Psychophysiological indexes in the detection of deception: A systematic review

Robust evidence on deception detection highlights that humans perform at chance level, especially when a truth-default cognitive threshold is crossed by the deceiver. This systematic review examined whether identification of deceptive stimuli elicits specific physiological responses in the detectors of deception. Following Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines, five databases were searched for human studies that evaluate physiological reactivity to deceptive stimuli, along with behavioural responses. Eleven studies (thirteen experiments) were included in a qualitative synthesis. Results show that deception detection is associated with higher activity in the prefrontal cortex and temporal lobe, with a specific involvement of the temporoparietal junction, alongside the cerebellum and cingulate cortex. Specific changes in other physiological activities (i.e., heart rate, skin temperature, motor excitability) also seem to be differently associated with the detection of deception. This review suggests that detecting deception should be considered a complex decision-making process and indicates that specific physiological activity is present across different types of deceptive stimuli. Implications are promising for further developments in security and forensic sciences.

Lie Detection Based on Acoustic Analysis

PURPOSE

Acoustic lie detection, prized for its covert nature and capability for remote processing, has spurred growing interest in acoustic features that can reliably aid in lie detection. In this study, the aim was to construct an acoustic polygraph based on a variety of phonetic and acoustic features rather than on electrodermal, cardiovascular, and respiratory values.

METHODS

Sixty-two participants from the University of Science and Technology of China, aged 18-30 years old, were involved in the mock crime experiment and were randomly assigned to the innocent and guilty groups. We collected 31 deceptive and truthful audios to analyze the performance of voice onset time (VOT) in lie detection.

RESULTS

Our findings revealed that VOT performed well in lie detection. Both the average sensitivity and specificity of the area under the curve are 0.888, and its lower and upper confidence limit are up to 0.803 and 0.973 respectively at the 95% confidence level. Although the other acoustic features had a lower reference value, they also provided a general trend in the judgment of lie detection.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results suggested that some acoustic features can be effectively used as aids to lie detection. Through a similar approach, we will explore more acoustic and phonetic features that contribute to detecting lies in the future.

The impact of romantic relationships on deception detection: Exploring the gender differences and the mediating role of mentalizing

In evolution, romantic relationships serve as the foundation for breeding and producing offspring. The ability to detect deception in these relationships can safeguard the investment and cultivation of descendants, leading to greater chances of survival and reproduction. However, barely any research has been carried out within this domain. The current study investigated the preliminary relationship between romantic relationships, mentalizing ability, and deception detection ability through an empirical experiment. Participants were primed by their romantic experiences and neutral experiences, and then went through a Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RTM) task and the deception detecting task for real person crime-type videos. Results showed that romantic relationships can improve participants' emotion recognition ability toward negative emotions, and females performed better in the deception detection task than males did. Most importantly, romantic relationships can improve participants' deception detection ability through the mediator of mentalizing ability. Though gender difference was not statistically significant in the RTM task, the results lay a solid foundation for further investigation into females' mentalizing ability and disclose the evolutionary meaning of romantic relationships.

Development of a Chinese werewolf deception database

Although it is important to accurately detect deception, limited research in this area has been undertaken involving Asian people. We aim to address this gap by undertaking research regarding the identification of deception in Asians in realistic environments. In this study, we develop a Chinese Werewolf Deception Database (C2W2D), which consists of 168 video clips (84 deception videos and 84 honest videos). A total of 1,738,760 frames of facial data are recorded. Fifty-eight healthy undergraduates (24 men and 34 women) and 26 drug addicts (26 men) participated in a werewolf game. The development of C2W2D is accomplished based on a "werewolf" deception game paradigm in which the participants spontaneously tell the truth or a lie. Two synced high-speed cameras are used to capture the game process. To explore the differences between lying and truth-telling in the database, descriptive statistics (e.g., duration and quantity) and hypothesis tests are conducted using action units (AUs) of facial expressions (e.g., t-test). The C2W2D contributes to a relatively sizable number of deceptive and honest samples with high ecological validity. These samples can be used to study the individual differences and the underlying mechanisms of lies and truth-telling between drug addicts and healthy people.

Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing

Studies using the priming paradigm often infer that unconscious processes have more veridical access to the world than conscious processes. These interpretations are based on a standard reasoning that erroneously infers good sensitivity of indirect measures from a clear priming effect. To correct for this fallacy, researchers should explicitly compute the sensitivities from indirect measures and compare them against the sensitivities of direct measures. Recent results suggest that indirect behavioral measures are not more sensitive than direct measures and challenge interpretations about veridical unconscious processing. We add to these behavioral results by focusing on neurophysiological indirect measures. In two EEG experiments, we investigate whether event related potentials (ERPs) are more sensitive to different visual stimuli than direct measures. The results show the opposite effect: higher sensitivities for direct than indirect measures. Therefore-contrasting commonly held belief-we find no evidence for more veridical unconscious than conscious processes in ERP measures.

The Pervasive Problem of Post Hoc Data Selection in Studies on Unconscious Processing

Studies on unconscious mental processes typically require that participants are unaware of some information (e.g., a visual stimulus). An important methodological question in this field of research is how to deal with data from participants who become aware of the critical stimulus according to some measure of awareness. While it has previously been argued that the post hoc selection of participants dependent on an awareness measure may often result in regression-to-the-mean artifacts (Shanks, 2017), a recent article (Sklar et al., 2021) challenged this conclusion claiming that the consideration of this statistical artifact might lead to unjustified rejections of true unconscious influences. In this reply, we explain this pervasive statistical problem with a basic and concrete example, show that Sklar et al. fundamentally mischaracterize it, and then refute the argument that the influence of the artifact has previously been overestimated. We conclude that, without safeguards, the method of post hoc data selection should never be employed in studies on unconscious processing.

The Conversational Circumplex: Identifying, prioritizing, and pursuing informational and relational motives in conversation

The meaning of success in conversation depends on people's goals. Often, individuals pursue multiple goals simultaneously, such as establishing shared understanding, making a favorable impression, having fun, or persuading a conversation partner. In this article, we introduce a novel theoretical framework, the Conversational Circumplex, to classify conversational motives along two key dimensions: 1) informational: the extent to which a speaker's motive focuses on giving and/or receiving accurate information; and 2) relational: the extent to which a speaker's motive focuses on building the relationship. We use the Conversational Circumplex to underscore the multiplicity of conversational goals that people hold and highlight the potential for individuals to have conflicting conversational goals (both intrapersonally and interpersonally) that make successful conversation a difficult challenge.

Do Not Tell Me More; You Are Honest: A Preconceived Honesty Bias

According to the previous literature, only a few papers found better accuracy than a chance to detect dishonesty, even when more information and verbal cues (VCs) improve precision in detecting dishonesty. A new classification of dishonesty profiles has recently been published, allowing us to study if this low success rate happens for all people or if some people have higher predictive ability. This paper aims to examine if (dis)honest people can detect better/worse (un)ethical behavior of others. With this in mind, we designed one experiment using videos from one of the most popular TV shows in the UK where contestants make a (dis)honesty decision upon gaining or sharing a certain amount of money. Our participants from an online MTurk sample (N = 1,582) had to determine under different conditions whether the contestants would act in an (dis)honest way. Three significant results emerged from these two experiments. First, accuracy in detecting (dis)honesty is not different than chance, but submaximizers (compared to maximizers) and radical dishonest people (compare to non-radicals) are better at detecting honesty, while there is no difference in detecting dishonesty. Second, more information and VCs improve precision in detecting dishonesty, but honesty is better detected using only non-verbal cues (NVCs). Finally, a preconceived honesty bias improves specificity (honesty detection accuracy) and worsens sensitivity (dishonesty detection accuracy).

Number processing outside awareness? Systematically testing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures of consciousness

In priming research, it is often argued that humans can discriminate stimuli outside consciousness. For example, the semantic meaning of numbers can be processed even when the numbers are so strongly masked that participants are not aware of them. These claims are typically based on a certain pattern of results: Direct measures indicate no conscious awareness of the masked stimuli, while indirect measures show clear priming effects of the same stimuli on reaction times or neurophysiological measures. From this pattern, preserved (unconscious) processing in the indirect task is concluded. However, this widely used standard reasoning is problematic and leads to spurious claims of unconscious processing. Such problems can be avoided by comparing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures. Many studies are affected by these problems, such that a reassessment of the literature is needed. Here, we investigated whether numbers can be processed unconsciously. In three experiments, we replicated and extended well-established effects of number priming over a wide range of stimulus visibilities. We then compared the standard reasoning to a sensitivity analysis, where direct and indirect effects are compared using the same metric. Results show that the sensitivities of indirect measures did not exceed those of direct measures, thereby indicating no evidence for preserved unconscious processing when awareness of the stimuli is low. Instead, it seems that at low visibility there is residual processing that affects direct and indirect measures to a similar degree. This suggests that similar processing modes cause those effects in direct and indirect measures.

The Limits of Conscious Deception Detection: When Reliance on False Deception Cues Contributes to Inaccurate Judgments

People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants’ judgments of targets being deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing may facilitate it.

Five Reasons Why I Am Skeptical That Indirect or Unconscious Lie Detection Is Superior to Direct Deception Detection

The relative advantage of indirect and unconscious lie detection compared to direct detection is examined. Empirical evidence for the superiority of indirect and unconscious lie is unconvincing. Three empirical issues include comparisons of incommensurate outcomes, questionable results in control conditions, and evidence for improved performance of direct detection under some conditions. Two theoretical reasons for skepticism include consideration of the casual forces producing poor accuracy and the tendency for people to believe other people absent active cognitive processing. Generally speaking, in human lie detection, effortful and disciplined thought provides more accurate detection of lies than intuition or less than fully conscious cognitive processing.

Science or pseudoscience? A distinction that matters for police officers, lawyers and judges

Scientific knowledge has been a significant contributor to the development of better practices within law enforcement agencies. However, some alleged 'experts' have been shown to have disseminated information to police officers, lawyers and judges that is neither empirically tested nor supported by scientific theory. The aim of this article is to provide organisations within the justice system with an overview of a) what science is and is not; b) what constitutes an empirically driven, theoretically founded, peer-reviewed approach; and c) how to distinguish science from pseudoscience. Using examples in relation to non-verbal communication, this article aims to demonstrate that not all information which is presented as comprehensively evaluated is methodologically reliable for use in the justice system.

A comparison of the effectiveness of two types of deceit detection training methods in older adults

Background

In general, people are poor at detecting deception. Older adults are even worse than young adults at detecting deceit, which might make them uniquely vulnerable to certain types of financial fraud. One reason for poor deceit detection abilities is that lay theories of cues to deception are not valid. This study compared the effectiveness of two training methods to improve deceit detection among older adults: valid facial cues versus valid verbal cues to deception. Approximately 150 older adults were randomly assigned to facial training, verbal training, or a control condition. Participants completed a pre-test deceit detection task, their assigned training, and a post-test deceit detection task.

Results

Both training groups significantly improved at recognizing their respectively trained cues after training. However, the facial cue training group were less accurate at detecting deception post-test compared to pre-test and the control group exhibited improved accuracy of deceit detection from pre-test to post-test.

Conclusions

These results are consistent with the body of literature on deception suggesting people hover around chance accuracy, even after training. Older adults’ facial and verbal cue recognition can be improved with training, but these improvements did not translate into more accurate deceit detection, and actually hampered performance in the facial condition. Older adults showed the most benefit from sheer practice at detecting deception (in the control condition), perhaps because this condition encouraged implicit rather than explicit judgments of deception.

Grasping Discriminates between Object Sizes Less Not More Accurately than the Perceptual System

Ganel, Freud, Chajut, and Algom (2012) demonstrated that maximum grip apertures (MGAs) differ significantly when grasping perceptually identical objects. From this finding they concluded that the visual size information used by the motor system is more accurate than the visual size information available to the perceptual system. A direct comparison between the accuracy in the perception and the action system is, however, problematic, given that accuracy in the perceptual task is measured using a dichotomous variable, while accuracy in the visuomotor task is determined using a continuous variable. We addressed this problem by dichotomizing the visuomotor measures. Using this approach, our results show that size discrimination in grasping is in fact inferior to perceptual discrimination therefore contradicting the original suggestion put forward by Ganel and colleagues.

Do Not Think Carefully? Re-examining the Effect of Unconscious Thought on Deception Detection

Several recent studies have examined the effect of unconscious thinking on deception detection with the hypothesis that unconscious thought increases the ability to discriminate between truth and deception, but these studies yielded conflicting results. The present study aimed to re-examine the effect of unconscious thinking and extend it by adopting both verbal and non-verbal/paraverbal stimuli. We hypothesized that unconscious thought leads to a higher accuracy rate than immediate decision and conscious thought when judging non-verbal/paraverbal stimuli, but not when judging verbal stimuli. In Study 1, we compared unconscious thought with immediate decision by using both video and audio stimuli. In Study 2, we compared unconscious thought with conscious thought by using both video and text stimuli. The results showed that when detecting deception vs. truth, (1) unconscious thought was not better than immediate decision on deception detection in both audio and video conditions (Study 1), and (2) unconscious thought was not better than conscious thought in both video and text conditions (Study 2). The Bayes factor of both studies also showed substantial evidence for null hypothesis (H0) relative to alternative hypothesis (H1). The implications and limitations of the present study are discussed.

People use less information than they think to make up their minds

A world where information is abundant promises unprecedented opportunities for information exchange. Seven studies suggest these opportunities work better in theory than in practice: People fail to anticipate how quickly minds change, believing that they and others will evaluate more evidence before making up their minds than they and others actually do. From evaluating peers, marriage prospects, and political candidates to evaluating novel foods, goods, and services, people consume far less information than expected before deeming things good or bad. Accordingly, people acquire and share too much information in impression-formation contexts: People overvalue long-term trials, overpay for decision aids, and overwork to impress others, neglecting the speed at which conclusions will form. In today's information age, people may intuitively believe that exchanging ever-more information will foster better-informed opinions and perspectives-but much of this information may be lost on minds long made up.

Decoding working memory content from attentional biases

What we are currently thinking influences where we attend. The finding that active maintenance of visual items in working memory (WM) biases attention toward memory-matching objects-even when WM content is irrelevant for attentional goals-suggests a tight link between WM and attention. To test whether this link is reliable enough to infer specific WM content from measures of attentional bias, we applied multivariate pattern classification techniques to response times from an unrelated visual search task during a WM delay. Single-trial WM content was successfully decoded from incidental attentional bias within an individual, highlighting the specificity and reliability of the WM-attention link. Furthermore, classifiers trained on a group of individuals predicted WM content in another, completely independent individual-implying a shared cognitive mechanism of memory-driven attentional bias. The existence of such classifiers demonstrates that memory-based attentional bias is both a robust and generalizable probe of WM.

Miami University deception detection database

In the present work, we introduce the Miami University Deception Detection Database (MU3D), a free resource containing 320 videos of target individuals telling truths and lies. Eighty (20 Black female, 20 Black male, 20 White female, and 20 White male) different targets were recorded speaking honestly and dishonestly about their social relationships. Each target generated four different videos (i.e., positive truth, negative truth, positive lie, negative lie), yielding 320 videos fully crossing target race, target gender, statement valence, and statement veracity. These videos were transcribed by trained research assistants and evaluated by naïve raters. Descriptive analyses of the video characteristics (e.g., length) and subjective ratings (e.g., target attractiveness) are provided. The stimuli and an information codebook can be accessed free of charge for academic research purposes from http://hdl.handle.net/2374.MIA/6067 . The MU3D offers scholars the ability to conduct research using standardized stimuli that can aid in building more comprehensive theories of interpersonal sensitivity, enhance replication among labs, facilitate the use of signal detection analyses, and promote consideration of race, gender, and their interactive effects in deception detection research.

Delta plots do not reveal response inhibition in lying

The role of response inhibition in lying is debated. By using the delta-plot method applied to the Sheffield Lie Test, Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De Schryver, and Verschuere (2015) provided evidence supporting the role of inhibition in lying. In the study of Debey et al., inhibitory skill was measured in terms of the size of the lie effect. However, to provide convincing evidence that delta plots highlight the role of response inhibition in lying, inhibitory ability must be evaluated independently from the size of the lie effect. After replicating original findings, this article shows that a delta plot analysis does not differentiate individuals with different inhibitory abilities, when inhibitory skill is measured by means of the Stop Signal Task, instead of the size of the lie effect. This suggests that researchers should be cautious when making conclusions about cognitive mechanisms based on the sole analysis of delta plots.

Black and White Lies: Race-Based Biases in Deception Judgments

In six studies ( N = 605), participants made deception judgments about videos of Black and White targets who told truths and lies about interpersonal relationships. In Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2, White participants judged that Black targets were telling the truth more often than they judged that White targets were telling the truth. This truth bias was predicted by Whites' motivation to respond without prejudice. For Black participants, however, motives to respond without prejudice did not moderate responses (Study 2). In Study 3, we found similar effects with a manipulation of the targets' apparent race. Finally, in Study 4, we used eye-tracking techniques to demonstrate that Whites' truth bias for Black targets is likely the result of late-stage correction processes: Despite ultimately judging that Black targets were telling the truth more often than White targets, Whites were faster to fixate on the on-screen "lie" response box when targets were Black than when targets were White. These systematic race-based biases have important theoretical implications (e.g., for lie detection and improving intergroup communication and relations) and practical implications (e.g., for reducing racial bias in law enforcement).

Regressive research: The pitfalls of post hoc data selection in the study of unconscious mental processes

Many studies of unconscious processing involve comparing a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with an awareness measure (such as a verbal report or a forced-choice response) taken either concurrently or separately. Unconscious processing is inferred when above-chance performance is combined with null awareness. Often, however, aggregate awareness is better than chance, and data analysis therefore employs a form of extreme group analysis focusing post hoc on participants, trials, or items where awareness is absent or at chance. The pitfalls of this analytic approach are described with particular reference to recent research on implicit learning and subliminal perception. Because of regression to the mean, the approach can mislead researchers into erroneous conclusions concerning unconscious influences on behavior. Recommendations are made about future use of post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition.

Can the Unconscious Boost Lie-Detection Accuracy?

Recently, a variety of methods have been used to show that unconscious processes can boost lie-detection accuracy. This article considers the latest developments in the context of research into unconscious cognition. Unconscious cognition has been under attack in recent years because the findings do not replicate, and when they do show reliably improved performance, they fail to exclude the possibility that conscious processing is at work. Here we show that work into unconscious lie detection suffers from the same weaknesses. Future research would benefit from taking a stronger theoretical stance and explicitly attempting to exclude conscious-processing accounts.

Effects of Disfluency in Online Interpretation of Deception

A speaker's manner of delivery of an utterance can affect a listener's pragmatic interpretation of the message. Disfluencies (such as filled pauses) influence a listener's off-line assessment of whether the speaker is truthful or deceptive. Do listeners also form this assessment during the moment-by-moment processing of the linguistic message? Here we present two experiments that examined listeners' judgments of whether a speaker was indicating the true location of the prize in a game during fluent and disfluent utterances. Participants' eye and mouse movements were biased toward the location named by the speaker during fluent utterances, whereas the opposite bias was observed during disfluent utterances. This difference emerged rapidly after the onset of the critical noun. Participants were similarly sensitive to disfluencies at the start of the utterance (Experiment 1) and in the middle (Experiment 2). Our findings support recent research showing that listeners integrate pragmatic information alongside semantic content during the earliest moments of language processing. Unlike prior work which has focused on pragmatic effects in the interpretation of the literal message, here we highlight disfluency's role in guiding a listener to an alternative non-literal message.

A Longitudinal Study of the Development of Emotional Deception Detection Within New Same-Sex Friendships

Previous studies show that close friends improve at lie detection over time. However, is this improvement due to an increase in the ability to decode the feelings of close friends or a change in how close friends communicate their true and deceptive emotions? In a study of 45 pairs of friends, one friend from each pair (the "sender") was videotaped showing truthful and faked affect in response to pleasant and unpleasant movie clips. The other friend from each pair (the "judge") guessed the true emotions of both the friend and a stranger 1 month and 6 months into the friendship. Judges were better at guessing the true emotions of friends than strangers, and this advantage in judging friends increased among close friends over time. Surprisingly, improvement over time was due mostly to a change in the sender's communication, rather than an increase in judges' ability to decode their friends' feelings.

Can lies be detected unconsciously?

People are typically poor at telling apart truthful and deceptive statements. Based on the Unconscious Thought Theory, it has been suggested that poor lie detection arises from the intrinsic limitations of conscious thinking and can be improved by facilitating the contribution of unconscious thought (UT). In support of this hypothesis, Reinhard et al. (2013) observed improved lie detection among participants engaging in UT. The present study aimed to replicate this UT advantage using a similar experimental procedure but with an important improvement in a key control condition. Specifically, participants judged the truthfulness of eight video recordings in three thinking modes: immediately after watching them or after a period of unconscious or conscious deliberation. Results from two experiments (combined N = 226) failed to reveal a significant difference in lie detection accuracy between the thinking modes, even after efforts were made to facilitate the occurrence of an UT advantage in Experiment 2. The results imply that the UT advantage in deception detection is not a robust phenomenon.

Deceit and facial expression in children: the enabling role of the "poker face" child and the dependent personality of the detector

This study presents the relation between the facial expression of a group of children when they told a lie and the accuracy in detecting the lie by a sample of adults. To evaluate the intensity and type of emotional content of the children's faces, we applied an automated method capable of analyzing the facial information from the video recordings (FaceReader 5.0 software). The program classified videos as showing a neutral facial expression or an emotional one. There was a significant higher mean of hits for the emotional than for the neutral videos, and a significant negative correlation between the intensity of the neutral expression and the number of hits from the detectors. The lies expressed with emotional facial expression were more easily recognized by adults than the lies expressed with a "poker face"; thus, the less expressive the child the harder it was to guess. The accuracy of the lie detectors was then correlated with their subclinical traits of personality disorders, to find that participants scoring higher in the dependent personality were significantly better lie detectors. A non-significant tendency for women to discriminate better was also found, whereas men tended to be more suspicious than women when judging the children's veracity. This study is the first to automatically decode the facial information of the lying child and relate these results with personality characteristics of the lie detectors in the context of deceptive behavior research. Implications for forensic psychology were suggested: to explore whether the induction of an emotion in a child during an interview could be useful to evaluate the testimony during legal trials.

If I imagine it, then it happened: the Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.

The Interpretation of Dreams, and of Jokes

The problem of meaning in dreams is examined along with the question of how such meaning may be legitimately extracted. Quantitative content analysis has shown that a rough continuity exists between dream content and awake experiences and concerns (and that, therefore, dreams are implicit memories). Continuity becomes more pronounced when figurative (latent) contents are taken into account in addition to literal (manifest) contents and when temporal disjunctions between dream experiences and life-events are factored in. Formal homologies exist between dreams and jokes, which provide a simplifying model for dream interpretation. Jokes prove, for example, that latent contents (which arise from interactions of surface manifest contents with context) convey crucial meanings missing in manifest contents. Dreams are release phenomena involving disinhibition and underregulation of content and style, and for this reason are simultaneously revealing and confusing. Dream distortions turn out to be identical to those found in other types of resource-poor cognition (e.g., aphasia, subliminal perception), suggesting that defense (“censorship”) is not necessarily responsible for dream distortion.