamma-band activity over the contralateral visual cortex, whereas spatial attention modulated high-frequency gamma-band activity in response to both consciously seen and unseen stimuli. A parametric analysis of the data at the single-trial level confirmed that the awareness-related mid-frequency activity drove the seen-unseen decision but also revealed a small influence of the attention-related high-frequency activity on the decision. These results suggest that subjective visual experience is shaped by the cumulative contribution of two processes operating independently at the neural level, one reflecting visual awareness per se and the other reflecting spatial attention.

The earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness?

To examine the neural correlates and timing of human visual awareness, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in two experiments while the observers were detecting a grey dot that was presented near subjective threshold. ERPs were averaged for conscious detections of the stimulus (hits) and nondetections (misses) separately. Our results revealed that hits, as compared to misses, showed a negativity around 180-350 ms at occipital and posterior temporal sites. It was followed by a positive wave after 400-500 ms, peaking at parietal sites. These correlates were not affected by a manipulation of attention. The early negativity, called 'visual awareness negativity' (VAN), may be a general, primary electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness. The present data show that it can be observed in response to appearance of a stimulus in visual awareness and that it generalizes across different manipulations of stimulus visibility.

Comparison of event-related potentials in attentional blink and repetition blindness

Attending to the first target in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) interferes with processing of the second target so that the participants fail to recognize the second target if the targets are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony of 200-500 ms. This phenomenon is attentional blink (AB). Repetition blindness (RB) is an additional difficulty to recognize the second occurrence of the same stimulus in RSVP. A controversial issue in studies of both deficits is the processing level at which they occur. To compare the timing and mechanisms of AB and RB directly during the same RSVP stream, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to repeated and unrepeated targets. Comparable to earlier ERP studies on visual awareness, the results showed for both types of targets a negative amplitude difference between ERPs to consciously recognized and unrecognized targets during 250-350 ms from stimulus onset, suggesting that both AB and RB are associated with deficits of conscious perception, occurring at earlier stages than access to working memory. However, the perceptual deficit in RB is more severe, which may be related to higher overall negativity in response to repeated targets observed 150-300 ms after stimulus onset, suggesting stronger cortical baseline activation and higher perceptual threshold for repeated targets as compared with unrepeated ones.