A method for campus-wide SARS-CoV-2 surveillance at a large public university

An intronic RNA element modulates Factor VIII exon-16 splicing

Pathogenic variants in the human Factor VIII (F8) gene cause Hemophilia A (HA). Here, we investigated the impact of 97 HA-causing single-nucleotide variants on the splicing of 11 exons from F8. For the majority of F8 exons, splicing was insensitive to the presence of HA-causing variants. However, splicing of several exons, including exon-16, was impacted by variants predicted to alter exonic splicing regulatory sequences. Using exon-16 as a model, we investigated the structure-function relationship of HA-causing variants on splicing. Intriguingly, RNA chemical probing analyses revealed a three-way junction structure at the 3'-end of intron-15 (TWJ-3-15) capable of sequestering the polypyrimidine tract. We discovered antisense oligonucleotides (ASOs) targeting TWJ-3-15 partially rescue splicing-deficient exon-16 variants by increasing accessibility of the polypyrimidine tract. The apical stem loop region of TWJ-3-15 also contains two hnRNPA1-dependent intronic splicing silencers (ISSs). ASOs blocking these ISSs also partially rescued splicing. When used in combination, ASOs targeting both the ISSs and the region sequestering the polypyrimidine tract, fully rescue pre-mRNA splicing of multiple HA-linked variants of exon-16. Together, our data reveal a putative RNA structure that sensitizes F8 exon-16 to aberrant splicing.

Rescue of blood coagulation Factor VIII exon-16 mis-splicing by antisense oligonucleotides

The human Factor VIII ( F8 ) protein is essential for the blood coagulation cascade and specific F8 mutations cause the rare bleeding disorder Hemophilia A (HA). Here, we investigated the impact of HA-causing single-nucleotide mutations on F8 pre-mRNA splicing. We found that 14/97 (∼14.4%) coding sequence mutations tested in our study induced exon skipping. Splicing patterns of 4/11 (∼36.4%) F8 exons tested were especially sensitive to the presence of common disease-causing mutations. RNA-chemical probing analyses revealed a three-way junction structure at the 3' end of intron 15 (TWJ-3-15). TWJ-3-15 sequesters the polypyrimidine tract, a key determinant of 3' splice site strength. Using exon-16 of the F8 gene as a model, we designed specific antisense oligonucleotides (ASOs) that target TWJ-3-15 and identified three that promote the splicing of F8 exon-16. Interaction of TWJ-3-15 with ASOs increases accessibility of the polypyrimidine tract and inhibits the binding of hnRNPA1-dependent splicing silencing factors. Moreover, ASOs targeting TWJ-3-15 rescue diverse splicing-sensitive HA-causing mutations, most of which are distal to the 3' splice site being impacted. The TWJ-3-15 structure and its effect on mRNA splicing provide a model for HA etiology in patients harboring specific F8 mutations and provide a framework for precision RNA-based HA therapies.

A multiplexed, paired-pooled droplet digital PCR assay for detection of SARS-CoV-2 in saliva

In response to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, we developed a multiplexed, paired-pool droplet digital PCR (MP4) screening assay. Key features of our assay are the use of minimally processed saliva, 8-sample paired pools, and reverse-transcription droplet digital PCR (RT-ddPCR) targeting the SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid gene. The limit of detection was determined to be 2 and 12 copies per µl for individual and pooled samples, respectively. Using the MP4 assay, we routinely processed over 1,000 samples a day with a 24-h turnaround time and over the course of 17 months, screened over 250,000 saliva samples. Modeling studies showed that the efficiency of 8-sample pools was reduced with increased viral prevalence and that this could be mitigated by using 4-sample pools. We also present a strategy for, and modeling data supporting, the creation of a third paired pool as an additional strategy to employ under high viral prevalence.

COVID-19 prevention at institutions of higher education, United States, 2020-2021: implementation of nonpharmaceutical interventions

BACKGROUND

In early 2020, following the start of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, institutions of higher education (IHEs) across the United States rapidly pivoted to online learning to reduce the risk of on-campus virus transmission. We explored IHEs' use of this and other nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during the subsequent pandemic-affected academic year 2020-2021.

METHODS

From December 2020 to June 2021, we collected publicly available data from official webpages of 847 IHEs, including all public (n = 547) and a stratified random sample of private four-year institutions (n = 300). Abstracted data included NPIs deployed during the academic year such as changes to the calendar, learning environment, housing, common areas, and dining; COVID-19 testing; and facemask protocols. We performed weighted analysis to assess congruence with the October 29, 2020, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance for IHEs. For IHEs offering ≥50% of courses in person, we used weighted multivariable linear regression to explore the association between IHE characteristics and the summated number of implemented NPIs.

RESULTS

Overall, 20% of IHEs implemented all CDC-recommended NPIs. The most frequently utilized NPI was learning environment changes (91%), practiced as one or more of the following modalities: distance or hybrid learning opportunities (98%), 6-ft spacing (60%), and reduced class sizes (51%). Additionally, 88% of IHEs specified facemask protocols, 78% physically changed common areas, and 67% offered COVID-19 testing. Among the 33% of IHEs offering ≥50% of courses in person, having < 1000 students was associated with having implemented fewer NPIs than IHEs with ≥1000 students.

CONCLUSIONS

Only 1 in 5 IHEs implemented all CDC recommendations, while a majority implemented a subset, most commonly changes to the classroom, facemask protocols, and COVID-19 testing. IHE enrollment size and location were associated with degree of NPI implementation. Additional research is needed to assess adherence to NPI implementation in IHE settings.

Mobile SARS‑CoV‑2 screening facilities for rapid deployment and university-based diagnostic laboratory

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has created a public crisis. Many medical and public institutions and businesses went into isolation in response to the pandemic. Because SARS-CoV-2 can spread irrespective of a patient's course of disease, these institutions' continued operation or reopening based on the assessment and control of virus spread can be supported by targeted population screening. For this purpose, virus testing in the form of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis and antibody detection in blood can be central. Mobile SARS-CoV-2 screening facilities with a built-in biosafety level (BSL)-2 laboratory were set up to allow the testing offer to be brought close to the subject group's workplace. University staff members, their expertise, and already available equipment were used to implement and operate the screening facilities and a certified diagnostic laboratory. This operation also included specimen collection, transport, PCR and antibody analysis, and informing subjects as well as public health departments. Screening facilities were established at different locations such as educational institutions, nursing homes, and companies providing critical supply chains for health care. Less than 4 weeks after the first imposed lockdown in Germany, a first mobile testing station was established featuring a build-in laboratory with two similar stations commencing operation until June 2020. During the 15-month project period, approximately 33,000 PCR tests and close to 7000 antibody detection tests were collected and analyzed. The presented approach describes the required procedures that enabled the screening facilities and laboratories to collect and process several hundred specimens each day under difficult conditions. This report can assist others in establishing similar setups for pandemic scenarios.

Prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection and associated risk factors: A testing program and nested case-control study conducted at Sapienza University of Rome between March and June 2021

Background

To safely resume in-person activities during the COVID-19 pandemic, Sapienza University of Rome implemented rigorous infection prevention and control measures, a successful communication campaign and a free SARS-CoV-2 testing program. In this study, we describe the University's experience in carrying out such a program in the context of the COVID-19 response and identify risk factors for infection.

Methods

Having identified resources, space, supplies and staff, from March to June 2021 Sapienza offered to all its enrollees a molecular test service (8.30 AM to 4 PM, Monday to Thursday). A test-negative case-control study was conducted within the program. Participants underwent structured interviews that investigated activity-related exposures in the 2 weeks before testing. Multivariable conditional logistic regression analyses were performed. Adjusted odds ratios (aORs) and 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs) were calculated.

Results

A total of 8,959 tests were administered, of which 56 were positive. The detection trend followed regional tendencies. Among 40 cases and 80 controls, multivariable analysis showed that a known exposure to a COVID-19 case increased the likelihood of infection (aOR: 8.39, 95% CI: 2.38-29.54), while having a job decreased it (aOR: 0.23, 95% CI: 0.06-0.88). Of factors that almost reached statistical significance, participation in activities in the university tended to reduce the risk (aOR: 0.32, 95% CI: 0.09-1.06), while attendance at private gatherings showed an increasing risk trend (aOR: 3.48, 95% CI: 0.95-12.79). Age, gender, activities in the community, visiting bars or restaurants, and use of public transportation were not relevant risk factors. When those students regularly attending the university campus were excluded from the analysis, the results were comparable, except that attending activities in the community came close to having a statistically significant effect (aOR: 8.13, 95% CI: 0.91-72.84).

Conclusions

The testing program helped create a safe university environment. Furthermore, promoting preventive behavior and implementing rigorous measures in public places, as was the case in the university setting, contributed to limit the virus transmission.