The evolution of cognitive control

Distinct neural mechanisms for action access and execution in the human brain: insights from an fMRI study

Goal-directed actions are fundamental to human behavior, whereby inner goals are achieved through mapping action representations to motor outputs. The left premotor cortex (BA6) and the posterior portion of Broca's area (BA44) are two modulatory poles of the action system. However, how these regions support the representation-output mapping within the system is not yet understood. To address this, we conducted a finger-tapping functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment using action categories ranging from specific to general. Our study found distinct neural behaviors in BA44 and BA6 during action category processing and motor execution. During access of action categories, activity in a posterior portion of BA44 (pBA44) decreased linearly as action categories became less specific. Conversely, during motor execution, activity in BA6 increased linearly with less specific categories. These findings highlight the differential roles of pBA44 and BA6 in action processing. We suggest that pBA44 facilitates access to action categories by utilizing motor information from the behavioral context while the premotor cortex integrates motor information to execute the selected action. This finding enhances our understanding of the interplay between prefrontal cortical regions and premotor cortex in mapping action representation to motor execution and, more in general, of the cortical mechanisms underlying human behavior.

Cognitive Archeology and the Attentional System: An Evolutionary Mismatch for the Genus Homo

Brain evolution is a key topic in evolutionary anthropology. Unfortunately, in this sense the fossil record can usually support limited anatomical and behavioral inferences. Nonetheless, information from fossil species is, in any case, particularly valuable, because it represents the only direct proof of cerebral and behavioral changes throughout the human phylogeny. Recently, archeology and psychology have been integrated in the field of cognitive archeology, which aims to interpret current cognitive models according to the evidence we have on extinct human species. In this article, such evidence is reviewed in order to consider whether and to what extent the archeological record can supply information regarding changes of the attentional system in different taxa of the human genus. In particular, behavioral correlates associated with the fronto-parietal system and working memory are employed to consider recent changes in our species, Homo sapiens, and a mismatch between attentional and visuospatial ability is hypothesized. These two functional systems support present-moment awareness and mind-wandering, respectively, and their evolutionary unbalance can explain a structural sensitivity to psychological distress in our species.

Analysis two types of K complexes on the human EEG based on classical continuous wavelet transform

In our work, we compare EEG time-frequency features for two types of K-complexes detected in volunteers performing the monotonous psychomotor test with their eyes closed. Type I K-complexes preceded spontaneous awakenings, while after type II K-complexes, subjects continued to sleep at least for 10 s after. The total number of K-complexes in the group of 18 volunteers was 646, of which of which type I K-complexes was 150 and type II K-complexes was 496. Time-frequency analysis was performed using continuous wavelet transform. EEG wavelet spectral power was averaged upon several brain zones for each of the classical frequency ranges (slow wave, δ, θ, α, β₁, β₂, γ bands). The low-frequency oscillatory activity ( δ-band) preceding type I K-complexes was asymmetrical and most prominent in the left hemisphere. Statistically significant differences were obtained by averaging over the left and right hemispheres, as well as projections of the motor area of the brain, p<0.05. The maximal differences between the types I and II of K-complexes were demonstrated in δ-, θ-bands in the occipital and posterior temporal regions. The high amplitude of the motor cortex projection response in β₂-band, [20;30] Hz, related to the sensory-motor modality of task in monotonous psychomotor test. The δ-oscillatory activity preceding type I K-complexes was asymmetrical and most prominent in the left hemisphere may be due to the important role of the left hemisphere in spontaneous awakening from sleep during monotonous work, which is an interesting issue for future research.

Neural processes of inhibitory control in American Indian peoples are associated with reduced mental health problems

American Indians (AI) experience disproportionately high prevalence of suicide and substance use disorders (SUD). However, accounting for risk burden (e.g. historical trauma and discrimination), the likelihood of mental health disorders or SUD is similar or decreased compared with the broader population. Such findings have spurred psychological research examining the protective factors, but no studies have investigated its potential neural mechanisms. Inhibitory control is one of the potential neurobehavioral construct with demonstrated protective effects, but has not been examined in neuroimaging studies with AI populations specifically. We examined the incidence of suicidal thoughts and behaviors (STB) and SUD among AI (n = 76) and propensity matched (sex, age, income, IQ proxy and trauma exposure) non-Hispanic White (NHW) participants (n = 76). Among the AI sample, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data recorded during the stop-signal task (SST) was examined in relation to STB and SUDs. AIs relative to NHW subjects displayed lower incidence of STB. AIs with no reported STBs showed greater activity in executive control regions during the SST compared with AI who endorsed STB. AI without SUD demonstrated lower activity relative to those individual reporting SUD. Results are consistent with a growing body of literature demonstrating the high level of risk burden driving disparate prevalence of mental health concerns in AI. Furthermore, differential activation during inhibitory control processing in AI individuals without STB may represent a neural mechanism of protective effects against mental health problems in AI. Future research is needed to elucidate sociocultural factors contributing protection against mental health outcomes in AIs and further delineate neural mechanisms with respect to specific concerns (e.g. SUD vs STB).

Attention: The grounds of self-regulated cognition

Everyone knows what paying attention is, yet not everybody knows what this means in cognitive and brain function terms. The attentive state can be defined as a state of optimal activation that allows selecting the sources of information and courses of action in order to optimize our interaction with the environment in accordance with either the saliency of the stimulation or internal goals and intentions. In this article we argue that paying attention consists in tuning the mind with the environment in a conscious and controlled mode in order to enable the strategic and flexible adaptation of responses in accordance with internal motivations and goals. We discuss the anatomy and neural mechanisms involved in attention functions and present a brief overview of the neurocognitive development of this seminal cognitive function on the grounds of self-regulated behavior. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention (BEAB) Brain Function and Dysfunction (BEAC) Cognitive Development (BAAD).

Automaticity and Executive Abilities in Developmental Dyslexia: A Theoretical Review

Cognitive difficulties are well documented in developmental dyslexia but they present a challenge to dyslexia theory. In this paper, the Model of the Control of Action is proposed as a theoretical explanation of how and why deficits in both automaticity and executive abilities are apparent in the cognitive profiles of dyslexia and how these deficits might relate to literacy difficulties. This theoretical perspective is used to consider evidence from different cognitive domains. The neuroanatomical underpinnings of automaticity and executive abilities are then discussed in relation to the understanding of dyslexia. Links between reading, writing, and executive function are considered. The reviewed evidence suggests that dyslexia theory should consider an interaction between procedural learned behaviour (automaticity) and higher-order (executive) abilities. The capacity to handle environmental interference, develop and engage adaptive strategies accordingly, and plan actions all require interactions between the cerebellum and the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Difficulties in these areas might explain both impairments in the cumulative development of literacy skills in childhood and general task management in everyday life in adulthood. It is suggested that improved measures are required to assess this cerebellar–PFC interaction and to allow early identification of future literacy difficulties, allowing implementation of timely interventions and reasonable adjustments.

The evolution of brain architectures for predictive coding and active inference

This article considers the evolution of brain architectures for predictive processing. We argue that brain mechanisms for predictive perception and action are not late evolutionary additions of advanced creatures like us. Rather, they emerged gradually from simpler predictive loops (e.g. autonomic and motor reflexes) that were a legacy from our earlier evolutionary ancestors-and were key to solving their fundamental problems of adaptive regulation. We characterize simpler-to-more-complex brains formally, in terms of generative models that include predictive loops of increasing hierarchical breadth and depth. These may start from a simple homeostatic motif and be elaborated during evolution in four main ways: these include the multimodal expansion of predictive control into an allostatic loop; its duplication to form multiple sensorimotor loops that expand an animal's behavioural repertoire; and the gradual endowment of generative models with hierarchical depth (to deal with aspects of the world that unfold at different spatial scales) and temporal depth (to select plans in a future-oriented manner). In turn, these elaborations underwrite the solution to biological regulation problems faced by increasingly sophisticated animals. Our proposal aligns neuroscientific theorising-about predictive processing-with evolutionary and comparative data on brain architectures in different animal species. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Greater dependence on working memory and restricted familiarity in orangutans compared with rhesus monkeys

The prefrontal cortex is larger than would be predicted by body size or visual cortex volume in great apes compared with monkeys. Because prefrontal cortex is critical for working memory, we hypothesized that recognition memory tests would engage working memory in orangutans more robustly than in rhesus monkeys. In contrast to working memory, the familiarity response that results from repetition of an image is less cognitively taxing and has been associated with nonfrontal brain regions. Across three experiments, we observed a striking species difference in the control of behavior by these two types of memory. First, we found that recognition memory performance in orangutans was controlled by working memory under conditions in which this memory system plays little role in rhesus monkeys. Second, we found that unlike the case in monkeys, familiarity was not involved in recognition memory performance in orangutans, shown by differences with monkeys across three different measures. Memory in orangutans was not improved by use of novel images, was always impaired by a concurrent cognitive load, and orangutans did not accurately identify images seen minutes ago. These results are surprising and puzzling, but do support the view that prefrontal expansion in great apes favored working memory. At least in orangutans, increased dependence on working memory may come at a cost in terms of the availability of familiarity.

The exploration-exploitation trade-off in a foraging task is affected by mood-related arousal and valence

The exploration-exploitation trade-off shows conceptual, functional, and neural analogies with the persistence-flexibility trade-off. We investigated whether mood, which is known to modulate the persistence-flexibility balance, would similarly affect the exploration-exploitation trade-off in a foraging task. More specifically, we tested whether interindividual differences in foraging behavior can be predicted by mood-related arousal and valence. In 119 participants, we assessed mood-related interindividual differences in exploration-exploitation using a foraging task that included minimal task constraints to reduce paradigm-induced biases of individual control tendencies. We adopted the marginal value theorem as a model-based analysis approach, which approximates optimal foraging behavior by tackling the patch-leaving problem. To assess influences of mood on foraging, participants underwent either a positive or negative mood induction. Throughout the experiment, we assessed arousal and valence levels as predictors for explorative/exploitative behavior. Our mood manipulation affected participants' arousal and valence ratings as expected. Moreover, mood-related arousal was found to predict exploration while valence predicted exploitation, which only partly matched our expectations and thereby the proposed conceptual overlap with flexibility and persistence, respectively. The current study provides a first insight into how processes related to arousal and valence differentially modulate foraging behavior. Our results imply that the relationship between exploration-exploitation and flexibility-persistence is more complicated than the semantic overlap between these terms might suggest, thereby calling for further research on the functional, neural, and neurochemical underpinnings of both trade-offs.

The evolution of hierarchical structure building capacity for language and music: a bottom-up perspective

A central property of human language is its hierarchical structure. Humans can flexibly combine elements to build a hierarchical structure expressing rich semantics. A hierarchical structure is also considered as playing a key role in many other human cognitive domains. In music, auditory-motor events are combined into hierarchical pitch and/or rhythm structure expressing affect. How did such a hierarchical structure building capacity evolve? This paper investigates this question from a bottom-up perspective based on a set of action-related components as a shared basis underlying cognitive capacities of nonhuman primates and humans. Especially, I argue that the evolution of hierarchical structure building capacity for language and music is tractable for comparative evolutionary study once we focus on the gradual elaboration of shared brain architecture: the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits for hierarchical control of goal-directed action and the dorsal pathways for hierarchical internal models. I suggest that this gradual elaboration of the action-related brain architecture in the context of vocal control and tool-making went hand in hand with amplification of working memory, and made the brain ready for hierarchical structure building in language and music.

Modality-specific neural mechanisms of cognitive control in a Stroop-like task

The successful resolution of ever-changing conflicting contexts requires efficient cognitive control. Previous studies have found similar neural patterns in conflict processing for different modalities using an event-related potential (ERP) approach and have concluded that cognitive control is supramodal. However, recent behavioral studies have found that conflict adaptation (a phenomenon with the reduction of congruency effect in the current trial after an incongruent trial as compared with a congruent trial) could not transfer across visual and auditory modalities and suggested that cognitive control is modality-specific, challenging the supramodal view. These discrepancies may have also arisen from methodological differences across studies. The current study examined the electroencephalographic profiles of a Stroop-like task to elucidate the modality-specific neural mechanisms of cognitive control. Participants were instructed to respond to a target always coming from the visual modality while disregarding the distractor coming from either the auditory or the visual modality. The results revealed significant congruency effects on both behavioral indices, i.e., reaction time and error rate, and ERP components, including the P3 and the conflict slow potential. Besides, the congruency effects on the amplitude of the P3 showed a negative correlation with reaction time, indicating an intrinsic link between these neural and behavioral indices. Furthermore, in the modality-repetition condition, conflict adaptation effects were significant on both reaction time and P3 amplitude, and the reaction time could be predicted by the P3 amplitude, while such effects were not observed in the modality-alternation condition. The time-frequency analysis also showed that conflict adaptation occurred in the modality-repetition condition, but not in the modality-alternation condition in low frequency bands, including the theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz), and beta1 (12-20 Hz) bands. Taken together, our results revealed modality-specific patterns of the conflict adaptation effects on the P3 amplitude and oscillatory power (in theta, alpha, and beta1 bands), providing neural evidence for the modality specificity of cognitive control and expanding the boundaries of cognitive control.

Chimpanzees flexibly update working memory contents and show susceptibility to distraction in the self-ordered search task

Working memory (WM) is a core executive function that allows individuals to hold, process and manipulate information. WM capacity has been repeatedly nominated as a key factor in human cognitive evolution; nevertheless, little is known about the WM abilities of our closest primate relatives. In this study, we examined signatures of WM ability in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Standard WM tasks for humans (Homo sapiens) often require participants to continuously update their WM. In Experiment 1, we implemented this updating requirement in a foraging situation: zoo-housed chimpanzees (n = 13) searched for food in an array of containers. To avoid redundant searches, they needed to continuously update which containers they had already visited (similar to WM paradigms for human children) with 15 s retention intervals in between each choice. We examined chimpanzees' WM capacity and to what extent they used spatial cues and object features to memorize their previous choices. In Experiment 2, we investigated how susceptible their WM was to attentional interference, an important signature, setting WM in humans apart from long-term memory. We found large individual differences with some individuals remembering at least their last four choices. Chimpanzees used a combination of spatial cues and object features to remember which boxes they had chosen already. Moreover, their performance decreased specifically when competing memory information was introduced. Finally, we found that individual differences in task performance were highly reliable over time. Together, these findings show remarkable similarities between human and chimpanzee WM abilities despite evolutionary and life-history differences.

Manipulation of Pro-Sociality and Rule-Following with Non-invasive Brain Stimulation

Decisions are often governed by rules on adequate social behaviour. Recent research suggests that the right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC) is involved in the implementation of internal fairness rules (norms), by controlling the impulse to act selfishly. A drawback of these studies is that the assumed norms and impulses have to be deduced from behaviour and that norm-following and pro-sociality are indistinguishable. Here, we directly confronted participants with a rule that demanded to make advantageous or disadvantageous monetary allocations for themselves or another person. To disentangle its functional role in rule-following and pro-sociality, we divergently manipulated the rLPFC by applying cathodal or anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Cathodal tDCS increased participants’ rule-following, even of rules that demanded to lose money or hurt another person financially. In contrast, anodal tDCS led participants to specifically violate more often those rules that were at odds with what participants chose freely. Brain stimulation over the rLPFC thus did not simply increase or decrease selfishness. Instead, by disentangling rule-following and pro-sociality, our results point to a broader role of the rLPFC in integrating the costs and benefits of rules in order to align decisions with internal goals, ultimately enabling to flexibly adapt social behaviour.

Cognitive control: componential and yet emergent

In this commentary, I will argue that the componential and emergent views of cognitive control as defined by Cooper (2010) do not necessarily oppose each other, and I will try to make a case for their interdependence. First, I will use the construct of cognitive inhibition-one of the main componential control functions mentioned in the target articles-to illustrate my line of reasoning. Then, I will comment on how some of the target articles, each from a different perspective, bring arguments in favor of this integrative view.

Defining an ontology of cognitive control requires attention to component interactions

Cognitive control is not only componential, but those components may interact in complicated ways in the service of cognitive control tasks. This complexity poses a challenge for developing an ontological description, because the mapping may not be direct between our task descriptions and true component differences reflected in indicators. To illustrate this point, I discuss two examples: (a) the relationship between adaptive gating and working memory and (b) the recent evidence for a control hierarchy. From these examples, I argue that an ontological program must simultaneously seek to identify component processes and their interactions within a broader processing architecture.

Cognitive demands of lower paleolithic toolmaking

Stone tools provide some of the most abundant, continuous, and high resolution evidence of behavioral change over human evolution, but their implications for cognitive evolution have remained unclear. We investigated the neurophysiological demands of stone toolmaking by training modern subjects in known Paleolithic methods (“Oldowan”, “Acheulean”) and collecting structural and functional brain imaging data as they made technical judgments (outcome prediction, strategic appropriateness) about planned actions on partially completed tools. Results show that this task affected neural activity and functional connectivity in dorsal prefrontal cortex, that effect magnitude correlated with the frequency of correct strategic judgments, and that the frequency of correct strategic judgments was predictive of success in Acheulean, but not Oldowan, toolmaking. This corroborates hypothesized cognitive control demands of Acheulean toolmaking, specifically including information monitoring and manipulation functions attributed to the "central executive" of working memory. More broadly, it develops empirical methods for assessing the differential cognitive demands of Paleolithic technologies, and expands the scope of evolutionary hypotheses that can be tested using the available archaeological record.

Degree of automaticity and the prefrontal cortex

The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), with more anterior areas [Brodmann area (BA) 45, 47, and 10], has been known to be activated as cognitive hierarchy increases. However, this does not hold for highly automatic processes such as first language (L1), where the posterior region (BA 44) is known as the key area for the processing of complex linguistic hierarchy. Discussing this disparity, we propose that the degree of automaticity (DoA) is a crucial factor for the framework of functional mapping in the PFC: the posterior-to-anterior gradient system for more controlled processes and the posterior-confined system for automatic processes. We support this view with previous findings and provide a new perspective on the functional organization of the PFC.

Cognitive control and attentional functions

Cognitive control is essential to flexible, goal-directed behavior under uncertainty, yet its underlying mechanisms are not clearly understood. Because attentional functions are known to allocate mental resources and prioritize the information to be processed, we propose that the attentional functions of alerting, orienting, and executive control and the interactions among them contribute to cognitive control in the service of uncertainty reduction. To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship between cognitive control and attentional functions. We used the Majority Function Task (MFT) to manipulate uncertainty in order to evoke cognitive control along with the Revised Attention Network Test (ANT-R) to measure the efficiency and the interactions of attentional functions. A backwards, stepwise regression model revealed that performance on the MFT could be significantly predicted by attentional functions and their interactions as measured by the ANT-R. These results provide preliminary support for our theory that the attentional functions are involved in the implementation of cognitive control as required to reduce uncertainty, though further investigation is needed.

Human frontal lobes are not relatively large

One of the most pervasive assumptions about human brain evolution is that it involved relative enlargement of the frontal lobes. We show that this assumption is without foundation. Analysis of five independent data sets using correctly scaled measures and phylogenetic methods reveals that the size of human frontal lobes, and of specific frontal regions, is as expected relative to the size of other brain structures. Recent claims for relative enlargement of human frontal white matter volume, and for relative enlargement shared by all great apes, seem to be mistaken. Furthermore, using a recently developed method for detecting shifts in evolutionary rates, we find that the rate of change in relative frontal cortex volume along the phylogenetic branch leading to humans was unremarkable and that other branches showed significantly faster rates of change. Although absolute and proportional frontal region size increased rapidly in humans, this change was tightly correlated with corresponding size increases in other areas and whole brain size, and with decreases in frontal neuron densities. The search for the neural basis of human cognitive uniqueness should therefore focus less on the frontal lobes in isolation and more on distributed neural networks.

Hypotonia, jaundice, and Chiari malformations: relationships to executive functions

This article postulates that movement and action control are the underpinning of executive functioning. We selectively examine brain regions that have traditionally been almost exclusively understood as critical to the control and expression of movement-namely, the basal ganglia and the cerebellum. We first describe the relationship between movement and cognition. This is followed by a review of common developmental disorders that are known to exhibit abnormal executive functions and movement anomalies. Against that background, we examine hypotonia, neonatal jaundice, and Chiari I malformation, and we demonstrate why these are "at-risk" factors for neurodevelopmental disorders that can feature both motor control and executive function abnormalities. Our goal is to prepare the clinical neuropsychologist for gathering information about these features of a child's birth and developmental histories, while using this as a framework for interpreting test results and applying test data in a useful, practical way to guide descriptive diagnosis and treatment.

From movement to thought: the development of executive function

This article presents a very simple definition of executive functioning (EF). Although EF is traditionally understood as a cognitive function dependent upon top-down cortical control, we challenge this model. We propose that the functional architecture of the brain evolved to meet the needs of interactive behavior and that cognition develops to control the motor system, which is of paramount importance in adaptation, essentially a manifestation of EF. We propose that traditional models of cognition are incomplete characterizations of EF and that procedural learning and "automatic" behaviors are the most basic, bottom-up functions that support all EF. We propose that motor development in children demonstrates how all knowledge is grounded in sensorimotor interaction and how interactive behavior generates both procedural and declarative knowledge, which later interact to generate EF. This model emphasizes the critical importance of motor behavior in children and stresses the importance of the pediatric motor examination in understanding the development of EF. This model also has implications for why traditional tests of EF have little predictive validity in both children and adults.

Stone tools, language and the brain in human evolution

Long-standing speculations and more recent hypotheses propose a variety of possible evolutionary connections between language, gesture and tool use. These arguments have received important new support from neuroscientific research on praxis, observational action understanding and vocal language demonstrating substantial functional/anatomical overlap between these behaviours. However, valid reasons for scepticism remain as well as substantial differences in detail between alternative evolutionary hypotheses. Here, we review the current status of alternative 'gestural' and 'technological' hypotheses of language origins, drawing on current evidence of the neural bases of speech and tool use generally, and on recent studies of the neural correlates of Palaeolithic technology specifically.

Stone toolmaking and the evolution of human culture and cognition

Although many species display behavioural traditions, human culture is unique in the complexity of its technological, symbolic and social contents. Is this extraordinary complexity a product of cognitive evolution, cultural evolution or some interaction of the two? Answering this question will require a much better understanding of patterns of increasing cultural diversity, complexity and rates of change in human evolution. Palaeolithic stone tools provide a relatively abundant and continuous record of such change, but a systematic method for describing the complexity and diversity of these early technologies has yet to be developed. Here, an initial attempt at such a system is presented. Results suggest that rates of Palaeolithic culture change may have been underestimated and that there is a direct relationship between increasing technological complexity and diversity. Cognitive evolution and the greater latitude for cultural variation afforded by increasingly complex technologies may play complementary roles in explaining this pattern.

Control of perception should be operationalized as a fundamental property of the nervous system

This commentary proposes that "cognitive control" is neither componential nor emergent, but a fundamental feature of behavior. The term "control" requires an operational definition. This is best provided by the negative feedback loop that utilizes behavior to control perception; it does not control behavior per se. In order to model complex cognitive control, Perceptual Control Theory proposes that loops are organized into a dissociable hierarchical network (PCT; Powers, Clark, & McFarland, 1960; Powers, 1973a, 2008). In this way, behavior is dynamically adaptive to environmental disturbances, rather than being formed by, or superimposed upon, learned associations between stimulus and response.

Toward a unified view of cognitive control

Allen Newell (1973) once observed that psychology researchers were playing "twenty questions with nature," carving up human cognition into hundreds of individual phenomena but shying away from the difficult task of integrating these phenomena with unifying theories. We argue that research on cognitive control has followed a similar path, and that the best approach toward unifying theories of cognitive control is that proposed by Newell, namely developing theories in computational cognitive architectures. Threaded cognition, a recent theory developed within the ACT-R cognitive architecture, offers promise as a unifying theory of cognitive control that addresses multitasking phenomena for both laboratory and applied task domains.