Evidence for emulation in chimpanzees in social settings using the floating peanut task

Tool mastering today - an interdisciplinary perspective

Tools have coined human life, living conditions, and culture. Recognizing the cognitive architecture underlying tool use would allow us to comprehend its evolution, development, and physiological basis. However, the cognitive underpinnings of tool mastering remain little understood in spite of long-time research in neuroscientific, psychological, behavioral and technological fields. Moreover, the recent transition of tool use to the digital domain poses new challenges for explaining the underlying processes. In this interdisciplinary review, we propose three building blocks of tool mastering: (A) perceptual and motor abilities integrate to tool manipulation knowledge, (B) perceptual and cognitive abilities to functional tool knowledge, and (C) motor and cognitive abilities to means-end knowledge about tool use. This framework allows for integrating and structuring research findings and theoretical assumptions regarding the functional architecture of tool mastering via behavior in humans and non-human primates, brain networks, as well as computational and robotic models. An interdisciplinary perspective also helps to identify open questions and to inspire innovative research approaches. The framework can be applied to studies on the transition from classical to modern, non-mechanical tools and from analogue to digital user-tool interactions in virtual reality, which come with increased functional opacity and sensorimotor decoupling between tool user, tool, and target. By working towards an integrative theory on the cognitive architecture of the use of tools and technological assistants, this review aims at stimulating future interdisciplinary research avenues.

Emulative learning of a two-step task in free-ranging domestic pigs

Previous research showed that young domestic pigs learn through observation of conspecifics by using social learning mechanisms like social facilitation, enhancement effects, and even object movement re-enactment. The latter suggests some form of emulative learning in which the observer learns about the object's movements and affordances. As it remains unclear whether pigs need a social agent to learn about objects, we provided 36 free-ranging domestic pigs with varying degrees of social to non-social demonstrations on how to solve a two-step manipulative foraging task: observers watched either a conspecific or a human demonstrator, or self-moving objects ("ghost control"), or a ghost control accompanied by an inactive conspecific bystander. In addition, 22 subjects that were previously tested without any demonstrator were used as a non-observer control. To solve the task, the subjects had to first remove a plug from its recess to then be able to slide a cover to the side, which would lay open a food compartment. Observers interacted longer with the relevant objects (plugs) and were more successful in solving the task compared to non-observers. We found no differences with regard to success between the four observer groups, indicating that the pigs mainly learned about the apparatus rather than about the actions. As the only common feature of the different demonstrations was the movement of the plug and the cover, we conclude the observer pigs learned primarily by emulation, suggesting that social agents are not necessary for pigs when learning through observation.

Cultural evolution in the science of culture and cultural evolution

My critical review [1] elicited a welcome diversity of perspectives across the 12 commentaries now published [2-13]. In total 28 co-authors were inspired to contribute. In addition to engaging with the critical perspectives of my review, several of the commentaries take the debates and discussions into insightful and potentially important supplementary domains that I highlight in what follows. I have extracted a number of major themes in which I detected overlaps in the foci of different commentaries, and I use these to organise my replies. I hope that our shared efforts will constitute some degree of 'cultural evolution' in our science, as suggested in the title of this reply to commentaries.

The method of exclusion (still) cannot identify specific mechanisms of cultural inheritance

The method of exclusion identifies patterns of distributions of behaviours and/or artefact forms among different groups, where these patterns are deemed unlikely to arise from purely genetic and/or ecological factors. The presence of such patterns is often used to establish whether a species is cultural or not-i.e. whether a species uses social learning or not. Researchers using or describing this method have often pointed out that the method cannot pinpoint which specific type(s) of social learning resulted in the observed patterns. However, the literature continues to contain such inferences. In a new attempt to warn against these logically unwarranted conclusions, we illustrate this error using a novel approach. We use an individual-based model, focused on wild ape cultural patterns-as these patterns are the best-known cases of animal culture and as they also contain the most frequent usage of the unwarranted inference for specific social learning mechanisms. We built a model that contained agents unable to copy specifics of behavioural or artefact forms beyond their individual reach (which we define as "copying"). We did so, as some of the previous inference claims related to social learning mechanisms revolve around copying defined in this way. The results of our model however show that non-copying social learning can already reproduce the defining-even iconic-features of observed ape cultural patterns detected by the method of exclusion. This shows, using a novel model approach, that copying processes are not necessary to produce the cultural patterns that are sometimes still used in an attempt to identify copying processes. Additionally, our model could fully control for both environmental and genetic factors (impossible in real life) and thus offers a new validity check for the method of exclusion as related to general cultural claims-a check that the method passed. Our model also led to new and additional findings, which we likewise discuss.

Raising the level: orangutans solve the floating peanut task without visual feedback

Chimpanzees and orangutans are able to generate innovative behaviors to solve complicated physical problems. For example, when presented with an out-of-reach peanut at the bottom of a vertical tube (floating peanut task-FPT), some of them spontaneously spit water into the tube until the peanut floats to the top. Yet, it is unclear whether this innovative solution results from repeating those actions that bring the peanut incrementally closer to the top or from anticipating the solution before acting. In the current study, we addressed this question by presenting three naïve orangutans with an opaque version of the FPT that prevented them from obtaining visual information about the effect of their actions on the position of the peanut. One of the subjects solved the opaque FPT in the very first trial: he collected water from the faucet and poured it into the opaque tube repeatedly until the hitherto non-visible peanut reached the top. This provides evidence for the first time that orangutans can potentially solve the FPT without relying on sensorimotor learning, but to some extent by mentally representing the problem.

One Function One Tool? A Review on Mutual Exclusivity in Tool Use Learning in Human and Non-human Species

The goal of this review is twofold: first to explore whether mutual exclusivity and functional fixedness overlap and what might be their respective specificities and second, to investigate whether mutual exclusivity as an inferential principle could be applied in other domains than language and whether it can be found in non-human species. In order to do that, we first give an overview of the representative studies of each phenomenon. We then analyze papers on tool use learning in children that studied or observed one of these phenomena. We argue that, despite their common principle -one tool one function- mutual exclusivity and functional fixedness are two distinct phenomena and need to be addressed separately in order to fully understand the mechanisms underlying social learning and cognition. In addition, mutual exclusivity appears to be applicable in other domains than language learning, namely tool use learning and is also found in non-human species when learning symbols and tools.

Beyond social learning

Cultural evolution requires the social transmission of information. For this reason, scholars have emphasized social learning when explaining how and why culture evolves. Yet cultural evolution results from many mechanisms operating in concert. Here, we argue that the emphasis on social learning has distracted scholars from appreciating both the full range of mechanisms contributing to cultural evolution and how interactions among those mechanisms and other factors affect the output of cultural evolution. We examine understudied mechanisms and other factors and call for a more inclusive programme of investigation that probes multiple levels of the organization, spanning the neural, cognitive-behavioural and populational levels. To guide our discussion, we focus on factors involved in three core topics of cultural evolution: the emergence of culture, the emergence of cumulative cultural evolution and the design of cultural traits. Studying mechanisms across levels can add explanatory power while revealing gaps and misconceptions in our knowledge. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Insights from comparative research on social and cultural learning

Social cognitive skills play a crucial role in human life, and have allowed us to reach a unique level of behavioral and cultural complexity. However, many nonhuman species also show a complex understanding of the social world. Building on theories of human social development, we will follow the emergence of cultural learning skills across taxa, discussing similarities and differences between humans and other species. We will first review literature on social learning, including enhancement, emulation and imitation. Then, we will discuss existing studies on the evolution of teaching, and finally, we will critically review literature on the social transmission of skills and knowledge across generations. By adopting a comparative perspective, we will be able to identify the unique characteristics of social transmission in humans, and the social skills that are instead shared with other species, to gain a deeper understanding of the role of cultural learning in social cognitive development.

The Psychological Reach of Culture in Animals’ Lives

Culture—the totality of traditions acquired in a community by social learning from other individuals—has increasingly been found to be pervasive not only in humans’ but in many other animals’ lives. Compared with learning on one’s own initiative, learning from others can be very much safer and more efficient, as the wisdom already accumulated by other individuals is assimilated. This article offers an overview of often surprising recent discoveries charting the reach of culture across an ever-expanding diversity of species, as well as an extensive variety of behavioral domains, and throughout an animal’s life. The psychological reach of culture is reflected in the knowledge and skills an animal thus acquires, via an array of different social learning processes. Social learning is often further guided by a suite of adaptive psychological biases, such as conformity and learning from optimal models. In humans, cumulative cultural change over generations has generated the complex cultural phenomena observed today. Animal cultures have been thought to lack this cumulative power, but recent findings suggest that elementary versions of cumulative culture may be important in animals’ lives.

Clarifying Misconceptions of the Zone of Latent Solutions Hypothesis: A Response to Haidle and Schlaudt: Miriam Noël Haidle and Oliver Schlaudt: Where Does Cumulative Culture Begin? A Plea for a Sociologically Informed Perspective (Biological Theory 15: 161-174, 2020)

The critical examination of current hypotheses is one of the key ways in which scientific fields develop and grow. Therefore, any critique, including Haidle and Schlaudt's article, "Where Does Cumulative Culture Begin? A Plea for a Sociologically Informed Perspective," represents a welcome addition to the literature. However, critiques must also be evaluated. In their article, Haidle and Schlaudt (Biol Theory 15:161-174, 2020. 10.1007/s13752-020-00351-w; henceforth H&S) review some approaches to culture and cumulative culture in both human and nonhuman primates. H&S discuss the "zone of latent solutions" (ZLS) hypothesis as applied to nonhuman primates and stone-toolmaking premodern hominins. Here, we will evaluate whether H&S's critique addresses its target.

The use of individual, social, and animated cue information by capuchin monkeys and children in a touchscreen task

The distinctiveness of human cumulative culture raises the question of whether humans respond differently to information originating from social sources, compared with information from other sources. Further, does any such differential responding set humans apart from other species? We studied how capuchin monkeys and 2- to 5-year-old children used information originating from their own actions, those of a human demonstrator, or an animated cue. This information, presented via a touchscreen, always revealed in the first trial (T1) the reward value (rewarded or unrewarded) of one stimulus from a 2- or 3-item array, and could be used in a follow-up trial (T2) involving the same stimulus array. Two monkeys achieved a level of proficiency indicating their appreciation of the T1–T2 relationship, i.e., reliably repeating rewarded (“win”) selections and actively avoiding repetition of unrewarded (“lose”) selections well above chance levels. Neither the two task-proficient monkeys nor the children showed overall performance differences between the three source conditions. Non-task-proficient monkeys, by contrast, did show effects of source, performing best with individually-acquired information. The overall pattern of results hints at an alternative perspective on evidence typically interpreted as showing a human advantage for social information use.

Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) problem-solving skills are influenced by housing facility and captive care duration

Although a large body of primate cognition research is done in captive institutions, little is known about how much individuals from different facilities vary in their experiences and cognitive skills. Here we present the results of an experimental study investigating how physical cognitive skills vary between chimpanzees in relation to captive settings and their time in captivity. We tested 59 chimpanzees housed at two different captive facilities (a rehabilitation center (sanctuary) and a zoo) in three problem-solving tasks. Our results showed that chimpanzees at the two housing facilities significantly differed in overall task performance. On average, the sanctuary chimpanzees outperformed the chimpanzees housed at the zoo in the detour reaching task and the honey trap task. However, the zoo chimpanzees performed slightly better on average in the learning task. We propose that, for this particular sample, the documented differences result from a combination of factors, such as prior experience with cognitive testing, motivation levels and varying degrees of human exposure. Within the sanctuary sample, we found that chimpanzees who arrived at an earlier age at the sanctuary and had therefore spent a larger percentage of their lives in a captive environment, were better problem-solvers than those that arrived at a later age to the sanctuary. Thus, rehabilitation and time in captivity contributed to improved physical cognitive skills in sanctuary chimpanzees. Our results highlight the importance of studying intraspecific variation and the effect that previous experience and living conditions might have on physical cognitive skills in non-human apes. Accordingly, we should be cautious when extrapolating findings of cognitive studies from one population to the species as a whole.

The technical reasoning hypothesis does not rule out the potential key roles of imitation and working memory for CTC

To support their claim for technical reasoning skills rather than imitation as the key for cumulative technological culture (CTC), Osiurak and Reynaud argue that chimpanzees can imitate mechanical actions, but do not have CTC. They also state that an increase in working memory in human evolution could not have been a key driver of CTC. We discuss why we disagree with these claims.

The elephant in the China shop: When technical reasoning meets cumulative technological culture

The commentaries have both revealed the implications of and challenged our approach. In this response, we reply to these concerns, discuss why the technical-reasoning hypothesis does not minimize the role of social-learning mechanisms - nor assume that technical-reasoning skills make individuals omniscient technically - and make suggestions for overcoming the classical opposition between the cultural versus cognitive niche hypothesis of cumulative technological culture.

A review of research in primate sanctuaries

While non-human primate studies have long been conducted in laboratories, and more recently at zoological parks, sanctuaries are increasingly considered a viable setting for research. Accredited sanctuaries in non-range countries house thousands of primates formerly used as subjects of medical research, trained performers or personal pets. In range countries, however, sanctuaries typically house orphaned primates confiscated from illegal poaching and the bushmeat and pet trafficking trades. Although the primary mission of these sanctuaries is to rescue and rehabilitate residents, many of these organizations are increasingly willing to participate in non-invasive research. Notably, from a scientific standpoint, most sanctuaries provide potential advantages over traditional settings, such as large, naturalistic physical and social environments which may result in more relevant models of primates' free-ranging wild counterparts than other captive settings. As a result, an impressive scope of research in the fields of primate behaviour, cognition, veterinary science, genetics and physiology have been studied in sanctuaries. In this review, we examine the range and form of research that has been conducted at accredited sanctuaries around the world. We also describe the potential challenges of sanctuary-based work and the considerations that external researchers may face when deciding to collaborate with primate sanctuaries on their research projects.

Testing the individual and social learning abilities of task-naïve captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes sp.) in a nut-cracking task

Nut-cracking is often cited as one of the most complex behaviours observed in wild chimpanzees. However, the cognitive mechanisms behind its acquisition are still debated. The current null hypothesis is that the form of nut-cracking behaviour relies on variants of social learning, with some researchers arguing, more precisely, that copying variants of social learning mechanisms are necessary. However, to date, very few experiments have directly investigated the potentially sufficient role of individual learning in explaining the behavioural form of nut-cracking. Despite this, the available data provides some evidence for the spontaneous acquisition of nut-cracking by chimpanzees; later group acquisition was then found to be at least facilitated by (unspecified) variants of social learning. The latter findings are in line with both suggested hypotheses, i.e., that copying social learning is required and that other (non-copying) social learning mechanisms are at play. Here we present the first study which focused (initially) on the role of individual learning for the acquisition of the nut-cracking behavioural form in chimpanzees. We tested task-naïve chimpanzees (N = 13) with an extended baseline condition to examine whether the behaviour would emerge spontaneously. After the baseline condition (which was unsuccessful), we tested for the role of social learning by providing social information in a step-wise fashion, culminating in a full action demonstration of nut-cracking by a human demonstrator (this last condition made it possible for the observers to copy all actions underlying the behaviour). Despite the opportunities to individually and/or socially learn nut-cracking, none of the chimpanzees tested here cracked nuts using tools in any of the conditions in our study; thus, providing no conclusive evidence for either competing hypothesis. We conclude that this failure was the product of an interplay of factors, including behavioural conservatism and the existence of a potential sensitive learning period for nut-cracking in chimpanzees. The possibility remains that nut-cracking is a behaviour that chimpanzees can individually learn. However, this behaviour might only be acquired when chimpanzees are still inside their sensitive learning period, and when ecological and developmental conditions allow for it. The possibility remains that nut-cracking is an example of a culture dependent trait in non-human great apes. Recommendations for future research projects to address this question are considered.

Refining our understanding of the “elephant in the room”

The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.

The zone of latent solutions and its relevance to understanding ape cultures

The zone of latent solutions (ZLS) hypothesis provides an alternative approach to explaining cultural patterns in primates and many other animals. According to the ZLS hypothesis, non-human great ape (henceforth: ape) cultures consist largely or solely of latent solutions. The current competing (and predominant) hypothesis for ape culture argues instead that at least some of their behavioural or artefact forms are copied through specific social learning mechanisms ("copying social learning hypothesis") and that their forms may depend on copying (copying-dependent forms). In contrast, the ape ZLS hypothesis does not require these forms to be copied. Instead, it suggests that several (non-form-copying) social learning mechanisms help determine the frequency (but typically not the form) of these behaviours and artefacts within connected individuals. The ZLS hypothesis thus suggests that increases and stabilisations of a particular behaviour's or artefact's frequency can derive from socially-mediated (cued) form reinnovations. Therefore, and while genes and ecology play important roles as well, according to the ape ZLS hypothesis, apes typically acquire the forms of their behaviours and artefacts individually, but are usually socially induced to do so (provided sufficient opportunity, necessity, motivation and timing). The ZLS approach is often criticized-perhaps also because it challenges the current null hypothesis, which instead assumes a requirement of form-copying social learning mechanisms to explain many ape behavioural (and/or artefact) forms. However, as the ZLS hypothesis is a new approach, with less accumulated literature compared to the current null hypothesis, some confusion is to be expected. Here, we clarify the ZLS approach-also in relation to other competing hypotheses-and address misconceptions and objections. We believe that these clarifications will provide researchers with a coherent theoretical approach and an experimental methodology to examine the necessity of form-copying variants of social learning in apes, humans and other species.

The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not the sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy.

Chimpanzees use observed temporal directionality to learn novel causal relations

We investigated whether chimpanzees use the temporal sequence of external events to determine causation. Seventeen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) witnessed a human experimenter press a button in two different conditions. When she pressed the "causal button" the delivery of juice and a sound immediately followed (cause-then-effect). In contrast, she pressed the "non-causal button" only after the delivery of juice and sound (effect-then-cause). When given the opportunity to produce the desired juice delivery themselves, the chimpanzees preferentially pressed the causal button, i.e., the one that preceded the effect. Importantly, they did so in their first test trial and even though both buttons were equally associated with juice delivery. This outcome suggests that chimpanzees, like human children, do not rely solely on their own actions to make use of novel causal relations, but they can learn causal sequences based on observation alone. We discuss these findings in relation to the literature on causal inferences as well as associative learning.

Innovative problem solving in great apes: the role of visual feedback in the floating peanut task

Nonhuman great apes show remarkable behavioural flexibility. Some individuals are even able to use water as a tool: They spit water into a vertical tube to make a peanut float upwards until it comes into reach (floating peanut task; FPT). In the current study, we used the FPT to investigate how visual feedback, an end-state demonstration and a social demonstration affect task performance in nonhuman great apes in three experiments. Our results indicate that apes who had acquired the solution with a clear tube maintained it with an opaque one. However, apes starting with an opaque tube failed to solve the task. Additionally, facing the peanut floating on a water-filled tube (i.e., an end-state demonstration) promoted success independent on the availability of visual feedback. Moreover, experiencing how water was poured into the tube either by a human demonstrator or by a water tap that had been opened either by the ape or a human did not seem to be of further assistance. First, this study suggests that great apes require visual feedback for solving the FPT, which is no longer required after the initial acquisition. Second, some subjects benefit from encountering the end-state, a finding corroborating previous studies.

Social learning through associative processes: a computational theory

Social transmission of information is a key phenomenon in the evolution of behaviour and in the establishment of traditions and culture. The diversity of social learning phenomena has engendered a diverse terminology and numerous ideas about underlying learning mechanisms, at the same time that some researchers have called for a unitary analysis of social learning in terms of associative processes. Leveraging previous attempts and a recent computational formulation of associative learning, we analyse the following learning scenarios in some generality: learning responses to social stimuli, including learning to imitate; learning responses to non-social stimuli; learning sequences of actions; learning to avoid danger. We conceptualize social learning as situations in which stimuli that arise from other individuals have an important role in learning. This role is supported by genetic predispositions that either cause responses to social stimuli or enable social stimuli to reinforce specific responses. Simulations were performed using a new learning simulator program. The simulator is publicly available and can be used for further theoretical investigations and to guide empirical research of learning and behaviour. Our explorations show that, when guided by genetic predispositions, associative processes can give rise to a wide variety of social learning phenomena, such as stimulus and local enhancement, contextual imitation and simple production imitation, observational conditioning, and social and response facilitation. In addition, we clarify how associative mechanisms can result in transfer of information and behaviour from experienced to naive individuals.

Biological mechanisms for observational learning

Observational learning occurs when an animal capitalizes on the experience of another to change its own behavior in a given context. This form of learning is an efficient strategy for adapting to changes in environmental conditions, but little is known about the underlying neural mechanisms. There is an abundance of literature supporting observational learning in humans and other primates, and more recent studies have begun documenting observational learning in other species such as birds and rodents. The neural mechanisms for observational learning depend on the species' brain organization and on the specific behavior being acquired. However, as a general rule, it appears that social information impinges on neural circuits for direct learning, mimicking or enhancing neuronal activity patterns that function during pavlovian, spatial or instrumental learning. Understanding the biological mechanisms for social learning could boost translational studies into behavioral interventions for a wide range of learning disorders.

The pervasive role of social learning in primate lifetime development

In recent decades, an accelerating research effort has exploited a substantial diversity of methodologies to garner mounting evidence for social learning and culture in many species of primate. As in humans, the evidence suggests that the juvenile phases of non-human primates’ lives represent a period of particular intensity in adaptive learning from others, yet the relevant research remains scattered in the literature. Accordingly, we here offer what we believe to be the first substantial collation and review of this body of work and its implications for the lifetime behavioral ecology of primates. We divide our analysis into three main phases: a first phase of learning focused on primary attachment figures, typically the mother; a second phase of selective learning from a widening array of group members, including some with expertise that the primary figures may lack; and a third phase following later dispersal, when a migrant individual encounters new ecological and social circumstances about which the existing residents possess expertise that can be learned from. Collating a diversity of discoveries about this lifetime process leads us to conclude that social learning pervades primate ontogenetic development, importantly shaping locally adaptive knowledge and skills that span multiple aspects of the behavioral repertoire.

Social Learning and Culture in Child and Chimpanzee

A few decades ago, we knew next to nothing about the behavior of our closest animal relative, the chimpanzee, but long-term field studies have since revealed an undreamed-of richness in the diversity of their cultural traditions across Africa. These discoveries have been complemented by a substantial suite of experimental studies, now bridging to the wild through field experiments. These field and experimental studies, particularly those in which direct chimpanzee-child comparisons have been made, delineate a growing set of commonalities between the phenomena of social learning and culture in the lives of chimpanzees and humans. These commonalities in social learning inform our understanding of the evolutionary roots of the cultural propensities the species share. At the same time, such comparisons throw into clearer relief the unique features of the distinctive human capacity for cumulative cultural evolution, and new research has begun to probe the key psychological attributes that may explain it.

Insightful problem solving and emulation in brown capuchin monkeys

We investigated problem solving abilities of capuchin monkeys via the "floating object problem," a task in which the subject must use creative problem solving to retrieve a favored food item from the bottom of a clear tube. Some great apes have solved this problem by adding water to raise the object to a level at which it can be easily grabbed. We presented seven capuchins with the task over eight trials (four "dry" and four "wet"). None of the subjects solved the task, indicating that no capuchin demonstrated insightful problem solving under these experimental conditions. We then investigated whether capuchins would emulate a solution to the task. Seven subjects observed a human model solve the problem by pouring water from a cup into the tube, which brought the object to the top of the tube, allowing the subject to retrieve it. Subjects were then allowed to interact freely with an unfilled tube containing the object in the presence of water and objects that could be used to solve the task. While most subjects were unable to solve the task after viewing a demonstrator solve it, one subject did so, but in a unique way. Our results are consistent with some previous results in great ape species and indicate that capuchins do not spontaneously solve the floating object problem via insight.

Social Models Enhance Apes' Memory for Novel Events

Nonhuman primates are more likely to learn from the actions of a social model than a non-social "ghost display", however the mechanism underlying this effect is still unknown. One possibility is that live models are more engaging, drawing increased attention to social stimuli. However, recent research with humans has suggested that live models fundamentally alter memory, not low-level attention. In the current study, we developed a novel eye-tracking paradigm to disentangle the influence of social context on attention and memory in apes. Tested in two conditions, zoo-housed apes (2 gorillas, 5 chimpanzees) were familiarized to videos of a human hand (social condition) and mechanical claw (non-social condition) constructing a three-block tower. During the memory test, subjects viewed side-by-side pictures of the previously-constructed block tower and a novel block tower. In accordance with looking-time paradigms, increased looking time to the novel block tower was used to measure event memory. Apes evidenced memory for the event featuring a social model, though not for the non-social condition. This effect was not dependent on attention differences to the videos. These findings provide the first evidence that, like humans, social stimuli increase nonhuman primates' event memory, which may aid in information transmission via social learning.

A Comparative and Evolutionary Analysis of the Cultural Cognition of Humans and Other Apes

The comparative and evolutionary analysis of social learning and all manner of cultural processes has become a flourishing field. Applying the ‘comparative method’ to such phenomena allows us to exploit the good fortunate we have in being able to study them in satisfying detail in our living primate relatives, using the results to reconstruct the cultural cognition of the ancestral forms we share with these species. Here I offer an overview of principal discoveries in recent years, organized through a developing scheme that targets three main dimensions of culture: the patterning of culturally transmitted traditions in time and space; the underlying social learning processes; and the particular behavioral and psychological contents of cultures. I focus on a comparison between humans, particularly children, and our closest primate relative the chimpanzee, for which we now have much the richest database of relevant observational and experimental findings. Commonalities across these sister-species can be identified in each of the three dimensions listed above and in several subcategories within them, but the comparisons also highlight the major contrasts in the nature of culture that have evolved between ourselves and closest primate relatives.

Experimental studies illuminate the cultural transmission of percussive technologies in Homo and Pan

The complexity of Stone Age tool-making is assumed to have relied upon cultural transmission, but direct evidence is lacking. This paper reviews evidence bearing on this question provided through five related empirical perspectives. Controlled experimental studies offer special power in identifying and dissecting social learning into its diverse component forms, such as imitation and emulation. The first approach focuses on experimental studies that have discriminated social learning processes in nut-cracking by chimpanzees. Second come experiments that have identified and dissected the processes of cultural transmission involved in a variety of other force-based forms of chimpanzee tool use. A third perspective is provided by field studies that have revealed a range of forms of forceful, targeted tool use by chimpanzees, that set percussion in its broader cognitive context. Fourth are experimental studies of the development of flint knapping to make functional sharp flakes by bonobos, implicating and defining the social learning and innovation involved. Finally, new and substantial experiments compare what different social learning processes, from observational learning to teaching, afford good quality human flake and biface manufacture. Together these complementary approaches begin to delineate the social learning processes necessary to percussive technologies within the Pan-Homo clade.

What's Special about Human Imitation? A Comparison with Enculturated Apes

What, if anything, is special about human imitation? An evaluation of enculturated apes’ imitation skills, a “best case scenario” of non-human apes’ imitation performance, reveals important similarities and differences between this special population of apes and human children. Candidates for shared imitation mechanisms include the ability to imitate various familiar transitive responses and object–object actions that involve familiar tools. Candidates for uniquely derived imitation mechanisms include: imitating novel transitive actions and novel tool-using responses as well as imitating opaque or intransitive gestures, regardless of familiarity. While the evidence demonstrates that enculturated apes outperform non-enculturated apes and perform more like human children, all apes, regardless of rearing history, generally excel at imitating familiar, over-rehearsed responses and are poor, relative to human children, at imitating novel, opaque or intransitive responses. Given the similarities between the sensory and motor systems of preschool age human children and non-human apes, it is unlikely that differences in sensory input and/or motor-output alone explain the observed discontinuities in imitation performance. The special rearing history of enculturated apes—including imitation-specific training—further diminishes arguments suggesting that differences are experience-dependent. Here, it is argued that such differences are best explained by distinct, specialized mechanisms that have evolved for copying rules and responses in particular content domains. Uniquely derived social and imitation learning mechanisms may represent adaptations for learning novel communicative gestures and complex tool-use. Given our species’ dependence on both language and tools, mechanisms that accelerated learning in these domains are likely to have faced intense selective pressures, starting with the earliest of human ancestors.

Great apes and children infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation

We investigated whether nonhuman great apes (N=23), 2.5-year-old (N=20), and 3-year-old children (N=40) infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation by adapting the blicket detector paradigm for apes. We presented chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), orangutans (Pongo abelii), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and children (Homo sapiens) with a novel reward dispenser, the blicket detector. The detector was activated by inserting specific (yet randomly determined) objects, the so-called blickets. Once activated a reward was released, accompanied by lights and a short tone. Participants were shown different patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the detector. When subsequently choosing between one of the two objects to activate the detector on their own all species, except gorillas (who failed the training), took these patterns of correlation into account. In particular, apes and 2.5-year-old children ignored objects whose effect on the detector completely depended on the presence of another object. Follow-up experiments explored whether the apes and children were also able to re-evaluate evidence retrospectively. Only children (3-year-olds in particular) were able to make such retrospective inferences about causal structures from observing the effects of the experimenter's actions. Apes succeeded here only when they observed the effects of their own interventions. Together, this study provides evidence that apes, like young children, accurately infer causal structures from patterns of (co)variation and that they use this information to inform their own interventions.

Neural connections foster social connections: a diffusion-weighted imaging study of social networks

Although we know the transition from childhood to adulthood is marked by important social and neural development, little is known about how social network size might affect neurocognitive development or vice versa. Neuroimaging research has identified several brain regions, such as the amygdala, as key to this affiliative behavior. However, white matter connectivity among these regions, and its behavioral correlates, remain unclear. Here we tested two hypotheses: that an amygdalocentric structural white matter network governs social affiliative behavior and that this network changes during adolescence and young adulthood. We measured social network size behaviorally, and white matter microstructure using probabilistic diffusion tensor imaging in a sample of neurologically normal adolescents and young adults. Our results suggest amygdala white matter microstructure is key to understanding individual differences in social network size, with connectivity to other social brain regions such as the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior temporal lobe predicting much variation. In addition, participant age correlated with both network size and white matter variation in this network. These findings suggest the transition to adulthood may constitute a critical period for the optimization of structural brain networks underlying affiliative behavior.

The role of redundant information in cultural transmission and cultural stabilization

Redundant copying has been proposed as a manner to achieve the high-fidelity necessary to pass on and preserve complex traits in human cultural transmission. There are at least 2 ways to define redundant copying. One refers to the possibility of copying repeatedly the same trait over time, and another to the ability to exploit multiple layers of information pointing to the same trait during a single copying event. Using an individual-based model, we explore how redundant copying (defined as in the latter way) helps to achieve successful transmission. The authors show that increasing redundant copying increases the likelihood of accurately transmitting a behavior more than either augmenting the number of copying occasions across time or boosting the general accuracy of social learning. They also investigate how different cost functions, deriving, for example, from the need to invest more energy in cognitive processing, impact the evolution of redundant copying. The authors show that populations converge either to high-fitness/high-costs states (with high redundant copying and complex culturally transmitted behaviors; resembling human culture) or to low-fitness/low-costs states (with low redundant copying and simple transmitted behaviors; resembling social learning forms typical of nonhuman animals). This outcome may help to explain why cumulative culture is rare in the animal kingdom.

Investigating animal cognition with the Aesop's Fable paradigm: Current understanding and future directions

The Aesop's Fable paradigm – in which subjects drop stones into tubes of water to obtain floating out-of-reach rewards – has been used to assess causal understanding in rooks, crows, jays and human children. To date, the performance of corvids suggests that they can recognize the functional properties of a variety of objects including size, weight and solidity, and they seem to be more capable of learning from causal information than arbitrary information. However, 2 alternative explanations for their performance have yet to be ruled out. The perceptual-motor feedback hypothesis suggests that subjects may attend solely to the movement of the reward, repeating actions which bring the reward closer, while the object-bias hypothesis suggests that subjects could pass certain tasks by preferring to handle objects that resemble natural stones. Here we review our current understanding of performance on the Aesop's Fable tasks, and suggest that studies controlling for feedback and object preferences will help us determine exactly what animals understand about the cause and effect of water displacement.

Imitation is necessary for cumulative cultural evolution in an unfamiliar, opaque task

Imitation, the replication of observed behaviors, has been proposed as the crucial social learning mechanism for the generation of humanlike cultural complexity. To date, the single published experimental microsociety study that tested this hypothesis found no advantage for imitation. In contrast, the current paper reports data in support of the imitation hypothesis. Participants in "microsociety" groups built weight-bearing devices from reed and clay. Each group was assigned to one of four conditions: three social learning conditions and one asocial learning control condition. Groups able to observe other participants building their devices, in contrast to groups that saw only completed devices, show evidence of successive improvement. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that imitation is required for cumulative cultural evolution. This study adds crucial data for understanding why imitation is needed for cultural accumulation, a central defining feature of our species.

Wild vervet monkeys copy alternative methods for opening an artificial fruit

Experimental studies of animal social learning in the wild remain rare, especially those that employ the most discriminating tests in which alternative means to complete naturalistic tasks are seeded in different groups. We applied this approach to wild vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) using an artificial fruit ('vervetable') opened by either lifting a door panel or sliding it left or right. In one group, a trained model lifted the door, and in two others, the model slid it either left or right. Members of each group then watched their model before being given access to multiple baited vervetables with all opening techniques possible. Thirteen of these monkeys opened vervetables, displaying a significant tendency to use the seeded technique on their first opening and over the course of the experiment. The option preferred in these monkeys' first successful manipulation session was also highly correlated with the proportional frequency of the option they had previously witnessed. The social learning effects thus documented go beyond mere stimulus enhancement insofar as the same door knob was grasped for either technique. Results thus suggest that through imitation, emulation or both, new foraging techniques will spread across groups of wild vervet monkeys to create incipient foraging traditions.

The importance of witnessed agency in chimpanzee social learning of tool use

Social learning refers to individuals learning from others, including information gained through indirect social influences, such as the results of others' actions and changes in the physical environment. One method to determine the relative influence of these varieties of information is the 'ghost display', in which no model is involved, but subjects can watch the results that a model would produce. Previous research has shown mixed success by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) learning from ghost displays, with some studies suggesting learning only in relatively simple tasks. To explore whether the failure of chimpanzees to learn from a ghost display may be due to neophobia when tested singly or a requirement for more detailed information for complex tasks, we presented ghost displays of a tool-use task to chimpanzees in their home social groups. Previous tests have revealed that chimpanzees are unable to easily solve this tool-use task asocially, or learn from ghost displays when tested singly, but can learn after observing conspecifics in a group setting. In the present study, despite being tested in a group situation, chimpanzees still showed no success in solving the task via trial-and-error learning, in a baseline condition, nor in learning the task from the ghost display. Simply being in the presence of their group mates and being shown the affordances of the task was not sufficient to encourage learning. Following this, in an escalating series of tests, we examined the chimpanzees' ability to learn from a demonstration by models with agency: (1) a human; (2) video footage of a chimpanzee; (3) a live chimpanzee model. In the first two of these 'social' conditions, subjects showed limited success. By the end of the final open diffusion phase, which was run to determine whether this new behavior would be transmitted among the group after seeing a successful chimpanzee use the task, 83% of chimpanzees were now successful. This confirmed a marked overall effect of observing animate conspecific modeling, in contrast to the ghost condition. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: insert SI title.

Interaction and self-correction

In this paper, I address the question of how to account for the normative dimension involved in conceptual competence in a naturalistic framework. First, I present what I call the naturalist challenge (NC), referring to both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of conceptual possession and acquisition. I then criticize two models that have been dominant in thinking about conceptual competence, the interpretationist and the causalist models. Both fail to meet NC, by failing to account for the abilities involved in conceptual self-correction. I then offer an alternative account of self-correction that I develop with the help of the interactionist theory of mutual understanding arising from recent developments in phenomenology and developmental psychology.

Synchrony and motor mimicking in chimpanzee observational learning

Cumulative tool-based culture underwrote our species' evolutionary success, and tool-based nut-cracking is one of the strongest candidates for cultural transmission in our closest relatives, chimpanzees. However the social learning processes that may explain both the similarities and differences between the species remain unclear. A previous study of nut-cracking by initially naïve chimpanzees suggested that a learning chimpanzee holding no hammer nevertheless replicated hammering actions it witnessed. This observation has potentially important implications for the nature of the social learning processes and underlying motor coding involved. In the present study, model and observer actions were quantified frame-by-frame and analysed with stringent statistical methods, demonstrating synchrony between the observer's and model's movements, cross-correlation of these movements above chance level and a unidirectional transmission process from model to observer. These results provide the first quantitative evidence for motor mimicking underlain by motor coding in apes, with implications for mirror neuron function.

What to copy: the key factor of observational learning in striped jack (Pseudocaranx dentex) juveniles

Animals in social environments can enhance their learning efficiency by observing the behaviour of others. Our previous study showed that learning efficiency of schooling fish increased through the observation of the behaviour of trained demonstrator conspecifics. The present study aimed to verify the key factor of observational learning by investigating what information is important for social transmission of feeding information. A striped jack (Pseudocaranx dentex) observer was provided with one of the five observation treatments: (a) pellets observation, where pellets were dropped near the aeration in an adjacent tank; (b) responding conspecific observation, where a trained conspecific demonstrator responded to the aeration without food in the adjacent tank; (c) foraging conspecific observation, where a conspecific demonstrator foraged near the aeration in the adjacent tank; (d) nearby pellets observation, where pellets were dropped in a transparent column near the aeration in the observer tank; and (e) foraging heterospecific observation, where a filefish (Stephanolepis cirrhifer) demonstrator foraged near the aeration in the adjacent tank. The response to the aeration in these observers was compared with that of controls who did not observe any behaviour. Only individuals who observed foraging conspecifics showed a response to the aeration after observing. These results suggest that observer fish acquire feeding information not through recognition of prey items or through imitation of the demonstrator, but through the vicarious reinforcement of a conspecific for foraging.