1
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Otten K, Buskens V, Przepiorka W, Ellemers N. Social norm dynamics and cooperation in changing groups. Curr Opin Psychol 2024; 59:101849. [PMID: 39178789 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101849] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/02/2024] [Revised: 07/17/2024] [Accepted: 07/25/2024] [Indexed: 08/26/2024]
Abstract
Social norms promote cooperation in human groups. How are these norms and cooperation affected when groups change due to new members arriving and old members leaving? In this review we highlight the scant literature that researches the effects of group changes on social norms and cooperation. Thus far evidence suggests that newcomers cooperate less than incumbents but adjust their cooperation levels over time. However, this adjustment is not necessarily accompanied by adjustments in terms of group identification and norms. We also point to the data limitations that ensue when researching phenomena at the group level and outline future research directions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kasper Otten
- Utrecht University, Department of Sociology, Netherlands; Research and Data Centre (WODC), Department of Asylum and Migration, Netherlands
| | | | | | - Naomi Ellemers
- Utrecht University, Department of Psychology, Netherlands
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2
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Fan J, Du H, Li G, He X. The effect of multi-tasks mechanism on cooperation in evolutionary game. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2024; 34:083101. [PMID: 39088350 DOI: 10.1063/5.0210787] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2024] [Accepted: 07/18/2024] [Indexed: 08/03/2024]
Abstract
Human games are inherently diverse, involving more than mere identity interactions. The diversity of game tasks offers a more authentic explanation in the exploration of social dilemmas. Human behavior is also influenced by conformity, and prosociality is a crucial factor in addressing social dilemmas. This study proposes a generalized prisoner's dilemma model of task diversity that incorporates a conformity-driven interaction. Simulation findings indicate that the diversity of multi-tasks and the path dependence contribute to the flourishing of cooperation in games. Conformity-driven interactions also promote cooperation. However, this promotion effect does not increase linearly, and only appropriate task sizes and suitable proportions of conformity-driven interactions yield optimal results. From a broader group perspective, the interplay of network adaptation, task size, and conformity-driven interaction can form a structure of attractors or repellents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jiarui Fan
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
| | - Haifeng Du
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
| | - Guangyu Li
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
| | - Xiaochen He
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
- School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
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3
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Dragicevic AZ. The Unification of Evolutionary Dynamics through the Bayesian Decay Factor in a Game on a Graph. Bull Math Biol 2024; 86:69. [PMID: 38714590 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-024-01299-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2024] [Accepted: 04/18/2024] [Indexed: 05/10/2024]
Abstract
We unify evolutionary dynamics on graphs in strategic uncertainty through a decaying Bayesian update. Our analysis focuses on the Price theorem of selection, which governs replicator(-mutator) dynamics, based on a stratified interaction mechanism and a composite strategy update rule. Our findings suggest that the replication of a certain mutation in a strategy, leading to a shift from competition to cooperation in a well-mixed population, is equivalent to the replication of a strategy in a Bayesian-structured population without any mutation. Likewise, the replication of a strategy in a Bayesian-structured population with a certain mutation, resulting in a move from competition to cooperation, is equivalent to the replication of a strategy in a well-mixed population without any mutation. This equivalence holds when the transition rate from competition to cooperation is equal to the relative strength of selection acting on either competition or cooperation in relation to the selection differential between cooperators and competitors. Our research allows us to identify situations where cooperation is more likely, irrespective of the specific payoff levels. This approach provides new perspectives into the intended purpose of Price's equation, which was initially not designed for this type of analysis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arnaud Zlatko Dragicevic
- Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand.
- Sustainable Development, CIRANO, Montréal, Canada.
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4
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Chiba-Okabe H, Plotkin JB. Can institutions foster cooperation by wealth redistribution? J R Soc Interface 2024; 21:20230698. [PMID: 38471530 PMCID: PMC10932717 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0698] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/06/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
Theoretical models prescribe how institutions can promote cooperation in a population by imposing appropriate punishments or rewards on individuals. However, many real-world institutions are not sophisticated or responsive enough to ensure cooperation by calibrating their policies. Or, worse yet, an institution might selfishly exploit the population it governs for its own benefit. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in the presence of an institution that is autonomous, in the sense that it has its own interests that may or may not align with those of the population. The institution imposes a tax on the population and redistributes a portion of the tax revenue to cooperators, withholding the remaining revenue for itself. The institution adjusts its rates of taxation and redistribution to optimize its own long-term, discounted utility. We consider three types of institutions with different goals, embodied in their utility functions. We show that a prosocial institution, whose goal is to maximize the average payoff of the population, can indeed promote cooperation-but only if it is sufficiently forward-looking. On the other hand, an institution that seeks to maximize welfare among cooperators alone will successfully promote collective cooperation even if it is myopic. Remarkably, even a selfish institution, which seeks to maximize the revenue it withholds for itself, can nonetheless promote cooperation. The average payoff of the population increases when a selfish institution is more forward-looking, so that a population under a selfish regime can sometimes fare better than under anarchy. Our analysis highlights the potential benefits of institutional wealth redistribution, even when an institution does not share the interests of the population it governs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hiroaki Chiba-Okabe
- Program in Applied Mathematics and Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Program in Applied Mathematics and Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
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5
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Simpson B, Montgomery B, Melamed D. Reputations for treatment of outgroup members can prevent the emergence of political segregation in cooperative networks. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7721. [PMID: 38001105 PMCID: PMC10674010 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-43486-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/14/2022] [Accepted: 11/09/2023] [Indexed: 11/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Reputation systems promote cooperation and tie formation in social networks. But how reputations affect cooperation and the evolution of networks is less clear when societies are characterized by fundamental, identity-based, social divisions like those centered on politics in the contemporary U.S. Using a large web-based experiment with participants (N = 1073) embedded in networks where each tie represents the opportunity to play a dyadic iterated prisoners' dilemma, we investigate how cooperation and network segregation varies with whether and how reputation systems track behavior toward members of the opposing political party (outgroup members). As predicted, when participants know others' political affiliation, early cooperation patterns show ingroup favoritism. As a result, networks become segregated based on politics. However, such ingroup favoritism and network-level political segregation is reduced in conditions in which participants know how others behave towards participants from both their own party and participants from the other party. These findings have implications for our understanding of reputation systems in polarized contexts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brent Simpson
- Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 29208, USA.
| | - Bradley Montgomery
- Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA
| | - David Melamed
- Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA.
- Translational Data Analytics Institute, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA.
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6
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Wang X, Zhou L, McAvoy A, Li A. Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7453. [PMID: 37978181 PMCID: PMC10656501 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-43048-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2023] [Accepted: 10/30/2023] [Indexed: 11/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how different styles of imitation quantitatively impact the evolution of cooperation. Here, we take a different perspective on the personal and external social information required by imitation. We develop a general model of imitation dynamics with incomplete information in networked systems, which unifies classical update rules including the death-birth and pairwise-comparison rule on complex networks. Under pairwise interactions, we find that collective cooperation is most promoted if individuals neglect personal information. If personal information is considered, cooperators evolve more readily with more external information. Intriguingly, when interactions take place in groups on networks with low degrees of clustering, using more personal and less external information better facilitates cooperation. Our unifying perspective uncovers intuition by examining the rate and range of competition induced by different information situations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaochen Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China
| | - Lei Zhou
- School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
| | - Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China.
- Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China.
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7
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Jensen GG, Busch MB, Piovesan M, Haerter JO. Nudging cooperation among agents in an experimental social network. APPLIED NETWORK SCIENCE 2023; 8:62. [PMID: 37711679 PMCID: PMC10497665 DOI: 10.1007/s41109-023-00588-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/04/2023] [Accepted: 08/27/2023] [Indexed: 09/16/2023]
Abstract
We investigate the development of cooperative behavior in networks over time. In our controlled laboratory experiment, subjects can cooperate by sending costly messages that contain valuable information for the receiver or other subjects in the network. Any message sent can increase the chance that subjects find the information they are looking for and consequently their profit. We find that cooperation emerges spontaneously and remains stable over time. In an additional treatment, we provide a non-binding suggestion about who to contact at the beginning of the experiment. We find that subjects partially follow our recommendation, and this increases their own and others' profit. Despite the removal of suggestions, subjects build long-lasting relationships with the suggested contacts. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s41109-023-00588-x.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gorm Gruner Jensen
- Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen, Blegdamsvej 17, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Martin Benedikt Busch
- Department of Economics, Management, and Quantitative Methods (DEMM), University of Milan, Milan, Italy
- Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI), University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Marco Piovesan
- Department of Economics, University of Verona, Verona, Italy
- Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI), University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Jan O. Haerter
- Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen, Blegdamsvej 17, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
- Complexity and Climate, Leibniz Centre for Tropical Marine Research, Bremen, Germany
- Constructor University, Bremen, Germany
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8
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Kings M, Arbon JJ, McIvor GE, Whitaker M, Radford AN, Lerner J, Thornton A. Wild jackdaws can selectively adjust their social associations while preserving valuable long-term relationships. Nat Commun 2023; 14:5103. [PMID: 37696804 PMCID: PMC10495349 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-40808-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/04/2023] [Accepted: 08/09/2023] [Indexed: 09/13/2023] Open
Abstract
Influential theories of the evolution of cognition and cooperation posit that tracking information about others allows individuals to adjust their social associations strategically, re-shaping social networks to favour connections between compatible partners. Crucially, to our knowledge, this has yet to be tested experimentally in natural populations, where the need to maintain long-term, fitness-enhancing relationships may limit social plasticity. Using a social-network-manipulation experiment, we show that wild jackdaws (Corvus monedula) learned to favour social associations with compatible group members (individuals that provided greater returns from social foraging interactions), but resultant change in network structure was constrained by the preservation of valuable pre-existing relationships. Our findings provide insights into the cognitive basis of social plasticity and the interplay between individual decision-making and social-network structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Kings
- Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Treliever Road, Penryn, TR10 9FE, UK.
| | - Josh J Arbon
- Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Treliever Road, Penryn, TR10 9FE, UK.
- School of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol, 24 Tyndall Avenue, Bristol, BS8 1TQ, UK.
| | - Guillam E McIvor
- Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Treliever Road, Penryn, TR10 9FE, UK
| | - Martin Whitaker
- technologywithin, Chevron Business Park, Limekiln Lane, Holbury, Southampton, SO45 2QL, UK
| | - Andrew N Radford
- School of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol, 24 Tyndall Avenue, Bristol, BS8 1TQ, UK
| | - Jürgen Lerner
- Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Konstanz, 78457, Konstanz, Germany
- HumTec Institute, RWTH Aachen University, 52062, Aachen, Germany
| | - Alex Thornton
- Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Treliever Road, Penryn, TR10 9FE, UK.
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9
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Su Q, McAvoy A, Plotkin JB. Strategy evolution on dynamic networks. NATURE COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCE 2023; 3:763-776. [PMID: 38177777 DOI: 10.1038/s43588-023-00509-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/19/2023] [Accepted: 08/08/2023] [Indexed: 01/06/2024]
Abstract
Models of strategy evolution on static networks help us understand how population structure can promote the spread of traits like cooperation. One key mechanism is the formation of altruistic spatial clusters, where neighbors of a cooperative individual are likely to reciprocate, which protects prosocial traits from exploitation. However, most real-world interactions are ephemeral and subject to exogenous restructuring, so that social networks change over time. Strategic behavior on dynamic networks is difficult to study, and much less is known about the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Here we provide an analytical treatment of cooperation on dynamic networks, allowing for arbitrary spatial and temporal heterogeneity. We show that transitions among a large class of network structures can favor the spread of cooperation, even if each individual social network would inhibit cooperation when static. Furthermore, we show that spatial heterogeneity tends to inhibit cooperation, whereas temporal heterogeneity tends to promote it. Dynamic networks can have profound effects on the evolution of prosocial traits, even when individuals have no agency over network structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China.
- Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Ministry of Education of China, Shanghai, China.
- Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Control and Management, Shanghai, China.
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
| | - Joshua B Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
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10
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Abstract
Reputation and reciprocity are key mechanisms for cooperation in human societies, often going hand in hand to favor prosocial behavior over selfish actions. Here we review recent researches at the interface of physics and evolutionary game theory that explored these two mechanisms. We focus on image scoring as the bearer of reputation, as well as on various types of reciprocity, including direct, indirect, and network reciprocity. We review different definitions of reputation and reciprocity dynamics, and we show how these affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We consider first-order, second-order, as well as higher-order models in well-mixed and structured populations, and we review experimental works that support and inform the results of mathematical modeling and simulations. We also provide a synthesis of the reviewed researches along with an outlook in terms of six directions that seem particularly promising to explore in the future.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chengyi Xia
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Tiangong University, Tianjin 300384, China
| | - Juan Wang
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China.
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404332, Taiwan; Alma Mater Europaea, Slovenska ulica 17, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xian 710072, China.
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11
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Gradwohl N, Strandburg-Peshkin A, Giese H. Humans strategically avoid connecting to others who agree and avert the emergence of network polarization in a coordination task. Sci Rep 2023; 13:11299. [PMID: 37438426 PMCID: PMC10338681 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-38353-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2022] [Accepted: 07/06/2023] [Indexed: 07/14/2023] Open
Abstract
Clusters of like-minded individuals can impede consensus in group decision-making. We implemented an online color coordination task to investigate whether control over communication links creates clusters impeding group consensus. In 244 6-member networks, individuals were incentivized to reach a consensus by agreeing on a color, but had conflicting incentives for which color to choose. We varied (1) if communication links were static, changed randomly over time, or were player-controlled; (2) whether links determined who was observed or addressed; and (3) whether a majority existed or equally many individuals preferred each color. We found that individuals preferentially selected links to previously unobserved and disagreeing others, avoiding links with agreeing others. This prevented cluster formation, sped up consensus formation rather than impeding it, and increased the probability that the group agreed on the majority incentive. Overall, participants with a consensus goal avoided clusters by applying strategies that resolved uncertainty about others.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nico Gradwohl
- Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.
- Department for the Ecology of Animal Societies, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Konstanz, Germany.
| | - Ariana Strandburg-Peshkin
- Biology Department, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
- Department for the Ecology of Animal Societies, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Konstanz, Germany
| | - Helge Giese
- Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
- Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany
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12
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Otten K, Frey UJ, Buskens V, Przepiorka W, Ellemers N. Human cooperation in changing groups in a large-scale public goods game. Nat Commun 2022; 13:6399. [PMID: 36302777 PMCID: PMC9613774 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-34160-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2022] [Accepted: 10/17/2022] [Indexed: 12/25/2022] Open
Abstract
How people cooperate to provide public goods is an important scientific question and relates to many societal problems. Previous research studied how people cooperate in stable groups in repeated or one-time-only encounters. However, most real-world public good problems occur in groups with a gradually changing composition due to old members leaving and new members arriving. How group changes are related to cooperation in public good provision is not well understood. To address this issue, we analyze a dataset from an online public goods game comprising approximately 1.5 million contribution decisions made by about 135 thousand players in about 11.3 thousand groups with about 234 thousand changes in group composition. We find that changes in group composition negatively relate to cooperation. Our results suggest that this is related to individuals contributing less in the role of newcomers than in the role of incumbents. During the process of moving from newcomer status to incumbent status, individuals cooperate more and more in line with incumbents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kasper Otten
- grid.5477.10000000120346234Utrecht University, Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht, the Netherlands
| | - Ulrich J. Frey
- grid.8664.c0000 0001 2165 8627Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Faculty of Biology and Chemistry, Giessen, Germany
| | - Vincent Buskens
- grid.5477.10000000120346234Utrecht University, Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht, the Netherlands
| | - Wojtek Przepiorka
- grid.5477.10000000120346234Utrecht University, Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht, the Netherlands
| | - Naomi Ellemers
- grid.5477.10000000120346234Utrecht University, Department of Psychology, Utrecht, the Netherlands
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13
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Su Q, McAvoy A, Plotkin JB. Evolution of cooperation with contextualized behavior. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2022; 8:eabm6066. [PMID: 35138905 PMCID: PMC10921959 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abm6066] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2021] [Accepted: 12/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
How do networks of social interaction govern the emergence and stability of prosocial behavior? Theoretical studies of this question typically assume unconditional behavior, meaning that an individual either cooperates with all opponents or defects against all opponents-an assumption that produces a pessimistic outlook for the evolution of cooperation, especially in highly connected populations. Although these models may be appropriate for simple organisms, humans have sophisticated cognitive abilities that allow them to distinguish between opponents and social contexts, so they can condition their behavior on the identity of opponents. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation when behavior is conditioned by social context, but behaviors can spill over between contexts. Our mathematical analysis shows that contextualized behavior rescues cooperation across a broad range of population structures, even when the number of social contexts is small. Increasing the number of social contexts further promotes cooperation by orders of magnitude.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
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14
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Pal A, Sengupta S. Network rewiring promotes cooperation in an aspirational learning model. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2022; 32:023109. [PMID: 35232058 DOI: 10.1063/5.0071873] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/17/2021] [Accepted: 01/17/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
We analyze a cooperative decision-making model that is based on individual aspiration levels using the framework of a public goods game in static and dynamic networks. Sensitivity to differences in payoff and dynamic aspiration levels modulates individual satisfaction and affects subsequent behavior. The collective outcome of such strategy changes depends on the efficiency with which aspiration levels are updated. Below a threshold learning efficiency, cooperators dominate despite short-term fluctuations in strategy fractions. Categorizing players based on their satisfaction level and the resulting strategy reveal periodic cycling between the different categories. We explain the distinct dynamics in the two phases in terms of differences in the dominant cyclic transitions between different categories of cooperators and defectors. Allowing even a small fraction of nodes to restructure their connections can promote cooperation across almost the entire range of values of learning efficiency. Our work reinforces the usefulness of an internal criterion for strategy updates, together with network restructuring, in ensuring the dominance of altruistic strategies over long time-scales.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anuran Pal
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur Campus, Mohanpur 741246, India
| | - Supratim Sengupta
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur Campus, Mohanpur 741246, India
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15
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Lin KY, Schank JC. Small group size promotes more egalitarian societies as modeled by the hawk-dove game. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0279545. [PMID: 36574418 PMCID: PMC9794044 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0279545] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/22/2022] [Accepted: 12/09/2022] [Indexed: 12/28/2022] Open
Abstract
The social organization of groups varies greatly across primate species, ranging from egalitarian to despotic. Moreover, the typical or average size of groups varies greatly across primate species. Yet we know little about how group size affects social organization across primate species. Here we used the hawk-dove game (HDG) to model the evolution of social organization as a function of maximum group size and used the evolved frequency of hawks as a measure of egalitarian/despotism in societies. That is, the lower the frequency of hawks, the more egalitarian a society is, and the higher the frequency of hawks, the more despotic it is. To do this, we built an agent-based model in which agents live in groups and play the HDG with fellow group members to obtain resources to reproduce offspring. Offspring inherit the strategy of their parent (hawk or dove) with a low mutation rate. When groups reach a specified maximum size, they are randomly divided into two groups. We show that the evolved frequency of hawks is dramatically lower for relatively small maximum group sizes than predicted analytically for the HDG. We discuss the relevance of group size for understanding and modeling primate social systems, including the transition from hunter-gather societies to agricultural societies of the Neolithic era. We conclude that group size should be included in our theoretical understanding of the organization of primate social systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kai-Yin Lin
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, United States of America
| | - Jeffrey C. Schank
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, United States of America
- * E-mail:
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16
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Takács K, Gross J, Testori M, Letina S, Kenny AR, Power EA, Wittek RPM. Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200297. [PMID: 34601917 PMCID: PMC8487750 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0297] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Affiliation(s)
- Károly Takács
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Computational Social Science-Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., 1097 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Jörg Gross
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Martina Testori
- Organization Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Srebrenka Letina
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Institute of Health and Wellbeing, MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow, Berkeley Square, 99 Berkeley Street, Glasgow G3 7HR, UK
| | - Adam R Kenny
- Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PN, UK.,Calleva Research Centre for Evolution and Human Sciences, Magdalen College, High Street, Oxford OX1 4AU, UK
| | - Eleanor A Power
- Department of Methodology, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
| | - Rafael P M Wittek
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands
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17
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Gareta García M, Farine DR, Brachotte C, Borgeaud C, Bshary R. Wild female vervet monkeys change grooming patterns and partners when freed from feeding constraints. Anim Behav 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2021.08.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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18
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Yousefi Nooraie R, Warren K, Juckett LA, Cao QA, Bunger AC, Patak-Pietrafesa MA. Individual- and group-level network-building interventions to address social isolation and loneliness: A scoping review with implications for COVID19. PLoS One 2021; 16:e0253734. [PMID: 34170980 PMCID: PMC8232435 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0253734] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/20/2020] [Accepted: 06/11/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
PURPOSE Worldwide mandates for social distancing and home-quarantine have contributed to loneliness and social isolation. We conducted a systematic scoping review to identify network-building interventions that address loneliness and isolation, describe their components and impact on network structure, and consider their application in the wake of COVID19. METHODS We performed forward and backward citation tracking of three seminal publications on network interventions and Bibliographic search of Web of Science and SCOPUS. We developed data charting tables and extracted and synthesized the characteristics of included studies, using an iteratively updating form. FINDINGS From 3390 retrieved titles and abstracts, we included 8 studies. These interventions focused on building networks at either individual- or group-levels. Key elements that were incorporated in the interventions at varying degrees included (a) creating opportunities to build networks; (b) improving social skills; (c) assessing network diagnostics (i.e. using network data or information to inform network strategies); (d) promoting engagement with influential actors; and (e) a process for goal-setting and feedback. The effect of interventions on network structures, or the moderating effect of structure on the intervention effectiveness was rarely assessed. CONCLUSIONS As many natural face-to-face opportunities for social connection are limited due to COVID19, groups already at risk for social isolation and loneliness are disproportionately impacted. Network-building interventions include multiple components that address both the structure of individuals' networks, and their skills and motivation for activating them. These intervention elements could be adapted for delivery via online platforms, and implemented by trained facilitators or novice volunteers, although more rigorous testing is needed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Reza Yousefi Nooraie
- Department of Public Health Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Keith Warren
- College of Social Work, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
| | - Lisa A. Juckett
- School of Health and Rehabilitation Sciences, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
| | - Qiuchang A. Cao
- College of Social Work, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
| | - Alicia C. Bunger
- College of Social Work, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
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19
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Gokcekus S, Cole EF, Sheldon BC, Firth JA. Exploring the causes and consequences of cooperative behaviour in wild animal populations using a social network approach. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 2021; 96:2355-2372. [DOI: 10.1111/brv.12757] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2020] [Revised: 05/25/2021] [Accepted: 05/27/2021] [Indexed: 12/26/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Samin Gokcekus
- Department of Zoology, Edward Grey Institute University of Oxford 11a Mansfield Road Oxford OX1 3SZ U.K
| | - Ella F. Cole
- Department of Zoology, Edward Grey Institute University of Oxford 11a Mansfield Road Oxford OX1 3SZ U.K
| | - Ben C. Sheldon
- Department of Zoology, Edward Grey Institute University of Oxford 11a Mansfield Road Oxford OX1 3SZ U.K
| | - Josh A. Firth
- Department of Zoology, Edward Grey Institute University of Oxford 11a Mansfield Road Oxford OX1 3SZ U.K
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20
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Riedl A, Rohde IMT, Strobel M. Free neighborhood choice boosts socially optimal outcomes in stag-hunt coordination problem. Sci Rep 2021; 11:7745. [PMID: 33833291 PMCID: PMC8032720 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-87019-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2020] [Accepted: 03/23/2021] [Indexed: 02/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Situations where independent agents need to align their activities to achieve individually and socially beneficial outcomes are abundant, reaching from everyday situations like fixing a time for a meeting to global problems like climate change agreements. Often such situations can be described as stag-hunt games, where coordinating on the socially efficient outcome is individually optimal but also entails a risk of losing out. Previous work has shown that in fixed interaction neighborhoods agents' behavior mostly converges to the collectively inefficient outcome. However, in the field, interaction neighborhoods often can be self-determined. Theoretical work investigating such circumstances is ambiguous in whether the efficient or inefficient outcome will prevail. We performed an experiment with human subjects exploring how free neighborhood choice affects coordination. In a fixed interaction treatment, a vast majority of subjects quickly coordinates on the inefficient outcome. In a treatment with neighborhood choice, the outcome is dramatically different: behavior quickly converges to the socially desirable outcome leading to welfare gains 2.5 times higher than in the environment without neighborhood choice. Participants playing efficiently exclude those playing inefficiently who in response change their behavior and are subsequently included again. Importantly, this mechanism is effective despite that only few exclusions actually occur.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arno Riedl
- Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics, Maastricht University, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
- Center for Economic Studies (CES), 81679, Munich, Germany.
- IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 53113, Bonn, Germany.
- Netspar, 5037 AB, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
| | - Ingrid M T Rohde
- Faculty of Management, Open University of the Netherlands, 6401 DL, Heerlen, The Netherlands
- Institute for Applied Microeconomics, Bonn University, 53113, Bonn, Germany
| | - Martin Strobel
- Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics, Maastricht University, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
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21
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Silk MJ, Hodgson DJ. Differentiated Social Relationships and the Pace-of-Life-History. Trends Ecol Evol 2021; 36:498-506. [PMID: 33810865 DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2021.02.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/11/2020] [Revised: 02/15/2021] [Accepted: 02/16/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
When selection is imposed by both social and ecological environments, the costs and benefits of social relationships can depend on life-history strategy. We argue that the formation and maintenance of differentiated social relationships will prevail in species and individuals with slow life histories. Social behaviours that benefit survival can promote slower life histories. Meanwhile, longer lifespan promotes the development of strong and stable social bonds by allowing fitness payoffs to be postponed. Differentiated social behaviours should be favoured for fast life histories only when they promote the rate of reproduction. Finally, associations between life-history strategies and other traits (e.g., personality) provide a mechanism to drive inter-individual variation in social relationships, making life-history important for sociality across taxonomic scales.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthew J Silk
- Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter Penryn Campus, Penryn, Cornwall, UK; Environment and Sustainability Institute, University of Exeter Penryn Campus, Penryn, Cornwall, UK.
| | - David J Hodgson
- Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter Penryn Campus, Penryn, Cornwall, UK
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22
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Pathak S, Verma P, Ram SK, Sengupta S. How strategy environment and wealth shape altruistic behaviour: cooperation rules affecting wealth distribution in dynamic networks. Proc Biol Sci 2020; 287:20202250. [PMID: 33323079 PMCID: PMC7779503 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2020.2250] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/11/2020] [Accepted: 11/23/2020] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Societies rely on individual contributions to sustain public goods that benefit the entire community. Several mechanisms, that specify how individuals change their decisions based on past experiences, have been proposed to explain how altruists are not outcompeted by selfish counterparts. A key aspect of such strategy updates involves a comparison of an individual's latest payoff with that of a random neighbour. In reality, both the economic and social milieu often shapes cooperative behaviour. We propose a new decision heuristic, where the propensity of an individual to cooperate depends on the local strategy environment in which she is embedded as well as her wealth relative to that of her neighbours. Our decision-making model allows cooperation to be sustained and also explains the results of recent experiments on social dilemmas in dynamic networks. Final cooperation levels depend only on the extent to which the strategy environment influences altruistic behaviour but are largely unaffected by network restructuring. However, the extent of wealth inequality in the community is affected by a subtle interplay between the environmental influence on a person's decision to contribute and the likelihood of reshaping social ties, with wealth-inequality levels rising with increasing likelihood of network restructuring in some situations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Spandan Pathak
- Biophysics Program, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-2431, USA
| | - Prateek Verma
- Research Group for Theoretical Models of Eco-evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August Thienemann Strasse 2, 24306 Plon, Germany
| | - Sumit K. Ram
- Chair of Entrepreneurial Risks, Department of Management, Technology and Economics (D-MTEC), ETH Zurich, Scheuchzerstrasse 7, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Supratim Sengupta
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur Campus, Mohanpur 741246, India
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23
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Cantor M, Maldonado‐Chaparro AA, Beck KB, Brandl HB, Carter GG, He P, Hillemann F, Klarevas‐Irby JA, Ogino M, Papageorgiou D, Prox L, Farine DR. The importance of individual‐to‐society feedbacks in animal ecology and evolution. J Anim Ecol 2020; 90:27-44. [DOI: 10.1111/1365-2656.13336] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2020] [Accepted: 08/31/2020] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Maurício Cantor
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Departamento de Ecologia e Zoologia Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina Florianópolis Brazil
- Centro de Estudos do Mar Universidade Federal do Paraná Pontal do Paraná Brazil
| | - Adriana A. Maldonado‐Chaparro
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
| | - Kristina B. Beck
- Department of Behavioural Ecology and Evolutionary Genetics Max Planck Institute for Ornithology Seewiesen Germany
| | - Hanja B. Brandl
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
| | - Gerald G. Carter
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Evolution, Ecology and Organismal Biology The Ohio State University Columbus OH USA
| | - Peng He
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
| | - Friederike Hillemann
- Edward Grey Institute of Field Ornithology Department of Zoology University of Oxford Oxford UK
| | - James A. Klarevas‐Irby
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Department of Migration Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Konstanz Germany
| | - Mina Ogino
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
| | - Danai Papageorgiou
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
| | - Lea Prox
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Department of Sociobiology/Anthropology Johann‐Friedrich‐Blumenbach Institute of Zoology & Anthropology University of Göttingen Göttingen Germany
- Behavioral Ecology & Sociobiology Unit German Primate Center Göttingen Germany
| | - Damien R. Farine
- Department of Collective Behaviour Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior Radolfzell Germany
- Department of Biology University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour University of Konstanz Konstanz Germany
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24
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Abstract
While it is undeniable that the ability of humans to cooperate in large-scale societies is unique in animal life, it remains open how such a degree of prosociality is possible despite the risks of exploitation. Recent evidence suggests that social networks play a crucial role in the development of prosociality and large-scale cooperation by allowing cooperators to cluster; however, it is not well understood if and how this also applies to real-world social networks in the field. We study intrinsic social preferences alongside emerging friendship patterns in 57 freshly formed school classes (n = 1,217), using incentivized measures. We demonstrate the existence of cooperative clusters in society, examine their emergence, and expand the evidence from controlled experiments to real-world social networks. Our results suggest that being embedded in cooperative environments substantially enhances the social preferences of individuals, thus contributing to the formation of cooperative clusters. Partner choice, in contrast, only marginally contributes to their emergence. We conclude that cooperative preferences are contagious; social and cultural learning plays an important role in the development and evolution of cooperation.
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25
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Darden SK, James R, Cave JM, Brask JB, Croft DP. Trinidadian guppies use a social heuristic that can support cooperation among non-kin. Proc Biol Sci 2020; 287:20200487. [PMID: 32900316 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2020.0487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Cooperation among non-kin is well documented in humans and widespread in non-human animals, but explaining the occurrence of cooperation in the absence of inclusive fitness benefits has proven a significant challenge. Current theoretical explanations converge on a single point: cooperators can prevail when they cluster in social space. However, we know very little about the real-world mechanisms that drive such clustering, particularly in systems where cognitive limitations make it unlikely that mechanisms such as score keeping and reputation are at play. Here, we show that Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata) use a 'walk away' strategy, a simple social heuristic by which assortment by cooperativeness can come about among mobile agents. Guppies cooperate during predator inspection and we found that when experiencing defection in this context, individuals prefer to move to a new social environment, despite having no prior information about this new social group. Our results provide evidence in non-human animals that individuals use a simple social partner updating strategy in response to defection, supporting theoretical work applying heuristics to understanding the proximate mechanisms underpinning the evolution of cooperation among non-kin.
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Affiliation(s)
- Safi K Darden
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
| | - Richard James
- Department of Physics and Centre for Networks and Collective Behaviour, University of Bath, Bath, UK
| | - James M Cave
- Department of Physics and Centre for Networks and Collective Behaviour, University of Bath, Bath, UK
| | - Josefine Bohr Brask
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
| | - Darren P Croft
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
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26
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Evolution of cooperation in malicious social networks with differential privacy mechanisms. Neural Comput Appl 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s00521-020-05243-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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27
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Understanding user-to-User interaction on government microblogs: An exponential random graph model with the homophily and emotional effect. Inf Process Manag 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ipm.2020.102229] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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28
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Direct Reciprocity and Model-Predictive Strategy Update Explain the Network Reciprocity Observed in Socioeconomic Networks. GAMES 2020. [DOI: 10.3390/g11010016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Network reciprocity has been successfully put forward (since M. A. Nowak and R. May’s, 1992, influential paper) as the simplest mechanism—requiring no strategical complexity—supporting the evolution of cooperation in biological and socioeconomic systems. The mechanism is actually the network, which makes agents’ interactions localized, while network reciprocity is the property of the underlying evolutionary process to favor cooperation in sparse rather than dense networks. In theoretical models, the property holds under imitative evolutionary processes, whereas cooperation disappears in any network if imitation is replaced by the more rational best-response rule of strategy update. In social experiments, network reciprocity has been observed, although the imitative behavior did not emerge. What did emerge is a form of conditional cooperation based on direct reciprocity—the propensity to cooperate with neighbors who previously cooperated. To resolve this inconsistency, network reciprocity has been recently shown in a model that rationally confronts the two main behaviors emerging in experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—with rationality introduced by extending the best-response rule to a multi-step predictive horizon. However, direct reciprocity was implemented in a non-standard way, by allowing cooperative agents to temporarily cut the interaction with defecting neighbors. Here, we make this result robust to the way cooperators reciprocate, by implementing direct reciprocity with the standard tit-for-tat strategy and deriving similar results.
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29
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Reciprocity and behavioral heterogeneity govern the stability of social networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2020; 117:2993-2999. [PMID: 31980520 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1913284117] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
The dynamics of social networks can determine the transmission of information, the spread of diseases, and the evolution of behavior. Despite this broad importance, a general framework for predicting social network stability has not been proposed. Here we present longitudinal data on the social dynamics of a cooperative bird species, the wire-tailed manakin, to evaluate the potential causes of temporal network stability. We find that when partners interact less frequently and when social connectedness increases, the network is subsequently less stable. Social connectivity was also negatively associated with the temporal persistence of coalition partnerships on an annual timescale. This negative association between connectivity and stability was surprising, especially given that individual manakins who were more connected also had more stable partnerships. This apparent paradox arises from a within-individual behavioral trade-off between partnership quantity and quality. Crucially, this trade-off is easily masked by behavioral variation among individuals. Using a simulation, we show that these results are explained by a simple model that combines among-individual behavioral heterogeneity and reciprocity within the network. As social networks become more connected, individuals face a trade-off between partnership quantity and maintenance. This model also demonstrates how among-individual behavioral heterogeneity, a ubiquitous feature of natural societies, can improve social stability. Together, these findings provide unifying principles that are expected to govern diverse social systems.
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30
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Gallo E, Riyanto YE, Teh TH, Roy N. Strong links promote the emergence of cooperative elites. Sci Rep 2019; 9:10857. [PMID: 31350455 PMCID: PMC6659657 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-47278-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/17/2018] [Accepted: 07/08/2019] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
The maintenance of cooperative behavior is fundamental for the prosperity of human societies. Empirical studies show that high cooperation is frequently associated with the presence of strong social ties, but they are silent on whether a causal mechanism exists, how it operates, and what features of the social environment are conducive to its emergence. Here we show experimentally that strong ties increase cooperation and welfare by enabling the emergence of a close-knit and strongly bound cooperative elite. Crucially, this cooperative elite is more prevalent in social environments characterized by a large payoff difference between weak and strong ties, and no gradation in the process of strengthening a tie. These features allow cooperative individuals to adopt an all or nothing strategy to tie strengthening based on the well-known mechanism of direct reciprocity: participants become very selective by forming strong ties only with other cooperative individuals and severing ties with everyone else. Once formed, these strong ties are persistent and enhance cooperation. A dichotomous society emerges with cooperators prospering in a close-knit, strongly bound elite, and defectors earning low payoffs in a weakly connected periphery. Methodologically, our set-up provides a framework to investigate the role of the strength of ties in an experimental setting.
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Affiliation(s)
- Edoardo Gallo
- Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK. .,Queens' College, CB3 9ET, Cambridge, UK.
| | - Yohanes E Riyanto
- Division of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, 48 Nanyang Avenue, HSS #04-70, Singapore, 639818, Singapore.
| | - Tat-How Teh
- Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, AS2 06-02 1 Arts Link, Singapore, 117570, Singapore
| | - Nilanjan Roy
- Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
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31
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Foley M, Forber P, Smead R, Riedl C. Conflict and convention in dynamic networks. J R Soc Interface 2019; 15:rsif.2017.0835. [PMID: 29563244 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2017.0835] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2017] [Accepted: 02/23/2018] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
An important way to resolve games of conflict (snowdrift, hawk-dove, chicken) involves adopting a convention: a correlated equilibrium that avoids any conflict between aggressive strategies. Dynamic networks allow individuals to resolve conflict via their network connections rather than changing their strategy. Exploring how behavioural strategies coevolve with social networks reveals new dynamics that can help explain the origins and robustness of conventions. Here, we model the emergence of conventions as correlated equilibria in dynamic networks. Our results show that networks have the tendency to break the symmetry between the two conventional solutions in a strongly biased way. Rather than the correlated equilibrium associated with ownership norms (play aggressive at home, not away), we usually see the opposite host-guest norm (play aggressive away, not at home) evolve on dynamic networks, a phenomenon common to human interaction. We also show that learning to avoid conflict can produce realistic network structures in a way different than preferential attachment models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Foley
- Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Patrick Forber
- Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA
| | - Rory Smead
- Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Christoph Riedl
- Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA .,D'Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.,College of Computer and Information Science, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.,Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
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32
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Direct reciprocity and model-predictive rationality explain network reciprocity over social ties. Sci Rep 2019; 9:5367. [PMID: 30931975 PMCID: PMC6443768 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-41547-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2018] [Accepted: 02/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Since M. A. Nowak & R. May’s (1992) influential paper, limiting each agent’s interactions to a few neighbors in a network of contacts has been proposed as the simplest mechanism to support the evolution of cooperation in biological and socio-economic systems. The network allows cooperative agents to self-assort into clusters, within which they reciprocate cooperation. This (induced) network reciprocity has been observed in several theoreticalmodels and shown to predict the fixation of cooperation under a simple rule: the benefit produced by an act of cooperation must outweigh the cost of cooperating with all neighbors. However, the experimental evidence among humans is controversial: though the rule seems to be confirmed, the underlying modeling assumptions are not. Specifically, models assume that agents update their strategies by imitating better performing neighbors, even though imitation lacks rationality when interactions are far from all-to-all. Indeed, imitation did not emerge in experiments. What did emerge is that humans are conditioned by their own mood and that, when in a cooperative mood, they reciprocate cooperation. To help resolve the controversy, we design a model in which we rationally confront the two main behaviors emerging from experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—in a networked prisoner’s dilemma. Rationality is introduced by means of a predictive rule for strategy update and is bounded by the assumed model society. We show that both reciprocity and a multi-step predictive horizon are necessary to stabilize cooperation, and sufficient for its fixation, provided the game benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than a measure of network connectivity. We hence rediscover the rule of network reciprocity, underpinned however by a different evolutionary mechanism.
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33
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Sariñana-González P, Romero-Martínez Á, Moya-Albiol L. Cooperation Between Strangers in Face-to-Face Dyads Produces More Cardiovascular Activation Than Competition or Working Alone. J PSYCHOPHYSIOL 2019. [DOI: 10.1027/0269-8803/a000210] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Abstract. Individual and shared goals can be achieved through social interpersonal interaction, cooperation and competition being two different yet similar strategies to reach such aims and objectives. Nevertheless, there is a gap in the literature analyzing the effect of these types of social interactions, especially in cooperation, on autonomic nervous system responses using noninvasive measures, such as heart rate (HR). The regulation of HR and other cardiovascular variables of the central nervous system offers information about how to encourage or discourage social engagement and prosocial behaviors. In fact, a more flexible engagement with the environment and efficient emotions regulation is enabled by an efficient cardiac control. Hence, the main aim of this study was to investigate heart rate variability (HRV) in strangers (180 healthy young participants) who were set to cooperate or compete in face-to-face dyads (between same-gender participants) or to work alone (as the control condition), considering outcomes in these tasks (positive or negative) and gender as moderating variables. We found that participants who cooperated had higher HRs and lower high frequency (HF) HRV than those who competed and/or worked alone. Regarding gender and outcome, men who cooperate and lose have lower HF-HRV levels than men on the simple task with negative outcomes. Hence, our study indicates that cooperation between strangers in face-to-face dyads may produce less parasympathetic activation than competition or working on the task without any social interaction. Research in this field may help us understand the psychophysiological basis of social interaction, providing an opportunity to establish interaction strategies that would be physiologically desirable, in order to promote well-being.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Luis Moya-Albiol
- Department of Psychobiology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Valencia, Spain
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34
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Shirado H, Iosifidis G, Tassiulas L, Christakis NA. Resource sharing in technologically defined social networks. Nat Commun 2019; 10:1079. [PMID: 30842424 PMCID: PMC6403336 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-019-08935-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2018] [Accepted: 02/05/2019] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Technologically enabled sharing-economy networks are changing the way humans trade and collaborate. Here, using a novel 'Wi-Fi sharing' game, we explored determinants of human sharing strategy. Subjects (N = 1,950) participated in a networked game in which they could choose how to allocate a limited, but personally not usable, resource (representing unused Wi-Fi bandwidth) to immediate network neighbors. We first embedded N = 600 subjects into 30 networks, experimentally manipulating the range over which subjects could connect. We find that denser networks decrease any wealth inequality, but that this effect saturates. Individuals' benefit is shaped by their network position, with having many partners who in turn have few partners being especially beneficial. We propose a new, simplified "sharing centrality" metric for quantifying this. Further experiments (N = 1,200) confirm the robustness of the effect of network structure on sharing behavior. Our findings suggest the possibility of interventions to help more evenly distribute shared resources over networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hirokazu Shirado
- Yale Institute for Network Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA
- Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA
| | - George Iosifidis
- School of Computer Science and Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, 2, Ireland
- SFI Research Centre CONNECT, Dublin, 2, Ireland
| | - Leandros Tassiulas
- Yale Institute for Network Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA
- Department of Electrical Engineering, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA
| | - Nicholas A Christakis
- Yale Institute for Network Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA.
- Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA.
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA.
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35
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Gross J, De Dreu CKW. The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization. Nat Commun 2019; 10:776. [PMID: 30770812 PMCID: PMC6377668 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-019-08727-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2017] [Accepted: 01/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans exhibit a remarkable capacity for cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals. Yet, human cooperation is neither universal, nor stable. Instead, cooperation is often bounded to members of particular groups, and such groups endogenously form or break apart. Cooperation networks are parochial and under constant reconfiguration. Here, we demonstrate how parochial cooperation networks endogenously emerge as a consequence of simple reputation heuristics people may use when deciding to cooperate or defect. These reputation heuristics, such as "a friend of a friend is a friend" and "the enemy of a friend is an enemy" further lead to the dynamic formation and fission of cooperative groups, accompanied by a dynamic rise and fall of cooperation among agents. The ability of humans to safeguard kin-independent cooperation through gossip and reputation may be, accordingly, closely interlinked with the formation of group-bounded cooperation networks that are under constant reconfiguration, ultimately preventing global and stable cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jörg Gross
- Department of Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands.
| | - Carsten K W De Dreu
- Department of Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 1551, 1001 NB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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36
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Bond RM. Low-cost, high-impact altruistic punishment promotes cooperation cascades in human social networks. Sci Rep 2019; 9:2061. [PMID: 30765746 PMCID: PMC6376046 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-38323-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/25/2018] [Accepted: 12/18/2018] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Theoretical models and experiments suggest that social networks may significantly impact the emergence and stability of cooperation in humans. Similarly, theoretical models and experiments have shown that punishing behavior can significantly increase cooperative behavior in individuals. However, how punishing impacts the effects of social networks on cooperation is not yet understood. Here, I examine a set of laboratory experiments in which participants choose to cooperate or defect under differing punishment arrangements. Through analysis of the experiment as a network, I evaluate how institutional arrangements affect the degree to which social networks promote cooperative behavior. The results show that cooperative behavior spreads from person-to-person in all versions of the game, but that in versions of the game with low-cost, high-impact punishment the influence both endures for more rounds and spreads further in the network. These results show that the extent to which cooperative behavior cascades is affected by the institutional arrangements that govern game play.
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Affiliation(s)
- Robert M Bond
- Ohio State University, School of Communication, Columbus, OH, USA.
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37
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Dakin R, Ryder TB. Dynamic network partnerships and social contagion drive cooperation. Proc Biol Sci 2018; 285:20181973. [PMID: 30963888 PMCID: PMC6304062 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.1973] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2018] [Accepted: 11/23/2018] [Indexed: 12/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Both reciprocity and positive assortment (like with like) are predicted to promote the evolution of cooperation, yet how partners influence each other's behaviour within dynamic networks is not well understood. One way to test this question is to partition phenotypic variation into differences among individuals in the expression of cooperative behaviour (the 'direct effect'), and plasticity within individuals in response to the social environment (the 'indirect effect'). A positive correlation between these two sources of variation, such that more cooperative individuals elicit others to cooperate, is predicted to facilitate social contagion and selection on cooperative behaviour. Testing this hypothesis is challenging, however, because it requires repeated measures of behaviour across a dynamic social landscape. Here, we use an automated data-logging system to quantify the behaviour of 179 wire-tailed manakins, birds that form cooperative male-male coalitions, and we use multiple-membership models to test the hypothesis that dynamic network partnerships shape within-individual variation in cooperative behaviour. Our results show strong positive correlations between a bird's own sociality and his estimated effect on his partners, consistent with the hypothesis that cooperation begets cooperation. These findings support the hypothesis that social contagion can facilitate selection for cooperative behaviour within social networks.
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38
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Testing the Sexual and Social Benefits of Cooperation in Animals. Trends Ecol Evol 2018; 34:112-120. [PMID: 30527795 DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2018.11.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2018] [Revised: 11/13/2018] [Accepted: 11/15/2018] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Theoretical models show that sexual and social selection can stabilise cooperation. However, field tests of these mechanisms have been difficult to conduct and the results are mixed. We discuss the conceptual and practical difficulties associated with testing the role of social and sexual selection on cooperation and argue that there are alternative ways of examining these hypotheses. Specifically, approaches based on the classic theories of sexual selection and signalling, and recent developments in the field of behavioural syndromes, provide mechanisms to insure the reliability of cooperation. In addition, methodological developments (social networks and microtracking) and long-term datasets, allow measuring partner choice in a cooperation context and the resulting fitness benefits for both the cooperators and the individuals that associate with them.
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39
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Harrell A, Melamed D, Simpson B. The strength of dynamic ties: The ability to alter some ties promotes cooperation in those that cannot be altered. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2018; 4:eaau9109. [PMID: 30525106 PMCID: PMC6281432 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aau9109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2018] [Accepted: 11/07/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Dynamic networks, where ties can be shed and new ties can be formed, promote the evolution of cooperation. Yet, past research has only compared networks where all ties can be severed to those where none can, confounding the benefits of fully dynamic networks with the presence of some dynamic ties within the network. Further, humans do not live in fully dynamic networks. Instead, in real-world networks, some ties are subject to change, while others are difficult to sever. Here, we consider whether and how cooperation evolves in networks containing both static and dynamic ties. We argue and find that the presence of dynamic ties in networks promotes cooperation even in static ties. Consistent with previous work demonstrating that cooperation cascades in networks, our results show that cooperation is enhanced in networks with both tie types because the higher rate of cooperation that occurs following the dynamics process "spills over" to those relations that are more difficult to alter. Thus, our findings demonstrate the critical role that dynamic ties play in promoting cooperation by altering behavioral outcomes even in non-dynamic relations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ashley Harrell
- Department of Organizational Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
| | - David Melamed
- Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
| | - Brent Simpson
- Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA
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40
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Tsvetkova M, Wagner C, Mao A. The emergence of inequality in social groups: Network structure and institutions affect the distribution of earnings in cooperation games. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0200965. [PMID: 30028884 PMCID: PMC6054378 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0200965] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2018] [Accepted: 07/04/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
From small communities to entire nations and society at large, inequality in wealth, social status, and power is one of the most pervasive and tenacious features of the social world. What causes inequality to emerge and persist? In this study, we investigate how the structure and rules of our interactions can increase inequality in social groups. Specifically, we look into the effects of four structural conditions—network structure, network fluidity, reputation tracking, and punishment institutions—on the distribution of earnings in network cooperation games. We analyze 33 experiments comprising 96 experimental conditions altogether. We find that there is more inequality in clustered networks compared to random networks, in fixed networks compared to randomly rewired and strategically updated networks, and in groups with punishment institutions compared to groups without. Secondary analyses suggest that the reasons inequality emerges under these conditions may have to do with the fact that fixed networks allow exploitation of the poor by the wealthy and clustered networks foster segregation between the poor and the wealthy, while the burden of costly punishment falls onto the poor, leaving them poorer. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence that inequality is affected by reputation in a systematic way but this could be because reputation needs to play out in a particular network environment in order to have an effect. Overall, our findings suggest possible strategies and interventions to decrease inequality and mitigate its negative impact, particularly in the context of mid- and large-sized organizations and online communities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Milena Tsvetkova
- Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Claudia Wagner
- GESIS – Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences, Cologne, Germany
| | - Andrew Mao
- Department of Management, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
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41
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Suzuki R, Ito M, Kodera S, Nishimoto K, Arita T. An Online Experimental Framework for Cooperative Relationships With a Real-Time Decision-Making and Rewarding Environment. Front Ecol Evol 2018. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2018.00074] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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42
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Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment. Sci Rep 2018; 8:9093. [PMID: 29904185 PMCID: PMC6002415 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-27544-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/20/2018] [Accepted: 05/01/2018] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation plays a key role among the mechanisms supporting cooperation in our society. This is a well-known observation and, in fact, several studies have shown that reputation may substantially increase cooperation among subjects playing Prisoner’s Dilemma games in the laboratory. Unfortunately, recent experiments indicate that when reputation can be faked cooperation can still be maintained at the expense of honest subjects who are deceived by the dishonest ones. As experimental work is limited due to financial and other reasons, we present here an agent-based simulation model inspired by, and calibrated against, the results obtained in the experiment. We thus simulate much larger population sizes over longer times, and test other model parameters to see whether the observed behavior generalizes in those yet untried conditions. The results show that the collective behavior is qualitatively similar in larger systems and stable over longer times horizons. We conclude that the findings of the experimental work are meaningful, taking into account that the model is strictly tailored to our particular experimental setting and therefore it is a possible explanation of our observations whose applicability to other contexts requires further research. We argue that simulations like the ones presented here may also be useful to cheaply and quickly suggest settings and options to enhance and facilitate further experiments, which, in turn, may provide new tests of the models themselves.
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43
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Stevens JR, Woike JK, Schooler LJ, Lindner S, Pachur T. Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation. Proc Biol Sci 2018; 285:20180407. [PMID: 29899067 PMCID: PMC6015862 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.0407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2018] [Accepted: 05/23/2018] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Analyses of the evolution of cooperation often rely on two simplifying assumptions: (i) individuals interact equally frequently with all social network members and (ii) they accurately remember each partner's past cooperation or defection. Here, we examine how more realistic, skewed patterns of contact-in which individuals interact primarily with only a subset of their network's members-influence cooperation. In addition, we test whether skewed contact patterns can counteract the decrease in cooperation caused by memory errors (i.e. forgetting). Finally, we compare two types of memory error that vary in whether forgotten interactions are replaced with random actions or with actions from previous encounters. We use evolutionary simulations of repeated prisoner's dilemma games that vary agents' contact patterns, forgetting rates and types of memory error. We find that highly skewed contact patterns foster cooperation and also buffer the detrimental effects of forgetting. The type of memory error used also influences cooperation rates. Our findings reveal previously neglected but important roles of contact pattern, type of memory error and the interaction of contact pattern and memory on cooperation. Although cognitive limitations may constrain the evolution of cooperation, social contact patterns can counteract some of these constraints.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeffrey R Stevens
- Department of Psychology, Center for Brain, Biology and Behavior, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA
- Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
| | - Jan K Woike
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany
| | - Lael J Schooler
- Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA
| | - Stefan Lindner
- Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
- Department of Psychology and Ergonomics, Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
| | - Thorsten Pachur
- Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
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44
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Campbell BW, Cranmer S, Harvey C, Warren K. Therapeutic community graduates cluster together in social networks: Evidence for spatial selection as a cooperative mechanism in therapeutic communities. Addict Behav 2018; 79:74-80. [PMID: 29253660 PMCID: PMC9563067 DOI: 10.1016/j.addbeh.2017.12.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2017] [Revised: 12/01/2017] [Accepted: 12/04/2017] [Indexed: 12/26/2022]
Affiliation(s)
| | - Skyler Cranmer
- The Ohio State University Department of Political Science, United States
| | | | - Keith Warren
- The Ohio State University College of Social Work, United States.
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45
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Su Q, Li A, Wang L. Evolution of cooperation with interactive identity and diversity. J Theor Biol 2018; 442:149-157. [PMID: 29407364 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.01.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2017] [Revised: 01/16/2018] [Accepted: 01/18/2018] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Interactive identity and interactive diversity are generally regarded as two typical interaction patterns in living systems. The former describes that in each generation every individual behaves identically to all of its opponents, and the latter allows each individual to behave diversely to its distinct opponents. Most traditional research on the evolution of cooperation, however, has been confined to populations with a uniform interaction pattern. Here we study the cooperation conundrum in a diverse population comprising players with interactive identity and with interactive diversity. We find that in homogeneous networks a small fraction of players taking interactive diversity are enough to stabilize cooperation for a wide range of payoff values even in a noisy environment. When assigned to heterogeneous networks, players in high-degree nodes taking interactive diversity significantly strengthen systems' resilience against the shifty environment and enlarge the survival region of cooperation. However, they fail to establish a homogeneous strategy 'cloud' in the neighborhood and thus can not coordinate players in low-degree nodes to reach a socially optimal cooperation level. The most favorable outcome emerges when players in high-degree nodes take interactive identity and meanwhile others adopt interactive diversity. Our findings reveal the significance of the two typical interaction patterns and could be a good heuristic in coordinating them to achieve the social optimum in cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China; Center for Polymer Studies, Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02115, USA
| | - Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China; Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zürich, Weinbergstrasse 56/58, Zürich CH-8092, Switzerland
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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46
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Abstract
Humans' propensity to cooperate is driven by our embeddedness in social networks. A key mechanism through which networks promote cooperation is clustering. Within clusters, conditional cooperators are insulated from exploitation by noncooperators, allowing them to reap the benefits of cooperation. Dynamic networks, where ties can be shed and new ties formed, allow for the endogenous emergence of clusters of cooperators. Although past work suggests that either reputation processes or network dynamics can increase clustering and cooperation, existing work on network dynamics conflates reputations and dynamics. Here we report results from a large-scale experiment (total n = 2,675) that embedded participants in clustered or random networks that were static or dynamic, with varying levels of reputational information. Results show that initial network clustering predicts cooperation in static networks, but not in dynamic ones. Further, our experiment shows that while reputations are important for partner choice, cooperation levels are driven purely by dynamics. Supplemental conditions confirmed this lack of a reputation effect. Importantly, we find that when participants make individual choices to cooperate or defect with each partner, as opposed to a single decision that applies to all partners (as is standard in the literature on cooperation in networks), cooperation rates in static networks are as high as cooperation rates in dynamic networks. This finding highlights the importance of structured relations for sustained cooperation, and shows how giving experimental participants more realistic choices has important consequences for whether dynamic networks promote higher levels of cooperation than static networks.
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47
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From objectivized morality to objective morality. Behav Brain Sci 2018; 41:e105. [PMID: 31064482 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x18000109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/05/2022]
Abstract
Stanford holds that the externalization and objectivization of moral judgments are what sustain human cooperative lifeways. We reply that the central function of human moral psychology is to track and respond to the structural features of our social environment, and we argue that moral obligations are grounded in the relationship between individual agents and the stability of their social groups.
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48
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Abstract
Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism-costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.
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49
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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory predicts that cooperation in social dilemma games is promoted when agents are connected as a network. However, when networks are fixed over time, humans do not necessarily show enhanced mutual cooperation. Here we show that reinforcement learning (specifically, the so-called Bush-Mosteller model) approximately explains the experimentally observed network reciprocity and the lack thereof in a parameter region spanned by the benefit-to-cost ratio and the node’s degree. Thus, we significantly extend previously obtained numerical results.
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50
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Page AE, Chaudhary N, Viguier S, Dyble M, Thompson J, Smith D, Salali GD, Mace R, Migliano AB. Hunter-Gatherer Social Networks and Reproductive Success. Sci Rep 2017; 7:1153. [PMID: 28442785 PMCID: PMC5430806 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-01310-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 50] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2016] [Accepted: 03/29/2017] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Individuals' centrality in their social network (who they and their social ties are connected to) has been associated with fertility, longevity, disease and information transmission in a range of taxa. Here, we present the first exploration in humans of the relationship between reproductive success and different measures of network centrality of 39 Agta and 38 BaYaka mothers. We collected three-meter contact ('proximity') networks and reproductive histories to test the prediction that individual centrality is positively associated with reproductive fitness (number of living offspring). Rather than direct social ties influencing reproductive success, mothers with greater indirect centrality (i.e. centrality determined by second and third degree ties) produced significantly more living offspring. However, indirect centrality is also correlated with sickness in the Agta, suggesting a trade-off. In complex social species, the optimisation of individuals' network position has important ramifications for fitness, potentially due to easy access to different parts of the network, facilitating cooperation and social influence in unpredictable ecologies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Abigail E Page
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK.
| | - Nikhil Chaudhary
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
| | - Sylvain Viguier
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
| | - Mark Dyble
- Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31015, Toulouse Cedex 6, France
| | - James Thompson
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
| | - Daniel Smith
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
| | - Gul D Salali
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
| | - Ruth Mace
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
| | - Andrea Bamberg Migliano
- Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK
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