Cognitive control and individual differences in economic ultimatum decision-making

Fast & slow decisions under risk: Intuition rather than deliberation drives advantageous choices

Would you take a gamble with a 10% chance to gain $100 and a 90% chance to lose $10? Even though this gamble has a positive expected value, most people would avoid taking it given the high chance of losing money. Popular "fast-and-slow" dual process theories of risky decision making assume that to take expected value into account and avoid a loss aversion bias, people need to deliberate. In this paper we directly test whether reasoners can also consider expected value benefit intuitively, in the absence of deliberation. To do so, we presented participants with bets and lotteries in which they could choose between a risky expected-value-based choice and a safe loss averse option. We used a two-response paradigm where participants made two choices in every trial: an initial intuitive choice under time-pressure and cognitive load and a final choice without constraints where they could freely deliberate. Results showed that in most trials participants were loss averse, both in the intuitive and deliberate stages. However, when people opted for the expected-value-based choice after deliberating, they had predominantly already arrived at this choice intuitively. Additionally, loss averse participants often showed an intuitive sensitivity to expected value (as reflected in decreased confidence). Overall, these results suggest that deliberation is not the primary route for expected-value-based responding in risky decision making. Risky decisions may be better conceptualized as an interplay between different types of "fast" intuitions rather than between two different types of "fast" and "slow" thinking per se.

An Exploratory Study of Large-Scale Brain Networks during Gambling Using SEEG

Decision-making is a cognitive process involving working memory, executive function, and attention. However, the connectivity of large-scale brain networks during decision-making is not well understood. This is because gaining access to large-scale brain networks in humans is still a novel process. Here, we used SEEG (stereoelectroencephalography) to record neural activity from the default mode network (DMN), dorsal attention network (DAN), and frontoparietal network (FN) in ten humans while they performed a gambling task in the form of the card game, "War". By observing these networks during a decision-making period, we related the activity of and connectivity between these networks. In particular, we found that gamma band activity was directly related to a participant's ability to bet logically, deciding what betting amount would result in the highest monetary gain or lowest monetary loss throughout a session of the game. We also found connectivity between the DAN and the relation to a participant's performance. Specifically, participants with higher connectivity between and within these networks had higher earnings. Our preliminary findings suggest that connectivity and activity between these networks are essential during decision-making.

Disruption of alpha oscillation propagation in patients with schizophrenia

OBJECTIVE

Propagation of electroencephalogram (EEG) oscillations, often referred to as traveling waves, reflects the role of brain oscillations in neural information transmission. This propagation can be distorted by brain disorders such as schizophrenia that features disconnection of neural information transmission (i.e., disconnection syndrome). However, this possibility of the disruption of EEG oscillation propagation in patients with schizophrenia remains largely unexplored.

METHODS

Using a publicly shared dataset (N = 19 and 24; patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls, respectively), we investigated EEG oscillation propagation by analyzing the local phase gradients (LPG) of alpha (8-12 Hz) oscillations in both healthy participants and patients with schizophrenia.

RESULTS

Our results showed significant directionality in the propagation of alpha oscillations in healthy participants. Specifically, alpha oscillations propagated in an anterior-to-posterior direction along mid-line and a posterior-to-anterior direction laterally. In patients with schizophrenia, some of alpha oscillation propagation were notably disrupted, particularly in the central midline area where alpha oscillations propagated from anterior to posterior areas.

CONCLUSION

Our finding lends support to the hypothesis of a disconnection syndrome in schizophrenia, underscoring a disruption in the anterior-to-posterior propagation of alpha oscillations.

SIGNIFICANCE

This study identified disruption of alpha oscillation propagation observed in scalp EEG as a biomarker for schizophrenia.

Material Hardship Predicts Response Bias in Loss-Averse Decisions: The Roles of Anxiety and Cognitive Control

Income poverty is associated with an enhanced tendency to avoid losses in economic decisions, which can be driven by a response bias (risk avoidance) and a valuation bias (loss aversion). However, the impact of non-income dimensions of poverty on these biases remains unclear. The current study tested the impact of material hardship on these biases, and the mediating effects of anxiety, depression, and cognitive control in these associations. Healthy adults (N = 188) completed questionnaire and behavioral measures of the variables. Results of regression-based analyses showed that participants who reported higher material hardship exhibited greater response bias, but not valuation bias. This effect was mediated by anxiety. Although material hardship predicted lower cognitive control, cognitive control did not mediate the association between material hardship and either type of bias. These findings suggest that material hardship may lead to economic decision-making biases because it impacts emotional states rather than cognitive control.

Explicit and implicit markers of fairness preeminence in criminal judges

Achieving justice could be considered a complex social decision-making scenario. Despite the relevance of social decisions for legal contexts, these processes have still not been explored for individuals who work as criminal judges dispensing justice. To bridge the gap, we used a complex social decision-making task (Ultimatum game) and tracked a heart rate variability measurement: the square root of the mean squared differences of successive NN intervals (RMSSD) at their baseline (as an implicit measurement that tracks emotion regulation behavior) for criminal judges (n = 24) and a control group (n = 27). Our results revealed that, compared to controls, judges were slower and rejected a bigger proportion of unfair offers. Moreover, the rate of rejections and the reaction times were predicted by higher RMSSD scores for the judges. This study provides evidence about the impact of legal background and expertise in complex social decision-making. Our results contribute to understanding how expertise can shape criminal judges' social behaviors and pave the way for promising new research into the cognitive and physiological factors associated with social decision-making.

The Role of Social Reward and Corticostriatal Connectivity in Substance Use

This report describes an ongoing R03 grant that explores the links between trait reward sensitivity, substance use, and neural responses to social and nonsocial reward. Although previous research has shown that trait reward sensitivity and neural responses to reward are linked to substance use, whether this relationship is impacted by how people process social stimuli remains unclear. We are investigating these questions via a neuroimaging study with college-aged participants, using individual difference measures that examine the relation between substance use, social context, and trait reward sensitivity with tasks that measure reward anticipation, strategic behavior, social reward consumption, and the influence of social context on reward processing. We predict that substance use will be tied to distinct patterns of striatal dysfunction. Specifically, reward hyposensitive individuals will exhibit blunted striatal responses to social and non-social reward and enhanced connectivity with the orbitofrontal cortex; in contrast, reward hypersensitive individuals will exhibit enhanced striatal responses to social and non-social reward and blunted connectivity with the orbitofrontal cortex. We also will examine the relation between self-reported reward sensitivity, substance use, and striatal responses to social reward and social context. We predict that individuals reporting the highest levels of substance use will show exaggerated striatal responses to social reward and social context, independent of self-reported reward sensitivity. Examining corticostriatal responses to reward processing will help characterize the relation between reward sensitivity, social context and substance use while providing a foundation for understanding risk factors and isolating neurocognitive mechanisms that may be targeted to increase the efficacy of interventions.

The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

Perceived relative social status and cognitive load influence acceptance of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game

Participants in the Ultimatum Game will often reject unfair resource allocations at personal cost, reflecting a trade-off between financial gain and maintenance of social standing. Although this rejection behavior is linked to executive control, the exact role of cognitive regulation in relation to status cues is unclear. We propose that the salience of status cues affects how cognitive regulation resolves the conflict between financial gain and social status considerations. Situations that tax executive control by limiting available cognitive resources should increase acceptance rates for unfair offers, particularly when the conflict between economic self-interest and social reputation is high. Here, participants rated their own subjective social status, and then either mentally counted (Load) or ignored (No Load) simultaneously-presented tones while playing two rounds of the Ultimatum Game with an online (sham) “Proposer” of either high or low social status. A logistic regression revealed an interaction of Proposer status with cognitive load. Compared to the No Load group, the Load group showed higher acceptance rates for unfair offers from the high-status Proposer. In contrast, cognitive load did not influence acceptance rates for unfair offers from the low-status Proposer. Additionally, Proposer status interacted with the relative social distance between participant and Proposer. Participants close in social distance to the high-status Proposer were more likely to accept the unfair offer than those farther in social distance, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for offers from the low-status Proposer. Although rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game has previously been conceptualized as an intuitive response, these results instead suggest it reflects a deliberative strategy, dependent on cognitive resources, to prioritize social standing over short-term financial gain. This study reveals the dynamic interplay of cognitive resources and status concerns within this paradigm, providing new insights into when and why people reject inequitable divisions of resources.

Left Amygdala and Putamen Activation Modulate Emotion Driven Decisions in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Although economic decision-making is commonly characterized as a purely rational phenomenon, it is clear that real-world decision-making is influenced by emotions. Yet, relatively little is known about the neural correlates of this process. To explore this issue, 20 participants underwent fMRI scanning while engaged in the Prisoner's Dilemma game under partner-directed sympathy, anger and neutral emotion conditions. Participants were most and least likely to cooperate after sympathy and anger induction, respectively, with the neutral condition eliciting intermediate cooperation rates. Moreover, the sympathy condition elicited quicker responses for cooperation than defection choices, whereas this pattern was reversed in the anger and neutral conditions. Left amygdala activation showed a positive correlation with cooperation rates and self-reports of partner directed sympathy in the sympathy condition. In the anger condition, left putamen activation was positively correlated with cooperation rates and negatively correlated with self-reports of partner directed anger strength. These findings indicate that while the left amygdala activation may be indicative of emotion enhancement and increase of cooperative behavior, the left putamen may help to suppress an emotion to overcome anger and engage in cooperation.

Norms and the Flexibility of Moral Action

A complex web of social and moral norms governs many everyday human behaviors, acting as the glue for social harmony. The existence of moral norms helps elucidate the psychological motivations underlying a wide variety of seemingly puzzling behavior, including why humans help or trust total strangers. In this review, we examine four widespread moral norms: Fairness, altruism, trust, and cooperation, and consider how a single social instrument-reciprocity-underpins compliance to these norms. Using a game theoretic framework, we examine how both context and emotions moderate moral standards, and by extension, moral behavior. We additionally discuss how a mechanism of reciprocity facilitates the adherence to, and enforcement of, these moral norms through a core network of brain regions involved in processing reward. In contrast, violating this set of moral norms elicits neural activation in regions involved in resolving decision conflict and exerting cognitive control. Finally, we review how a reinforcement mechanism likely governs learning about morally normative behavior. Together, this review aims to explain how moral norms are deployed in ways that facilitate flexible moral choices.

Preference and strategy in proposer's prosocial giving in the ultimatum game

The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers provides evidence that humans are driven by social preferences such as preferences for fairness and prosociality. On the other hand, if and how the proposer's behavior is affected by social preferences remains unelucidated. We addressed this question for the first time by manipulating the knowledge that the proposer had about the responder's belief concerning the intentionality of the proposer. In a new game called the "ultimatum game with ambiguous intentions of the proposer (UGAMB)," we made the intentionality of the proposer ambiguous to the recipient. We expected and found that the proposer would make more unfair offers in this new game than in the standard ultimatum game. This expectation can be derived from either the preference-based model or the strategy model of the proposer's giving decision. The additional finding that more unfair giving in the UGAMB was not mediated by the proposer's expectation that the recipient would be more willing to accept unfair offers provided support for the preference-based model. Using a psychological measure of cognitive control, the preference-based model received additional support through a conceptual replication of the previous finding that cognitive control of intuitive drive for prosociality in the dictator game, rather than mind reading in the ultimatum game, is responsible for the difference in giving between the two games.

Fairness, fast and slow: A review of dual process models of fairness

Fairness, the notion that people deserve or have rights to certain resources or kinds of treatment, is a fundamental dimension of moral cognition. Drawing on recent evidence from economics, psychology, and neuroscience, we ask whether self-interest is always intuitive, requiring self-control to override with reasoning-based fairness concerns, or whether fairness itself can be intuitive. While we find strong support for rejecting the notion that self-interest is always intuitive, the literature has reached conflicting conclusions about the neurocognitive systems underpinning fairness. We propose that this disagreement can largely be resolved in light of an extended Social Heuristics Hypothesis. Divergent findings may be attributed to the interpretation of behavioral effects of ego depletion or neurostimulation, reverse inference from brain activity to the underlying psychological process, and insensitivity to social context and inter-individual differences. To better dissect the neurobiological basis of fairness, we outline how future research should embrace cross-disciplinary methods that combine psychological manipulations with neuroimaging, and that can probe inter-individual, and cultural heterogeneities.

Cognitive reflection predicts the acceptance of unfair ultimatum game offers

In the ultimatum game, one player proposes a split of money between him- or herself and another player, who can accept the offer (and both players keep the allocated money) or reject the offer (and both players get nothing). The present study examined predictors of accepting unfair ultimatum offers. In Study 1, 184 participants responded to an unfair ultimatum offer, completed a measure of cognitive reflection, and completed a self-report measure of rational and experiential thinking. Slightly more than half of the participants (54.3%) accepted the unfair offer, and cognitive reflection was positively correlated with accepting unfair offers. The rational and experiential thinking scales were not significantly correlated with ultimatum decisions. In Study 2, 306 participants responded to 20 ultimatum offers that varied in fairness and completed an expanded measure of cognitive reflection. Performance on the cognitive reflection measure predicted the number of ultimatum offers accepted. These results suggest that rejecting ultimatum offers is related to intuitive, heuristic-based thinking, whereas accepting offers is related to deliberate, analytic-based thinking.

The importance of working memory updating in the Prisoner's dilemma

Successful cooperation requires that humans can flexibly adjust choices to their partner's behaviour. This, in turn, presupposes a representation of a partner's past decisions in working memory. The aim of the current study was to investigate the role of working memory processes in cooperation. For that purpose, we tested the effects of working memory updating (Experiment 1) and working memory maintenance demands (Experiments 2 and 3) on cooperative behaviour in the Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that demands on updating, but not maintenance, of working memory contents impaired strategy use in the Prisoner's dilemma. Thus, our data show that updating a partner's past behaviour in working memory represents an important precondition for strategy use in cooperation.

Dynamic adjustments of cognitive control during economic decision making

Decision making in the Ultimatum game requires the resolution of conflicts between economic self-interest and fairness intuitions. Since cognitive control processes play an important role in conflict resolution, the present study examined how control processes that are triggered by conflicts between fairness and self-interest in unfair offers affect subsequent decisions in the Ultimatum game. Our results revealed that more unfair offers were accepted following previously unfair, compared to previously fair offers. Interestingly, the magnitude of this conflict adaptation effect correlated with the individual subjects' focus on economic self-interest. We concluded that conflicts between fairness and self-interest trigger cognitive control processes, which reinforce the focus on the current task goal.

The cost of social punishment and high-lethality suicide attempts in the second half of life

Age-related cognitive changes may contribute to impairments in making complex social decisions. Interpersonal conflict is a key factor behind suicidal behavior in old age, with suicidal motivations ranging from escape to revenge. Such conflicts may prove catastrophic for people prone to suicide, in part because of their tendency to make disadvantageous decisions. Yet, little is known about social decision making in older suicidal individuals. We assessed economic bargaining behavior using the Ultimatum Game, where players decide whether to accept or punish (reject) unfair monetary offers from another player. Our sample included depressed older adults with a history of high-medical-lethality suicide attempts, low-medical-lethality suicide attempts, nonsuicidal depressed older adults, and those with no psychiatric history who served as control groups. Participants in all groups punished their counterparts in response to unfair offers. However, low-lethality attempters, nonsuicidal depressed, and nonpsychiatric controls punished less as the cost of punishment increased, accepting more unfair offers as the stakes grew large. High-lethality attempters did not adjust their choices based on stake magnitude, punishing unfair offers without regard to the cost. Two thirds of the difference between the high-lethality attempters and nonpsychiatric controls was explained by individual differences in fairness judgments: the comparison group judged offer fairness as a joint function of inequality and magnitude, whereas the high-lethality attempter participants judged offer fairness on the basis of inequality. In real life, high-lethality attempters' relative insensitivity to the cost of retaliation may lead to uncompromising, catastrophic responses to conflict.

Disabling conditional inferences: an EEG study

Although the Modus Ponens inference is one of the most basic logical rules, decades of conditional reasoning research show that it is often rejected when people consider stored background knowledge about potential disabling conditions. In the present study we used EEG to identify neural markers of this process. We presented participants with many and few disabler conditionals for which retrieval of disabling conditions was likely or unlikely. As in classic behavioral studies we observed that participants accepted the standard MP conclusion less for conditionals with many disablers. The key finding was that the presentation of the standard MP conclusion also resulted in a more pronounced N2 and less pronounced P3b for the many disabler conditionals. This specific N2/P3b pattern has been linked to the violation and satisfaction of expectations, respectively. Thereby, the present ERP findings support the idea that disabler retrieval lowers reasoners' expectations that the standard MP conclusion can be drawn.

The effect of partner-directed emotion in social exchange decision-making

Despite the prevalence of studies examining economic decision-making as a purely rational phenomenon, common sense suggests that emotions affect our decision-making particularly in a social context. To explore the influence of emotions on economic decision-making, we manipulated opponent-directed emotions prior to engaging participants in two social exchange decision-making games (the Trust Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma). Participants played both games with three different (fictional) partners and their tendency to defect was measured. Prior to playing each game, participants exchanged handwritten "essays" with their partners, and subsequently exchanged evaluations of each essay. The essays and evaluations, read by the participant, were designed to induce either anger, sympathy, or a neutral emotional response toward the confederate with whom they would then play the social exchange games. Galvanic skin conductance level (SCL) showed enhanced physiological arousal during anger induction compared to both the neutral and sympathy conditions. In both social exchange games, participants were most likely to defect against their partner after anger induction and least likely to defect after sympathy induction, with the neutral condition eliciting intermediate defection rates. This pattern was found to be strongest in participants exhibiting low cognitive control (as measured by a Go/no-Go task). The findings indicate that emotions felt toward another individual alter how one chooses to interact with them, and that this influence depends both on the specific emotion induced and the cognitive control of the individual.