The hidden cost of organ sale

The Altruism Requirement as Moral Fiction

It is widely agreed that living kidney donation is permitted but living kidney sales are not. Call this the Received View. One way to support the Received View is to appeal to a particular understanding of the conditions under which living kidney transplantation is permissible. It is often claimed that donors must act altruistically, without the expectation of payment and for the sake of another. Call this the Altruism Requirement. On the conventional interpretation, the Altruism Requirement is a moral fact. It states a legitimate constraint on permissible transplantation and is accepted on the basis of cogent argument. The present paper offers an alternative interpretation. I suggest the Altruism Requirement is a moral fiction-a kind of motivated falsehood. It is false that transplantation requires altruism. But the Requirement serves a purpose. Accepting it allows kidney donation but not kidney sale. It, in short, rationalizes the Received View.

A fair exchange: why living kidney donors in England should be financially compensated

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one 'buyer'-in this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the 'crowding out' of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England.

The Morality of Kidney Sales: When Caring for the Seller's Dignity Has Moral Costs

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller's dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller's dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney.

Individuals' willingness to provide geospatial global positioning system (GPS) data from their smartphone during the COVID-19 pandemic

This study aims to evaluate people's willingness to provide their geospatial global positioning system (GPS) data from their smartphones during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the self-determination theory, the addition of monetary incentives to encourage data provision may have an adverse effect on spontaneous donation. Therefore, we tested if a crowding-out effect exists between financial and altruistic motivations. Participants were randomized to different frames of motivational messages regarding the provision of their GPS data based on (1) self-interest, (2) pro-social benefit, and (3) monetary compensation. We also sought to examine the use of a negative versus positive valence in the framing of the different armed messages. 1055 participants were recruited from 41 countries with a mean age of 34 years on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online crowdsourcing platform. Participants living in India or in Brazil were more willing to provide their GPS data compared to those living in the United States. No significant differences were seen between positive and negative valence framing messages. Monetary incentives of $5 significantly increased participants' willingness to provide GPS data. Half of the participants in the self-interest and pro-social arms agreed to provide their GPS data and almost two-thirds of participants were willing to provide their data in exchange for $5. If participants refused the first framing proposal, they were followed up with a "Vickrey auction" (a sealed-bid second-priced auction, SPSBA). An average of $17 bid was accepted in the self-interest condition to provide their GPS data, and the average "bid" of $21 was for the pro-social benefit experimental condition. These results revealed that a crowding-out effect between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations did not take place in our sample of internet users. Framing and incentivization can be used in combination to influence the acquisition of private GPS smartphone data. Financial incentives can increase data provision to a greater degree with no losses on these intrinsic motivations, to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.

Prize, not price: reframing rewards for kidney donors

Worldwide 1.2 million people are dying from kidney failure each year, and in the USA alone, approximately 100 000 people are currently on the waiting list for a kidney transplant. One possible solution to the kidney shortage is for governments to pay donors for one of their healthy kidneys and distribute these kidneys according to need. There are, however, compelling objections to this government-monopsony model. To avoid these objections, I propose a small adjustment to the model. I suggest we reward kidney sellers with both money and a ceremony that celebrates their noble act. They should, in other words, receive a prize rather than a price.

If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage

Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and a market-based procurement system introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment-for-consent futures market, and the family-reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, that consent to sell organs is invalid, that sellers will be harmed, and that commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family-reward futures market fares best in this comparison but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models and the increase in available organs they can be expected to provide.

Pure Altruistic Gift and the Ethics of Transplant Medicine

The article argues that altruistic giving based on anonymity, which is expected to promote social solidarity and block trade in human body parts, is conceptually defective and practically unproductive. It needs to be replaced by a more adequate notion which responds to the human practices of giving and receiving. The argument starts with identification of the main characteristics of the anonymous altruistic donation: social separation of the organ donor (or donor family) from the recipient, their mutual replaceability, non-obligatoriness of donation, and non-obligatoriness of reciprocation on the recipient's part. Since these characteristics are also central to typical market relations, anonymous altruistic donation not only cannot promote solidarity but may encourage proposals for (regulated) markets of transplantable organs. Thus, transplant ethics needs to be reframed. It needs to be rooted in, rather than promote, the practices of giving and receiving known to human societies. As the basis for such reframing, the idea of sharing in another's misfortune is proposed. It relies on the human practices of giving and receiving and, with appropriate regulatory safeguards, can provide a better conceptual basis for blocking commercial exchanges of human body parts.

An ethical comparison of living kidney donation and surrogacy: understanding the relational dimension

BACKGROUND

The bioethical debates concerning living donation and surrogacy revolve around similar ethical questions and moral concepts. Nevertheless, the ethical discourses in both fields grew largely isolated from each other.

METHODS

Based on a review of ethical, sociological and anthropological research this paper aims to link the ethical discourses on living kidney donation and surrogacy by providing a comparative analysis of the two practices' relational dimension with regard to three aspects, i.e. the normative role of relational dynamics, social norms and gender roles, and reciprocity. Based on this analysis, we derive conclusions for the framing of living organ donation and surrogacy in ethical theory and practice.

RESULTS

First, our analysis emphasizes the relevance of acknowledging the complex relational implications of living kidney donation and surrogacy. Underestimating this relational dimension may not only lead to individual crises but endanger existing as well as newly emerging familial relationships. Second, we point out differences in the normative assessment of social norms and gender roles in the ethical debates about living kidney donation and surrogacy. In particular, we show how different evaluations of altruism affect the understanding of autonomy in both contexts. In addition, we sensitize for biased perceptions of gender roles. Finally, we argue that challenges resulting from unresolved reciprocity are an issue in living kidney donation and surrogacy independent of whether the exchange of body parts or bodily services is framed as a gift or commercial exchange. By pointing out the limits of financial compensation, we stress the relevance of non-material, relational rewards as potential remedy.

Choice, pressure and markets in kidneys

We do not always benefit from the expansion of our choice sets. This is because some options change the context in which we must make decisions in ways that render us worse off than we would have been otherwise. One promising argument against paid living kidney donation holds that having the option of selling a 'spare' kidney would impact people facing financial pressures in precisely this way. I defend this argument from two related criticisms: first, that having the option to sell one's kidney would only be harmful if one is pressured or coerced to take this specific course of action; and second, that such forms of pressure are unlikely to feature in a legal market.

The Body as Gift, Commodity, or Something in Between: Ethical Implications of Advanced Kidney Donation

An innovative program recently initiated at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical Center allows people to donate a kidney in exchange for a voucher that a loved one can redeem for a kidney if and when needed. As a relatively new practice, the ethical implications of advanced kidney donation have not yet been widely discussed. This paper reflects on some of the bioethical issues at stake in this new donation program, as well as some broader philosophical issues related to the meaning and moral salience of commodification. I first consider whether the literature on commercial markets in organs--a longstanding topic of bioethical debate--can meaningfully inform ethical analysis of kidney voucher programs. Specifically, I consider whether and to what extent common objections to the exchange of kidneys for cash also apply to the exchange of kidneys for "kidney vouchers." Second, I argue that the contrast between the ethical issues raised by these two practices highlights the need to understand commodification as existing on a continuum, with different degrees of commodification giving rise to different ethical issues. Doing so can help sharpen our understanding of commodification as a moral concept, as well as its relevance to broader debates about the moral limits of markets.

Banking on Living Kidney Donors-A New Way to Facilitate Donation without Compromising on Ethical Values

Public surveys conducted in many countries report widespread willingness of individuals to donate a kidney while alive to a family member or close friend, yet thousands suffer and many die each year while waiting for a kidney transplant. Advocates of financial incentive programs or "regulated markets" in kidneys present the problem of the kidney shortage as one of insufficient public motivation to donate, arguing that incentives will increase the number of donors. Others believe the solutions lie-at least in part-in facilitating so-called "altruistic donation;" harnessing the willingness of relatives and friends to donate by addressing the many barriers which serve as disincentives to living donation. Strategies designed to minimize financial barriers to donation and the use of paired kidney exchange programs are increasingly enabling donation, and now, an innovative program designed to address what has been termed "chronologically incompatible donation" is being piloted at the University of California, Los Angeles, and elsewhere in the United States. In this program, a person whose kidney is not currently required for transplantation in a specific recipient may instead donate to the paired exchange program; in return, a commitment is made to the specified recipient that priority access for a living-donor transplant in a paired exchange program will be offered when or if the need arises in the future. We address here potential ethical concerns related to this form of organ "banking" from living donors, and argue that it offers significant benefits without undermining the well-established ethical principles and values currently underpinning living donation programs.

Kidney Sales and Market Regulation: A Reply to Semrau

Luke Semrau argues that the documented harms of existing organ markets do not undermine the case for establishing regulated systems of paid kidney donation. He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Semrau argues that the harms of kidney selling are straightforwardly amenable to regulatory solution. Second, Semrau argues that even in existing black markets, sellers would likely have experienced greater harm if the option of selling a kidney were not available. This commentary challenges both of Semrau's claims. I argue that there is no reason to believe that kidney sellers benefit from the current black market trade in organs, and highlight a number of potential issues regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of Semrau's proposed market regulations.

Kidney sales and the analogy with dangerous employment

Proponents of permitting living kidney sales often argue as follows. Many jobs involve significant risks; people are and should be free to take these risks in exchange for money; the risks involved in giving up a kidney are no greater than the risks involved in acceptable hazardous jobs; so people should be free to give up a kidney for money, too. This paper examines this frequently invoked but rarely analysed analogy. Two objections are raised. First, it is far from clear that kidney sales and dangerous jobs involve comparable risks on an appropriately broad comparison. Second, and more importantly, even if they do involve comparable risks it does not follow that kidney sales must be permitted because dangerous jobs are. The analogy assumes that kidney sales are banned for paternalistic reasons. But there may be other, non-paternalistic reasons for the ban. And paternalists, too, can consistently defend the ban even if kidney sales are no riskier than occupations that they find acceptable. Soft paternalists may want to protect would-be vendors from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen. Egalitarian hard paternalists may want to protect already badly off vendors from further worsening their situation. For neither species of paternalist is the size of the risk prevented decisive. I conclude that the analogy with dangerous jobs, while rhetorically powerful, pulls little real argumentative weight. Future debates on living kidney sales should therefore proceed without it.

Policy options for increasing the supply of transplantable kidneys in Singapore

Kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for eligible end-stage renal disease patients. However, the supply of donated kidneys has been consistently insufficient to meet the transplantation requirements of the population. In this paper, I discuss the feasibility of several policy options that engage potential donors or key individuals in a Singapore context, including financial and non-financial incentives for deceased/living organ donors and their families, improving actualisation rates of both donation after brain death, donation after cardiac death through quality improvement programmes and remuneration schemes, and a media platform for directed organ donation. I conclude by highlighting the most feasible policies to be considered.

Does the ethical appropriateness of paying donors depend on what body parts they donate?

The idea of paying donors in order to make more human bodily material available for therapy, assisted reproduction, and biomedical research is notoriously controversial. However, while national and international donation policies largely oppose financial incentives they do not treat all parts of the body equally: incentives are allowed in connection to the provision of some parts but not others. Taking off from this observation, I discuss whether body parts differ as regards the ethical legitimacy of incentives and, if so, why. I distinguish two approaches to this issue. On a "principled" approach, some but not all body parts are inherently special in a way that proscribes payment. On a "pragmatic" approach, the appropriateness of payment in relation to a specific part must be determined through an overall assessment of e.g. the implications of payment for the health and welfare of providers, recipients, and third parties, and the quality of providers' consent. I argue that the first approach raises deep and potentially divisive questions about the good life, whereas the second approach invokes currently unsupported empirical assumptions and requires difficult balancing between different values and the interests of different people. This does not mean that any attempt to distinguish between body parts in regard to the appropriateness of payment necessarily fails. However, I conclude, any plausible such attempt should either articulate and defend a specific view of the good life, or gather relevant empirical evidence and apply defensible principles for weighing goods and interests.

The best argument against kidney sales fails

Simon Rippon has recently argued against kidney markets on the grounds that introducing the option to vend will result in many people, especially the poor, being subject to harmful pressure to vend. Though compelling, Rippon's argument fails. What he takes to be a single phenomenon-social and legal pressure to vend-is actually two. Only one of these forms of pressure is, by Rippon's own account, harmful. Further, an empirically informed view of the regulated market suggests that this harmful pressure is easily avoided. Thus, the harm that is the lynchpin of Rippon's opposition is neither a necessary feature of the market nor is it likely to play a significant role in its operation.

From blood donation to kidney sales: the gift relationship and transplant commercialism

In The Gift Relationship, Richard Titmuss argued that the practice of altruistic blood donation fosters social solidarity while markets in blood erode it. This paper considers the implications of this line of argument for the organ market debate. I defend Titmuss' arguments against a number of criticisms and respond to claims that Titmuss' work is not relevant to the context of live donor organ transplantation. I conclude that Titmuss' arguments are more resilient than many advocates of organ markets suggest, and more relevant to the debate than is commonly appreciated.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: charting an ethical course for research into financial incentives for living kidney donation

New approaches to address the kidney scarcity in the United States are urgently needed. The greatest potential source of kidneys is from living donors. Proposals to offer financial incentives to increase living kidney donation rates remain highly controversial. Despite repeated calls for a pilot study to assess the impact of financial compensation on living kidney donation rates, many fear that financial incentives will exploit vulnerable individuals and cast the field of transplantation in a negative public light, ultimately reducing donation rates. This paper provides an ethical justification for conducting a pilot study of a federally regulated approach to providing financial incentives to living kidney donors, with the goal of assessing donors' perceptions.

Living and deceased organ donation should be financially neutral acts

The supply of organs—particularly kidneys—donated by living and deceased donors falls short of the number of patients added annually to transplant waiting lists in the United States. To remedy this problem, a number of prominent physicians, ethicists, economists and others have mounted a campaign to suspend the prohibitions in the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) on the buying and selling of organs. The argument that providing financial benefits would incentivize enough people to part with a kidney (or a portion of a liver) to clear the waiting lists is flawed. This commentary marshals arguments against the claim that the shortage of donor organs would best be overcome by providing financial incentives for donation. We can increase the number of organs available for transplantation by removing all financial disincentives that deter unpaid living or deceased kidney donation. These disincentives include a range of burdens, such as the costs of travel and lodging for medical evaluation and surgery, lost wages, and the expense of dependent care during the period of organ removal and recuperation. Organ donation should remain an act that is financially neutral for donors, neither imposing financial burdens nor enriching them monetarily.

Does financial compensation for living kidney donation change willingness to donate?

The potential use of financial compensation to increase living kidney donation rates remains controversial in potentially introducing undue inducement of vulnerable populations to donate. This cross-sectional study assessed amounts of financial compensation that would generate motivation and an undue inducement to donate to family/friends or strangers. Individuals leaving six Departments of Motor Vehicles were surveyed. Of the 210 participants who provided verbal consent (94% participation rate), respondents' willingness to donate would not change (70%), or would increase (29%) with compensation. Median lowest amounts of financial compensation for which participants would begin to consider donating a kidney were $5000 for family/friends, and $10,000 for strangers; respondents reporting $0 for family/friends (52%) or strangers (26%) were excluded from analysis. Median lowest amounts of financial compensation for which participants could no longer decline (perceive an undue inducement) were $50,000 for family/friends, and $100,000 for strangers; respondents reporting $0 for family/friends (44%) or strangers (23%) were excluded from analysis. The two most preferred forms of compensation included: direct payment of money (61%) and paid leave (21%). The two most preferred uses of compensation included: paying off debt (38%) and paying nonmedical expenses associated with the transplant (29%). Findings suggest tolerance for, but little practical impact of, financial compensation. Certain compensation amounts could motivate the public to donate without being perceived as an undue inducement.

Kidney sales and the analogy with dangerous employment

Proponents of permitting living kidney sales often argue as follows. Many jobs involve significant risks; people are and should be free to take these risks in exchange for money; the risks involved in giving up a kidney are no greater than the risks involved in acceptable hazardous jobs; so people should be free to give up a kidney for money, too. This paper examines this frequently invoked but rarely analysed analogy. Two objections are raised. First, it is far from clear that kidney sales and dangerous jobs involve comparable risks on an appropriately broad comparison. Second, and more importantly, even if they do involve comparable risks it does not follow that kidney sales must be permitted because dangerous jobs are. The analogy assumes that kidney sales are banned for paternalistic reasons. But there may be other, non-paternalistic reasons for the ban. And paternalists, too, can consistently defend the ban even if kidney sales are no riskier than occupations that they find acceptable. Soft paternalists may want to protect would-be vendors from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen. Egalitarian hard paternalists may want to protect already badly off vendors from further worsening their situation. For neither species of paternalist is the size of the risk prevented decisive. I conclude that the analogy with dangerous jobs, while rhetorically powerful, pulls little real argumentative weight. Future debates on living kidney sales should therefore proceed without it.

We're not in it for the money-lay people's moral intuitions on commercial use of 'their' biobank

Great hope has been placed on biobank research as a strategy to improve diagnostics, therapeutics and prevention. It seems to be a common opinion that these goals cannot be reached without the participation of commercial actors. However, commercial use of biobanks is considered morally problematic and the commercialisation of human biological materials is regulated internationally by policy documents, conventions and laws. For instance, the Council of Europe recommends that: "Biological materials should not, as such, give rise to financial gain". Similarly, Norwegian legislation reads: "Commercial exploitation of research participants, human biological material and personal health data in general is prohibited". Both articles represent kinds of common moral intuitions. A problem, however, is that legislative documents are too vague and provide room for ample speculation. Through the use of focus group interviews with Norwegian biobank donors, we have tried to identify lay intuitions and morals regarding the commercial use of biobanks. Our findings indicate that the act of donation and the subsequent uses of the samples belong to two different spheres. While concerns around dignity and commodification were present in the first, injustice and unfairness were our informants' major moral concerns in the latter. Although some opposition towards commercial actors was voiced, these intuitions show that it is possible to render commercial use of biobanks ethically acceptable based on frameworks and regulations which hinder commodification of the human body and promote communal benefit sharing.

In defense of a regulated system of compensation for living donation

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The organ shortage is the major problem in kidney transplantation today. Despite aggressive organ procurement efforts, the supply of donated kidneys, living and deceased, has not matched the growing demand; as a consequence, more and more qualified candidates are suffering on dialysis and then dying before being transplanted. Herein, we provide justification for a regulated system of compensation for donation.

RECENT FINDINGS

The main argument in favor of compensation is simple-financial incentives will increase donation, so fewer transplant candidates will suffer and die while waiting. In addition, development of a regulated system of compensation is the most effective means of crippling the core economic support for transplant tourism. Because dialysis is so much more expensive than a transplant, compensated donation could be cost-neutral to the healthcare system. Importantly, opinion polls suggest that the public would support compensation. As uncompensated kidney donation is widely accepted, persuasive arguments against compensation must explain why such a system would be morally distinguishable from uncompensated donation.

SUMMARY

We suggest that the potential advantages of a regulated system of compensation for donation far outweigh any potential disadvantages. It is time to advocate for a change in the law so that trials can be done.

Key issues in transplant tourism

Access to organ transplantation depends on national circumstances, and is partly determined by the cost of health care, availability of transplant services, the level of technical capacity and the availability of organs. Commercial transplantation is estimated to account for 5%-10% (3500-7000) of kidney transplants performed annually throughout the world. This review is to determine the state and outcome of renal transplantation associated with transplant tourism (TT) and the key challenges with such transplantation. The stakeholders of commercial transplantation include: patients on the waiting lists in developed countries or not on any list in developing countries; dialysis funding bodies; middlemen, hosting transplant centres; organ-exporting countries; and organ vendors. TT and commercial kidney transplants are associated with a high incidence of surgical complications, acute rejection and invasive infection which cause major morbidity and mortality. There are ethical and medical concerns regarding the management of recipients of organs from vendors. The growing demand for transplantation, the perceived failure of altruistic donation in providing enough organs has led to calls for a legalised market in organ procurement or regulated trial in incentives for donation. Developing transplant services worldwide has many benefits - improving results of transplantation as they would be performed legally, increasing the donor pool and making TT unnecessary. Meanwhile there is a need to re-examine intrinsic attitudes to TT bearing in mind the cultural and economic realities of globalisation. Perhaps the World Health Organization in conjunction with The Transplantation Society would set up a working party of stakeholders to study this matter in greater detail and make recommendations.

Organised crime and the efforts to combat it: a concern for public health

This paper considers the public health impacts of the income-generating activities of organised crime. These range from the traditional vice activities of running prostitution and supplying narcotics, to the newer growth areas of human trafficking in its various forms, from international supply of young people and children as sex workers through deceit, coercion or purchase from family, through to smuggling of migrants, forced labour and the theft of human tissues for transplant, and the sale of fake medications, foodstuffs and beverages, cigarettes and other counterfeit manufactures. It looks at the effect of globalisation on integrating supply chains from poorly-regulated and impoverished source regions through to their distant markets, often via disparate groups of organised criminals who have linked across their traditional territories for mutual benefit and enhanced profit, with both traditional and newly-created linkages between production, distribution and retail functions of cooperating criminal networks from different cultures. It discusses the interactions between criminals and the structures of the state which enable illegal and socially undesirable activities to proceed on a massive scale through corruption and subversion of regulatory mechanisms. It argues that conventional approaches to tackling organised crime often have deleterious consequences for public health, and calls for an evidence-based approach with a focus on outcomes rather than ideology.

Regulated payments for living kidney donation: an empirical assessment of the ethical concerns

BACKGROUND

Although regulated payments to encourage living kidney donation could reduce morbidity and mortality among patients waiting for a kidney transplant, doing so raises several ethical concerns.

OBJECTIVE

To determine the extent to which the 3 main concerns with paying kidney donors might manifest if a regulated market were created.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional study of participants' willingness to donate a kidney in 12 scenarios.

SETTING

Regional rail and urban trolley lines in Philadelphia County, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

PARTICIPANTS

Of 550 potential participants, 409 completed the questionnaire (response rate, 74.4%); 342 of these participants were medically eligible to donate.

INTERVENTION

Across scenarios, researchers experimentally manipulated the amount of money that participants would receive, the participants' risk for subsequently developing kidney failure themselves, and who would receive the donated kidney.

MEASUREMENTS

The researchers determined whether payment represents an undue inducement by evaluating participants' sensitivity to risk in relation to the payment offered or an unjust inducement by evaluating participants' sensitivity to payment as a function of their annual income. The researchers also evaluated whether introducing payment would hinder altruistic donations by comparing participants' willingness to donate altruistically before versus after the introduction of payments.

RESULTS

Generalized estimating equation models revealed that participants' willingness to donate increased significantly as their risk for kidney failure decreased, as the payment offered increased, and when the kidney recipient was a family member rather than a patient on a public waiting list (P < 0.001 for each). No statistical interactions were identified between payment and risk (odds ratio, 1.00 [95% CI, 0.96 to 1.03]) or between payment and income (odds ratio, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]). The proximity of these estimates to 1.0 and narrowness of the CIs suggest that payment is neither an undue nor an unjust inducement, respectively. Alerting participants to the possibility of payment did not alter their willingness to donate for altruistic reasons (P = 0.40).

LIMITATION

Choices revealed in hypothetical scenarios may not reflect real-world behaviors.

CONCLUSION

Theoretical concerns about paying persons for living kidney donation are not corroborated by empirical evidence. A real-world test of regulated payments for kidney donation is needed to definitively show whether payment provides a viable and ethical method to increase the supply of kidneys available for transplantation.

PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE

None.

Incentivizing living organ donation

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The number of organs available for the patients on the transplant waitlist remains at a disproportionate low. All possible methods to curtail this shortage, including providing donors with incentives, have been proposed. This article reviews recent publications addressing the benefits and risks involved in incentivizing living donation.

RECENT FINDINGS

The debate about the ethics, feasibility, and possible models for compensating organ donors has been prominent in recent literature. As certain countries take lead on this initiative, others are cautiously weighing in on the impact implementations of such policies may have on the society, especially on the underprivileged.

SUMMARY

The shortage of organs has resulted in proposal of strategies that encroach on certain moral and ethical principles. Providing incentives to donors is one such strategy that is likely to receive a lot of attention in the next few years.

Religious aspects of organ transplantation

No religion formally forbid donation or receipt of organs or is against transplantation from living or deceased donors. Only some orthodox jews may have religious objections to "opting in." However, transplantation from deceased donors may be discouraged by Native Americans, Roma Gypsies, Confucians, Shintoists, and some Orthodox rabbis. Some South Asia Muslim ulemas (scholars) and muftis (jurists) oppose donation from human living and deceased donors because the human body is an "amanat" (trusteeship) from God and must not be desecrated following death, but they encourage xenotransplantation research. No religion formally obliges one to donate or refuse organs. No religion formally obliges one to consider cadaveric organs "a societal resource" or considers organ donation "a religious duty" (except some rabbis and isolated Muslim and Christian scholars) No religion has a formal position on "bonus points," which is priority on the waiting list. Living organ donation is strongly encouraged only between jesus christians (15 of 28 jesus christians worldwide have donated a kidney). No religion forbid this practice. Directed organ donation to people of the same religion has been proposed only by some Orthodox Jews and some Islamic Ulemas/Muftis. Only some Muslim Ulemas/Muftis and some Asian religions may prefer living donation over cadaveric donation. No religion prefers cadaveric over living donation. No religion formally forbid non-heart-beating donors (nhbd) cadaveric donation or cross-over donation. Due to the sacrad of human life, the Catholic Church is against donation from anencephalic donors or after active euthanasia. No religion formally forbid xenotransplantation. Addressing the participants of the First International Congress of the Society for Organ Sharing in 1991, Pope John Paul II said "There are many questions of an ethical, legal and social nature which need to be more deeply investigated. There are even shameful abuses which call for determined action on the part of medical association and donor societies, and especially of competent legislative bodies" and later on "In effect, the human body is always a personal body, the body of a person. The body cannot be treated as a merely physical or biological entity, nor can its organs and tissues ever be used as item for sale or exchange". Addressing the participants at the XVIII International Congress of the Transplantation Society in 2000, Pope John Paul II said "Accordingly, any procedure which tends to commercialize human organs or to consider them as items of exchange or trade must be considered morally unacceptable, because to use the body as an object is to violate the dignity of the human person" and later on added "The criteria for assigning donated organs should in no way be discriminatory (i.e. based on age, sex, race, religion, social standing, etc.) or utilitarian (i.e. based on work capacity, social usefulness, etc.)." To conclude, according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church Compendium signed by Pope Benedict XVI on june 28, 2005, 476. Are allowed transplantation and organ donation, before and after death? Organ transplantation is morally acceptable with the consent of the donor and without excessive risks for him/her. For the noble act of organ donation after death, the real death of the donor must be fully ascertained.

Solving the organ shortage crisis: the 7th annual American Society of Transplant Surgeons' State-of-the-Art Winter Symposium

The 2007 American Society of Transplant Surgeons' (ASTS) State-of-the-Art Winter Symposium entitled, 'Solving the Organ Shortage Crisis' explored ways to increase the supply of donor organs to meet the challenge of increasing waiting lists and deaths while awaiting transplantation. While the increasing use of organs previously considered marginal, such as those from expanded criteria donors (ECD) or donors after cardiac death (DCD) has increased the number of transplants from deceased donors, these transplants are often associated with inferior outcomes and higher costs. The need remains for innovative ways to increase both deceased and living donor transplants. In addition to increasing ECD and DCD utilization, increasing use of deceased donors with certain types of infections such as Hepatitis B and C, and increasing use of living donor liver, lung and intestinal transplants may also augment the organ supply. The extent by which donors may be offered incentives for donation, and the practical, ethical and legal implications of compensating organ donors were also debated. The expanded use of nonstandard organs raises potential ethical considerations about appropriate recipient selection, informed consent and concerns that the current regulatory environment discourages and penalizes these efforts.

The Cost of Kidney Transplantation in Iran

BACKGROUND

Kidney transplantation has gained widespread popularity by improving the outcome of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients. However, this is a highly complicated and expensive procedure that puts much pressure on the health system in developing countries. We report the costs in Iran model of kidney transplantation.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We reviewed the regulations for kidney transplantation using Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA) information, 2005. All data regarding the cost of transplantation procedure, immunosuppression, and the money given to donors were included. The cost of transplantation procedure was categorized into personnel, drugs, paraclinics, hospital bed, and other expenses. To achieve more comprehensive results, all costs were converted into US dollars (1 USD = 9000 Rials).

RESULTS

The total cost of kidney transplantation procedure was $9224. Of this, 65.8% ($6076) was related to the immunosuppression therapy in the first year, 22.2% ($2048) to the transplantation procedure, and 12% ($1100) to organ procurement. The details of donor nephrectomy were as follows: personnel, $183; accommodations, $107; drugs, $39; paraclinics, $23; and other, $22. These values for kidney recipient were personnel, $331; drugs, $367; paraclinics, $278; accommodations, $475; and other, $222.

CONCLUSION

Compared with other countries, the kidney transplantation cost is low in Iran. The health system also pays for all the expenses. These, along with full medical insurance coverage of kidney recipients, make kidney transplantation available for every patient, regardless of the socioeconomic status due to its low cost. It is expected that a higher number of transplantation candidates with a low socioeconomic status will select transplantation.