Two Is Not Always Better Than One

Cognitive load reduces the reinforcement of ventral striatum by anterior insula in taste processing: An fMRI study on self-control

Recent studies have shown that cognitive overload disrupted the affective processing of taste attributes in food-related tasks, which is difficult to explain using dual-system theories with their reflective and impulsive systems (involved in the cognitive and affective processing of stimuli, respectively). The tripartite neurocognitive model proposes an additional interoceptive system that regulates the activities of reflective and impulsive systems. Using this framework, we studied self-control over food choices and hypothesized inferior processing of both affective (taste) and cognitive (health) components of choice-relevant attributes under increased cognitive load. We expected increased cognitive load to decrease the coupling between interoceptive and impulsive systems (represented by anterior insula (AI) and ventral striatum (VS), respectively), and to strengthen decoupling between interoceptive and reflective system (represented by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)). In an fMRI scanner, 49 participants made 60 food choices requiring self-control (i.e., between a healthier and tastier item) twice: in high (HL) and low working memory load (LL) conditions. We found that functional connectivity between the right AI and VS was weaker in HL compared to LL condition. We also revealed an expected trend towards a stronger negative connectivity between the right AI and DLPFC in HL compared to LL condition. Our findings suggest that cognitively demanding task concurrent to food self-control task overloads AI and reduces the reinforcement of VS by AI. This helps in explaining how and why the affective processing of taste attributes, together with the cognitive processing of health attributes, may be disrupted under cognitive overload.

How can we apply decision-making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory

Our understanding of decision-making processes and cognitive biases is ever increasing, thanks to an accumulation of testable models and a large body of research over the last several decades. The vast majority of this work has been done in humans and laboratory animals because these study subjects and situations allow for tightly controlled experiments. However, it raises questions about how this knowledge can be applied to wild animals in their complex environments. Here, we review two prominent decision-making theories, dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory, to assess the similarities in these approaches and consider how they may apply to wild animals living in heterogenous environments within complicated social groupings. In particular, we wanted to assess when wild animals are likely to respond to a situation with a quick heuristic decision and when they are likely to spend more time and energy on the decision-making process. Based on the literature and evidence from our multi-destination routing experiments on primates, we find that individuals are likely to make quick, heuristic decisions when they encounter routine situations, or signals/cues that accurately predict a certain outcome, or easy problems that experience or evolutionary history has prepared them for. Conversely, effortful decision-making is likely in novel or surprising situations, when signals and cues have unpredictable or uncertain relationships to an outcome, and when problems are computationally complex. Though if problems are overly complex, satisficing via heuristics is likely, to avoid costly mental effort. We present hypotheses for how animals with different socio-ecologies may have to distribute their cognitive effort. Finally, we examine the conservation implications and potential cognitive overload for animals experiencing increasingly novel situations caused by current human-induced rapid environmental change.

Beyond thinking fast and slow: a Bayesian intuitionist model of clinical reasoning in real-world practice

Clinical reasoning is a quintessential aspect of medical training and practice, and is a topic that has been studied and written about extensively over the past few decades. However, the predominant conceptualisation of clinical reasoning has insofar been extrapolated from cognitive psychological theories that have been developed in other areas of human decision-making. Till date, the prevailing model of understanding clinical reasoning has remained as the dual process theory which views cognition as a dichotomous two-system construct, where intuitive thinking is fast, efficient, automatic but error-prone, and analytical thinking is slow, effortful, logical, deliberate and likely more accurate. Nonetheless, we find that the dual process model has significant flaws, not only in its fundamental construct validity, but also in its lack of practicality and applicability in naturistic clinical decision-making. Instead, we herein offer an alternative Bayesian-centric, intuitionist approach to clinical reasoning that we believe is more representative of real-world clinical decision-making, and suggest pedagogical and practice-based strategies to optimise and strengthen clinical thinking in this model to improve its accuracy in actual practice.

Free Will as Defined by the Constrained Disorder Principle: a Restricted, Mandatory, Personalized, Regulated Process for Decision-Making

The concept of free will has challenged physicists, biologists, philosophers, and other professionals for decades. The constrained disorder principle (CDP) is a fundamental law that defines systems according to their inherent variability. It provides mechanisms for adapting to dynamic environments. This work examines the CDP's perspective of free will concerning various free will theories. Per the CDP, systems lack intentions, and the "freedom" to select and act is built into their design. The "freedom" is embedded within the response range determined by the boundaries of the systems' variability. This built-in and self-generating mechanism enables systems to cope with perturbations. According to the CDP, neither dualism nor an unknown metaphysical apparatus dictates choices. Brain variability facilitates cognitive adaptation to complex, unpredictable situations across various environments. Human behaviors and decisions reflect an underlying physical variability in the brain and other organs for dealing with unpredictable noises. Choices are not predetermined but reflect the ongoing adaptation processes to dynamic prssu½res. Malfunctions and disease states are characterized by inappropriate variability, reflecting an inability to respond adequately to perturbations. Incorporating CDP-based interventions can overcome malfunctions and disease states and improve decision processes. CDP-based second-generation artificial intelligence platforms improve interventions and are being evaluated to augment personal development, wellness, and health.

Beyond the Surface: A New Perspective on Dual-System Theories in Decision-Making

The current paper provides a critical evaluation of the dual-system approach in cognitive psychology. This evaluation challenges traditional classifications that associate intuitive processes solely with noncompensatory models and deliberate processes with compensatory ones. Instead, it suggests a more nuanced framework where intuitive and deliberate characteristics coexist within both compensatory and noncompensatory processes. This refined understanding of dual-process models has significant implications for improving theoretical models of decision-making, providing a more comprehensive account of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human judgment and choice.

Exploring proportions of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk - It is not always the one or the other

The dichotomous classification of self-talk statements into goal-directed as a more controlled type of self-talk and spontaneous as a more uncontrolled type of self-talk might be an oversimplification. To address this issue, two studies were conducted aiming to explore the idea that the distinction between the two self-talk types should rather be proportional and not mutually exclusive. In Study 1, football players took part in a penalty competition and were subsequently asked to state the self-talk they had before and after the penalty. In Study 2, table tennis players took part in two activities (i.e., a precision task and a competitive set) and were subsequently asked to state the self-talk they had before the individual rounds in each activity. In both studies, the players subsequently rated for each self-talk statement the extent to which it was spontaneous and the extent to which it was goal-directed. The majority of self-talk statements were rated to some extent as both spontaneous and goal-directed. For Study 1, paired-sample t-tests showed that before a penalty kick self-talk was more goal-directed than spontaneous and after the penalty kick it was more spontaneous than goal-directed. In the more exploratory Study 2, multilevel regression analyses showed that the two types of self-talk could not predict sports performance. While the results support the usefulness of the distinction between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, treating the two types of self-talk as proportional rather than dichotomous might reflect more accurately the mental activity. Key words: dual-process, organic self-talk, self-regulation, System 1, System 2.

Single session and repeated anodal transcranial direct current stimulation over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increases reflective thinking but not working memory updating performance

Background

Anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has shown to have effects on different domains of cognition yet there is a gap in the literature regarding effects on reflective thinking performance.

Objective

The current study investigated if single session and repeated anodal tDCS over the right DLPFC induces effects on judgment and decision-making performance and whether these are linked to working memory (updating) performance or cognitive inhibition.

Methods

Participants received anodal tDCS over the right DLPFC once (plus sham tDCS in a second session) or twice (24 h apart). In the third group participants received a single session of sham stimulation only. Cognitive characteristic measures were administered pre-stimulation (thinking disposition, impulsivity, cognitive ability). Experimental tasks included two versions of the Cognitive Reflection Test (numeric vs verbal-CRT), a set of incongruent base-rate vignettes, and two working memory tests (Sternberg task and n-back task). Forty-eight participants (mean age = 26.08 ± 0.54 years; 27 females) were recruited.

Results

Single sessions of tDCS were associated with an increase in reflective thinking performance compared to the sham conditions, with stimulation improving scores on incongruent base rate tasks as well as marginally improving numeric CRT scores (compared to sham), but not thinking tasks without a numeric component (verbal-CRT). Repeated anodal stimulation only improved numeric CRT scores. tDCS did not increase working memory (updating) performance. These findings could not be explained by a practice effect or a priori differences in cognitive characteristics or impulsivity across the experimental groups.

Conclusion

The current results demonstrate the involvement of the right DLPFC in reflective thinking performance which cannot be explained by working memory (updating) performance or general cognitive characteristics of participants.

Beyond Difference Scores: Unlocking Insights with Polynomial Regression in Studies on the Effects of Implicit-Explicit Congruency

The aim of our study was to investigate whether theories of congruence are better tested using polynomial regression analysis, rather than expressing discrepancy between implicit and explicit measures as continuous or categorical difference scores. This paper also aims to make knowledge more accessible by providing a step-by-step explanation of both methods, illustrating differences between them, and making materials openly available for other researchers. In this paper, implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem are used as predictors for depressive symptoms, anxiety, and aggression in a general population sample (N = 135). Explicit self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, implicit self-esteem was measured using the Implicit Association Test, and the Symptom Questionnaire was used to measure depressive symptoms, anxiety, and aggression. The results show those difference score models all imply that the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem explains depression and anxiety, but not aggression. However, polynomial regression analysis shows that depression and anxiety are not accounted for by the explicit-implicit discrepancy as such, but are foremost explained by explicit self-esteem. Polynomial regression has the potential to evaluate more complex and more detailed hypotheses than what would be possible using statistical approaches based on discrepancy scores. It is therefore recommended for future research aimed at disentangling the roles of explicit and implicit self-esteem in psychological outcomes.

Attention biases the process of risky decision-making: Evidence from eye-tracking

Attention determines what kind of option information is processed during risky choices owing to the limitation of visual attention. This paper reviews research on the relationship between higher-complexity risky decision-making and attention as illustrated by eye-tracking to explain the process of risky decision-making by the effect of attention. We demonstrate this process from three stages: the pre-phase guidance of options on attention, the process of attention being biased, and the impact of attention on final risk preference. We conclude that exogenous information can capture attention directly to salient options, thereby altering evidence accumulation. In particular, for multi-attribute risky decision-making, attentional advantages increase the weight of specific attributes, thus biasing risk preference in different directions. We highlight the significance of understanding how people use available information to weigh risks from an information-processing perspective via process data.

Specificity and sensitivity of the fixed-point test for binary mixture distributions

When two cognitive processes contribute to a behavioral output-each process producing a specific distribution of the behavioral variable of interest-and when the mixture proportion of these two processes varies as a function of an experimental condition, a common density point should be present in the observed distributions of the data across said conditions. In principle, one can statistically test for the presence (or absence) of a fixed point in experimental data to provide evidence in favor of (or against) the presence of a mixture of processes, whose proportions are affected by an experimental manipulation. In this paper, we provide an empirical diagnostic of this test to detect a mixture of processes. We do so using resampling of real experimental data under different scenarios, which mimic variations in the experimental design suspected to affect the sensitivity and specificity of the fixed-point test (i.e., mixture proportion, time on task, and sample size). Resampling such scenarios with real data allows us to preserve important features of data which are typically observed in real experiments while maintaining tight control over the properties of the resampled scenarios. This is of particular relevance considering such stringent assumptions underlying the fixed-point test. With this paper, we ultimately aim at validating the fixed-point property of binary mixture data and at providing some performance metrics to researchers aiming at testing the fixed-point property on their experimental data.

Implementing Approach-Bias Modification as Add-On to Varieties of Clinical Treatment for Alcohol Use Disorders: Results of a Multicenter RCT

INTRODUCTION

Abstinence rates after inpatient treatment for alcohol use disorder (AUD) are modest (1-year rate around 50%). One promising approach is to re-train the automatically activated action tendency to approach alcohol-related stimuli (alcohol-approach bias) in AUD patients, as add-on to regular treatment. As efficacy has been demonstrated in well-controlled randomized controlled trials, the important next step is to add alcohol-approach-bias modification (alcohol-ApBM) to varieties of existing treatments for AUD. Therefore, this prospective, multicenter implementation-RCT examined whether adding alcohol-ApBM to regular treatments (various abstinence-oriented treatments including both individual and group-based interventions) would significantly increase abstinence rates compared to receiving regular treatment only, in a variety of naturalistic settings with different therapeutic approaches.

METHODS

A total of 1,586 AUD inpatients from 9 German rehabilitation clinics were randomly assigned to receive either ApBM in addition to regular treatment or not. Training satisfaction of patients and therapists was measured after training. Success rates were determined at 3, 6, and 12 months post-treatment.

RESULTS

Return rates of the post-treatment assessments varied greatly between clinics, often being low (18-76%). Nevertheless, ApBM significantly increased success rates after 3 months. After 6 and 12 months, the differences were not significant. ApBM was evaluated mostly positively by patients and therapists.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

ApBM was an effective add-on to regular treatment of AUD at 3 months follow-up, across a variety of AUD treatment settings. However, low return rates for the clinical outcomes reduced the effect size of ApBM considerably. The application of ApBM proved feasible in varying clinical settings, offering the opportunity to modify automatic processes and to promote abstinence.

Evidence for Shifting Cognitive Strategies when Icons Appear in Unexpected Locations

OBJECTIVE

The present study examines the cognitive effects of placing icons in unexpected spatial locations within websites.

BACKGROUND

Prior research has revealed evidence for cognitive conflict when web icons occur in unexpected locations (e.g., cart, top left), generally consistent with a dynamical systems models. Here, we compare the relative strength of evidence for both dual and dynamical systems models.

METHODS

Participants clicked on icons located in either expected (e.g., cart, top right) or unexpected (e.g., cart, top left) locations while mouse trajectories were continuously recorded. Trajectories were classified according to prototypes associated with each cognitive model. The dynamical systems model predicts curved trajectories, while the dual-systems model predicts straight and change of mind trajectories.

RESULTS

Trajectory classification revealed that curved trajectories increased (+11%), while straight and change of mind trajectories decreased (-12%) when target icons occurred in unexpected locations (p < .001).

CONCLUSION

Rather than employing a single cognitive strategy, users shift from a primarily dual-systems to dynamical systems strategy when icons occur in unexpected locations.

APPLICATION

Potential applications of this work include the assessment of cognitive impacts such as mental workload and cognitive conflict during real-time interaction with websites and other screen-based interfaces, personalization and adaptive interfaces based on an individual's cognitive strategy, and data-driven A/B testing of alternative interface designs.

Dual-process modeling of sequential decision making in the balloon analogue risk task

People are often faced with repeated risky decisions that involve uncertainty. In sequential risk-taking tasks, like the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), the underlying decision process is not yet fully understood. Dual-process theory proposes that human cognition involves two main families of processes, often referred to as System 1 (fast and automatic) and System 2 (slow and conscious). We cross models of the BART with different architectures of the two systems to yield a pool of computational dual-process models that are evaluated on multiple performance measures (e.g., parameter identifiability, model recovery, and predictive accuracy). Results show that the best-performing model configuration assumes the two systems are competitively connected, an evaluation process based on the Scaled Target Learning model of the BART, and an assessment rate that incorporates sensitivity to the trial number, pumping opportunity, and bias to engage in System 1. Findings also shed light on how modeling choices and response times in a dual-process framework can benefit our understanding of sequential risk-taking behavior.

Changes of intuition in paranoid personality disorder

Wherever psychopathology operates with the concept of (disorders of) the self and personality, it can address the role of the intuitive access we have toward ourselves, others, and the world. This study discusses the concept of oikeiôsis. It examines its role in explaining paranoia as a change in intuitive self-and-world relatedness. In the first step, symptomatic features of paranoid personality disorder are sketched, with a focus on the explanatory role of attentional and interpretative biases, which correlate with significant changes in intuitive processing. In the second step, the prototypical phenomenality of feelings of unfamiliarity and mistrust are discussed against the backdrop of changes of oikeiôsis in paranoid personality disorder. In the third step, the main therapeutic challenge in treating paranoid personality disorder-building a trustful relationship-is explored. It is concluded that the notion of oikeiôsis resonates particularly with introspection-based therapeutic approaches.

Dual-Process Theory and Two Types of Metacognitive Monitoring and Control Processes

Metacognitive monitoring and control processes are important parts of our cognitive system. In this article, they are considered in the light of the dual-process theory and interpreted as occurring at the level of Type 1 and Type 2 information processing. Associative connection is the main factor that allows us to divide these processes into two types. Accordingly, metacognitive monitoring of the first type occurs when feelings of rightness/error automatically appear along with a certain judgment. The second type occurs when a controlled inference is made about whether a judgment is true or false. Metacognitive control of the first type occurs when the decision to reject, revise or accept the received judgment is associated with the feelings of rightness/error and automatically appears when one of these feelings appears. The second type takes place when a person rejects (or they are unclear) the results of the first type of metacognitive control and deliberately decides what to do with the received judgment - reject, revise or accept.

Toward a General Framework of Biased Reasoning: Coherence-Based Reasoning

A considerable amount of experimental research has been devoted to uncovering biased forms of reasoning. Notwithstanding the richness and overall empirical soundness of the bias research, the field can be described as disjointed, incomplete, and undertheorized. In this article, we seek to address this disconnect by offering "coherence-based reasoning" as a parsimonious theoretical framework that explains a sizable number of important deviations from normative forms of reasoning. Represented in connectionist networks and processed through constraint-satisfaction processing, coherence-based reasoning serves as a ubiquitous, essential, and overwhelmingly adaptive apparatus in people's mental toolbox. This adaptive process, however, can readily be overrun by bias when the network is dominated by nodes or links that are incorrect, overweighted, or otherwise nonnormative. We apply this framework to explain a variety of well-established biased forms of reasoning, including confirmation bias, the halo effect, stereotype spillovers, hindsight bias, motivated reasoning, emotion-driven reasoning, ideological reasoning, and more.

The formation and revision of intuitions

This paper presents 59 new studies (N = 72,310) which focus primarily on the "bat and ball problem." It documents our attempts to understand the determinants of the erroneous intuition, our exploration of ways to stimulate reflection, and our discovery that the erroneous intuition often survives whatever further reflection can be induced. Our investigation helps inform conceptions of dual process models, as "system 1" processes often appear to override or corrupt "system 2" processes. Many choose to uphold their intuition, even when directly confronted with simple arithmetic that contradicts it - especially if the intuition is approximately correct.

Differences in Art Appreciation in Autism: A Measure of Reduced Intuitive Processing

Art appreciation reflects an initial emotional and intuitive response to artwork evaluation, although this intuitive evaluation can be attenuated by subsequent deliberation. The Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have a greater propensity to deliberate and reduced intuition compared to matched controls. Evaluations of high- and low-quality artworks were undertaken by 107 individuals with a diagnosis of ASD and 145 controls. Controls consistently evaluated high-quality artworks to be much better quality than the low-quality artworks, reflecting intuitive processing. The ASD sample showed a reduced difference in evaluations between high- versus low-quality artwork, which reflects reduced intuitive processing and greater deliberative processing and is consistent with predictions by the Dual Process Theory of Autism.

The role of attention and health goals in nudging healthy food choice

Introduction

Nudging is a promising intervention technique that supports people in pursuing their healthy eating goals. Recent research suggests that, despite previous assumptions, disclosure of the presence of a nudge does not compromise nudge effectiveness. However, it is unknown whether attention to a nudge affects nudge effects. We assessed the role of attention systematically, by examining explicit and implicit attention to nudges, while also exploring healthy eating goals as a potential moderator.

Methods

Participants were assigned to a nudge (i.e., a shopping basket inlay with pictures of healthy items) or control condition (i.e., a shopping basket inlay with neutral pictures) and chose a snack in an experimental supermarket field study. Explicit and implicit attention (with a mobile eye-tracker) to nudges, healthiness of snack choice, and healthy eating goals were assessed.

Results

Results showed that attention to the nudge did not hamper the nudge's effect. Furthermore, individuals with strong healthy eating goals made healthier food choices in the nudge condition. Individuals with weak to non-existent healthy eating goals were not influenced by the nudge.

Discussion

Findings are in line with the viewpoint that nudging does not by definition work 'in the dark', and suggests that nudges support people in adhering to their healthy eating goal.

Teaching categories via examples and explanations

People often learn categories through interaction with knowledgeable others who may use verbal explanations, visual exemplars, or both, to share their knowledge. Verbal and nonverbal means of pedagogical communication are commonly used in conjunction, but their respective roles are not fully understood. In this work, we studied how well these modes of communication work with different category structures. We conducted two experiments to investigate the effect of perceptual confusability and stimulus dimensionality on the effectiveness of verbal, exemplar-based, and mixed communication. One group of participants - teachers - learned a categorization rule and prepared learning materials for the students. Students studied the materials prepared for them and then demonstrated their knowledge on test stimuli. All communication modes were generally successful, but not equivalent, with mixed communication consistently showing best results. When teachers were free to generate as many visual exemplars or words as they wish, verbal and exemplar-based communication showed similar performance, although the verbal channel was slightly less reliable in situations requiring high perceptual precision. At the same time, verbal communication was better suited to handling high-dimensional stimuli when communication volume was restricted. We believe that our work serves as an important step towards studying language as a means for pedagogical category leaning.

Hoist by its own petard: The ironic and fatal flaws of dual-process theory

By stipulating the existence of a system 1 and a system 2, dual-process theories raise questions about how these systems function. De Neys identifies several such questions for which no plausible answers have ever been offered. What makes the nature of systems 1 and 2 so difficult to ascertain? The answer is simple: The systems do not exist.

Using the study of reasoning to address the age of unreason

If we accept that societally, politically, and even culturally enlightenment face some serious challenges, can we use this rethinking of theories of reasoning to address them? The aim here is to make a case for building on the work presented by De Neys as an opportunity to advance an applied reasoning research programme.

Thinking, fast and slow on the autism spectrum

What is already known about the topicDaniel Kahneman wrote a highly influential book titled 'thinking, fast and slow'. He proposes that people usually think in a rapid, automatic, intuitive style. When people realise their intuitive thinking may be wrong, a slower, effortful, deliberative style of thinking takes over. It has recently been proposed that thinking in autistic individuals can be characterised as usually thinking in the deliberative style (rather than the intuitive style that non-autistic people usually think in).What this paper addsAs intuitive thinking is fast and deliberative thinking is slow, this research manipulated the time available to complete a series of reasoning questions. These questions have been developed to have intuitive answers (which are incorrect) and deliberative answers (which are correct). For the first time, a fast time manipulation (you must answer quickly) and slow (you must think about your answer before responding) was undertaken with autistic individuals. Autistic participants did produce more deliberative answers than the non-autistic participants. However, both groups produced comparably more intuitive answers and less deliberative answers in the fast condition. This shows that while autistic people tend not to use their intuition, autistic people can be encouraged to use their intuition.Implications for practice, research or policyUsing rapid intuition can be useful in fast-changing contexts, such as some social situations. Future research can explore how to support autistic individuals to use their intuition when the need arises. In addition, the propensity for deliberation resulting in unbiased, correct responses reflects a strengths-based account of autism. This requires more mental effort and is less susceptible to bias and errors. This is called 'Dual Process Theory'.

Clinical Assessment of Judgment in Adults and the Elderly: Development and Validation of the Three Domains of Judgment Test-Clinical Version (3DJT-CV)

(1) Background: This article discusses the first two phases of development and validation of the Three Domains of Judgment Test (3DJT). This computer-based tool, co-constructed with users and capable of being administered remotely, aims to assess the three main domains of judgment (practical, moral, and social) and learn from the psychometric weaknesses of tests currently used in clinical practice. (2) Method: First, we presented the 3DJT to experts in cognition, who evaluated the tool as a whole as well as the content validity, relevance, and acceptability of 72 scenarios. Second, an improved version was administered to 70 subjects without cognitive impairment to select scenarios with the best psychometric properties in order to build a future clinically short version of the test. (3) Results: Fifty-six scenarios were retained following expert evaluation. Results support the idea that the improved version has good internal consistency, and the concurrent validity primer shows that 3DJT is a good measure of judgment. Furthermore, the improved version was found to have a significant number of scenarios with good psychometric properties to prepare a clinical version of the test. (4) Conclusion: The 3DJT is an interesting alternative tool for assessing judgment. However, more studies are needed for its implementation in a clinical context.

Approach-Bias Retraining and Other Training Interventions as Add-On in the Treatment of AUD Patients

In the past two decades, a variety of cognitive training interventions have been developed to help people overcome their addictive behaviors. Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between programs in which reactions to addiction-relevant cues are trained (varieties of cognitive bias modification, CBM) and programs in which general abilities are trained such as working memory or mindfulness. CBM was first developed to study the hypothesized causal role in mental disorders: by directly manipulating the bias, it was investigated to what extent this influenced disorder-relevant behavior. In these proof-of-principle studies, the bias was temporarily modified in volunteers, either temporarily increased or decreased, with corresponding effects on behavior (e.g., beer consumption), in case the bias was successfully manipulated. In subsequent clinical randomized controlled trials (RCTs), training (away from the substance vs. sham training) was added to clinical treatment. These studies have demonstrated that CBM, as added to treatment, reduces relapse with a small effect of about 10% (similar effect size as for medication, with the strongest evidence for approach-bias modification). This has not been found for general ability training (e.g., working memory training), although effects on other psychological functions have been found (e.g., impulsivity). Mindfulness also has been found to help people overcome addictions, and different from CBM, also as stand-alone intervention. Research on (neuro-)cognitive mechanisms underlying approach-bias modification has pointed to a new perspective in which automatic inferences rather than associations are influenced by training, which has led to the development of a new variety of training: ABC training.

Stabilizing expectations when shifting from analytical to intuitive reasoning: The role of prediction errors in reasoning

As humans, we rely on intuitive reasoning for most of our decisions. However, when there is a novel or atypical decision to be made, we must rely on a slower and more deliberative thought process-analytical reasoning. As we gain experience with these novel or atypical decisions, our reasoning shifts from analytical to intuitive, which parallels a reduction in the need for cognitive control. Here, we sought to confirm this claim by employing electroencephalographic (EEG) measures of cognitive control as participants performed a simple perceptual decision-making task. Specifically, we had participants categorize "blobs" into families based on their visual attributes so we could examine how their reasoning changed with learning. In a key manipulation, halfway through the experiment we introduced novel blob families to categorize, thus temporarily increasing the need for analytical reasoning (i.e., cognitive control). Congruent with past research, we focused our EEG analyses on frontal theta activity as it has been linked to cognitive control and analytical thinking. As hypothesized, we found a transition from analytical to intuitive decision-making systems with learning as indexed by a decrease in frontal theta power. Further, when the novel blobs were introduced at the midpoint of the experiment, we found that decisions about these stimuli recruited analytical reasoning as indicated by increased theta power in comparison to decisions about well-practiced stimuli. We propose our findings to reflect prediction errors to decision demands-a monitoring process that determines whether our expectations of demands are met. Shifting from analytical to intuitive reasoning thus reflects the stabilization of our expectations of decision demands, which can be violated with unexpected demands when encountering novel stimuli.

Formal vs. intuitive categorization and obsessive-compulsive symptoms

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is often characterized by rigidity regarding rules and perfectionism, which suggests a formal reasoning style. However, other characterizations suggest an overreliance on internal cues for behavior termination, which suggests a more intuitive reasoning style. We examine reasoning styles in OCD by assessing categorization preferences traditionally classified to rule-based and family resemblance categorization.

METHOD

An initial study (n = 41) and an online replication (n = 85) were conducted. In both studies, groups scoring high and low on OCD symptoms were compared. Categorization preferences and confidence ratings were examined via a modification of a classic categorization task. The task was administered in three conditions: under time limits, with no time limits, and with explicit explanation of both categorization styles.

RESULTS

Aggregating results from both studies showed that obsessive-compulsive symptoms were associated with a reduced preference for rule-based categorization reflecting a tendency towards a more intuitive, non-formal reasoning style. This preference was apparent even when rules were explicitly described. Group differences regarding confidence were inconclusive.

LIMITATIONS

Generalizing results to the clinical population requires further research, and specificity to OC symptoms should be determined.

CONCLUSIONS

Challenging the expected association between OCD and rigidity and perfectionism, findings support suggestions that OCD reasoning strays from formal reasoning. This may explain some of the subjective and idiosyncratic rules adopted by individuals with OCD.

A neurocognitive perspective on the relationship between exercise and reward: Implications for weight management and drug addiction

The impact of exercise on food reward is increasingly being discussed as an interplay between executive function (EF), homeostasis and mechanisms promoting or undermining intentional behaviour change. Integrating current knowledge of neurocognitive processes encompassing cognitive and affective networks within an energy balance framework will provide a more comprehensive account. Reward circuitry affected by recreational drugs and food overlap. Therefore the underlying processes explaining changes in drug-taking behaviour may offer new insights into how exercise affects the reward value of recreational drugs and food. EF is important for successful self-regulation, and training EF may boost inhibitory control in relation to food- and drug-related reward. Preclinical and clinical observations suggest that reward-seeking can transfer within and between categories of reward. This may have clinical implications beyond exercise improving metabolic health in people with obesity to understanding therapeutic responses to exercise in people with neurocognitive deficits in non-food reward-based decision making such as drug dependence.

A framework for application of consumer neuroscience in pro-environmental behavior change interventions

Most consumers are aware that climate change is a growing problem and admit that action is needed. However, research shows that consumers' behavior often does not conform to their value and orientations. This value-behavior gap is due to contextual factors such as price, product design, and social norms as well as individual factors such as personal and hedonic values, environmental beliefs, and the workload capacity an individual can handle. Because of this conflict of interest, consumers have a hard time identifying the true drivers of their behavior, as they are either unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the processes at play. Therefore, consumer neuroscience methods might provide a valuable tool to uncover the implicit measurements of pro-environmental behavior (PEB). Several studies have already defined neurophysiological differences between green and non-green individuals; however, a behavior change intervention must be developed to motivate PEB among consumers. Motivating behavior with reward or punishment will most likely get users engaged in climate change action via brain structures related to the reward system, such as the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and (pre)frontal cortex, where the reward information and subsequent affective responses are encoded. The intensity of the reward experience can be increased when the consumer is consciously considering the action to achieve it. This makes goal-directed behavior the potential aim of behavior change interventions. This article provides an extensive review of the neuroscientific evidence for consumer attitude, behavior, and decision-making processes in the light of sustainability incentives for behavior change interventions. Based on this review, we aim to unite the current theories and provide future research directions to exploit the power of affective conditioning and neuroscience methods for promoting PEB engagement.

Making habits measurable beyond what they are not: A focus on associative dual-process models

Habits are the subject of intense international research. Under the associative dual-process model the outcome devaluation paradigm has been used extensively to classify behaviours as being either goal-directed (sensitive to shifts in the value of associated outcomes) or habitual (triggered by stimuli without anticipation of consequences). This has proven to be a useful framework for studying the neurobiology of habit and relevance of habits in clinical psychopathology. However, in recent years issues have been raised about this rather narrow definition of habits in comparison to habitual behaviour experienced in the real world. Specifically, defining habits as the absence of goal-directed control, the very specific set-ups required to demonstrate habit experimentally and the lack of direct evidence for habits as stimulus-response behaviours are viewed as problematic. In this review paper we address key critiques that have been raised about habit research within the framework of the associative dual-process model. We then highlight novel research approaches studying different features of habits with methods that expand beyond traditional paradigms.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Metacognitive and Non-Metacognitive Processes in Arithmetic Performance: Can There Be More than One Meta-Level?

The nature of the development of arithmetic performance has long been intensively studied, and available scientific evidence can be evaluated and synthesized in light of Nelson and Narens’ model of metacognition. According to the Nelson–Narens model, human cognition can be split into two or more interrelated levels. Obviously, in the case of more than two levels, cognitive processes from at least one level can be described as both meta- and object-level processes. The question arises whether it is possible that the very same cognitive processes are both controlled and controlling. The feasibility of owning the same cognitive processes—which are considered the same from an external point of view of assessment—as both meta- and object-level processes within the same individual opens the possibility of investigating the transition from meta-level to object-level. Modeling cognitive development by means of a series of such transitions calls forth an understanding of possible developmental phases in a given domain of learning. The developmental phases of arithmetic performance are described as a series of transitions from arithmetical facts to strategies of arithmetic word problem solving. For school learning and instruction, the role of metacognitive scaffolding as a powerful educational approach is emphasized.

The parallelism of cognitive economy and physiological economy: A rationality-based dual process theory

Researchers recognize the affinity of habits-as-heuristics and habits-as-routines. This paper argues that the affinity should not be surprising, as both kinds of habits are the outcome of rational choice. The paper finds that the dual process theory, once reconstructed as based on rational choice, reveals that the affinity runs deep, as three-fold parallelism: i) the cognitive economy responsible for habits-as-heuristics parallels what this paper calls the “physiological economy” responsible for habits-as-routines; ii) the occasional slipup of heuristics generated by the cognitive economy parallels the occasional slipup of routines of the physiological economy; and iii) the breakdown of heuristics of the cognitive economy parallels the breakdown of routines of the physiological economy. The rationality-based dual process theory can explain—whereas the single process theory cannot—why slipups do not induce the decision makers to abandon the pertinent habit, but breakdowns do.

Supporting Health and Medical Decision Making: Findings and Insights from Fuzzy-Trace Theory

HIGHLIGHTS

Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) supports practical approaches to improving health and medicine.FTT differs in important respects from other theories of decision making, which has implications for how to help patients, providers, and health communicators.Gist mental representations emphasize categorical distinctions, reflect understanding in context, and help cue values relevant to health and patient care.Understanding the science behind theory is crucial for evidence-based medicine.

Understanding the effects of serotonin in the brain through its role in the gastrointestinal tract

The neuromodulatory arousal system imbues the nervous system with the flexibility and robustness required to facilitate adaptive behaviour. While there are well-understood mechanisms linking dopamine, noradrenaline and acetylcholine to distinct behavioural states, similar conclusions have not been as readily available for serotonin. Fascinatingly, despite clear links between serotonergic function and cognitive capacities as diverse as reward processing, exploration, and the psychedelic experience, over 95% of the serotonin in the body is released in the gastrointestinal tract, where it controls digestive muscle contractions (peristalsis). Here, we argue that framing neural serotonin as a rostral extension of the gastrointestinal serotonergic system dissolves much of the mystery associated with the central serotonergic system. Specifically, we outline that central serotonin activity mimics the effects of a digestion/satiety circuit mediated by hypothalamic control over descending serotonergic nuclei in the brainstem. We review commonalities and differences between these two circuits, with a focus on the heterogeneous expression of different classes of serotonin receptors in the brain. Much in the way that serotonin-induced peristalsis facilitates the work of digestion, serotonergic influences over cognition can be reframed as performing the work of cognition. Extending this analogy, we argue that the central serotonergic system allows the brain to arbitrate between different cognitive modes as a function of serotonergic tone: low activity facilitates cognitive automaticity, whereas higher activity helps to identify flexible solutions to problems, particularly if and when the initial responses fail. This perspective sheds light on otherwise disparate capacities mediated by serotonin, and also helps to understand why there are such pervasive links between serotonergic pathology and the symptoms of psychiatric disorders.

Debiasing System 1: Training favours logical over stereotypical intuiting

Whereas people’s reasoning is often biased by intuitive stereotypical associations, recent debiasing studies suggest that performance can be boosted by short training interventions that stress the underlying problem logic. The nature of this training effect remains unclear. Does training help participants correct erroneous stereotypical intuitions through deliberation? Or does it help them develop correct intuitions? We addressed this issue in four studies with base-rate neglect and conjunction fallacy problems. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Studies 1A and 2A showed that training boosted performance and did so as early as the intuitive stage. After training, most participants solved the problems correctly from the outset and no longer needed to correct an initial incorrect answer through deliberation. Studies 1B and 2B indicated that this sound intuiting persisted over at least two months. The findings confirm that a short training can debias reasoning at an intuitive “System 1” stage and get reasoners to favour logical over stereotypical intuitions.

The Feelings of Goals Hypothesis: Emotional Feelings are Non-Conceptual, Non-Motoric Representations of Goals

This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.

Hot and Cold Cognitive Disturbances in Parkinson Patients Treated with DBS-STN: A Combined PET and Neuropsychological Study

Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) often suffer from non-motor symptoms, which may be caused by serotonergic dysfunction. Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) in the subthalamic nucleus (STN) may also influence non-motor symptoms. The aim of this study is to investigate how the cerebral 5-HT system associates to disturbances in cognition and mood in PD patients with DBS-STN turned on and off. We used psychological tests and questionnaires to evaluate cognitive function and the effects on mood from turning DBS-STN off. We applied a novel PET neuroimaging methodology to evaluate the integrity of the cerebral serotonin system. We measured 5-HT1BR binding in 13 DBS-STN-treated PD patients, at baseline and after turning DBS off. Thirteen age-matched volunteers served as controls. The measures for cognition and mood were correlated to the 5-HT1BR availability in temporal limbic cortex. 5-HT1BR binding was proportional to working memory performance and inverse proportional to affective bias for face recognition. When DBS is turned off, patients feel less vigorous; the higher the limbic and temporal 5-HT1BR binding, the more they are affected by DBS being turned off. Our study suggests that cerebral 5-HTR binding is associated with non-motor symptoms, and that preservation of serotonergic functions may be predictive of DBS-STN effects.

A review of mathematical modeling of addiction regarding both (neuro-) psychological processes and the social contagion perspectives

Addiction is a complex biopsychosocial phenomenon, impacted by biological predispositions, psychological processes, and the social environment. Using mathematical and computational models that allow for surrogative reasoning may be a promising avenue for gaining a deeper understanding of this complex behavior. This paper reviews and classifies a selection of formal models of addiction focusing on the intra- and inter-individual dynamics, i.e., (neuro) psychological models and social models. We find that these modeling approaches to addiction are too disjoint and argue that in order to unravel the complexities of biopsychosocial processes of addiction, models should integrate intra- and inter-individual factors.

Changing healthcare professionals' non-reflective processes to improve the quality of care

RATIONALE

Translating research evidence into clinical practice to improve care involves healthcare professionals adopting new behaviours and changing or stopping their existing behaviours. However, changing healthcare professional behaviour can be difficult, particularly when it involves changing repetitive, ingrained ways of providing care. There is an increasing focus on understanding healthcare professional behaviour in terms of non-reflective processes, such as habits and routines, in addition to the more often studied deliberative processes. Theories of habit and routine provide two complementary lenses for understanding healthcare professional behaviour, although to date, each perspective has only been applied in isolation.

OBJECTIVES

To combine theories of habit and routine to generate a broader understanding of healthcare professional behaviour and how it might be changed.

METHODS

Sixteen experts met for a two-day multidisciplinary workshop on how to advance implementation science by developing greater understanding of non-reflective processes.

RESULTS

From a psychological perspective 'habit' is understood as a process that maintains ingrained behaviour through a learned link between contextual cues and behaviours that have become associated with those cues. Theories of habit are useful for understanding the individual's role in developing and maintaining specific ways of working. Theories of routine add to this perspective by describing how clinical practices are formed, adapted, reinforced and discontinued in and through interactions with colleagues, systems and organisational procedures. We suggest a selection of theory-based strategies to advance understanding of healthcare professionals' habits and routines and how to change them.

CONCLUSION

Combining theories of habit and routines has the potential to advance implementation science by providing a fuller understanding of the range of factors, operating at multiple levels of analysis, which can impact on the behaviours of healthcare professionals, and so quality of care provision.

Dual Process Theory: Embodied and Predictive; Symbolic and Classical

Dual Process Theory is currently a popular theory for explaining why we show bounded rationality in reasoning and decision-making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow and reflective one (Type 2). A problem for this theory is identifying a common principle that binds these features together, explaining why they form a unity, the unity problem. To solve it, a hypothesis is developed combining embodied predictive processing with symbolic classical approaches. The hypothesis, simplified, states that Type 1 processes are bound together because they rely on embodied predictive processing whereas Type 2 processes form a unity because they are accomplished by symbolic classical cognition. To show that this is likely the case, the features of Dual Process Theory are discussed in relation to these frameworks.

Functional Mechanisms of Health Behavior Change Techniques: A Conceptual Review

Background

Health behavior change is among the top recommendations for improving health of patients with lifestyle-related chronic diseases. An array of behavior change techniques (BCTs) have been developed to support behavior change initiation and maintenance. These BCTs often show limited success when they are not informed by theory, leading to a mismatch between the intention of the BCT and patients' needs or expectations. Previous studies have identified a number of resources (domains) which patients may require to initiate and maintain health behavior change. Indeed, not yet well established is how BCTs address these resources, i.e., the functional mechanisms of BCTs.

Purpose

Provide a theoretical framework of the functional mechanisms of BCTs for developing and implementing successful interventions for health behavior change.

Methods

Conceptual review, including literature analysis and synthesis as well as conceptualization of a new model based on the synthesis.

Results

Through the integration of dual-process models as well as reward and motivation proceeding, i.e., affective, emotional, or intuitive neurobiological cues, into the rational framework of rather linear cognitive or task-related decision progress, we categorize previously identified resources into three distinct sets: external, internal reflective, and internal affective resources. Based on this triad, we classify BCTs according to their functional mechanisms into facilitating (=providing external resources), boosting (=strengthening internal reflective resources), and nudging (=activating internal affective resources). Consequently, we present a simplified Behavior Change Resource Model (BCRM) that is centered on patients' resources.

Conclusion

The model can be applied to develop health behavior change interventions, which promote engagement and empowerment. Future studies should aim at testing the applicability and practicality of the BCRM.

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

An Indirect Measure of Implicit Sexual Assertiveness: Reliability and Validity of the Sexual Assertiveness IAT in Young Adults in The Netherlands

In the present study we investigated the reliability and validity of an Implicit Association Test of sexual assertiveness (the SA-IAT) in a sample of young adults (n = 159). The D600 algorithm was used to calculate implicit sexual assertiveness scores. Explicit sexual assertiveness was measured using a selection of items from the Hurlbert Index of Sexual Assertiveness. Personality traits were assessed using the revised, short version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. The internal consistency of the SA-IAT was evaluated based on split-half reliability, and found acceptable with α = 0.61 for the practice trials, and α = 0.70 for the test trials, after correction for attenuation. Convergent and divergent validity were evaluated using correlation analysis. Correlation with explicit sexual assertiveness was found to be low, as expected. Divergent validity of the SA-IAT was evaluated against the personality traits of extraversion, neuroticism, and social desirability. Except for a significant correlation of implicit sexual assertiveness with extraversion in the full sample and the female subsample, implicit sexual assertiveness and personality traits were not found to share variance, as expected.

The effect of methylphenidate and mixed amphetamine salts on cognitive reflection: a field study

RATIONALE

Methylphenidate (MPH) and mixed D,L-amphetamine salts (MASs; Adderall) were previously found to have unreliable effects on judgment and decision processes.

OBJECTIVE

We predicted that MPH and MASs have a specific effect of reducing heuristic responses, which should lead to increased performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT). The CRT is considered to be a testbed for heuristic versus deliberative response modes.

METHODS

We recruited a sample of 15,361 individuals using the Prolific Academic crowdsourcing platform. From this initial pool, our final sample consisted of 294 participants (125 MPH users and 169 MASs users) who conformed to the study criteria and completed the experimental tasks. Tasks were performed on days where participants were either medicated or not, allowing to assess the effect of medication status.

RESULTS

There was a strong positive effect of taking MPH on CRT scores (Cohen's d = 0.40) which was not qualified by frequency of MPH usage, ADHD symptoms, and demographic factors. There was also a somewhat weaker effect for MASs (Cohen's d = 0.07). No effects of MPH and MASs were recorded for risk-taking and numeracy.

CONCLUSIONS

The results indicate that MPH enhances decision-making in tasks where heuristic responses typically bias it.