Is the evidence on the effectiveness of pay for performance schemes in healthcare changing? Evidence from a meta-regression analysis

Information provision and financial incentives in Catalonia's public primary care (2010-2019): an interrupted time series analysis

Background

The relative efficacy of information provision versus financial incentives in improving primary care quality remains a critical, unresolved question. We investigated these two strategies in Catalonia's public primary care system from 2010 to 2019: an innovative online platform providing real-time quality indicator information and targeted economic incentives for achieving indicator goals.

Methods

We conducted a comprehensive interrupted time series regression analysis on data from 272 primary care practices (5,628,080 patients). This analysis used linear regression models with Newey-West standard errors, and a sensitivity analysis including logit transformations to address ceiling effects. We evaluated 1) immediate post-intervention changes (step changes) in indicator results and inter-practice variability (coefficient of variation, CV), and 2) shifts in pre-intervention trends (slopes). We scrutinized 39 indicators after rigorous quality control: 23 novel (12 informed, 11 incentivized) and 16 derived from existing incentivized indicators. Robustness checks included 14 consistently incentivized and 10 non-intervened indicators. Overall, we assessed 63 indicators: 18 control, 13 follow-up, 9 quaternary prevention, 7 treatment, 7 diagnosis, 6 screening and 3 vaccination indicators.

Findings

Informed indicators showed positive impacts in 75% (9/12) of cases, and incentivized indicators in 64% (7/11) of cases. Incentivized indicators displayed improvements in annual trends ranging from 6.66 to 1.25 percentage points, with step changes up to 8.87 percentage points. Information led to step changes ranging from 19.67 to 1.07 percentage points, along with trend improvements between 1.09 and 0.34 percentage points annually. Both interventions were associated with step reductions in variability (up to -0.18 CV reduction) and significant trend improvements. Derived indicators showed limited improvements in results or variability (31%, 5/16), with minor step increases up to 2.22 percentage points.

Interpretation

Our findings reveal that information provision alone can match or even surpass the impact of financial incentives in improving care quality and reducing practice variability. This challenges conventional wisdom and offers a cost-effective, scalable approach to primary care quality enhancement, with far-reaching implications for global health policy.

Funding

European Union, Horizon Europe.

Inclusion of disability in primary healthcare facilities and socioeconomic inequity in Brazil

OBJECTIVE

To describe disability-related performance and inequality nationwide in Brazil, and the changes that took place between 2012 and 2019 after the introduction of Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ).

METHODS

We derived scores for disability-related care and accessibility of primary healthcare facilities from PMAQ indicators collected in round 1 (2011-2013), and round 3 (2015-2019). We assessed how scores changed after the introduction of PMAQ. We used census data on per capita income of local areas to examine the disability-specific care and accessibility scores by income group. We undertook ordinary least squares regressions to examine the association between PMAQ scores and per capita income of each local area across implementation rounds.

RESULTS

Disability-related care scores were low in round 1 (18.8, 95%CI 18.3-19.3, out of a possible 100) and improved slightly by round 3 (22.5, 95%CI 22.0-23.1). Accessibility of primary healthcare facilities was also poor in round 1 (30.3, 95%CI 29.8-30.8) but doubled by round 3 (60.8, 95%CI 60.3-61.3). There were large socioeconomic inequalities in round 1, with both scores approximately twice as high in the richest compared to the poorest group. Inequalities weakened somewhat for accessibility scores by round 3. These trends were confirmed through regression analyses, controlling for other area characteristics. Disability-related and accessibility scores also varied strongly between states in both rounds.

CONCLUSIONS

People with disabilities are being left behind by the Brazilian healthcare system, particularly in poor areas, which will challenge the achievement of universal health coverage.

Evidence on the effectiveness of value-based payment schemes implemented in a hospital setting: A systematic review

Value-based payment is among payment models rewarding health care providers for achieving pre-defined targets of quality or efficiency measures of care. This paper aims to identify the evidence of the effectiveness of value-based payment schemes implemented in hospital settings. A systematic review of databases for studies published from 2000 to 2022 that evaluated VBP programs was conducted. We searched four databases including PubMed, Scopus, Embase, and Web of Sciences in July 2023. Studies were screened and assessed for eligibility. A thematic analysis approach was used to synthesize and summarize the findings. Overall, 29 articles looking into the VBP programs have been included. Most articles describe the effects on the outcome of care (n = 18). The findings of a great deal of evidence in this field show that VBP is not correlated with some outcome measures including hospital-acquired conditions, 30-day mortality, mortality trends, as well as mortality among patients with acute myocardial infarction or heart failure. Only three of 12 studies have revealed a positive relationship between a P4P program and efficiency. Seven studies from the United States (US) found no evidence or mixed findings on the effects of P4P on efficiency. The magnitude of the effects of VBP on healthcare quality, patient experience, and costs has often been small and non-significant. The unintended negative impact of incentives in value-based payment on hospitals should be tackled when adopting policies and decisions.

Assessing the uptake of incentivised physical health checks for people with serious mental illness: a cohort study in primary care

BACKGROUND

People with serious mental illness are more likely to experience physical illnesses. The onset of many of these illnesses can be prevented if detected early. Physical health screening for people with serious mental illness is incentivised in primary care in England through the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). GPs are paid to conduct annual physical health checks on patients with serious mental illness, including checks of body mass index (BMI), cholesterol, and alcohol consumption.

AIM

To assess the impact of removing and reintroducing QOF financial incentives on uptake of three physical health checks (BMI, cholesterol, and alcohol consumption) for patients with serious mental illness.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Cohort study using UK primary care data from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink between April 2011 and March 2020.

METHOD

A difference-in-difference analysis was employed to compare differences in the uptake of physical health checks before and after the intervention, accounting for relevant observed and unobserved confounders.

RESULTS

An immediate change was found in uptake after physical health checks were removed from, and after they were added back to, the QOF list. For BMI, cholesterol, and alcohol checks, the overall impact of removal was a reduction in uptake of 14.3, 6.8, and 11.9 percentage points, respectively. The reintroduction of BMI screening in the QOF increased the uptake by 10.2 percentage points.

CONCLUSION

This analysis supports the hypothesis that QOF incentives lead to better uptake of physical health checks.

Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physicians

In France, addressing balance billing is essential for equitable healthcare access and reducing physician income disparities. The National Health Insurance (NHI) introduced financial incentive programs, namely the "Contract for Access to Care" (CAS) in 2014 and the "Option for Controlled Pricing" (OPTAM) in 2017, to encourage physicians to reduce extra fees and adhere to regulated prices. This study analyzed the impact of these programs on self-employed physicians using a comprehensive administrative dataset covering specialist physicians from 2005 to 2017. The dataset comprised 9891 surgical specialists (30,972 observations) and 6926 medical specialists (21,650 observations) between 2005 and 2017. Applying a difference-in-differences design with a two-way fixed effect model and matching through the "Coarsened Exact Matching" method, the study examined CAS and/or OPTAM membership effects on physicians' activity and fees. The results indicate that both the CAS and OPTAM successfully enhance access to care. Physicians treat more patients, particularly those with lower incomes who might have previously avoided care because of the extra fees. However, an increased patient load translates to a higher workload for physicians. Despite a fee increase, it was observed to be smaller than the surge in activity. Furthermore, if all physicians are appropriately rewarded for their efforts, this improvement in access comes at a cost to NHI. This study's findings provide crucial insights into the nuanced effects of these financial incentive programs on physicians' behavior, highlighting the tradeoff between improved access and increased NHI costs. Ultimately, these findings underscore the complexity of balancing financial incentives, physician workload, and healthcare accessibility in pursuit of a more equitable healthcare system.

Pay-for-Performance incentives for specialised services in England: a mixed methods evaluation

BACKGROUND

A Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programme, known as Prescribed Specialised Services Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (PSS CQUIN), was introduced for specialised services in the English NHS in 2013/2014. These services treat patients with rare and complex conditions. We evaluate the implementation of PSS CQUIN contracts between 2016/2017 and 2018/2019.

METHODS

We used a mixed methods evaluative approach. In the quantitative analysis, we used a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the effectiveness of ten PSS CQUIN schemes across a range of targeted outcomes. Potential selection bias was addressed using propensity score matching. We also estimated impacts on costs by scheme and financial year. In the qualitative analysis, we conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to gain insights into the complexities of contract design and programme implementation. Qualitative data analysis was based on the constant comparative method, inductively generating themes.

RESULTS

The ten PSS CQUIN schemes had limited impact on the targeted outcomes. A statistically significant improvement was found for only one scheme: in the clinical area of trauma, the incentive scheme increased the probability of being discharged from Adult Critical Care within four hours of being clinically ready by 7%. The limited impact may be due to the size of the incentive payments, the complexity of the schemes' design, and issues around ownership, contracting and flexibility.

CONCLUSION

The PSS CQUIN schemes had little or no impact on quality improvements in specialised services. Future P4P programmes in healthcare could benefit from lessons learnt from this study on incentive design and programme implementation.

Primary care providers' preferences for pay-for-performance programs: a discrete choice experiment study in Shandong China

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes are commonly used to incentivize primary healthcare (PHC) providers to improve the quality of care they deliver. However, the effectiveness of P4P schemes can vary depending on their design. In this study, we aimed to investigate the preferences of PHC providers for participating in P4P programs in a city in Shandong province, China.

METHOD

We conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) with 882 PHC providers, using six attributes: type of incentive, whom to incentivize, frequency of incentive, size of incentive, the domain of performance measurement, and release of performance results. Mixed logit models and latent class models were used for the statistical analyses.

RESULTS

Our results showed that PHC providers had a strong negative preference for fines compared to bonuses (- 1.91; 95%CI - 2.13 to - 1.69) and for annual incentive payments compared to monthly (- 1.37; 95%CI - 1.59 to - 1.14). Providers also showed negative preferences for incentive size of 60% of monthly income, group incentives, and non-release of performance results. On the other hand, an incentive size of 20% of monthly income and including quality of care in performance measures were preferred. We identified four distinct classes of providers with different preferences for P4P schemes. Class 2 and Class 3 valued most of the attributes differently, while Class 1 and Class 4 had a relatively small influence from most attributes.

CONCLUSION

P4P schemes that offer bonuses rather than fines, monthly rather than annual payments, incentive size of 20% of monthly income, paid to individuals, including quality of care in performance measures, and release of performance results are likely to be more effective in improving PHC performance. Our findings also highlight the importance of considering preference heterogeneity when designing P4P schemes.

A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

[Pay for performance in public directly managed healthcare centers. Part 1: General framework. SESPAS Report 2024]

Assessing and compensating performance in professional organizations is extremely difficult in direct public management settings of health services. Performance assessment is technically complex and, more so, with multiplicity of principals influencing goal setting. Incentives are a lever to generate directionality and motivation, both structural (for attracting and retaining workers) and specific ones (rewarding performance and directing behavior towards institutional goals). Incentives influence the behavior of workers in various ways, and their effectiveness seams weak and controversial in publicly run health services. To overcome the problems of deciding and evaluating performance, both good governance models and the revitalization of contractual management are required. To improve the effectiveness of incentive models, it is convenient to: 1) widen the conceptual framework of incentives, to incorporate the structural aspects of employment contract and payment; 2) improve the designs from a greater understanding of the determinants of motivation; and 3) broaden the lens to survey the extra-mural factors that alter the behavior of workers, trying to counter them.

Physician-hospital alignment: A definition and framework grounded in physicians' perception

The alignment of physicians' interests with those of their hospital has garnered considerable interest in recent years, in part because of their central role in health care expenditure and patient outcomes. However, the systematic study of physician-hospital alignment is currently impeded by a lack of construct clarity. This is evidenced by research that conflates the actions intended to create alignment with alignment itself. It is also evidenced by a variety of different definitions, conceptualizations, and measures in the literature, most of which are confounded with constructs that are something other than alignment (e.g., commitment, trust).

CRITICAL THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

We draw on agency theory and person-organization fit to define physician-hospital alignment as a physician's perception that their financial incentives, goals, and values and those of their hospital are mutually supporting and reinforcing rather than in conflict with one another.

ADVANCE

To better understand the nature of the construct and to help guide future research, we present an integrative framework grounded in physicians' perceptions.

PRACTICE IMPLICATION

Our definition and framework set the stage for improved construct validation and more systematic study and management of physician-hospital alignment.

It takes quality improvement to cross the chasm

Healthcare organisations in the USA rank significantly lower in quality of care compared with other developed nations. Research shows US performance emphasises expensive treatment over effective prevention programmes. This study demonstrates how a comprehensive quality improvement programme can improve health outcomes in a large county-based Medicaid health plan. The health plan serves a diverse community of members spanning racial and ethnic groups with varying levels of clinical risk and social determinants of health burdens. We used a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the impact of a comprehensive quality improvement programme vs using mainly pay-for-performance on Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) metrics over the course of 10 years. We found significant improvements in several HEDIS metrics that occurred after the quality improvement programme was implemented. These results demonstrate the importance of using a comprehensive quality improvement strategy along with pay-for-performance to improve health outcomes. It was determined that this research was exempt from institutional review board approval, as it used administrative healthcare data, and did not involve direct interventions with human subjects.

Spillover effects of financial incentives for providers onto non-targeted patients: daycase surgery in English hospitals

BACKGROUND

Incentives for healthcare providers may also affect non-targeted patients. These spillover effects have important implications for the full impact and evaluation of incentive schemes. However, there are few studies on the extent of such spillovers in health care. We investigated whether incentives to perform surgical procedures as daycases affected whether other elective procedures in the same specialties were also treated as daycases.

DATA

8,505,754 patients treated for 92 non-targeted procedures in 127 hospital trusts in England between April and March 2016.

METHODS

Interrupted time series analysis of the probability of being treated as a daycase for non-targeted patients treated in six specialties where targeted patients were also treated and three specialties where they were not.

RESULTS

The daycase rate initially increased (1.04 percentage points, SE: 0.30) for patients undergoing a non-targeted procedure in incentivised specialties but then reduced over time. Conversely, the daycase rate gradually decreased over time for patients treated in a non-incentivised specialty.

DISCUSSION

Spillovers from financial incentives have variable effects over different activities and over time. Policymakers and researchers should consider the possibility of spillovers in the design and evaluation of incentive schemes.

Assessing Taiwan's pay-for-performance program for diabetes care: a cost-benefit net value approach

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) to better manage chronic conditions has yielded mixed results. A better understanding of the cost and benefit of P4P is needed to improve program assessment. To this end, we assessed the effect of a P4P program using a quasi-experimental intervention and control design. Two different intervention groups were used, one consisting of newly enrolled P4P patients, and another using P4P patients who have been enrolled since the beginning of the study. Patient-level data on clinical indicators, utilization and expenditures, linked with national death registry, were collected for diabetic patients at a large regional hospital in Taiwan between 2007 and 2013. Net value, defined as the value of life years gained minus the cost of care, is calculated and compared for the intervention group of P4P patients with propensity score-matched non-P4P samples. We found that Taiwan's implementation of the P4P program for diabetic care yielded positive net values, ranging from $40,084 USD to $348,717 USD, with higher net values in the continuous enrollment model. Our results suggest that the health benefits from P4P enrollment may require a sufficient time frame to manifest, so a net value approach incorporating future predicted mortality risks may be especially important for studying chronic disease management. Future research on the mechanisms by which the Taiwan P4P program helped improve outcomes could help translate our findings to other clinical contexts.

Family doctor responses to changes in target stringency under financial incentives

Healthcare providers may game when faced with targets. We examine how family doctors responded to a temporary but substantial increase in the stringency of targets determining payments for controlling blood pressure amongst younger hypertensive patients. We apply difference-in-differences and bunching techniques to data from electronic health records of 107,148 individuals. Doctors did not alter the volume or composition of lists of their hypertension patients. They did increase treatment intensity, including a 1.2 percentage point increase in prescribing antihypertensive medicines. They also undertook more blood pressure measurements. Multiple testing increased by 1.9 percentage points overall and by 8.8 percentage points when first readings failed more stringent target. Exemption of patients from reported performance increased by 0.8 percentage points. Moreover, the proportion of patients recorded as exactly achieving the more stringent target increased by 3.1 percentage points to 16.6%. Family doctors responded as intended and gamed when set more stringent pay-for-performance targets.

Motivation and competition in health care

Non-pecuniary sources of motivation are a strong feature of the health care sector and the impact of competitive incentives on behavior may be lower where pecuniary motivation is low. This paper measures the marginal utility of income (MUY) of physicians from a stated-choice experiment, and examines whether this measure influences the association between competition faced by physicians and the prices they charge. We find that physicians are more likely to exploit a lack of competition with higher prices if they have a high MUY.

Changing Hospital Care For Older Adults: The Case for Geriatric Hospitals in the United States

Hospital care of frail older adults is far from optimal. Although some geriatric models of care have been shown to improve outcomes, the effect size is small and models are difficult to fully implement, sustain and replicate. The two root causes for these shortcomings are competing interests (high revenue generating diseases, procedures and surgeries) and current hospital cultures (for example a culture of safety that emphasizes bed alarms and immobility rather than frequent ambulation). Geriatric hospitals would be hospitals completely dedicated to the care of frail older patients, a group which is most vulnerable to the negative consequences of a hospitalization. They would differ from a typical adult hospital because they could implement evidence based principles of successful geriatric models of care on a hospital wide basis, which would make them sustainable and allow for scaling up of proven outcomes. Innovative structural designs, unachievable in a typical adult hospital, would enhance mobility while maintaining safety. Financial viability and stability would be a challenge but should be feasible, likely through affiliation with larger health care systems with other hospitals because of cost savings associated with geriatric models of care (decreased length of stay, increased likelihood of discharge home, without increasing costs).

Perceptions of nurses and physicians on pay-for-performance in hospital: a systematic review of qualitative studies

AIMS

To systematically examine perceptions of nurses and physicians on pay-for-performance in hospital.

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance projects have proliferated over the past two decades, most systematic reviews of which solely focused on its effectiveness in primary healthcare and the physicians' or nurses' attitudes. However, systematic reviews of qualitative approaches for better examining perceptions of both nurses and physicians in hospital are lacking.

EVALUATION

Electronic databases were systematic searched with date from its inception to December 31, 2020. Meta-aggregation synthesis methodology and the conceptual framework of the Theory of Planned Behavior were used to summarize findings.

KEY ISSUES

A total of nine studies were included. Three major synthesized themes were identified: (1) perceptions of the motivation effects and positive outcomes (2) perceptions about the design defects and negative effects (3) perceptions of the obstacles in the implementation process.

CONCLUSION

To maximize the intended positive effects, nurses' and physicians' perceptions should be considered and incorporated into the project design and implementation stage.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NURSING MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH

The paper gives enlightenment to nurse managers on improving and advancing the cause of nurses when planning for or evaluating their institutions' policies on pay-for-performance in the future research.