Partial direct contact transmission in ferrets of a mallard H7N3 influenza virus with typical avian-like receptor specificity

Zoonotic Animal Influenza Virus and Potential Mixing Vessel Hosts

Influenza viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae with a negative-sense, single-stranded segmented RNA genome. They infect a wide range of animals, including humans. From 1918 to 2009, there were four influenza pandemics, which caused millions of casualties. Frequent spillover of animal influenza viruses to humans with or without intermediate hosts poses a serious zoonotic and pandemic threat. The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic overshadowed the high risk raised by animal influenza viruses, but highlighted the role of wildlife as a reservoir for pandemic viruses. In this review, we summarize the occurrence of animal influenza virus in humans and describe potential mixing vessel or intermediate hosts for zoonotic influenza viruses. While several animal influenza viruses possess a high zoonotic risk (e.g., avian and swine influenza viruses), others are of low to negligible zoonotic potential (e.g., equine, canine, bat and bovine influenza viruses). Transmission can occur directly from animals, particularly poultry and swine, to humans or through reassortant viruses in "mixing vessel" hosts. To date, there are less than 3000 confirmed human infections with avian-origin viruses and less than 7000 subclinical infections documented. Likewise, only a few hundreds of confirmed human cases caused by swine influenza viruses have been reported. Pigs are the historic mixing vessel host for the generation of zoonotic influenza viruses due to the expression of both avian-type and human-type receptors. Nevertheless, there are a number of hosts which carry both types of receptors and can act as a potential mixing vessel host. High vigilance is warranted to prevent the next pandemic caused by animal influenza viruses.

Mammalian pathogenicity and transmissibility of low pathogenic avian influenza H7N1 and H7N3 viruses isolated from North America in 2018

Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H7 subtype viruses are infrequently, but persistently, associated with outbreaks in poultry in North America. These LPAI outbreaks provide opportunities for the virus to develop enhanced virulence and transmissibility in mammals and have previously resulted in both occasional acquisition of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) phenotype in birds and sporadic cases of human infection. Two notable LPAI H7 subtype viruses caused outbreaks in 2018 in North America: LPAI H7N1 virus in chickens and turkeys, representing the first confirmed H7N1 infection in poultry farms in the United States, and LPAI H7N3 virus in turkeys, a virus subtype often associated with LPAI-to-HPAI phenotypes. Here, we investigated the replication capacity of representative viruses from these outbreaks in human respiratory tract cells and mammalian pathogenicity and transmissibility in the mouse and ferret models. We found that the LPAI H7 viruses replicated to high titre in human cells, reaching mean peak titres generally comparable to HPAI H7 viruses. Replication was efficient in both mammalian species, causing mild infection, with virus primarily limited to respiratory tract tissues. The H7 viruses demonstrated a capacity to transmit to naïve ferrets in a direct contact setting. These data support the need to perform routine risk assessments of LPAI H7 subtype viruses, even in the absence of confirmed human infection.

Pathogenesis and Transmission Assessments of Two H7N8 Influenza A Viruses Recently Isolated from Turkey Farms in Indiana Using Mouse and Ferret Models

Avian influenza A H7 viruses have caused multiple outbreaks in domestic poultry throughout North America, resulting in occasional infections of humans in close contact with affected birds. In early 2016, the presence of H7N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and closely related H7N8 low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses was confirmed in commercial turkey farms in Indiana. These H7N8 viruses represent the first isolation of this subtype in domestic poultry in North America, and their virulence in mammalian hosts and the potential risk for human infection are largely unknown. In this study, we assessed the ability of H7N8 HPAI and LPAI viruses to replicate in vitro in human airway cells and in vivo in mouse and ferret models. Both H7N8 viruses replicated efficiently in vitro and in vivo, but they exhibited substantial differences in disease severity in mammals. In mice, while the H7N8 LPAI virus largely remained avirulent, the H7N8 HPAI virus exhibited greater infectivity, virulence, and lethality. Both H7N8 viruses replicated similarly in ferrets, but only the H7N8 HPAI virus caused moderate weight loss, lethargy, and mortality. The H7N8 LPAI virus displayed limited transmissibility in ferrets placed in direct contact with an inoculated animal, while no transmission of H7N8 HPAI virus was detected. Our results indicate that the H7N8 avian influenza viruses from Indiana are able to replicate in mammals and cause severe disease but with limited transmission. The recent appearance of H7N8 viruses in domestic poultry highlights the need for continued influenza surveillance in wild birds and close monitoring of the potential risk to human health.

IMPORTANCE

H7 influenza viruses circulate in wild birds in the United States, but when the virus emerges in domestic poultry populations, the frequency of human exposure and the potential for human infections increases. An H7N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus and an H7N8 low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus were recently isolated from commercial turkey farms in Indiana. To determine the risk that these influenza viruses pose to humans, we assessed their pathogenesis and transmission in vitro and in mammalian models. We found that the H7N8 HPAI virus exhibited enhanced virulence, and although transmission was only observed with the H7N8 LPAI virus, the ability of this H7 virus to transmit in a mammalian host and quickly evolve to a more virulent strain is cause for concern. Our findings offer important insight into the potential for emerging H7 avian influenza viruses to acquire the ability to cause disease and transmit among mammals.

Influenza A virus transmission via respiratory aerosols or droplets as it relates to pandemic potential

Many respiratory viruses of humans originate from animals. For instance, there are now eight paramyxoviruses, four coronaviruses and four orthomxoviruses that cause recurrent epidemics in humans but were once confined to other hosts. In the last decade, several members of the same virus families have jumped the species barrier from animals to humans. Fortunately, these viruses have not become established in humans, because they lacked the ability of sustained transmission between humans. However, these outbreaks highlighted the lack of understanding of what makes a virus transmissible. In part triggered by the relatively high frequency of occurrence of influenza A virus zoonoses and pandemics, the influenza research community has started to investigate the viral genetic and biological traits that drive virus transmission via aerosols or respiratory droplets between mammals. Here we summarize recent discoveries on the genetic and phenotypic traits required for airborne transmission of zoonotic influenza viruses of subtypes H5, H7 and H9 and pandemic viruses of subtypes H1, H2 and H3. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of respiratory virus transmission is not only key from a basic scientific perspective, but may also aid in assessing the risks posed by zoonotic viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks.

Mapping influenza transmission in the ferret model to transmission in humans

The controversy surrounding 'gain-of-function' experiments on high-consequence avian influenza viruses has highlighted the role of ferret transmission experiments in studying the transmission potential of novel influenza strains. However, the mapping between influenza transmission in ferrets and in humans is unsubstantiated. We address this gap by compiling and analyzing 240 estimates of influenza transmission in ferrets and humans. We demonstrate that estimates of ferret secondary attack rate (SAR) explain 66% of the variation in human SAR estimates at the subtype level. Further analysis shows that ferret transmission experiments have potential to identify influenza viruses of concern for epidemic spread in humans, though small sample sizes and biological uncertainties prevent definitive classification of human transmissibility. Thus, ferret transmission experiments provide valid predictions of pandemic potential of novel influenza strains, though results should continue to be corroborated by targeted virological and epidemiological research.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.07969.001

Every year, thousands of people develop influenza (flu). After being infected by the influenza virus, the immune systems of most people adapt to fight off the virus if it is encountered again. However, there are many different strains of influenza, and new strains constantly evolve. Therefore, although someone may have developed resistance to one previously encountered strain, they can still become ill if another strain infects them.

Different strains of the influenza virus have different abilities to spread between people and make them ill. One way that scientists assess whether a particular strain of influenza is a threat to people is by studying ferrets, which develop many of the same flu symptoms as humans. However, questions have been raised over how accurately ferret studies reflect whether a particular virus strain will spread between humans.

Controversy has also arisen over experiments in which ferrets are infected with genetically engineered strains of influenza that mimic how a strain that has evolved in birds could adapt to cause a pandemic in humans. In 2014, the United States government suggested that such research should be temporarily stopped until more is known about the risks and usefulness of these studies. Now, Buhnerkempe, Gostic et al. have compared the results of 240 ferret and human studies that aimed to assess how easily strains of influenza spread. Specifically, the studies looked at how often a healthy ferret or human became ill when exposed to an animal or human infected with a particular strain of influenza.

The results of the ferret transmission studies matched well with transmission patterns observed in human studies. Ferret studies that assessed how the influenza virus is transmitted through the air via sneezes and coughs were particularly good at predicting how the virus spreads in humans. But Buhnerkempe, Gostic et al. caution that ferret studies are not always accurate, partly because they involve small numbers of animals, which can skew the results. There also needs to be more effort to standardize the procedures and measurements used in ferret studies.

Still, the analysis suggests that overall, ferret studies are a useful tool for making an initial prediction of which influenza strains may cause a pandemic in humans, which can then be verified using other methods.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.07969.002

Validation of normal human bronchial epithelial cells as a model for influenza A infections in human distal trachea

Primary normal human bronchial/tracheal epithelial (NHBE) cells, derived from the distal-most aspect of the trachea at the bifurcation, have been used for a number of studies in respiratory disease research. Differences between the source tissue and the differentiated primary cells may impact infection studies based on this model. Therefore, we examined how well-differentiated NHBE cells compared with their source tissue, the human distal trachea, as well as the ramifications of these differences on influenza A viral pathogenesis research using this model. We employed a histological analysis including morphological measurements, electron microscopy, multi-label immunofluorescence confocal microscopy, lectin histochemistry, and microarray expression analysis to compare differentiated NHBEs to human distal tracheal epithelium. Pseudostratified epithelial height, cell type variety and distribution varied significantly. Electron microscopy confirmed differences in cellular attachment and paracellular junctions. Influenza receptor lectin histochemistry revealed that α2,3 sialic acids were rarely present on the apical aspect of the differentiated NHBE cells, but were present in low numbers in the distal trachea. We bound fluorochrome bioconjugated virus to respiratory tissue and NHBE cells and infected NHBE cells with human influenza A viruses. Both indicated that the pattern of infection progression in these cells correlated with autopsy studies of fatal cases from the 2009 pandemic.

Identification, characterization, and natural selection of mutations driving airborne transmission of A/H5N1 virus

Recently, A/H5N1 influenza viruses were shown to acquire airborne transmissibility between ferrets upon targeted mutagenesis and virus passage. The critical genetic changes in airborne A/Indonesia/5/05 were not yet identified. Here, five substitutions proved to be sufficient to determine this airborne transmission phenotype. Substitutions in PB1 and PB2 collectively caused enhanced transcription and virus replication. One substitution increased HA thermostability and lowered the pH of membrane fusion. Two substitutions independently changed HA binding preference from α2,3-linked to α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. The loss of a glycosylation site in HA enhanced overall binding to receptors. The acquired substitutions emerged early during ferret passage as minor variants and became dominant rapidly. Identification of substitutions that are essential for airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between ferrets and their associated phenotypes advances our fundamental understanding of virus transmission and will increase the value of future surveillance programs and public health risk assessments.

Prevalence and control of H7 avian influenza viruses in birds and humans

The H7 subtype HA gene has been found in combination with all nine NA subtype genes. Most exhibit low pathogenicity and only rarely high pathogenicity in poultry (and humans). During the past few years infections of poultry and humans with H7 subtypes have increased markedly. This review summarizes the emergence of avian influenza virus H7 subtypes in birds and humans, and the possibilities of its control in poultry. All H7Nx combinations were reported from wild birds, the natural reservoir of the virus. Geographically, the most prevalent subtype is H7N7, which is endemic in wild birds in Europe and was frequently reported in domestic poultry, whereas subtype H7N3 is mostly isolated from the Americas. In humans, mild to fatal infections were caused by subtypes H7N2, H7N3, H7N7 and H7N9. While infections of humans have been associated mostly with exposure to domestic poultry, infections of poultry have been linked to wild birds or live-bird markets. Generally, depopulation of infected poultry was the main control tool; however, inactivated vaccines were also used. In contrast to recent cases caused by subtype H7N9, human infections were usually self-limiting and rarely required antiviral medication. Close genetic and antigenic relatedness of H7 viruses of different origins may be helpful in development of universal vaccines and diagnostics for both animals and humans. Due to the wide spread of H7 viruses and their zoonotic importance more research is required to better understand the epidemiology, pathobiology and virulence determinants of these viruses and to develop improved control tools.

Airborne transmission of highly pathogenic H7N1 influenza virus in ferrets

Avian H7 influenza viruses are recognized as potential pandemic viruses, as personnel often become infected during poultry outbreaks. H7 infections in humans typically cause mild conjunctivitis; however, the H7N9 outbreak in the spring of 2013 has resulted in severe respiratory disease. To date, no H7 viruses have acquired the ability for sustained transmission among humans. Airborne transmission is considered a requirement for the emergence of pandemic influenza, and advanced knowledge of the molecular changes or signature required for transmission would allow early identification of pandemic vaccine seed stocks, screening and stockpiling of antiviral compounds, and eradication efforts focused on flocks harboring threatening viruses. Thus, we sought to determine if a highly pathogenic influenza A H7N1 (A/H7N1) virus with no history of human infection could become capable of airborne transmission among ferrets. We show that after 10 serial passages, A/H7N1 developed the ability to be transmitted to cohoused and airborne contact ferrets. Four amino acid mutations (PB2 T81I, NP V284M, and M1 R95K and Q211K) in the internal genes and a minimal amino acid mutation (K/R313R) in the stalk region of the hemagglutinin protein were associated with airborne transmission. Furthermore, transmission was not associated with loss of virulence. These findings highlight the importance of the internal genes in host adaptation and suggest that natural isolates carrying these mutations be further evaluated. Our results demonstrate that a highly pathogenic avian H7 virus can become capable of airborne transmission in a mammalian host, and they support ongoing surveillance and pandemic H7 vaccine development.

IMPORTANCE

The major findings of this report are that a highly pathogenic strain of H7N1 avian influenza virus can be adapted to become capable of airborne transmission in mammals without mutations altering receptor specificity. Changes in receptor specificity have been shown to play a role in the ability of avian influenza viruses to cross the species barrier, and these changes are assumed to be essential. The work reported here challenges this paradigm, at least for the influenza viruses of the H7 subtype, which have recently become the focus of major attention, as they have crossed to humans.

Mammalian models for the study of H7 virus pathogenesis and transmission

Mammalian models, most notably the mouse and ferret, have been instrumental in the assessment of avian influenza virus pathogenicity and transmissibility, and have been used widely to characterize the molecular determinants that confer H5N1 virulence in mammals. However, while H7 influenza viruses have typically been associated with conjunctivitis and/or mild respiratory disease in humans, severe disease and death is also possible, as underscored by the recent emergence of H7N9 viruses in China. Despite the public health need to understand the pandemic potential of this virus subtype, H7 virus pathogenesis and transmission has not been as extensively studied. In this review, we discuss the heterogeneity of H7 subtype viruses isolated from humans, and the characterization of mammalian models to study the virulence of H7 subtype viruses associated with human infection, including viruses of both high and low pathogenicity and following multiple inoculation routes. The use of the ferret transmission model to assess the influence of receptor binding preference among contemporary H7 influenza viruses is described. These models have enabled the study of preventative and therapeutic agents, including vaccines and antivirals, to reduce disease burden, and have permitted a greater appreciation that not all highly pathogenic influenza viruses are created equal.

High efficiency gene transfer to airways of mice using influenza hemagglutinin pseudotyped lentiviral vectors

BACKGROUND

A limitation to efficient lentivirus-mediated airway gene transfer is the lack of receptors to commonly used viral envelopes on the luminal surface of airway epithelia. The use of viral envelopes with natural tropism to the airway could be useful for overcoming this limitation.

METHODS

We investigated influenza hemagglutinin (HA) pseudotyped equine infectious anemia virus-derived lentiviral vector-mediated gene transfer to the airway epithelium of adult and newborn mice. For these studies, high-titer vectors were delivered by intranasal administration. In addition, we tested the feasibility of vector re-dosing to the nasal airway.

RESULTS

Delivery of high-titer HA pseudotyped lentiviral vectors by nasal administration to newborn mouse pups or adult mice results in the efficient transduction of airway epithelial cells in the nose, trachea, and lungs. In the nose, vector expression was predominant in the respiratory epithelium and was not observed in the olfactory epithelium. In the trachea and large airways of the lung, approximately 46% and 40%, respectively, of surface epithelial cells could be transduced. The efficiency of re-dosing to the nasal airway of mice was found to be dependent of the age of the animal when the first dose is administered, as well as the length of time between doses.

CONCLUSIONS

A single intranasal dose of concentrated influenza HA-pseudotyped lentiviral vector is sufficient for efficient gene transfer to the airways of mice. This is a promising result that could lead to the development of effective gene transfer reagents for the treatment of cystic fibrosis and other human lung diseases.

Pathogenesis, transmissibility, and ocular tropism of a highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H7N3) virus associated with human conjunctivitis

H7 subtype influenza A viruses, responsible for numerous outbreaks in land-based poultry in Europe and the Americas, have caused over 100 cases of confirmed or presumed human infection over the last decade. The emergence of a highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N3 virus in poultry throughout the state of Jalisco, Mexico, resulting in two cases of human infection, prompted us to examine the virulence of this virus (A/Mexico/InDRE7218/2012 [MX/7218]) and related avian H7 subtype viruses in mouse and ferret models. Several high- and low-pathogenicity H7N3 and H7N9 viruses replicated efficiently in the respiratory tract of mice without prior adaptation following intranasal inoculation, but only MX/7218 virus caused lethal disease in this species. H7N3 and H7N9 viruses were also detected in the mouse eye following ocular inoculation. Virus from both H7N3 and H7N9 subtypes replicated efficiently in the upper and lower respiratory tracts of ferrets; however, only MX/7218 virus infection caused clinical signs and symptoms and was capable of transmission to naive ferrets in a direct-contact model. Similar to other highly pathogenic H7 viruses, MX/7218 replicated to high titers in human bronchial epithelial cells, yet it downregulated numerous genes related to NF-κB-mediated signaling transduction. These findings indicate that the recently isolated North American lineage H7 subtype virus associated with human conjunctivitis is capable of causing severe disease in mice and spreading to naive-contact ferrets, while concurrently retaining the ability to replicate within ocular tissue and allowing the eye to serve as a portal of entry.

Engineering H5N1 avian influenza viruses to study human adaptation

Two studies of H5N1 avian influenza viruses that had been genetically engineered to render them transmissible between ferrets have proved highly controversial. Divergent opinions exist about the importance of these studies of influenza transmission and about potential 'dual use' research implications. No consensus has developed yet about how to balance these concerns. After not recommending immediate full publication of earlier, less complete versions of the studies, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity subsequently recommended full publication of more complete manuscripts; however, controversy about this and similar research remains.

In vitro evolution of H5N1 avian influenza virus toward human-type receptor specificity

Acquisition of α2-6 sialoside receptor specificity by α2-3 specific highly-pathogenic avian influenza viruses (H5N1) is thought to be a prerequisite for efficient transmission in humans. By in vitro selection for binding α2-6 sialosides, we identified four variant viruses with amino acid substitutions in the hemagglutinin (S227N, D187G, E190G, and Q196R) that revealed modestly increased α2-6 and minimally decreased α2-3 binding by glycan array analysis. However, a mutant virus combining Q196R with mutations from previous pandemic viruses (Q226L and G228S) revealed predominantly α2-6 binding. Unlike the wild type H5N1, this mutant virus was transmitted by direct contact in the ferret model although not by airborne respiratory droplets. However, a reassortant virus with the mutant hemagglutinin, a human N2 neuraminidase and internal genes from an H5N1 virus was partially transmitted via respiratory droplets. The complex changes required for airborne transmissibility in ferrets suggest that extensive evolution is needed for H5N1 transmissibility in humans.

Predicting 'airborne' influenza viruses: (trans-) mission impossible?

Repeated transmission of animal influenza viruses to humans has prompted investigation of the viral, host, and environmental factors responsible for transmission via aerosols or respiratory droplets. How do we determine-out of thousands of influenza virus isolates collected in animal surveillance studies each year-which viruses have the potential to become 'airborne', and hence pose a pandemic threat? Here, using knowledge from pandemic, zoonotic and epidemic viruses, we postulate that the minimal requirements for efficient transmission of an animal influenza virus between humans are: efficient virus attachment to (upper) respiratory tissues, replication to high titers in these tissues, and release and aerosolization of single virus particles. Investigating 'airborne' transmission of influenza viruses is key to understand-and predict-influenza pandemics.

Lack of transmission of a human influenza virus with avian receptor specificity between ferrets is not due to decreased virus shedding but rather a lower infectivity in vivo

Influenza virus attaches to host cells by sialic acid (SA). Human influenza viruses show preferential affinity for α2,6-linked SA, whereas avian influenza viruses bind α2,3-linked SA. In this study, mutation of the haemagglutinin receptor-binding site of a human H3N2 influenza A virus to switch binding to α2,3-linked SA did not eliminate infection of ferrets but prevented transmission, even in a co-housed model. The mutant virus was shed from the noses of ferrets directly inoculated with virus in the same amounts and for the same length of time as wild-type virus. Mutant virus infection was localized to the same anatomical regions of the upper respiratory tract of directly inoculated animals. Interestingly, wild-type virus was more readily neutralized than the mutant virus in vitro by ferret nasal washes containing mucus. Moreover after inoculation of equal doses, the mutant virus grew poorly in ex vivo ferret nasal turbinate tissue compared with wild-type virus. The dose of mutant virus required to establish infection in the directly inoculated ferrets was 40-fold higher than for wild-type virus. It was concluded that minimum infectious dose is a predictor of virus transmissibility and it is suggested that, as virus passes from one host to another through stringent environmental conditions, viruses with a preference for α2,3-linked SA are unlikely to inoculate a new mammalian host in sufficient quantities to initiate a productive infection.

Infection with highly pathogenic H7 influenza viruses results in an attenuated proinflammatory cytokine and chemokine response early after infection

Avian influenza A viruses of the H7 subtype have resulted in more than 100 cases of human infection since 2002. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7 viruses have the capacity to cause severe respiratory disease and even death; however, the induction of the human innate immune response to H7 virus infection has not been well characterized. To better understand H7 virus pathogenesis in the human respiratory tract, we employed a polarized human bronchial epithelial cell model and primary human monocyte-derived macrophages. Here, we show that infection with HPAI H7 viruses resulted in a delayed and weakened production of cytokines, including the type I interferon response, compared with infections of other influenza A subtypes, including H7 viruses of low pathogenicity. These studies revealed that H7 viruses vary greatly in their ability to activate host innate responses and may contribute to the virulence of these viruses observed in humans.

Influenza A virus transmission: contributing factors and clinical implications

Efficient human-to-human transmission is a necessary property for the generation of a pandemic influenza virus. To date, only influenza A viruses within the H1-H3 subtypes have achieved this capacity. However, sporadic cases of severe disease in individuals following infection with avian influenza A viruses over the past decade, and the emergence of a pandemic H1N1 swine-origin virus in 2009, underscore the need to better understand how influenza viruses acquire the ability to transmit efficiently. In this review, we discuss the biological constraints and molecular features known to affect virus transmissibility to and among humans. Factors influencing the behaviour of aerosols in the environment are described, and the mammalian models used to study virus transmission are presented. Recent progress in understanding the molecular determinants that confer efficient transmission has identified crucial roles for the haemagglutinin and polymerase proteins; nevertheless, influenza virus transmission remains a polygenic trait that is not completely understood. The clinical implications of this research, including methods currently under investigation to mitigate influenza virus human-to-human transmission, are discussed. A better understanding of the viral determinants necessary for efficient transmission will allow us to identify avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.

Receptor binding profiles of avian influenza virus hemagglutinin subtypes on human cells as a predictor of pandemic potential

The host adaptation of influenza virus is partly dependent on the sialic acid (SA) isoform bound by the viral hemagglutinin (HA). Avian influenza viruses preferentially bind the α-2,3 SA and human influenza viruses the α-2,6 isoform. Each isoform is predominantly associated with different surface epithelial cell types of the human upper airway. Using recombinant HAs and human tracheal airway epithelial cells in vitro and ex vivo, we show that many avian HA subtypes do not adhere to this canonical view of SA specificity. The propensity of avian viruses to adapt to human receptors may thus be more widespread than previously supposed.