Examining the links between conspiracy beliefs and the EU “Brexit” referendum vote in the UK: Evidence from a two‐wave survey

Unfounded beliefs, distress and powerlessness: A three-wave longitudinal study

The aim of the study was to examine the relationships between unfounded COVID-19 beliefs and distress and powerlessness, specifically, whether distress and powerlessness are causes or consequences of unfounded COVID-19 beliefs represented by conspiracy beliefs and pseudoscientific beliefs regarding treatment and measures. Unfounded beliefs were assessed using the COVID-19 Unfounded Beliefs Scale; distress was measured with the Symptom Checklist-10, and powerlessness was measured with four items measuring the feeling of losing control. Data collection took place during three phases of the pandemic in Slovakia (October 2021, N = 1838; July 2022, N = 1,420; April 2023, N = 925). Results suggest that individuals with stronger unfounded beliefs about COVID-19 reported greater powerlessness longitudinally, and individuals with stronger COVID-19 unfounded beliefs treatment and measures reported greater distress longitudinally (notably, beliefs about COVID-19 measures in the first wave were associated with distress in the second wave, and beliefs about COVID-19 treatment in the second wave were associated with distress in the third wave). The present findings corroborate an existential threat model of conspiracy theories that says the relationship between unfounded beliefs and indicators of well-being is bidirectional, so interventions should be focused both on eliminating the unfounded beliefs and strengthening well-being.

People do change their beliefs about conspiracy theories-but not often

Recent research has produced a significant body of knowledge about the antecedents and consequences of individual differences in belief in conspiracy theories. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which individuals' beliefs in conspiracy theories vary over time (i.e., within-person variation). In this descriptive and exploratory study, we therefore aimed to describe within-person variability in belief in conspiracy theories. We collected data from 498 Australians and New Zealanders using an online longitudinal survey, with data collected at monthly intervals over 6 months (March to September 2021). Our measure of conspiracy theories included items describing ten conspiracy theories with responses on a 5-point Likert scale. While there was substantial between-person variance, there was much less within-person variance (intraclass r = 0.91). This suggests that beliefs in conspiracy theories were highly stable in our sample. This stability implies that longitudinal studies testing hypotheses about the causes and consequences of belief in conspiracy theories may require large samples of participants and time points to achieve adequate power. It also implies that explanations of belief in conspiracy theories need to accommodate the observation that beliefs in such theories vary much more between people than within people.

What is hiding behind the rainbow plot? The gender ideology and LGBTQ+ lobby conspiracies (GILC) scale

Previous literature on conspiracy beliefs has an important gap, as it has almost completely excluded conspiracy beliefs relating to LGBTQ+ people. The purpose of the present research was to develop and validate a specific tool to measure the Gender Ideology and LGBTQ+ Lobby Conspiracies Beliefs: the GILC scale. Two independent data collections (Ntot  = 1.908) were run involving both heterosexual and gay, lesbian and bisexual people. We expected a mono-factorial structure of the tool, with high levels of internal reliability, invariant by respondents' gender, sexual orientation and previous knowledge or hearsay of gender ideology. Furthermore, we expected that GILC scale manages to measure a differentiated construct: (a) compared to other specific and general conspiracy contents; (b) compared to a generic disposition to engage in conspiratorial mentality; (c) compared to existing measures of sexual prejudice, stereotypes and negative attitudes towards sexual minority people. In relation to criterion validity, we expected that several psychosocial and socio-political ideology variables (i.e. RWA and SDO), would associate with high levels in GILC scale. The results confirmed our expectations, showing that GILC scale is a short tool which include nine items with a mono-factorial structure and with excellent psychometric properties. Limitations and further research directions are discussed.

The revelations of Q. Dissemination and resonance of the QAnon conspiracy theory among US Evangelical Christians and the role of the Covid-19 crisis

Previous studies show that the QAnon conspiracy theory is especially popular among American evangelical Christians. The paper investigates the reasons behind this relationship. We hypothesize a mediation relationship between evangelical dogma and how it is practiced on the one hand and the susceptibility for conspiracy thinking on the other hand. We argue that evangelicalism due to its biblicism is characterized by the belief that its perception of reality holds absolute truth (nomization), that the world can be clearly divided into good and evil (Manichaeism), and that salvation can be achieved through political means (immanent eschatology). Those beliefs, in turn, in the uncertain times of the Covid crisis resonate with the cognitive (epistemic), the affective (moral), and conative (eschatological) elements of conspiracy theories. Using data of waves 46 (March 2019), 68 (April 2020), and 73 (September 2020) of the American Trends Panel, conducted by the PEW Research Center we show respective mediation effects: Evangelical Christians are particularly convinced that their religion alone holds absolute truth and that religion has not enough influence on politics. The latter also correlates with the conspiracy belief that "powerful people intentionally planned the Covid outbreak". QAnon support again is linked both to such Covid related conspiracy thinking and the three elements of nomization, Manichaeism, and immanent eschatology.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

Background

The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers' interest in this issue.

Methods

Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants' characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research.

Results

Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism).

Conclusion and limitations

The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

What Are Conspiracy Theories? A Definitional Approach to Their Correlates, Consequences, and Communication

Conspiracy theories are abundant in social and political discourse, with serious consequences for individuals, groups, and societies. However, psychological scientists have started paying close attention to them only in the past 20 years. We review the spectacular progress that has since been made and some of the limitations of research so far, and we consider the prospects for further progress. To this end, we take a step back to analyze the defining features that make conspiracy theories different in kind from other beliefs and different in degree from each other. We consider how these features determine the adoption, consequences, and transmission of belief in conspiracy theories, even though their role as causal or moderating variables has seldom been examined. We therefore advocate for a research agenda in the study of conspiracy theories that starts-as is routine in fields such as virology and toxicology-with a robust descriptive analysis of the ontology of the entity at its center.

Of precarity and conspiracy: Introducing a socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity-the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain-in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social-psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

A gateway conspiracy? Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories prospectively predicts greater conspiracist ideation

A primary focus of research on conspiracy theories has been understanding the psychological characteristics that predict people's level of conspiracist ideation. However, the dynamics of conspiracist ideation-i.e., how such tendencies change over time-are not well understood. To help fill this gap in the literature, we used data from two longitudinal studies (Study 1 N = 107; Study 2 N = 1,037) conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that greater belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories at baseline predicts both greater endorsement of a novel real-world conspiracy theory involving voter fraud in the 2020 American Presidential election (Study 1) and increases in generic conspiracist ideation over a period of several months (Studies 1 and 2). Thus, engaging with real-world conspiracy theories appears to act as a gateway, leading to more general increases in conspiracist ideation. Beyond enhancing our knowledge of conspiracist ideation, this work highlights the importance of fighting the spread of conspiracy theories.

Shining a spotlight on the dangerous consequences of conspiracy theories

The COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated how conspiracy beliefs–that explain important events as the secret actions of the powerful–can severely impact health choices (such as reduced infection-prevention behaviours). However, the consequences of conspiracy beliefs span far beyond the topic of COVID-19. This review shines a spotlight on how conspiracy beliefs could impact public and personal health (e.g., vaccine uptake), democratic citizenship (e.g., political engagement), intergroup relations (e.g., prejudice and discrimination), and may inspire violence and extremism. We argue that conspiracy beliefs are likely to have the power to mobilise citizens in ways detrimental to a smooth-running society. We conclude the review by offering a range of fruitful avenues for future investigation.