The central role of social exclusion when representing ethnic minorities and its association with intergroup attitudes

A mixed-methods approach was used to analyze the social representations of four ethnic minorities in southern Spain. Following a between-subjects design, Spanish participants (n = 532) were assigned to evaluate either Romanian Roma, Spanish Roma, Moroccan, or Romanian non-Roma people, with a free-association task and scales of stereotypes, emotions, and behavioral tendencies. Results showed that Romanian Roma was the most devalued target, eliciting the worst representation and attitudes. The content analysis revealed that participants described minorities mainly in terms of social exclusion, culture, appearance, personality, opportunity seeking, stigmatization, and personalization/equality, with social exclusion being a key category associated with worst attitudes.

Intergenerational concern relates to constructive coping and emotional reactions to climate change via increased legacy concerns and environmental cognitive alternatives

As the threat of climate change looms large, and we experience first-hand the impacts of rapid global warming, researchers and clinicians emphasize the need to better understand the impact of these changes on our mental health. Existing research suggests that coping with and emotional reactions to climate change can promote action to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change and reduce its negative impacts to one's mental health. In this pre-registered study (N = 771) we examined whether people who display extreme intergenerational concern would also constructively cope with climate change. Empirically-identified individuals showing high intergenerational concern reported more problem-focused and meaning-based coping, and less avoidant coping strategies with climate change. Further, even though they felt guilty, angry, sorrowful and isolated, these individuals also felt hopeful about the future. These effects were explained by increased concerns about one's legacy and higher access to environmental cognitive alternatives. By instilling values that highlight intergenerational concern as a key priority, we could thus not only increase pro-climate action, but also help individuals actively and constructively cope with changes produced by climate change.

Moral Uncertainty and Our Relationships with Unknown Minds

We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with "locked-in" syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the "risk asymmetry argument," which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human-AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take.

Do Bad People Deserve Empathy? Selective Empathy Based on Targets' Moral Characteristics

The relation between empathy and morality is a widely discussed topic. However, previous discussions mainly focused on whether and how empathy influences moral cognition and moral behaviors, with limited attention to the reverse influence of morality on empathy. This review summarized how morality influences empathy by drawing together a number of hitherto scattered studies illustrating the influence of targets' moral characteristics on empathy. To explain why empathy is morally selective, we discuss its ultimate cause, to increase survival rates, and five proximate causes based on similarity, affective bonds, the appraisal of deservingness, dehumanization, and potential group membership. To explain how empathy becomes morally selective, we consider three different pathways (automatic, regulative, and mixed) based on previous findings. Finally, we discuss future directions, including the reverse influence of selective empathy on moral cognition, the moral selectivity of positive empathy, and the role of selective empathy in selective helping and third-party punishment.

Moral barrier to compassion: How perceived badness of sufferers dampens observers' compassionate responses

Compassion has been theorized as a desirable prosocial emotion due to its potential to transcend arbitrary boundaries (e.g., race, physical distance) and motivate us to alleviate the suffering of all human beings. Our paper nevertheless examines a potential moral barrier to compassion--whether and how moral evaluations of the suffering and the sufferer hinder our compassion and prosocial motivation. In four pre-registered studies (total N = 421, within-participant design), we demonstrated that adult U.S. participants withheld their compassion and willingness to help when they perceived moral badness of the sufferer, even when the perceived moral badness did not directly cause the suffering. The effects were found in terms of diverse types of moral judgments, including the sufferers' immoral intention (e.g., harming another; Study 1), bad moral character (e.g., being a dishonest person; Study 2), and even mere associations with groups perceived as deserving of suffering based on moral status (Studies 3-4). Deservedness judgment--how much the sufferer was viewed as deserving the suffering--mediated the effect between moral judgment and compassionate responses. Importantly, participants judged withholding compassion based on moral deservedness as what should be done and what morally good people would do, suggesting that people hold a normative view of the tendency that might make it difficult to overcome. Our findings thus reveal moral judgment as a barrier that prevents us from alleviating the suffering of all human beings.

Awe promotes moral expansiveness via the small-self

The experience of awe has been shown to challenge how people think about themselves and the world around them, linking them to something greater than themselves. We investigated whether this emotional experience of awe may also challenge the boundaries of our moral consideration, leading to a generalized expansion in our moral worlds. Across five studies (N = 990), we examined whether awe might promote moral expansiveness; that is, increased moral concern across a broad range of entities (e.g., out-groups, animals, plants, environments). Cross-sectional Studies 1a and 1b, found dispositional awe was related to greater moral expansiveness. Experimental Studies 2 and 3, using video-induced awe, found consistent indirect effects on moral expansiveness, via self-reported awe and the small-self sense of vastness. Experimental Study 4, using Virtual Reality induced awe, found those in the awe condition (vs. control) reported greater moral expansiveness, and this was fully mediated by the small-self sense of vastness. Our findings show awe expands our sense of connectedness to the broader world, and through this, increases the breath of our moral concern.

Social value at a distance: Higher identification with all of humanity is associated with reduced social discounting

How much we value the welfare of others has critical implications for the collective good. Yet, it is unclear what leads people to make more or less equal decisions about the welfare of those from whom they are socially distant. The current research sought to explore the psychological mechanisms that might underlie welfare judgements across social distance. Here, a social discounting paradigm was used to measure the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the social distance of its recipient increased. Across two cohorts (one discovery, one replication), we found that a more expansive identity with all of humanity was associated with reduced social discounting. Additionally, we investigated the specificity of this association by examining whether this relationship extended to delay discounting, the tendency for the value of a reward to be discounted as the temporal distance to its receipt increases. Our findings suggest that the observed association with identity was unique to social discounting, thus underscoring a distinction in value-based decision-making processes across distances in time and across social networks. As data were collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also considered how stress associated with this global threat might influence welfare judgements across social distances. We found that, even after controlling for COVID-19 related stress, correlations between identity and social discounting held. Together, these findings elucidate the psychological processes that are associated with a more equal distribution of generosity.

Moral Expansiveness Around the World: The Role of Societal Factors Across 36 Countries

What are the things that we think matter morally, and how do societal factors influence this? To date, research has explored several individual-level and historical factors that influence the size of our ‘moral circles.' There has, however, been less attention focused on which societal factors play a role. We present the first multi-national exploration of moral expansiveness—that is, the size of people’s moral circles across countries. We found low generalized trust, greater perceptions of a breakdown in the social fabric of society, and greater perceived economic inequality were associated with smaller moral circles. Generalized trust also helped explain the effects of perceived inequality on lower levels of moral inclusiveness. Other inequality indicators (i.e., Gini coefficients) were, however, unrelated to moral expansiveness. These findings suggest that societal factors, especially those associated with generalized trust, may influence the size of our moral circles.

Prosocial correlates of transformative experiences at secular multi-day mass gatherings

Humans have long sought experiences that transcend or change their sense of self. By weakening boundaries between the self and others, such transformative experiences may lead to enduring changes in moral orientation. Here we investigated the psychological nature and prosocial correlates of transformative experiences by studying participants before (n = 600), during (n = 1217), 0-4 weeks after (n = 1866), and 6 months after (n = 710) they attended a variety of secular, multi-day mass gatherings in the US and UK. Observations at 6 field studies and 22 online followup studies spanning 5 years showed that self-reported transformative experiences at mass gatherings were common, increased over time, and were characterized by feelings of universal connectedness and new perceptions of others. Participants' circle of moral regard expanded with every passing day onsite-an effect partially mediated by transformative experience and feelings of universal connectedness. Generosity was remarkably high across sites but did not change over time. Immediately and 6 months following event attendance, self-reported transformative experience persisted and predicted both generosity (directly) and moral expansion (indirectly). These findings highlight the prosocial qualities of transformative experiences at secular mass gatherings and suggest such experiences may be associated with lasting changes in moral orientation.

Psychological barriers to effective altruism: An evolutionary perspective

People usually engage in (or at least profess to engage in) altruistic acts to benefit others. Yet, they routinely fail to maximize how much good is achieved with their donated money and time. An accumulating body of research has uncovered various psychological factors that can explain why people's altruism tends to be ineffective. These prior studies have mostly focused on proximate explanations (e.g. emotions, preferences, lay beliefs). Here, we adopt an evolutionary perspective and highlight how three fundamental motives - parochialism, status, and conformity - can explain many seemingly disparate failures to do good effectively. Our approach outlines ultimate explanations for ineffective altruism, and we illustrate how fundamental motives can be leveraged to promote more effective giving.

Fear leads to suffering: Fears of compassion predict restriction of the moral boundary

Empirical investigations into the psychological drivers of more or less expansive moral thinking are lacking from the psychological literature. One potential driver that warrants deeper investigation is compassion - a prosocial motivation to both identity and alleviate suffering. The current research examined the extent to which compassion, and fears of compassion, act as a driver and inhibitor, respectively, of a morally expansive mindset. We tested these associations across three studies (N = 749) and found robust support for our predictions. Specifically, stronger compassion to others, and greater fears of extending compassion to others, were linked to enhanced and reduced moral expansiveness, respectively. Moreover, over and above empathy and mindfulness, fears of compassion and compassion uniquely predicted moral expansiveness. Finally, compassion was found to consistently mediate the relationship between fears of compassion to others and moral expansiveness. Our findings further our understanding of the psychological factors that may drive and restrict morally expansive mindsets and hold implications for the broader domains of moral decision-making and prosocial motivation as well as the application of practices that are designed to facilitate a compassionate mindset (e.g., Compassionate Mind Training).

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive "minimal model" (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal's (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by "ontological frames" defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are "framed" in the relevant dimensions of "moral space."

Tree-Huggers Versus Human-Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade-offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree-huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human-lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero-sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree-huggers and human-lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree-huggers and human-lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one-third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree-huggers and human-lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree-huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members-thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Finding relevance in the news: The scale of self-reference

According to both professional journalists and news users, news should be relevant. While a great deal of research that treats relevance as co-constructed starts from the text of news stories, this paper asks how news users explicitly construct the (ir)relevance of particular news reports, taking a language-centered lens to open-ended survey responses. This paper makes a methodological argument in favor of a language-centered approach to open-ended survey data. Given the ubiquity of online surveys in many social science disciplines, the present paper provides an example of how this approach can deepen our understanding of survey responses. We find that news users construct relevance at varying scales, using a number of linguistic strategies of self-reference. Those who said they found the story they saw relevant used pronouns with a different distribution than those who did not, and these differences exceeded chance. In general, those who referred to themselves as members of larger collectivities were more likely to say they found a news story relevant, suggesting that relevance is discursively constructed in part through practices of self-reference.

The Evolution of Prosocial and Antisocial Competitive Behavior and the Emergence of Prosocial and Antisocial Leadership Styles

Evolutionary analysis focuses on how genes build organisms with different strategies for engaging and solving life's challenges of survival and reproduction. One of those challenges is competing with conspecifics for limited resources including reproductive opportunities. This article suggests that there is now good evidence for considering two dimensions of social competition. The first, has been labeled as antisocial strategies, to the extent that they tend to be self-focused, threat sensitive and aggressive, and use tactics of bulling, threatening, and intimidating subordinates, or even injuring/killing competitors. Such strategies can inhibit care and affiliative social interactions and motivation. The social signals emitted stimulate threat processing in recipients and can create stressed and highly stratified groups with a range of detrimental psychological and physiological effects. Second, in contrast, prosocial strategies seek to create relaxed and secure social interactions that enable sharing, cooperative, mutually supportive and beneficial relationships. The friendly and low/no threat social signals emitted in friendly cooperative and affiliative relationships stimulate physiological systems (e.g., oxytocin, the vagus nerve of the parasympathetic system) that downregulates threat processing, enhances the immune system, and facilitates frontal cortical processes and general wellbeing. This article reviews the literature pertaining to the evidence for these two dimensions of social engagement.

Styles of Leadership, Fears of Compassion, and Competing to Avoid Inferiority

There is general agreement that styles of leadership evolved from mammalian group living strategies that form social ranks. In both non-human primates and humans, different styles of hierarchical dominant-subordinate and leader-follower behavior can be observed. These can be described in terms of dimensions of antisocial (relatively self-focused, aggressive and threat-based) and prosocial (relatively empathic, caring, and supportive) interpersonal styles. The aim of this study was to explore how a set of established self-report questionnaires might relate to these two dimensions. Two hundred and nineteen students completed questionnaires assessing ruthless self-advancement, coalition building, and dominant leadership styles, as well as hypercompetitiveness, narcissism, striving to avoid inferiority, compassion focused and ego focused goals, fears of compassion, social safeness and attachment (in)security. A principal component analysis supported an antisocial leadership style factor which comprised of ruthless self-advancement, narcissism and hypercompetitiveness. This was significantly correlated with fears of compassion, ego focused goals, insecure striving (striving to avoid inferiority), fears of losing out, fears of being overlooked, fears of being rejected, and avoidant relating in close relationships. It was significantly negatively correlated with compassionate goals. As the results did not reveal a clear factor solution for a prosocial leadership style, we chose to use the coalition building leadership style variable. This showed the opposite pattern, being significantly negatively correlated with narcissism, hypercompetitiveness, fears of compassion, fears of active rejection, and avoidance in close relationships. It was significantly positively correlated with secure striving, compassionate goals, and social safeness. We also found that fears of compassion for others was a partial mediator of the relationship between insecure striving with antisocial leadership style. Moreover, lower fears of compassion for the self emerged as a key mediator for the relationship between non-avoidant attachment with coalition building leadership style and, secure non-striving with coalition building leadership style. While the motive to accumulate social power, resources and dominance may be linked to antisocial forms of leadership, the intensity of the drive may also be linked to unaddressed threats and fears of rejection and fears of compassion. Efforts to promote more ethical, moral and prosocial forms of leadership may falter if such fears are left unaddressed.

Moral expansiveness short form: Validity and reliability of the MESx

Moral expansiveness refers to the range of entities (human and non-human) deemed worthy of moral concern and treatment. Previous research has established that the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) is a powerful predictor of altruistic moral decision-making and captures a unique dimension of moral cognition. However, the length of the full MES may be restrictive for some researchers. Here we establish the reliability and validity of a reduced moral expansiveness scale, the MESx. Consistent with the full version, the MESx is strongly associated with (but not reducible to) theoretically related constructs, such as endorsement of universalism values, identification with all humanity, and connectedness to nature. The MESx also predicted measures of altruistic moral decision-making to the same degree as the full MES. Further, the MESx passed tests of discriminant validity, was unrelated to political conservatism (unlike the full MES), only mildly associated with the tendency to provide socially desirable responses, and produced moderate reliability over time. We conclude that the MESx is a psychometrically valid alternative for researchers requiring a short measure of moral expansiveness.

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

Prominent theorists have made the argument that modern humans express moral concern for a greater number of entities than at any other time in our past. Moreover, adults show stable patterns in the degrees of concern they afford certain entities over others, yet it remains unknown when and how these patterns of moral decision-making manifest in development. Children aged 4 to 10 years (N = 151) placed 24 pictures of human, animal, and environmental entities on a stratified circle representing three levels of moral concern. Although younger and older children expressed similar overall levels of moral concern, older children demonstrated a more graded understanding of concern by including more entities within the outer reaches of their moral circles (i.e., they were less likely to view moral inclusion as a simple in vs. out binary decision). With age children extended greater concern to humans than other forms of life, and more concern to vulnerable groups, such as the sick and disabled. Notably, children's level of concern for human entities predicted their prosocial behavior. The current research provides novel insights into the development of our moral reasoning and its structure within childhood.

Extreme self-sacrifice beyond fusion: Moral expansiveness and the special case of allyship

As a general theory of extreme self-sacrifice, Whitehouse's article misses one relevant dimension: people's willingness to fight and die in support of entities not bound by biological markers or ancestral kinship (allyship). We discuss research on moral expansiveness, which highlights individuals' capacity to self-sacrifice for targets that lie outside traditional in-group markers, including racial out-groups, animals, and the natural environment.