Robust mixture modeling reveals category-free selectivity in reward region neuronal ensembles

Semi-orthogonal subspaces for value mediate a binding and generalization trade-off

When choosing between options, we must associate their values with the actions needed to select them. We hypothesize that the brain solves this binding problem through neural population subspaces. Here, in macaques performing a choice task, we show that neural populations in five reward-sensitive regions encode the values of offers presented on the left and right in distinct subspaces. This encoding is sufficient to bind offer values to their locations while preserving abstract value information. After offer presentation, all areas encode the value of the first and second offers in orthogonal subspaces; this orthogonalization also affords binding. Our binding-by-subspace hypothesis makes two new predictions confirmed by the data. First, behavioral errors should correlate with spatial, but not temporal, neural misbinding. Second, behavioral errors should increase when offers have low or high values, compared to medium values, even when controlling for value difference. Together, these results support the idea that the brain uses semi-orthogonal subspaces to bind features.

Semi-orthogonal subspaces for value mediate a tradeoff between binding and generalization

When choosing between options, we must associate their values with the action needed to select them. We hypothesize that the brain solves this binding problem through neural population subspaces. To test this hypothesis, we examined neuronal responses in five reward-sensitive regions in macaques performing a risky choice task with sequential offers. Surprisingly, in all areas, the neural population encoded the values of offers presented on the left and right in distinct subspaces. We show that the encoding we observe is sufficient to bind the values of the offers to their respective positions in space while preserving abstract value information, which may be important for rapid learning and generalization to novel contexts. Moreover, after both offers have been presented, all areas encode the value of the first and second offers in orthogonal subspaces. In this case as well, the orthogonalization provides binding. Our binding-by-subspace hypothesis makes two novel predictions borne out by the data. First, behavioral errors should correlate with putative spatial (but not temporal) misbinding in the neural representation. Second, the specific representational geometry that we observe across animals also indicates that behavioral errors should increase when offers have low or high values, compared to when they have medium values, even when controlling for value difference. Together, these results support the idea that the brain makes use of semi-orthogonal subspaces to bind features together.

Widespread coding of navigational variables in prefrontal cortex

To navigate effectively, we must represent information about our location in the environment. Traditional research highlights the role of the hippocampal complex in this process. Spurred by recent research highlighting the widespread cortical encoding of cognitive and motor variables previously thought to have localized function, we hypothesized that navigational variables would be likewise encoded widely, especially in the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with volitional behavior. We recorded neural activity from six prefrontal regions while macaques performed a foraging task in an open enclosure. In all regions, we found strong encoding of allocentric position, allocentric head direction, boundary distance, and linear and angular velocity. These encodings were not accounted for by distance, time to reward, or motor factors. The strength of coding of all variables increased along a ventral-to-dorsal gradient. Together, these results argue that encoding of navigational variables is not localized to the hippocampus and support the hypothesis that navigation is continuous with other forms of flexible cognition in the service of action.

Abstract Value Encoding in Neural Populations But Not Single Neurons

An important open question in neuroeconomics is how the brain represents the value of offers in a way that is both abstract (allowing for comparison) and concrete (preserving the details of the factors that influence value). Here, we examine neuronal responses to risky and safe options in five brain regions that putatively encode value in male macaques. Surprisingly, we find no detectable overlap in the neural codes used for risky and safe options, even when the options have identical subjective values (as revealed by preference) in any of the regions. Indeed, responses are weakly correlated and occupy distinct (semi-orthogonal) encoding subspaces. Notably, however, these subspaces are linked through a linear transform of their constituent encodings, a property that allows for comparison of dissimilar option types. This encoding scheme allows these regions to multiplex decision related processes: they can encode the detailed factors that influence offer value (here, risky and safety) but also directly compare dissimilar offer types. Together these results suggest a neuronal basis for the qualitatively different psychological properties of risky and safe options and highlight the power of population geometry to resolve outstanding problems in neural coding.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT To make economic choices, we must have some mechanism for comparing dissimilar offers. We propose that the brain uses distinct neural codes for risky and safe offers, but that these codes are linearly transformable. This encoding scheme has the dual advantage of allowing for comparison across offer types while preserving information about offer type, which in turn allows for flexibility in changing circumstances. We show that responses to risky and safe offers exhibit these predicted properties in five different reward-sensitive regions. Together, these results highlight the power of population coding principles for solving representation problems in economic choice.

Subspace orthogonalization as a mechanism for binding values to space

When choosing between options, we must solve an important binding problem. The values of the options must be associated with information about the action needed to select them. We hypothesize that the brain solves this binding problem through use of distinct population subspaces. To test this hypothesis, we examined the responses of single neurons in five reward-sensitive regions in rhesus macaques performing a risky choice task. In all areas, neurons encoded the value of the offers presented on both the left and the right side of the display in semi-orthogonal subspaces, which served to bind the values of the two offers to their positions in space. Supporting the idea that this orthogonalization is functionally meaningful, we observed a session-to-session covariation between choice behavior and the orthogonalization of the two value subspaces: trials with less orthogonalized subspaces were associated with greater likelihood of choosing the less valued option. Further inspection revealed that these semi-orthogonal subspaces arose from a combination of linear and nonlinear mixed selectivity in the neural population. We show this combination of selectivity balances reliable binding with an ability to generalize value across different spatial locations. These results support the hypothesis that semi-orthogonal subspaces support reliable binding, which is essential to flexible behavior in the face of multiple options.

Integrated neural dynamics of sensorimotor decisions and actions

Recent theoretical models suggest that deciding about actions and executing them are not implemented by completely distinct neural mechanisms but are instead two modes of an integrated dynamical system. Here, we investigate this proposal by examining how neural activity unfolds during a dynamic decision-making task within the high-dimensional space defined by the activity of cells in monkey dorsal premotor (PMd), primary motor (M1), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) as well as the external and internal segments of the globus pallidus (GPe, GPi). Dimensionality reduction shows that the four strongest components of neural activity are functionally interpretable, reflecting a state transition between deliberation and commitment, the transformation of sensory evidence into a choice, and the baseline and slope of the rising urgency to decide. Analysis of the contribution of each population to these components shows meaningful differences between regions but no distinct clusters within each region, consistent with an integrated dynamical system. During deliberation, cortical activity unfolds on a two-dimensional "decision manifold" defined by sensory evidence and urgency and falls off this manifold at the moment of commitment into a choice-dependent trajectory leading to movement initiation. The structure of the manifold varies between regions: In PMd, it is curved; in M1, it is nearly perfectly flat; and in dlPFC, it is almost entirely confined to the sensory evidence dimension. In contrast, pallidal activity during deliberation is primarily defined by urgency. We suggest that these findings reveal the distinct functional contributions of different brain regions to an integrated dynamical system governing action selection and execution.

The implications of categorical and category-free mixed selectivity on representational geometries

The firing rates of individual neurons displaying mixed selectivity are modulated by multiple task variables. When mixed selectivity is nonlinear, it confers an advantage by generating a high-dimensional neural representation that can be flexibly decoded by linear classifiers. Although the advantages of this coding scheme are well accepted, the means of designing an experiment and analyzing the data to test for and characterize mixed selectivity remain unclear. With the growing number of large datasets collected during complex tasks, the mixed selectivity is increasingly observed and is challenging to interpret correctly. We review recent approaches for analyzing and interpreting neural datasets and clarify the theoretical implications of mixed selectivity in the variety of forms that have been reported in the literature. We also aim to provide a practical guide for determining whether a neural population has linear or nonlinear mixed selectivity and whether this mixing leads to a categorical or category-free representation.

The PRO model accounts for the anterior cingulate cortex role in risky decision-making and monitoring

The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been implicated in a number of functions, including performance monitoring and decision-making involving effort. The prediction of responses and outcomes (PRO) model has provided a unified account of much human and monkey ACC data involving anatomy, neurophysiology, EEG, fMRI, and behavior. We explored the computational nature of ACC with the PRO model, extending it to account specifically for both human and macaque monkey decision-making under risk, including both behavioral and neural data. We show that the PRO model can account for a number of additional effects related to outcome prediction, decision-making under risk, gambling behavior. In particular, we show that the ACC represents the variance of uncertain outcomes, suggesting a link between ACC function and mean-variance theories of decision making. The PRO model provides a unified account of a large set of data regarding the ACC.

New insights on single-neuron selectivity in the era of population-level approaches

In the past, neuroscience was focused on individual neurons seen as the functional units of the nervous system, but this approach fell short over time to account for new experimental evidence, especially for what concerns associative and motor cortices. For this reason and thanks to great technological advances, a part of modern research has shifted the focus from the responses of single neurons to the activity of neural ensembles, now considered the real functional units of the system. However, on a microscale, individual neurons remain the computational components of these networks, thus the study of population dynamics cannot prescind from studying also individual neurons which represent their natural substrate. In this new framework, ideas such as the capability of single cells to encode a specific stimulus (neural selectivity) may become obsolete and need to be profoundly revised. One step in this direction was made by introducing the concept of “mixed selectivity,” the capacity of single cells to integrate multiple variables in a flexible way, allowing individual neurons to participate in different networks. In this review, we outline the most important features of mixed selectivity and we also present recent works demonstrating its presence in the associative areas of the posterior parietal cortex. Finally, in discussing these findings, we present some open questions that could be addressed by future studies.

Choice-relevant information transformation along a ventrodorsal axis in the medial prefrontal cortex

Choice-relevant brain regions in prefrontal cortex may progressively transform information about options into choices. Here, we examine responses of neurons in four regions of the medial prefrontal cortex as macaques performed two-option risky choices. All four regions encode economic variables in similar proportions and show similar putative signatures of key choice-related computations. We provide evidence to support a gradient of function that proceeds from areas 14 to 25 to 32 to 24. Specifically, we show that decodability of twelve distinct task variables increases along that path, consistent with the idea that regions that are higher in the anatomical hierarchy make choice-relevant variables more separable. We also show progressively longer intrinsic timescales in the same series. Together these results highlight the importance of the medial wall in choice, endorse a specific gradient-based organization, and argue against a modular functional neuroanatomy of choice.

Partial integration of the components of value in anterior cingulate cortex

Evaluation often involves integrating multiple determinants of value, such as the different possible outcomes in risky choice. A brain region can be placed either before or after a presumed evaluation stage by measuring how responses of its neurons depend on multiple determinants of value. A brain region could also, in principle, show partial integration, which would indicate that it occupies a middle position between (preevaluative) nonintegration and (postevaluative) full integration. Existing mathematical techniques cannot distinguish full from partial integration and therefore risk misidentifying regional function. Here we use a new Bayesian regression-based approach to analyze responses of neurons in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) to risky offers. We find that dACC neurons only partially integrate across outcome dimensions, indicating that dACC cannot be assigned to either a pre- or postevaluative position. Neurons in dACC also show putative signatures of value comparison, thereby demonstrating that comparison does not require complete evaluation before proceeding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Value and choice as separable and stable representations in orbitofrontal cortex

Value-based decision-making requires different variables-including offer value, choice, expected outcome, and recent history-at different times in the decision process. Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is implicated in value-based decision-making, but it is unclear how downstream circuits read out complex OFC responses into separate representations of the relevant variables to support distinct functions at specific times. We recorded from single OFC neurons while macaque monkeys made cost-benefit decisions. Using a novel analysis, we find separable neural dimensions that selectively represent the value, choice, and expected reward of the present and previous offers. The representations are generally stable during periods of behavioral relevance, then transition abruptly at key task events and between trials. Applying new statistical methods, we show that the sensitivity, specificity and stability of the representations are greater than expected from the population's low-level features-dimensionality and temporal smoothness-alone. The separability and stability suggest a mechanism-linear summation over static synaptic weights-by which downstream circuits can select for specific variables at specific times.

The Transition from Evaluation to Selection Involves Neural Subspace Reorganization in Core Reward Regions

Economic choice proceeds from evaluation, in which we contemplate options, to selection, in which we weigh options and choose one. These stages must be differentiated so that decision makers do not proceed to selection before evaluation is complete. We examined responses of neurons in two core reward regions, orbitofrontal (OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), during two-option choice with asynchronous offer presentation. Our data suggest that neurons selective during the first (presumed evaluation) and second (presumed comparison and selection) offer epochs come from a single pool. Stage transition is accompanied by a shift toward orthogonality in the low-dimensional population response manifold. Nonetheless, the relative position of each option in driving responses in the population subspace is preserved. The orthogonalization we observe supports the hypothesis that the transition from evaluation to selection leads to reorganization of response subspace and suggests a mechanism by which value-related signals are prevented from prematurely driving choice.

The neural basis of predictive pursuit

It remains unclear whether and, if so, how nonhuman animals make on-the-fly predictions during pursuit. Here we used a novel laboratory pursuit task that incentivizes the prediction of future prey positions. We trained three macaques to perform a joystick-controlled pursuit task in which prey follow intelligent escape algorithms. Subjects aimed toward the likely future positions of the prey, which indicated that they generate internal predictions and use these to guide behavior. We then developed a generative model that explains real-time pursuit trajectories and showed that our subjects use prey position, velocity and acceleration to make predictions. We identified neurons in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex whose responses track these three variables. These neurons multiplexed prediction-related variables with a distinct and explicit representation of the future position of the prey. Our results provide a clear demonstration that the brain can explicitly represent future predictions and highlight the critical role of anterior cingulate cortex for future-oriented cognition.

An Integrative Model of Effortful Control

This article presents an integrative model of effortful control, a resource-limited top-down control mechanism involved in mental tasks and physical exercises. Based on recent findings in the fields of neuroscience, social psychology and cognitive psychology, this model posits the intrinsic costs related to a weakening of the connectivity of neural networks underpinning effortful control as the main cause of mental fatigue in long and high-demanding tasks. In this framework, effort reflects three different inter-related aspects of the same construct. First, effort is a mechanism comprising a limited number of interconnected processing units that integrate information regarding the task constraints and subject’s state. Second, effort is the main output of this mechanism, namely, the effort signal that modulates neuronal activity in brain regions involved in the current task to select pertinent information. Third, effort is a feeling that emerges in awareness during effortful tasks and reflects the costs associated with goal-directed behavior. Finally, the model opens new avenues for research investigating effortful control at the behavioral and neurophysiological levels.

Activity in orbitofrontal neuronal ensembles reflects inhibitory control

Stopping, or inhibition, is a form of self-control that is a core element of flexible and adaptive behavior. Its neural origins remain unclear. Some views hold that inhibition decisions reflect the aggregation of widespread and diverse pieces of information, including information arising in ostensible core reward regions (i.e., outside the canonical executive system). We recorded activity of single neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) of macaques, a region associated with economic decisions, and whose role in inhibition is debated. Subjects performed a classic inhibition task known as the stop signal task. Ensemble decoding analyses reveal a clear firing rate pattern that distinguishes successful from failed inhibition and that begins after the stop signal and before the stop signal reaction time (SSRT). We also found a different and orthogonal ensemble pattern that distinguishes successful from failed stopping before the beginning of the trial. These signals were distinct from, and orthogonal to, value encoding, which was also observed in these neurons. The timing of the early and late signals was, respectively, consistent with the idea that neuronal activity in OFC encodes inhibition both proactively and reactively.

Economic Decisions through Circuit Inhibition

Economic choices between goods are thought to rely on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), but the decision mechanisms remain poorly understood. To shed light on this fundamental issue, we recorded from the OFC of monkeys choosing between two juices offered sequentially. An analysis of firing rates across time windows revealed the presence of different groups of neurons similar to those previously identified under simultaneous offers. This observation suggested that economic decisions in the two modalities are formed in the same neural circuit. We then examined several hypotheses on the decision mechanisms. OFC neurons encoded good identities and values in a juice-based representation (labeled lines). Contrary to previous assessments, our data argued against the idea that decisions rely on mutual inhibition at the level of offer values. In fact, we showed that previous arguments for mutual inhibition were confounded by differences in value ranges. Instead, decisions seemed to involve mechanisms of circuit inhibition, whereby each offer value indirectly inhibited neurons encoding the opposite choice outcome. Our results reconcile a variety of previous findings and provide a general account for the neuronal underpinnings of economic choices.

Categorical encoding of decision variables in orbitofrontal cortex

A fundamental and recurrent question in systems neuroscience is that of assessing what variables are encoded by a given population of neurons. Such assessments are often challenging because neurons in one brain area may encode multiple variables, and because neuronal representations might be categorical or non-categorical. These issues are particularly pertinent to the representation of decision variables in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)-an area implicated in economic choices. Here we present a new algorithm to assess whether a neuronal representation is categorical or non-categorical, and to identify the encoded variables if the representation is indeed categorical. The algorithm is based on two clustering procedures, one variable-independent and the other variable-based. The two partitions are then compared through adjusted mutual information. The present algorithm overcomes limitations of previous approaches and is widely applicable. We tested the algorithm on synthetic data and then used it to examine neuronal data recorded in the primate OFC during economic decisions. Confirming previous assessments, we found the neuronal representation in OFC to be categorical in nature. We also found that neurons in this area encode the value of individual offers, the binary choice outcome and the chosen value. In other words, during economic choice, neurons in the primate OFC encode decision variables in a categorical way.

Neuronal evidence for good-based economic decisions under variable action costs

Previous work showed that economic decisions can be made independently of spatial contingencies. However, when goods available for choice bear different action costs, the decision necessarily reflects aspects of the action. One possibility is that "stimulus values" are combined with the corresponding action costs in a motor representation, and decisions are then made in actions space. Alternatively, action costs could be integrated with other determinants of value in a non-spatial representation. If so, decisions under variable action costs could take place in goods space. Here, we recorded from orbitofrontal cortex while monkeys chose between different juices offered in variable amounts. We manipulated action costs by varying the saccade amplitude, and we dissociated in time and space offer presentation from action planning. Neurons encoding the binary choice outcome did so well before the presentation of saccade targets, indicating that decisions were made in goods space.

Perceptual Decision-Making: A Field in the Midst of a Transformation

Major changes are underway in the field of perceptual decision-making. Single-neuron studies have given way to population recordings with identified cell types, traditional analyses have been extended to accommodate these large and diverse collections of neurons, and novel methods of neural disruption have provided insights about causal circuits. Further, the field has expanded to include multiple new species: rodents and invertebrates, for example, have been instrumental in demonstrating the importance of internal state on neural responses. Finally, a renewed interest in ethological stimuli prompted development of new behaviors, frequently analyzed by new, automated movement tracking methods. Taken together, these advances constitute a seismic shift in both our approach and understanding of how incoming sensory signals are used to guide decisions.

Opposing pupil responses to offered and anticipated reward values

Previous studies have shown that the pupils dilate more in anticipation of larger rewards. This finding raises the possibility of a more general association between reward amount and pupil size. We tested this idea by characterizing macaque pupil responses to offered rewards during evaluation and comparison in a binary choice task. To control attention, we made use of a design in which offers occurred in sequence. By looking at pupil responses after choice but before reward, we confirmed the previously observed positive association between pupil size and anticipated reward values. Surprisingly, however, we find that pupil size is negatively correlated with the value of offered gambles before choice, during both evaluation and comparison stages of the task. These results demonstrate a functional distinction between offered and anticipated rewards and present evidence against a narrow version of the simulation hypothesis; the idea that we represent offers by reactivating states associated with anticipating them. They also suggest that pupil size is correlated with relative, not absolute, values of offers, suggestive of an accept-reject model of comparison.

Correlates of economic decisions in the dorsal and subgenual anterior cingulate cortices

The anterior cingulate cortex can be divided into distinct ventral (subgenual, sgACC) and dorsal (dACC), portions. The role of dACC in value-based decision-making is hotly debated, while the role of sgACC is poorly understood. We recorded neuronal activity in both regions in rhesus macaques performing a token-gambling task. We find that both encode many of the same variables; including integrated offered values of gambles, primary as well as secondary reward outcomes, number of current tokens and anticipated rewards. Both regions exhibit memory traces for offer values and putative value comparison signals. Both regions use a consistent scheme to encode the value of the attended option. This result suggests that neurones do not appear to be specialized for specific offers (that is, neurones use an attentional as opposed to labelled line coding scheme). We also observed some differences between the two regions: (i) coding strengths in dACC were consistently greater than those in sgACC, (ii) neurones in sgACC responded especially to losses and in anticipation of primary rewards, while those in dACC showed more balanced responding and (iii) responses to the first offer were slightly faster in sgACC. These results indicate that sgACC and dACC have some functional overlap in economic choice, and are consistent with the idea, inspired by neuroanatomy, which sgACC may serve as input to dACC.

Using a Simple Neural Network to Delineate Some Principles of Distributed Economic Choice

The brain uses a mixture of distributed and modular organization to perform computations and generate appropriate actions. While the principles under which the brain might perform computations using modular systems have been more amenable to modeling, the principles by which the brain might make choices using distributed principles have not been explored. Our goal in this perspective is to delineate some of those distributed principles using a neural network method and use its results as a lens through which to reconsider some previously published neurophysiological data. To allow for direct comparison with our own data, we trained the neural network to perform binary risky choices. We find that value correlates are ubiquitous and are always accompanied by non-value information, including spatial information (i.e., no pure value signals). Evaluation, comparison, and selection were not distinct processes; indeed, value signals even in the earliest stages contributed directly, albeit weakly, to action selection. There was no place, other than at the level of action selection, at which dimensions were fully integrated. No units were specialized for specific offers; rather, all units encoded the values of both offers in an anti-correlated format, thus contributing to comparison. Individual network layers corresponded to stages in a continuous rotation from input to output space rather than to functionally distinct modules. While our network is likely to not be a direct reflection of brain processes, we propose that these principles should serve as hypotheses to be tested and evaluated for future studies.

Robust Encoding of Spatial Information in Orbitofrontal Cortex and Striatum

Knowing whether core reward regions carry information about the positions of relevant objects is crucial for adjudicating between choice models. One limitation of previous studies, including our own, is that spatial positions can be consistently differentially associated with rewards, and thus position can be confounded with attention, motor plans, or target identity. We circumvented these problems by using a task in which value-and thus choices-was determined solely by a frequently changing rule, which was randomized relative to spatial position on each trial. We presented offers asynchronously, which allowed us to control for reward expectation, spatial attention, and motor plans in our analyses. We find robust encoding of the spatial position of both offers and choices in two core reward regions, orbitofrontal Area 13 and ventral striatum, as well as in dorsal striatum of macaques. The trial-by-trial correlation in noise in encoding of position was associated with variation in choice, an effect known as choice probability correlation, suggesting that the spatial encoding is associated with choice and is not incidental to it. Spatial information and reward information are not carried by separate sets of neurons, although the two forms of information are temporally dissociable. These results highlight the ubiquity of multiplexed information in association cortex and argue against the idea that these ostensible reward regions serve as part of a pure value domain.

A neuronal theory of sequential economic choice

Results of recent studies point towards a new framework for the neural bases of economic choice. The principles of this framework include the idea that evaluation is limited to a single option within the focus of attention and that we accept or reject that option relative to the entire set of alternatives. Rejection leads attention to a new option, although it can later switch back to a previously rejected one. The option to which a neuron's firing rate refers is determined dynamically by attention and not stably by labelled lines. Value is always computed relative to the value of rejection. Comparison results not from explicit competition between discrete populations of neurons, but indirectly, as in a horse race, from the fact that the first option whose value crosses a threshold is selected. Consequently, comparison can occur within a single pool of neurons rather than by competition between two or more neuronal populations. The computations that constitute comparison thus occur at multiple levels, including premotor levels, simultaneously (i.e. the brain uses a distributed consensus), and not in discrete stages. This framework suggests a solution to a set of otherwise unresolved neuronal binding problems that result from the need to link options to values, comparisons to actions, and choices to outcomes.

Correlates of decisional dynamics in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex

We hypothesized that during binary economic choice, decision makers use the first option they attend as a default to which they compare the second. To test this idea, we recorded activity of neurons in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) of macaques choosing between gambles presented asynchronously. We find that ensemble encoding of the value of the first offer includes both choice-dependent and choice-independent aspects, as if reflecting a partial decision. That is, its responses are neither entirely pre- nor post-decisional. In contrast, coding of the value of the second offer is entirely decision dependent (i.e., post-decisional). This result holds even when offer-value encodings are compared within the same time period. Additionally, we see no evidence for 2 pools of neurons linked to the 2 offers; instead, all comparison appears to occur within a single functionally homogenous pool of task-selective neurons. These observations suggest that economic choices reflect a context-dependent evaluation of attended options. Moreover, they raise the possibility that value representations reflect, to some extent, a tentative commitment to a choice.