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Abstract
The term Gain-of-Function (GoF) describes the gain of new functions by organisms through genetic changes, which can naturally occur or by experimental genetic modifications. Gain-of-Function research on viruses is enhancing transmissibility, virus replication, virulence, host range, immune evasion or drug and vaccine resistance to get insights into the viral mechanisms, to create and analyze animal models, to accelerate drug and vaccine development and to improve pandemic preparedness. A subset is the GoF research of concern (GOFROC) on enhanced potentially pandemic pathogens (ePPPs) that could be harmful for humans. A related issue is the military use of research as dual-use research of concern (DURC). Influenza and coronaviruses are main research targets, because they cause pandemics by airborne infections. Two studies on avian influenza viruses initiated a global debate and a temporary GoF pause in the United States which ended with a new regulatory framework in 2017. In the European Union and China, GoF and DURC are mainly covered by the legislation for laboratory safety and genetically modified organisms. After the coronavirus outbreaks, the GoF research made significant advances, including analyses of modified MERS-like and SARS-like viruses and the creation of synthetic SARS-CoV-2 viruses as a platform to generate mutations. The GoF research on viruses will still play an important role in future, but the need to clarify the differences and overlaps between GoF research, GOFROC and DURC and the need for specialized oversight authorities are still debated.
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2
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Schreiber SJ, Ke R, Loverdo C, Park M, Ahsan P, Lloyd-Smith JO. Cross-scale dynamics and the evolutionary emergence of infectious diseases. Virus Evol 2021; 7:veaa105. [PMID: 35186322 PMCID: PMC8087961 DOI: 10.1093/ve/veaa105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2023] Open
Abstract
When emerging pathogens encounter new host species for which they are poorly adapted, they must evolve to escape extinction. Pathogens experience selection on traits at multiple scales, including replication rates within host individuals and transmissibility between hosts. We analyze a stochastic model linking pathogen growth and competition within individuals to transmission between individuals. Our analysis reveals a new factor, the cross-scale reproductive number of a mutant virion, that quantifies how quickly mutant strains increase in frequency when they initially appear in the infected host population. This cross-scale reproductive number combines with viral mutation rates, single-strain reproductive numbers, and transmission bottleneck width to determine the likelihood of evolutionary emergence, and whether evolution occurs swiftly or gradually within chains of transmission. We find that wider transmission bottlenecks facilitate emergence of pathogens with short-term infections, but hinder emergence of pathogens exhibiting cross-scale selective conflict and long-term infections. Our results provide a framework to advance the integration of laboratory, clinical, and field data in the context of evolutionary theory, laying the foundation for a new generation of evidence-based risk assessment of emergence threats.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ruian Ke
- T-6: Theoretical Biology and Biophysics, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA
| | - Claude Loverdo
- Laboratoire Jean Perrin, Sorbonne Université, CNRS, Paris 75005, France
| | - Miran Park
- Department of Ecology & Evolution, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
| | - Prianna Ahsan
- Department of Ecology & Evolution, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
| | - James O Lloyd-Smith
- Department of Ecology & Evolution, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
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3
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Application of a Biologically Contained Reporter System To Study Gain-of-Function H5N1 Influenza A Viruses with Pandemic Potential. mSphere 2020; 5:5/4/e00423-20. [PMID: 32848003 PMCID: PMC7449622 DOI: 10.1128/msphere.00423-20] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding how animal influenza viruses can adapt to spread in humans is critical to prepare for, and prevent, new pandemics. However, working safely with pathogens that have pandemic potential requires tight regulation and the use of high-level physical and biological risk mitigation strategies to stop accidental loss of containment. Here, we used a biological containment system for influenza viruses to study strains with pandemic potential. The system relies on deletion of the essential HA gene from the viral genome and its provision by a genetically modified cell line, to which virus propagation is therefore restricted. We show that this method permits safe handling of these pathogens, including gain-of-function variants, without the risk of generating fully infectious viruses. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this system can be used to assess virus sensitivity to both approved and experimental drugs, as well as the antigenic profile of viruses, important considerations for evaluating prepandemic vaccine and antiviral strategies. Natural adaptation of an antigenically novel avian influenza A virus (IAV) to be transmitted efficiently in humans has the potential to trigger a devastating pandemic. Understanding viral genetic determinants underlying adaptation is therefore critical for pandemic preparedness, as the knowledge gained enhances surveillance and eradication efforts, prepandemic vaccine design, and efficacy assessment of antivirals. However, this work has risks, as making gain-of-function substitutions in fully infectious IAVs may create a pathogen with pandemic potential. Thus, such experiments must be tightly controlled through physical and biological risk mitigation strategies. Here, we applied a previously described biological containment system for IAVs to a 2009 pandemic H1N1 strain and a highly pathogenic H5N1 strain. The system relies on deletion of the essential viral hemagglutinin (HA) gene, which is instead provided in trans, thereby restricting multicycle virus replication to genetically modified HA-complementing cells. In place of HA, a Renilla luciferase gene is inserted within the viral genome, and a live-cell luciferase substrate allows real-time quantitative monitoring of viral replication kinetics with a high dynamic range. We demonstrate that biologically contained IAV-like particles exhibit wild-type sensitivities to approved antivirals, including oseltamivir, zanamivir, and baloxavir. Furthermore, the inability of these IAV-like particles to genetically acquire the host-encoded HA allowed us to introduce gain-of-function substitutions in the H5 HA gene that promote mammalian transmissibility. Biologically contained “transmissible” H5N1 IAV-like particles exhibited wild-type sensitivities to approved antivirals, to the fusion inhibitor S20, and to neutralization by existing H5 monoclonal and polyclonal sera. This work represents a proof of principle that biologically contained IAV systems can be used to safely conduct selected gain-of-function experiments. IMPORTANCE Understanding how animal influenza viruses can adapt to spread in humans is critical to prepare for, and prevent, new pandemics. However, working safely with pathogens that have pandemic potential requires tight regulation and the use of high-level physical and biological risk mitigation strategies to stop accidental loss of containment. Here, we used a biological containment system for influenza viruses to study strains with pandemic potential. The system relies on deletion of the essential HA gene from the viral genome and its provision by a genetically modified cell line, to which virus propagation is therefore restricted. We show that this method permits safe handling of these pathogens, including gain-of-function variants, without the risk of generating fully infectious viruses. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this system can be used to assess virus sensitivity to both approved and experimental drugs, as well as the antigenic profile of viruses, important considerations for evaluating prepandemic vaccine and antiviral strategies.
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4
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Abstract
Half a decade after the contentious "gain-of-function" (GOF) debate of 2012 that followed experimentation showing that highly pathogenic avian influenza virus could become mammalian transmissible, it is possible to reflect on the arguments for and against this type of research. In this essay we argue that GOF-type experiments have already produced important information not available from any other source while also providing information on pathogenesis and the requirements for optimizing strains for vaccine production. We analyze the moral arguments against GOF and find them less compelling for a variety of reasons ranging from the uncertainty of risk-benefit analysis to the reduced likelihood of accidents given the enhanced biosafety and biosecurity protocols currently in place. In our view the most important consequence of the GOF debate is that it brought renewed attention to biosafety protocols and ushered innovation in answering the relevant biological questions with greater safety. We conclude that GOF experiments should go forward provided that necessary biosafety and biosecurity conditions are in place.
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5
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Abstract
This chapter makes the case against performing exceptionally dangerous gain-of-function experiments that are designed to create potentially pandemic and novel strains of influenza, for example, by enhancing the airborne transmissibility in mammals of highly virulent avian influenza strains. This is a question of intense debate over the last 5 years, though the history of such experiments goes back at least to the synthesis of viable influenza A H1N1 (1918) based on material preserved from the 1918 pandemic. This chapter makes the case that experiments to create potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) are nearly unique in that they present biosafety risks that extend well beyond the experimenter or laboratory performing them; an accidental release could, as the name suggests, lead to global spread of a virulent virus, a biosafety incident on a scale never before seen. In such cases, biosafety considerations should be uppermost in the consideration of alternative approaches to experimental objectives and design, rather than being settled after the fact, as is appropriately done for most research involving pathogens. The extensive recent discussion of the magnitude of risks from such experiments is briefly reviewed. The chapter argues that, while there are indisputably certain questions that can be answered only by gain-of-function experiments in highly pathogenic strains, these questions are narrow and unlikely to meaningfully advance public health goals such as vaccine production and pandemic prediction. Alternative approaches to experimental influenza virology and characterization of existing strains are in general completely safe, higher throughput, more generalizable, and less costly than creation of PPP in the laboratory and can thereby better inform public health. Indeed, virtually every finding of recent PPP experiments that has been cited for its public health value was predated by similar findings using safe methodologies. The chapter concludes that the unique scientific and public health value of PPP experiments is inadequate to justify the unique risks they entail and that researchers would be well-advised to turn their talents to other methodologies that will be safe and more rewarding scientifically.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marc Lipsitch
- Departments of Epidemiology and Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA.
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6
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Adam DC, Magee D, Bui CM, Scotch M, MacIntyre CR. Does influenza pandemic preparedness and mitigation require gain-of-function research? Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2017; 11:306-310. [PMID: 28502086 PMCID: PMC5485867 DOI: 10.1111/irv.12458] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/05/2017] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The risk and benefits of gain‐of‐function studies on influenza A have been widely debated since 2012 when the methods to create two respiratory transmissible H5N1 mutant isolates were published. Opponents of gain‐of‐function studies argue the biosecurity risk is unacceptable, while proponents cite potential uses for pandemic surveillance, preparedness and mitigation. In this commentary, we provide an overview of the background and applications of gain‐of‐function research and argue that the anticipated benefits have yet to materialize while the significant risks remain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dillon C Adam
- School of Public Health and Community Medicine, UNSW, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Daniel Magee
- Biodesign Center for Environmental Security, Biodesign Institute, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA.,Department of Biomedical Informatics, College of Health Solutions, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
| | - Chau M Bui
- School of Public Health and Community Medicine, UNSW, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Matthew Scotch
- School of Public Health and Community Medicine, UNSW, Sydney, NSW, Australia.,Biodesign Center for Environmental Security, Biodesign Institute, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA.,Department of Biomedical Informatics, College of Health Solutions, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
| | - C Raina MacIntyre
- School of Public Health and Community Medicine, UNSW, Sydney, NSW, Australia.,College of Public Service & Community Solutions, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
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7
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Lipsitch M, Barclay W, Raman R, Russell CJ, Belser JA, Cobey S, Kasson PM, Lloyd-Smith JO, Maurer-Stroh S, Riley S, Beauchemin CA, Bedford T, Friedrich TC, Handel A, Herfst S, Murcia PR, Roche B, Wilke CO, Russell CA. Viral factors in influenza pandemic risk assessment. eLife 2016; 5. [PMID: 27834632 PMCID: PMC5156527 DOI: 10.7554/elife.18491] [Citation(s) in RCA: 68] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/09/2016] [Accepted: 11/03/2016] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The threat of an influenza A virus pandemic stems from continual virus spillovers from reservoir species, a tiny fraction of which spark sustained transmission in humans. To date, no pandemic emergence of a new influenza strain has been preceded by detection of a closely related precursor in an animal or human. Nonetheless, influenza surveillance efforts are expanding, prompting a need for tools to assess the pandemic risk posed by a detected virus. The goal would be to use genetic sequence and/or biological assays of viral traits to identify those non-human influenza viruses with the greatest risk of evolving into pandemic threats, and/or to understand drivers of such evolution, to prioritize pandemic prevention or response measures. We describe such efforts, identify progress and ongoing challenges, and discuss three specific traits of influenza viruses (hemagglutinin receptor binding specificity, hemagglutinin pH of activation, and polymerase complex efficiency) that contribute to pandemic risk.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marc Lipsitch
- Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard T. H Chan School of Public Health, Boston, United States.,Department of Epidemiology, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, United States.,Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, United States
| | - Wendy Barclay
- Division of Infectious Disease, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College, London, United Kingdom
| | - Rahul Raman
- Department of Biological Engineering, Koch Institute for Integrative Cancer Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, United States
| | - Charles J Russell
- Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, United States
| | - Jessica A Belser
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, United States
| | - Sarah Cobey
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Chicago, Chicago, United States
| | - Peter M Kasson
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, United States.,Department of Molecular Physiology and Biological Physics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, United States
| | - James O Lloyd-Smith
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, United States.,Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, United States
| | - Sebastian Maurer-Stroh
- Bioinformatics Institute, Agency for Science Technology and Research, Singapore, Singapore.,National Public Health Laboratory, Communicable Diseases Division, Ministry of Health, Singapore, Singapore.,School of Biological Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
| | - Steven Riley
- MRC Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling, School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom.,Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
| | | | - Trevor Bedford
- Vaccine and Infectious Disease Division, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seattle, United States
| | - Thomas C Friedrich
- Department of Pathobiological Sciences, University of Wisconsin School of Veterinary Medicine, Madison, United States
| | - Andreas Handel
- Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, College of Public Health, University of Georgia, Athens, United States
| | - Sander Herfst
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam, Netherlands
| | - Pablo R Murcia
- MRC-University of Glasgow Centre For Virus Research, Glasgow, United Kingdom
| | | | - Claus O Wilke
- Center for Computational Biology and Bioinformatics, Institute for Cellular and Molecular Biology, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States.,Department of Integrative Biology, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, United States
| | - Colin A Russell
- Department of Veterinary Medicine, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
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8
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Lipsitch M. Comment on "Gain-of-Function Research and the Relevance to Clinical Practice". J Infect Dis 2016; 214:1284-5. [PMID: 27503367 PMCID: PMC7107370 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jiw348] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2016] [Accepted: 07/14/2016] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Marc Lipsitch
- Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics Department of Epidemiology Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts
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9
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Harder T, Stech J, Abdelwhab ESM, Veits J, Conraths FJ, Beer M, Mettenleiter TC. A pallid rainbow: toward improved understanding of avian influenza biology. Future Virol 2016. [DOI: 10.2217/fvl-2016-0040] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (‘fowl plague’) has been known since the late 19th century as a devastating infection in poultry but of concern primarily to farmers and veterinarians. Mostly sporadic outbreaks occurred and, except for one episode, wild birds were unaffected. This situation changed drastically by the recognition that avian influenza viruses exhibit zoonotic potential leading to fatal infections in mammals including humans. Moreover, highly pathogenic avian influenza gained access to highly mobile, migratory wild bird populations resulting in unprecedented intercontinental spread. The rapid evolution of avian influenza viruses, their adaption to novel hosts and the resulting change in epidemiology are of major concern. Recent advances in understanding influenza virus biology at the interface between wild birds-terrestrial poultry-livestock and humans are highlighted here.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timm Harder
- Institute of Diagnostic Virology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Jürgen Stech
- Institute of Molecular Virology & Cell Biology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - El-Sayed M Abdelwhab
- Institute of Molecular Virology & Cell Biology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Jutta Veits
- Institute of Molecular Virology & Cell Biology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Franz J Conraths
- Institute of Epidemiology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Martin Beer
- Institute of Diagnostic Virology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Thomas C Mettenleiter
- Institute of Molecular Virology & Cell Biology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Südufer 10, D-17493 Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany
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10
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Millman AJ, Havers F, Iuliano AD, Davis CT, Sar B, Sovann L, Chin S, Corwin AL, Vongphrachanh P, Douangngeun B, Lindblade KA, Chittaganpitch M, Kaewthong V, Kile JC, Nguyen HT, Pham DV, Donis RO, Widdowson MA. Detecting Spread of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus Beyond China. Emerg Infect Dis 2016; 21:741-9. [PMID: 25897654 PMCID: PMC4412232 DOI: 10.3201/eid2105.141756] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/26/2023] Open
Abstract
This virus is unlikely to have spread substantially among humans in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. During February 2013–March 2015, a total of 602 human cases of low pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) were reported; no autochthonous cases were reported outside mainland China. In contrast, since highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) reemerged during 2003 in China, 784 human cases in 16 countries and poultry outbreaks in 53 countries have been reported. Whether the absence of reported A(H7N9) outside mainland China represents lack of spread or lack of detection remains unclear. We compared epidemiologic and virologic features of A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) and used human and animal influenza surveillance data collected during April 2013–May 2014 from 4 Southeast Asia countries to assess the likelihood that A(H7N9) would have gone undetected during 2014. Surveillance in Vietnam and Cambodia detected human A(H5N1) cases; no A(H7N9) cases were detected in humans or poultry in Southeast Asia. Although we cannot rule out the possible spread of A(H7N9), substantial spread causing severe disease in humans is unlikely.
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Richard M, Fouchier RAM. Influenza A virus transmission via respiratory aerosols or droplets as it relates to pandemic potential. FEMS Microbiol Rev 2016; 40:68-85. [PMID: 26385895 PMCID: PMC5006288 DOI: 10.1093/femsre/fuv039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 82] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Revised: 01/13/2015] [Accepted: 08/20/2015] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Many respiratory viruses of humans originate from animals. For instance, there are now eight paramyxoviruses, four coronaviruses and four orthomxoviruses that cause recurrent epidemics in humans but were once confined to other hosts. In the last decade, several members of the same virus families have jumped the species barrier from animals to humans. Fortunately, these viruses have not become established in humans, because they lacked the ability of sustained transmission between humans. However, these outbreaks highlighted the lack of understanding of what makes a virus transmissible. In part triggered by the relatively high frequency of occurrence of influenza A virus zoonoses and pandemics, the influenza research community has started to investigate the viral genetic and biological traits that drive virus transmission via aerosols or respiratory droplets between mammals. Here we summarize recent discoveries on the genetic and phenotypic traits required for airborne transmission of zoonotic influenza viruses of subtypes H5, H7 and H9 and pandemic viruses of subtypes H1, H2 and H3. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of respiratory virus transmission is not only key from a basic scientific perspective, but may also aid in assessing the risks posed by zoonotic viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mathilde Richard
- Department of Viroscience, Postgraduate School Molecular Medicine, Erasmus MC, 3000 CA Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Ron A M Fouchier
- Department of Viroscience, Postgraduate School Molecular Medicine, Erasmus MC, 3000 CA Rotterdam, the Netherlands
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12
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Identification of a small-molecule inhibitor of influenza virus via disrupting the subunits interaction of the viral polymerase. Antiviral Res 2015; 125:34-42. [PMID: 26593979 DOI: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2015.11.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/25/2015] [Revised: 11/11/2015] [Accepted: 11/12/2015] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
Assembly of the heterotrimeric influenza virus polymerase complex from the individual subunits PB1, PA, and PB2 is a prerequisite for viral replication, in which the interaction between the C terminal of PA (PAC) and the N-terminal of PB1 (PB1N) may be a desired target for antiviral development. In this study, we compared the feasibility of high throughput screening by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and fluorescence polarization assay. Among the two, ELISA was demonstrated to own broader dynamic range so that it was used for screening inhibitors that blocked PAC and PB1N interaction. Several binding inhibitors of PAC-PB1N were identified and subsequently tested for the antiviral efficacy. Apparently, 3-(2-chlorophenyl)-6-ethyl-7-methyl[1,2,4]triazolo[4,3-a]pyrimidin-5-ol, designated ANA-1, was found to be a strong inhibitor of viral polymerase activity and act as a potent antiviral agent against the infections of multiple subtypes of influenza A virus, including H1N1, H3N2, H5N1, H7N7, H7N9 and H9N2 subtypes, in cell cultures. Intranasal administration of ANA-1 protected mice from lethal challenge and reduced lung viral loads in H1N1 virus infected BALB/c mice. Docking analyses predicted that ANA-1 bound to an allosteric site of PAC, which might cause conformational changes thereby disrupting the PAC-PB1N interaction. Overall, our study has identified a novel compound with potential to be developed as an anti-influenza drug.
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13
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Evans NG, Lipsitch M, Levinson M. The ethics of biosafety considerations in gain-of-function research resulting in the creation of potential pandemic pathogens. JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2015; 41:901-8. [PMID: 26320212 PMCID: PMC4623968 DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102619] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/02/2014] [Accepted: 08/12/2015] [Indexed: 05/28/2023]
Abstract
This paper proposes an ethical framework for evaluating biosafety risks of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments that create novel strains of influenza expected to be virulent and transmissible in humans, so-called potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs). Such research raises ethical concerns because of the risk that accidental release from a laboratory could lead to extensive or even global spread of a virulent pathogen. Biomedical research ethics has focused largely on human subjects research, while biosafety concerns about accidental infections, seen largely as a problem of occupational health, have been ignored. GOF/PPP research is an example of a small but important class of research where biosafety risks threaten public health, well beyond the small number of persons conducting the research.We argue that bioethical principles that ordinarily apply only to human subjects research should also apply to research that threatens public health, even if, as in GOF/PPP studies, the research involves no human subjects. Specifically we highlight the Nuremberg Code's requirements of 'fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods', and proportionality of risk and humanitarian benefit, as broad ethical principles that recur in later documents on research ethics and should also apply to certain types of research not involving human subjects. We address several potential objections to this view, and conclude with recommendations for bringing these ethical considerations into policy development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicholas Grieg Evans
- Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA.
| | - Marc Lipsitch
- Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Meira Levinson
- Levinson, Harvard Graduate School of Education, Cambridge, MA, USA
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14
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Kilianski A, Nuzzo JB, Modjarrad K. Gain-of-Function Research and the Relevance to Clinical Practice. J Infect Dis 2015; 213:1364-9. [PMID: 26416657 PMCID: PMC7107371 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jiv473] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/21/2015] [Accepted: 09/02/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The ongoing moratorium on gain-of-function (GOF) research with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus, and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus has drawn attention to the current debate on these research practices and the potential benefits and risks they present. While much of the discussion has been steered by members of the microbiology and policy communities, additional input from medical practitioners will be highly valuable toward developing a broadly inclusive policy that considers the relative value and harm of GOF research. This review attempts to serve as a primer on the topic for the clinical community by providing a historical context for GOF research, summarizing concerns about its risks, and surveying the medical products that it has yielded.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andy Kilianski
- BioDefense Branch, Biosciences Division, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground
| | - Jennifer B Nuzzo
- University of Pittsburgh Medical Center-Center for Health Security, Baltimore
| | - Kayvon Modjarrad
- US Military HIV Research Program, Walter Reed Army Institute for Research, Silver Spring, Maryland
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15
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel J Rozell
- Department of Technology and Society, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York, USA
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16
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Studies on influenza virus transmission between ferrets: the public health risks revisited. mBio 2015; 6:mBio.02560-14. [PMID: 25616377 PMCID: PMC4323420 DOI: 10.1128/mbio.02560-14] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
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17
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Reply to "Studies on influenza virus transmission between ferrets: the public health risks revisited". mBio 2015; 6:mBio.00041-15. [PMID: 25616376 PMCID: PMC4323416 DOI: 10.1128/mbio.00041-15] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
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18
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Vagueness and costs of the pause on gain-of-function (GOF) experiments on pathogens with pandemic potential, including influenza virus. mBio 2014; 5:mBio.02292-14. [PMID: 25505121 PMCID: PMC4278541 DOI: 10.1128/mbio.02292-14] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
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