1
|
Katyal S, Abdoun O, Mounier H, Lutz A. Reduced processing of afforded actions while observing mental content as ongoing mental phenomena. Sci Rep 2024; 14:10130. [PMID: 38698150 PMCID: PMC11065984 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-60934-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Accepted: 04/29/2024] [Indexed: 05/05/2024] Open
Abstract
While consciousness is typically considered equivalent to mental contents, certain meditation practices-including open monitoring (OM)-are said to enable a unique conscious state where meditators can experience mental content from a de-reified perspective as "ongoing phenomena." Phenomenologically, such a state is considered as reduction of intentionality, the mental act upon mental content. We hypothesised that this de-reified state would be characterised by reduced mental actional processing of affording objects. We recruited two groups of participants, meditators with long-term experience in cultivating a de-reified state, and demographically-matched novice meditators. Participants performed a task with images in two configurations-where objects did (high-affordance) and did not imply actions (low-affordance)-following both a baseline and OM-induced de-reified state, along with EEG recordings. While long-term meditators exhibited preferential processing of high-affordance images compared to low-affordance images during baseline, such an effect was abolished during the OM state, as hypothesised. For novices, however, the high-affordance configuration was preferred over the low-affordance one both during baseline and OM. Perceptual durations of objects across conditions positively correlated with the degree of µ-rhythm desynchronization, indicating that neural processing of affordance impacted perceptual awareness. Our results indicate that OM styles of meditation may help in mentally decoupling otherwise automatic cognitive processing of mental actions by affording objects.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sucharit Katyal
- EDUWELL Team, Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, Lyon, France.
- Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.
| | - Oussama Abdoun
- EDUWELL Team, Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, Lyon, France
| | - Hugues Mounier
- L2S - Laboratoire des signaux et systemes, Université Paris-Saclay, CentraleSupélec, CNRS, Gif Sur Yvette, France
| | - Antoine Lutz
- EDUWELL Team, Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, Lyon, France.
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Perceptual Awareness and Its Relationship with Consciousness: Hints from Perceptual Multistability. NEUROSCI 2022. [DOI: 10.3390/neurosci3040039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022] Open
Abstract
Many interesting theories of consciousness have been proposed, but so far, there is no “unified” theory capable of encompassing all aspects of this phenomenon. We are all aware of what it feels like to be conscious and what happens if there is an absence of consciousness. We are becoming more and more skilled in measuring consciousness states; nevertheless, we still “don’t get it” in its deeper essence. How does all the processed information converge from different brain areas and structures to a common unity, giving us this very private “feeling of being conscious”, despite the constantly changing flow of information between internal and external states? “Multistability” refers to a class of perceptual phenomena where subjective awareness spontaneously and continuously alternates between different percepts, although the objective stimuli do not change, supporting the idea that the brain “interprets” sensorial input in a “constructive” way. In this perspective paper, multistability and perceptual awareness are discussed as a methodological window for understanding the “local” states of consciousness, a privileged position from which it is possible to observe the brain dynamics and mechanisms producing the subjective phenomena of perceptual awareness in the very moment they are happening.
Collapse
|
3
|
Skora LI, Seth AK, Scott RB. Sensorimotor predictions shape reported conscious visual experience in a breaking continuous flash suppression task. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab003. [PMID: 33763234 PMCID: PMC7970722 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/24/2020] [Revised: 01/04/2021] [Accepted: 01/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Accounts of predictive processing propose that conscious experience is influenced not only by passive predictions about the world, but also by predictions encompassing how the world changes in relation to our actions-that is, on predictions about sensorimotor contingencies. We tested whether valid sensorimotor predictions, in particular learned associations between stimuli and actions, shape reports about conscious visual experience. Two experiments used instrumental conditioning to build sensorimotor predictions linking different stimuli with distinct actions. Conditioning was followed by a breaking continuous flash suppression task, measuring the speed of reported breakthrough for different pairings between the stimuli and prepared actions, comparing those congruent and incongruent with the trained sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 1, counterbalancing of the response actions within the breaking continuous flash suppression task was achieved by repeating the same action within each block but having them differ across the two blocks. Experiment 2 sought to increase the predictive salience of the actions by avoiding the repetition within blocks. In Experiment 1, breakthrough times were numerically shorter for congruent than incongruent pairings, but Bayesian analysis supported the null hypothesis of no influence from the sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 2, reported conscious perception was significantly faster for congruent than for incongruent pairings. A meta-analytic Bayes factor combining the two experiments confirmed this effect. Altogether, we provide evidence for a key implication of the action-oriented predictive processing approach to conscious perception, namely that sensorimotor predictions shape our conscious experience of the world.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lina I Skora
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Pevensey Building, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
| | - Anil K Seth
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Program on Brain, Mind and Consciousness, 661 University Ave, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Ryan B Scott
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Pevensey Building, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Deroy O, Faivre N, Lunghi C, Spence C, Aller M, Noppeney U. The Complex Interplay Between Multisensory Integration and Perceptual Awareness. Multisens Res 2018; 29:585-606. [PMID: 27795942 DOI: 10.1163/22134808-00002529] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
The integration of information has been considered a hallmark of human consciousness, as it requires information being globally available via widespread neural interactions. Yet the complex interdependencies between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness, or consciousness, remain to be defined. While perceptual awareness has traditionally been studied in a single sense, in recent years we have witnessed a surge of interest in the role of multisensory integration in perceptual awareness. Based on a recent IMRF symposium on multisensory awareness, this review discusses three key questions from conceptual, methodological and experimental perspectives: (1) What do we study when we study multisensory awareness? (2) What is the relationship between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness? (3) Which experimental approaches are most promising to characterize multisensory awareness? We hope that this review paper will provoke lively discussions, novel experiments, and conceptual considerations to advance our understanding of the multifaceted interplay between multisensory integration and consciousness.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- O Deroy
- Centre for the Study of the Senses, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, UK
| | - N Faivre
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
| | - C Lunghi
- Department of Translational Research on New Technologies in Medicine and Surgery, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
| | - C Spence
- Crossmodal Research Laboratory, Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford University, Oxford, UK
| | - M Aller
- Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics Centre, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
| | - U Noppeney
- Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics Centre, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Dogge M, Gayet S, Custers R, Aarts H. The influence of action-effect anticipation on bistable perception: differences between onset rivalry and ambiguous motion. Neurosci Conscious 2018; 2018:niy004. [PMID: 30042857 PMCID: PMC6007180 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niy004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2017] [Revised: 02/02/2018] [Accepted: 03/08/2018] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Perception is strongly shaped by the actions we perform. According to the theory of event coding, and forward models of motor control, goal-directed action preparation activates representations of desired effects. These expectations about the precise stimulus identity of one's action-outcomes (i.e. identity predictions) are thought to selectively influence perceptual processing of action-contingent effects. However, the existing evidence for such identity-prediction effects is scarce and mixed. Here, we developed a new paradigm to capture such effects and examined whether action-outcome predictions can bias the perception of binocular onset rivalry (Experiments 1a and 1b) and bistable motion (Experiment 2). Participants performed learning tasks in which they were exposed to action-outcome associations. On test trials, actions were followed by bistable stimuli that could be perceived as being either congruent or incongruent with the aforementioned associations (i.e. rivalrous oriented gratings in Experiments 1a and 1b and spheres with ambiguous rotation directions in Experiment 2). Across three experiments, we show that, whilst exposure to action-effect associations can bias the apparent motion direction of ambiguous spheres, it fails to influence perceptual selection of grating orientations in binocular onset rivalry. This pattern of results extends previous work on ambiguous motion by demonstrating that action-induced modulations do not generalize to all types of bistable percepts.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Myrthel Dogge
- Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, 3582 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands
| | - Surya Gayet
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Montessorilaan 3, 6525 HR Nijmegen, The Netherlands
| | - Ruud Custers
- Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, 3582 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Henk Aarts
- Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, 3582 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
|