Clinicians With High Socially At-Risk Caseloads Received Reduced Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Scores

Are Quality Scores in the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System Associated With Outcomes After Outpatient Orthopaedic Surgery?

BACKGROUND

The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) ties reimbursement incentives to clinician performance to improve healthcare quality. It is unclear whether the MIPS quality score can accurately distinguish between high-performing and low-performing clinicians.

QUESTIONS/PURPOSES

(1) What were the rates of unplanned hospital visits (emergency department visits, observation stays, or unplanned admissions) within 7, 30, and 90 days of outpatient orthopaedic surgery among Medicare beneficiaries? (2) Was there any association of MIPS quality scores with the risk of an unplanned hospital visit (emergency department visits, observation stays, or unplanned admissions)?

METHODS

Between January 2018 and December 2019, a total of 605,946 outpatient orthopaedic surgeries were performed in New York State according to the New York Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System database. Of those, 56,772 patients were identified as Medicare beneficiaries and were therefore potentially eligible. A further 34% (19,037) were excluded because of missing surgeon identifier, age younger than 65 years, residency outside New York State, emergency department visit on the same day as outpatient surgery, observation stay on the same claim as outpatient surgery, and concomitant high-risk or eye procedures, leaving 37,735 patients for analysis. The database does not include a list of all state residents and thus does not allow for censoring of patients who move out of state. We chose this dataset because it includes nearly all hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers in a large geographic area (New York State) and hence is not limited by sampling bias. We included 37,735 outpatient orthopaedic surgical encounters among Medicare beneficiaries in New York State from 2018 to 2019. For the 37,735 outpatient orthopaedic surgical procedures included in our study, the mean ± standard deviation age of patients was 73 ± 7 years, 84% (31,550) were White, and 59% (22,071) were women. Our key independent variable was the MIPS quality score percentile (0 to 19th, 20th to 39th, 40th to 59th, or 60th to 100th) for orthopaedic surgeons. Clinicians in the MIPS program may receive a bonus or penalty based on the overall MIPS score, which ranges from 0 to 100 and is a weighted score based on four subscores: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and cost. The MIPS quality score, which attempts to reward clinicians providing superior quality of care, accounted for 50% and 45% of the overall MIPS score in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Our main outcome measures were 7-day, 30-day, and 90-day unplanned hospital visits after outpatient orthopaedic surgery. To determine the association between MIPS quality scores and unplanned hospital visits, we estimated multivariable hierarchical logistic regression models controlling for MIPS quality scores; patient-level (age, race and ethnicity, gender, and comorbidities), facility-level (such as bed size and teaching status), surgery and surgeon-level (such as surgical procedure and surgeon volume) covariates; and facility-level random effects. We then used these models to estimate the adjusted rates of unplanned hospital visits across MIPS quality score percentiles after adjusting for covariates in the multivariable models.

RESULTS

In total, 2% (606 of 37,735), 2% (783 of 37,735), and 3% (1013 of 37,735) of encounters had an unplanned hospital visit within 7, 30, or 90 days of outpatient orthopaedic surgery, respectively. Most hospital visits within 7 days (95% [576 of 606]), 30 days (94% [733 of 783]), or 90 days (91% [924 of 1013]) were because of emergency department visits. We found very small differences in unplanned hospital visits by MIPS quality scores, with the 20th to 39th percentile of MIPS quality scores having 0.71% points (95% CI -1.19% to -0.22%; p = 0.004), 0.68% points (95% CI -1.26% to -0.11%; p = 0.02), and 0.75% points (95% CI -1.42% to -0.08%; p = 0.03) lower than the 0 to 19th percentile at 7, 30, and 90 days, respectively. There was no difference in adjusted rates of unplanned hospital visits between patients undergoing surgery with a surgeon in the 0 to 19th, 40th to 59th, or 60th to 100th percentiles at 7, 30, or 90 days.

CONCLUSION

We found that the rates of unplanned hospital visits after outpatient orthopaedic surgery among Medicare beneficiaries were low and primarily driven by emergency department visits. We additionally found only a small association between MIPS quality scores for individual physicians and the risk of an unplanned hospital visit after outpatient orthopaedic surgery. These findings suggest that policies aimed at reducing postoperative emergency department visits may be the best target to reduce overall postoperative unplanned hospital visits and that the MIPS program should be eliminated or modified to more strongly link reimbursement to risk-adjusted patient outcomes, thereby better aligning incentives among patients, surgeons, and the Centers for Medicare ad Medicaid Services. Future work could seek to evaluate the association between MIPS scores and other surgical outcomes and evaluate whether annual changes in MIPS score weighting are independently associated with clinician performance in the MIPS and regarding clinical outcomes.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level III, therapeutic study.

Differential Hospital Participation in Bundled Payments in Communities with Higher Shares of Marginalized Populations

BACKGROUND

Medicare's voluntary bundled payment programs have demonstrated generally favorable results. However, it remains unknown whether uneven hospital participation in these programs in communities with greater shares of minorities and patients of low socioeconomic status results in disparate access to practice redesign innovations.

OBJECTIVE

Examine whether communities with higher proportions of marginalized individuals were less likely to be served by a hospital participating in Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced (BPCI-Advanced).

DESIGN

Cross-sectional study using ordinary least squares regression controlling for patient and community factors.

PARTICIPANTS

Medicare fee-for-service patients enrolled from 2015-2017 (pre-BPCI-Advanced) and residing in 2,058 local communities nationwide defined by Hospital Service Areas (HSAs). Each community's share of marginalized patients was calculated separately for each of the share of beneficiaries of Black race, Hispanic ethnicity, or dual eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid.

MAIN MEASURES

Dichotomous variable indicating whether a given community had at least one hospital that ever participated in BPCI-Advanced from 2018-2022.

KEY RESULTS

Communities with higher shares of dual-eligible individuals were less likely to be served by a hospital participating in BPCI-Advanced than communities with the lowest quartile of dual-eligible individuals (Q4: -15.1 percentage points [pp] lower than Q1, 95% CI: -21.0 to -9.1, p < 0.001). There was no consistent significant relationship between community proportion of Black beneficiaries and likelihood of having a hospital participating in BPCI-Advanced. Communities with higher shares of Hispanic beneficiaries were more likely to have a hospital participating in BPCI-Advanced than those in the lowest quartile (Q4: 19.2 pp higher than Q1, 95% CI: 13.4 to 24.9, p < 0.001).

CONCLUSIONS

Communities with greater shares of dual-eligible beneficiaries, but not racial or ethnic minorities, were less likely to be served by a hospital participating in BPCI-Advanced Policymakers should consider approaches to incentivize more socioeconomically uniform participation in voluntary bundled payments.

Performance of Neurosurgeons Providing Safety-Net Care Under Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Under the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), Medicare evaluates provider performance to determine payment adjustments. Studies examining the first year of MIPS (2017) showed that safety-net providers had lower MIPS scores, but the performance of safety-net physicians over time has not been studied. This study aimed to examine the performance of safety-net vs non-safety-net neurosurgeons in MIPS from 2017 to 2020.

METHODS

Safety-net neurosurgeons were defined as being in the top quartile according to proportion of dual-eligible beneficiaries and non-safety-net in the bottom quartile. Outcomes were total MIPS scores and dual-eligible proportion over time. In this descriptive study, we evaluated ordinary least squares regression models with SEs clustered at the physician level. Covariates of interest included safety-net status, year, and average Hierarchical Condition Category risk score of beneficiaries.

RESULTS

There were 2796-3322 physicians included each year between 2017 and 2020. Mean total MIPS scores were not significantly different for safety-net than non-safety-net physicians in 2017 but were greater for safety-net in 2018 (90.7 vs 84.5, P < .01), 2019 (86.4 vs 81.5, P < .01), and 2020 (90.9 vs 86.7, P < .01). Safety-net status (coefficient -9.11; 95% CI [-13.15, -5.07]; P < .01) and participation in MIPS as an individual (-9.89; [-12.66, -7.13]; P < .01) were associated with lower scores while year, the interaction between safety-net status and year, and participation in MIPS as a physician group or alternative payment model were associated with higher scores. Average Hierarchical Condition Category risk score of beneficiaries (-.011; [-.015, -.006]; P < .01) was associated with decreasing dual-eligible case mix, whereas average age of beneficiaries (.002; [.002, .003]; P < .01) was associated with increasing dual-eligible case mix.

CONCLUSION

Being a safety-net physician was associated with lower MIPS scores, but safety-net neurosurgeons demonstrated greater improvement in MIPS scores than non-safety-net neurosurgeons over time. Providers with higher-risk patients were more likely to decrease their dual-eligible case mix over time.

Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model

Importance

The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model.

Objective

To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk.

Design, Setting, and Participants

A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021.

Exposure

Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization.

Results

Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001).

Conclusions

In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

Hospital-physician Integration and Value-based Payment: Early Results From MIPS

BACKGROUND

Hospital-physician integration is often justified as a driver of clinical quality improvement due to joint resources covering a broad spectrum of care. Value-based programs, such as the Medicare Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), are intended to tie financial incentives to clinical quality, which may confer an advantage on such integrated practices.

OBJECTIVES

We assessed the relationship between hospital-physician integration and MIPS performance by comparing hospital-integrated practices and independent practices.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This was a cross-sectional study using data from the Quality Payment Program for the performance year 2020.

SUBJECTS

Physician practices with a valid MIPS composite score in performance year 2020.

MEASURES

Hospital integration was based on whether at least 75% of a practice's physicians either billed most of their services using hospital outpatient department codes or billed through a hospital tax identifier. The primary outcome was the MIPS quality category score, and the secondary outcomes were the specific quality measures reported by practice groups.

RESULTS

Of the 20 most frequently reported measures, 14 were common in both groups. No difference was observed in the quality category score between hospital-integrated practices and independent practices in either unadjusted comparisons or after adjusting for practice characteristics, including practice size, geography, specialty mix, and case mix. In the secondary outcome models for specific quality measures, hospital-integrated practices achieved higher scores on most overlap measures but not all.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings on quality category score suggest that hospital integration does not confer much advantage in the context of MIPS quality performance.

Plastic Surgeons and Equity: Are Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Scores Impacted by Minority Patient Caseload?

BACKGROUND

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services introduced the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) in 2017 to extend value-based payment to outpatient physicians. The authors hypothesized that the MIPS scores for plastic surgeons are impacted by the existing measures of patient disadvantage, minority patient caseload, and dual eligibility.

METHODS

The authors conducted a retrospective cohort study of plastic surgeons participating in Medicare and MIPS using the Physician Compare national downloadable file and MIPS scores. Minority patient caseload was defined as nonwhite patient caseload. The authors evaluated the characteristics of participating plastic surgeons, their patient caseloads, and their scores.

RESULTS

Of 4539 plastic surgeons participating in Medicare, 1257 participated in MIPS in the first year of scoring. The average patient caseload is 85% white, with racial/ethnicity data available for 73% of participating surgeons. In multivariable regression, higher minority patient caseload is associated with a lower MIPS score.

CONCLUSIONS

As minority patient caseload increases, MIPS scores decrease for otherwise similar caseloads. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services must consider existing and additional measures of patient disadvantage to ensure equitable surgeon scoring.

Value-Based Payment for Clinicians Treating Cardiovascular Disease: A Policy Statement From the American Heart Association

Clinician payment is transitioning from fee-for-service to value-based payment, with reimbursement tied to health care quality and cost. However, the overarching goals of value-based payment-to improve health care quality, lower costs, or both-have been largely unmet. This policy statement reviews the current state of value-based payment and provides recommended best practices for future design and implementation. The policy statement is divided into sections that detail different aspects of value-based payment: (1) key program design features (patient population, quality measurement, cost measurement, and risk adjustment), (2) the role of equity during design and evaluation, (3) adjustment of payment, and (4) program implementation and evaluation. Each section introduces the topic, describes important considerations, and lists examples from existing programs. Each section includes recommended best practices for future program design. The policy statement highlights 4 key themes for successful value-based payment. First, programs should carefully weigh the incentives between lowering cost and improving quality of care and ensure that there is adequate focus on quality of care. Second, the expansion of value-based payment should be a tool for improving equity, which is central to quality of care and should be a focal point of program design and evaluation. Third, value-based payment should continue to move away from fee for service toward more flexible funding that allows clinicians to focus resources on the interventions that best help patients. Last, successful programs should find ways to channel clinicians' intrinsic motivation to improve their performance and the care for their patients. These principles should guide the future development of clinician value-based payment models.

Performance on Patient Experience Measures of Former Chief Medical Residents as Physician Exemplars Chosen by the Profession

Importance

Physicians' knowledge about each other's quality is central to clinical decision-making, but such information is not well understood and is rarely harnessed to identify exemplars for disseminating best practices or quality improvement. One exception is chief medical resident selection, which is typically based on interpersonal, teaching, and clinical skills.

Objective

To compare care for patients of primary care physicians (PCPs) who were former chiefs with care for patients of nonchief PCPs.

Design, Setting, and Participants

Using 2010 to 2018 Medicare Fee-For-Service Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey data (response rate, 47.6%), Medicare claims for random 20% samples of fee-for-service beneficiaries, and medical board data from 4 large US states, we compared care for patients of former chief PCPs with care for patients of nonchief PCPs in the same practice using linear regression. Data were analyzed from August 2020 to January 2023.

Exposures

Receiving the plurality of primary care office visits from a former chief PCP.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Composite of 12 patient experience items as primary outcome and 4 spending and utilization measures as secondary outcomes.

Results

The CAHPS samples included 4493 patients with former chief PCPs and 41 278 patients with nonchief PCPs. The 2 groups were similar in age (mean [SD], 73.1 [10.3] years vs 73.2 [10.3] years), sex (56.8% vs 56.8% female), race and ethnicity (1.2% vs 1.0% American Indian or Alaska Native, 1.3% vs 1.9% Asian or Pacific Islander, 4.8% vs. 5.6% Hispanic, 7.3% vs 6.6% non-Hispanic Black, and 81.5% vs. 80.0% non-Hispanic White), and other characteristics. The Medicare claims for random 20% samples included 289 728 patients with former chief PCPs and 2 954 120 patients with nonchief PCPs. Patients of former chief PCPs rated their care experiences significantly better than patients of nonchief PCPs (adjusted difference in composite, 1.6 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.4-2.8; effect size of 0.30 standard deviations (SD) of the physician-level distribution of performance; P = .01), including markedly higher ratings of physician-specific communication and interpersonal skills typically emphasized in chief selection. Differences were large for patients of racial and ethnic minority groups (1.16 SD), dual-eligible patients (0.81 SD), and those with less education (0.44 SD) but did not vary significantly across groups. Differences in spending and utilization were minimal overall.

Conclusions and Relevance

In this study, patients of PCPs who were former chief medical residents reported better care experiences than patients of other PCPs in the same practice, especially for physician-specific items. The study results suggest that the profession possesses information about physician quality, motivating the development and study of strategies for harnessing such information to select and repurpose exemplars for quality improvement.

Association Between Community-Level Social Risk and Spending Among Medicare Beneficiaries: Implications for Social Risk Adjustment and Health Equity

Importance

Payers are increasingly using approaches to risk adjustment that incorporate community-level measures of social risk with the goal of better aligning value-based payment models with improvements in health equity.

Objective

To examine the association between community-level social risk and health care spending and explore how incorporating community-level social risk influences risk adjustment for Medicare beneficiaries.

Design, Setting, and Participants

Using data from a Medicare Advantage plan linked with survey data on self-reported social needs, this cross-sectional study estimated health care spending health care spending was estimated as a function of demographics and clinical characteristics, with and without the inclusion of Area Deprivation Index (ADI), a measure of community-level social risk. The study period was January to December 2019. All analyses were conducted from December 2021 to August 2022.

Exposures

Census block group-level ADI.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Regression models estimated total health care spending in 2019 and approximated different approaches to social risk adjustment. Model performance was assessed with overall model calibration (adjusted R2) and predictive accuracy (ratio of predicted to actual spending) for subgroups of potentially vulnerable beneficiaries.

Results

Among a final study population of 61 469 beneficiaries (mean [SD] age, 70.7 [8.9] years; 35 801 [58.2%] female; 48 514 [78.9%] White; 6680 [10.9%] with Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility; median [IQR] ADI, 61 [42-79]), ADI was weakly correlated with self-reported social needs (r = 0.16) and explained only 0.02% of the observed variation in spending. Conditional on demographic and clinical characteristics, every percentile increase in the ADI (ie, more disadvantage) was associated with a $11.08 decrease in annual spending. Directly incorporating ADI into a risk-adjustment model that used demographics and clinical characteristics did not meaningfully improve model calibration (adjusted R2 = 7.90% vs 7.93%) and did not significantly reduce payment inequities for rural beneficiaries and those with a high burden of self-reported social needs. A postestimation adjustment of predicted spending for dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in high ADI areas also did not significantly reduce payment inequities for rural beneficiaries or beneficiaries with self-reported social needs.

Conclusions and Relevance

In this cross-sectional study of Medicare beneficiaries, the ADI explained little variation in health care spending, was negatively correlated with spending conditional on demographic and clinical characteristics, and was poorly correlated with self-reported social risk factors. This prompts caution and nuance when using community-level measures of social risk such as the ADI for social risk adjustment within Medicare value-based payment programs.

Adjustment for Social Risk Factors in a Measure of Clinician Quality Assessing Acute Admissions for Patients With Multiple Chronic Conditions

Importance

Adjusting quality measures used in pay-for-performance programs for social risk factors remains controversial.

Objective

To illustrate a structured, transparent approach to decision-making about adjustment for social risk factors for a measure of clinician quality that assesses acute admissions for patients with multiple chronic conditions (MCCs).

Design, Setting, and Participants

This retrospective cohort study used 2017 and 2018 Medicare administrative claims and enrollment data, 2013 to 2017 American Community Survey data, and 2018 and 2019 Area Health Resource Files. Patients were Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries 65 years or older with at least 2 of 9 chronic conditions (acute myocardial infarction, Alzheimer disease/dementia, atrial fibrillation, chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or asthma, depression, diabetes, heart failure, and stroke/transient ischemic attack). Patients were attributed to clinicians in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS; primary health care professionals or specialists) using a visit-based attribution algorithm. Analyses were conducted between September 30, 2017, and August 30, 2020.

Exposures

Social risk factors included low Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Socioeconomic Status Index, low physician-specialist density, and Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Number of acute unplanned hospital admissions per 100 person-years at risk for admission. Measure scores were calculated for MIPS clinicians with at least 18 patients with MCCs assigned to them.

Results

There were 4 659 922 patients with MCCs (mean [SD] age, 79.0 [8.0] years; 42.5% male) assigned to 58 435 MIPS clinicians. The median (IQR) risk-standardized measure score was 38.9 (34.9-43.6) per 100 person-years. Social risk factors of low Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Socioeconomic Status Index, low physician-specialist density, and Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility were significantly associated with the risk of hospitalization in the univariate models (relative risk [RR], 1.14 [95% CI, 1.13-1.14], RR, 1.05 [95% CI, 1.04-1.06], and RR, 1.44 [95% CI, 1.43-1.45], respectively), but the association was attenuated in adjusted models (RR, 1.11 [95% CI 1.11-1.12] for dual eligibility). Across MIPS clinicians caring for variable proportions of dual-eligible patients with MCCs (quartile 1, 0%-3.1%; quartile 2, >3.1%-9.5%; quartile 3, >9.5%-24.5%, and quartile 4, >24.5%-100%), median measure scores per quartile were 37.4, 38.6, 40.0, and 39.8 per 100 person-years, respectively. Balancing conceptual considerations, empirical findings, programmatic structure, and stakeholder input, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services decided to adjust the final model for the 2 area-level social risk factors but not dual Medicare-Medicaid eligibility.

Conclusions and Relevance

This cohort study demonstrated that adjustment for social risk factors in outcome measures requires weighing high-stake, competing concerns. A structured approach that includes evaluation of conceptual and contextual factors, as well as empirical findings, with active engagement of stakeholders can be used to make decisions about social risk factor adjustment.

Review of the National Quality Forum's Measure Endorsement Process

ABSTRACT

The National Quality Forum (NQF) evaluates healthcare performance measures for endorsement based on a broad set of criteria. We extracted data from NQF technical reports released between spring 2018 and spring 2019. Measures were commonly stewarded by federal agencies (44.29%), evaluated for maintenance (67.14%), classified as outcome (42.14%) or process (39.29%) measures, and used a statistical model for risk adjustment (48.57%). For 80% of the measures reviewed, a patient advocate was present on the reviewing committee. Validity was evaluated using face validity (65.00%) or score-level empirical validity (67.14%), and reliability was frequently evaluated using score-level testing (71.43%). Although 91.56% of all reviewed measures were endorsed, most standing committee members voted moderate rather than high support on key assessment criteria like measure validity, measure reliability, feasibility of use, and whether the measure addresses a key performance gap. Results show that although the Consensus Development Process includes multidisciplinary stakeholder input and thorough evaluations of measures, continued work to identify and describe appropriate and robust methods for reliability and validity testing is needed. Further work is needed to study the extent to which stakeholder input is truly representative of diverse viewpoints and improve processes for considering social factors when risk adjusting.

Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes

IMPORTANCE

The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) influences reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of US physicians, but little is known about whether program performance accurately captures the quality of care they provide.

OBJECTIVE

To examine whether primary care physicians' MIPS scores are associated with performance on process and outcome measures.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

Cross-sectional study of 80 246 US primary care physicians participating in the MIPS program in 2019.

EXPOSURES

MIPS score.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

The association between physician MIPS scores and performance on 5 unadjusted process measures, 6 adjusted outcome measures, and a composite outcome measure.

RESULTS

The study population included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80 246 primary care physicians, including 4773 physicians with low MIPS scores (≤30), 6151 physicians with medium MIPS scores (>30-75), and 69 322 physicians with high MIPS scores (>75). Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations (56.1% vs 63.2%; difference, -7.1 percentage points [95% CI, -8.0 to -6.2]; P < .001), diabetic HbA1c screening (84.6% vs 89.4%; difference, -4.8 percentage points [95% CI, -5.4 to -4.2]; P < .001), and mammography screening (58.2% vs 70.4%; difference, -12.2 percentage points [95% CI, -13.1 to -11.4]; P < .001) but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination (78.0% vs 76.8%; difference, 1.2 percentage points [95% CI, 0.0 to 2.5]; P = .045] and tobacco screening (95.0% vs 94.1%; difference, 0.9 percentage points [95% CI, 0.3 to 1.5]; P = .001). MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on 1 outcome (307.6 vs 316.4 emergency department visits per 1000 patients; difference, -8.9 [95% CI, -13.7 to -4.1]; P < .001), worse performance on 1 outcome (255.4 vs 225.2 all-cause hospitalizations per 1000 patients; difference, 30.2 [95% CI, 24.8 to 35.7]; P < .001), and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with low MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with high MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. Physicians with low MIPS scores but superior outcomes cared for more medically complex and socially vulnerable patients, compared with physicians with low MIPS scores and poor outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

Society of General Internal Medicine Position Statement on Social Risk and Equity in Medicare's Mandatory Value-Based Payment Programs

The Affordable Care Act (2010) and Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (2015) ushered in a new era of Medicare value-based payment programs. Five major mandatory pay-for-performance programs have been implemented since 2012 with increasing positive and negative payment adjustments over time. A growing body of evidence indicates that these programs are inequitable and financially penalize safety-net systems and systems that care for a higher proportion of racial and ethnic minority patients. Payments from penalized systems are often redistributed to those with higher performance scores, which are predominantly better-financed, large, urban systems that serve less vulnerable patient populations - a "Reverse Robin Hood" effect. This inequity may be diminished by adjusting for social risk factors in payment policy. In this position statement, we review the literature evaluating equity across Medicare value-based payment programs, major policy reports evaluating the use of social risk data, and provide recommendations on behalf of the Society of General Internal Medicine regarding how to address social risk and unmet health-related social needs in these programs. Immediate recommendations include implementing peer grouping (stratification of healthcare systems by proportion of dual eligible Medicare/Medicaid patients served, and evaluation of performance and subsequent payment adjustments within strata) until optimal methods for accounting for social risk are defined. Short-term recommendations include using census-based, area-level indices to account for neighborhood-level social risk, and developing standardized approaches to collecting individual socioeconomic data in a robust but sensitive way. Long-term recommendations include implementing a research agenda to evaluate best practices for accounting for social risk, developing validated health equity specific measures of care, and creating policies to better integrate healthcare and social services.

Neurosurgical Performance in the First 2 Years of Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: A Descriptive Analysis and Predictors of Receiving Bonus Payments

BACKGROUND

The merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) program was implemented to tie Medicare reimbursements to value-based care measures. Neurosurgical performance in MIPS has not yet been described.

OBJECTIVE

To characterize neurosurgical performance in the first 2 years of MIPS.

METHODS

Publicly available data regarding MIPS performance for neurosurgeons in 2017 and 2018 were queried. Descriptive statistics about physician characteristics, MIPS performance, and ensuing payment adjustments were performed, and predictors of bonus payments were identified.

RESULTS

There were 2811 physicians included in 2017 and 3147 in 2018. Median total MIPS scores (99.1 vs 90.4, P < .001) and quality scores (97.9 vs 88.5, P < .001) were higher in 2018 than in 2017. More neurosurgeons (2758, 87.6%) received bonus payments in 2018 than in 2017 (2013, 71.6%). Of the 2232 neurosurgeons with scores in both years, 1347 (60.4%) improved their score. Reporting through an alternative payment model (odds ratio [OR]: 32.3, 95% CI: 16.0-65.4; P < .001) and any practice size larger than 10 (ORs ranging from 2.37 to 10.2, all P < .001) were associated with receiving bonus payments. Increasing years in practice (OR: 0.99; 95% CI: 0.982-0.998, P = .011) and having 25% to 49% (OR: 0.72; 95% CI: 0.53-0.97; P = .029) or ≥50% (OR: 0.48; 95% CI: 0.28-0.82; P = .007) of a physician's patients eligible for Medicaid were associated with lower rates of bonus payments.

CONCLUSION

Neurosurgeons performed well in MIPS in 2017 and 2018, although the program may be biased against surgeons who practice in small groups or take care of socially disadvantaged patients.

Evaluating How Safety-Net Hospitals Are Identified: Systematic Review and Recommendations

Objective:

To systematically review how safety-net hospitals' status is identified and defined, discuss current definitions' limitations, and provide recommendations for a new classification and evaluation framework.

Data Sources:

Safety-net hospital-related studies in the MEDLINE database published before May 16, 2019.

Study Design:

Systematic review of the literature that adheres to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines.

Data Collection/Extraction Methods:

We followed standard selection protocol, whereby studies went through an abstract review followed by a full-text screening for eligibility. For each included study, we extracted information about the identification method itself, including the operational definition, the dimension(s) of disadvantage reflected, study objective, and how safety-net status was evaluated.

Principal Findings:

Our review identified 132 studies investigating safety-net hospitals. Analysis of identification methodologies revealed substantial heterogeneity in the ways disadvantage is defined, measured, and summarized at the hospital level, despite a 4.5-fold increase in studies investigating safety-net hospitals for the past decade. Definitions often exclusively used low-income proxies captured within existing health system data, rarely incorporated external social risk factor measures, and were commonly separated into distinct safety-net status categories when analyzed.

Conclusions:

Consistency in research and improvement in policy both require a standard definition for identifying safety-net hospitals. Yet no standardized definition of safety-net hospitals is endorsed and existing definitions have key limitations. Moving forward, approaches rooted in health equity theory can provide a more holistic framework for evaluating disadvantage at the hospital level. Furthermore, advancements in precision public health technologies make it easier to incorporate detailed neighborhood-level social determinants of health metrics into multidimensional definitions. Other countries, including the United Kingdom and New Zealand, have used similar methods of identifying social need to determine more accurate assessments of hospital performance and the development of policies and targeted programs for improving outcomes.

Comparison of Performance of Psychiatrists vs Other Outpatient Physicians in the 2020 US Medicare Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

Importance

Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a new, mandatory, outpatient value-based payment program that ties reimbursement to performance on cost and quality measures for many US clinicians. However, it is currently unknown how the program measures the performance of psychiatrists, who often treat a different patient case mix with different clinical considerations than do other outpatient clinicians.

Objective

To compare performance scores and value-based reimbursement for psychiatrists vs other outpatient physicians in the 2020 MIPS.

Design Setting and Participants

In this cross-sectional study, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Provider Data Catalog was used to identify outpatient Medicare physicians listed in the National Downloadable File between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2020, who participated in the 2020 MIPS and received a publicly reported final performance score. Data from the 593 863 clinicians participating in the 2020 MIPS were used to compare differences in the 2020 MIPS performance scores and value-based reimbursement (based on performance in 2018) for psychiatrists vs other physicians, adjusting for physician, patient, and practice area characteristics.

Exposures

Participation in MIPS.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Primary outcomes were final MIPS performance score and negative (penalty), positive, and exceptional performance bonus payment adjustments. Secondary outcomes were scores in the MIPS performance domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and cost.

Results

This study included 9356 psychiatrists (3407 [36.4%] female and 5 949 [63.6%] male) and 196 306 other outpatient physicians (69 221 [35.3%] female and 127 085 [64.7%] male) (data on age and race are not available). Compared with other physicians, psychiatrists were less likely to be affiliated with a safety-net hospital (2119 [22.6%] vs 64 997 [33.1%]) or a major teaching hospital (2148 [23.0%] vs 53 321 [27.2%]) and had lower annual Medicare patient volume (181 vs 437 patients) and mean patient risk scores (1.65 vs 1.78) (P < .001 for all). The mean final MIPS performance score for psychiatrists was 84.0 vs 89.7 for other physicians (absolute difference, -5.7; 95% CI, -6.2 to -5.2). A total of 573 psychiatrists (6.1%) received a penalty vs 5739 (2.9%) of other physicians (absolute difference, 3.2%; 95% CI, 2.8%-3.6%); 8664 psychiatrists (92.6%) vs 189 037 other physicians (96.3%) received a positive payment adjustment (absolute difference, -3.7%; 95% CI, -3.3% to -4.1%), and 7672 psychiatrists (82.0%) vs 174 040 other physicians (88.7%) received a bonus payment adjustment (absolute difference, -6.7%; 95% CI, -6.0% to -7.3%). These differences remained significant after adjustment.

Conclusions and Relevance

In this cross-sectional study that compared US psychiatrists with other outpatient physicians, psychiatrists had significantly lower 2020 MIPS performance scores, were penalized more frequently, and received fewer bonuses. Policy makers should evaluate whether current MIPS performance measures appropriately assess the performance of psychiatrists.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND

The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes.

QUESTIONS/PURPOSES

We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS?

METHODS

Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100.

RESULTS

Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score.

CONCLUSION

Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden.

LEVEL OF EVIDENCE

Level III, therapeutic study.

Anesthesia provider performance in the first two years of merit-based incentive payment system: Shifts in reporting and predictors of receiving bonus payments

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) program was intended to align CMS quality and incentive programs. To date, no reports have described anesthesia clinician performance in the first two years of the program.

DESIGN

Observational retrospective cohort study.

SETTING

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services public datasets for their Quality Payment Program.

PATIENTS

Anesthesia clinicians who participated in MIPS for 2017 and 2018 performance years.

INTERVENTIONS

Descriptive statistics compared anesthesia clinician characteristics, practice setting, and MIPS performance between the two years to determine associations with MIPS-based payment adjustments.

MEASUREMENTS

Logistic regression identified independent predictors of bonus payments for exceptional performance.

MAIN RESULTS

Compared with participants in 2017 (n = 25,604), participants in 2018 (n = 54,381) had a higher proportion of reporting through groups and alternative payment models (APMs) than as individuals (p < 0.001). The proportion of clinicians earning performance bonuses increased from 2017 to 2018 except for those MIPS participants reporting as individuals. Median total MIPS scores were higher in 2018 than 2017 (84.6 vs. 82.4, p < 0.001), although median total scores fell for participants reporting as individuals (40.9 vs 75.5, p < 0.001). Among clinicians with scores in both years (n = 20,490), 10,559 (51.3%) improved their total score between 2017 and 2018, and 347 (1.7%) changed reporting from individual to APM. Reporting as an individual compared with group reporting (OR: 0.75; 95% CI: 0.71 to 0.80; p < 0.001) was associated with lower rates of bonus payments, as was having a greater proportion of patients dual-eligible for Medicaid and Medicare. Reporting through an APM (OR: 149.6; 95% CI: 110 to 203.4; p < 0.001) and increasing practice group size were associated with higher likelihood of bonus payments.

CONCLUSIONS

Anesthesia clinician MIPS participation and performance were strong during 2017 and 2018 performance years. Providers who reported through groups or APMs have a higher likelihood of receiving bonus payments.

Evaluation of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Surgeons Caring for Patients at High Social Risk

Importance

The latest step in the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare transformation to pay-for-value is the Medicare Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). Value-based payment designs often do not account for uncaptured clinical status and social determinants of health in patients at high social risk, and the consequences for clinicians and patients associated with their use have not been explored.

Objective

To evaluate MIPS scoring of surgeons caring for patients at high social risk to determine whether this implementation threatens disadvantaged patients' access to surgical care.

Design, Setting, and Participants

A retrospective cohort study of US general surgeons participating in MIPS during its first year in outpatient surgical practices across the US and territories. The study was conducted from September 1, 2020, to May 1, 2021. Data were analyzed from November 1, 2020, to March 30, 2021 (although data were collected during the 2017 calendar year and reported ahead of 2019 payment adjustments).

Main Outcomes and Measures

Characteristics of surgeons participating in MIPS, overall MIPS score assigned to clinician. and practice-level disadvantage measures. The MIPS scores can range from 0 to 100. For the first year, a score of less than 3 led to negative payment adjustment; a score of greater than 3 but less than 70 to a positive adjustment; and a score of 70 or higher to the exceptional performance bonus.

Results

Of 20 593 general surgeons, 10 252 participated in the first year of MIPS. Surgeons with complete patient data (n = 9867) were evaluated and a wide range of dual-eligible patient caseloads from 0% to 96% (mean [SD], 27.1% [14.5%]) was identified. Surgeons in the highest quintile of dual eligibility cared for a Medicare patient caseload ranging from 37% to 96% dual eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. Surgeons caring for the patients at highest social risk had the lowest final mean (SD) MIPS score compared with the surgeons caring for the patients at least social risk (66.8 [37.3] vs 71.2 [35.9]; P < .001).

Conclusions and Relevance

Results of this cohort study suggest that implementation of MIPS value-based care reimbursement without adjustment for caseload of patients at high social risk may penalize surgeons who care for patients at highest social risk.

Association Between the Physician Quality Score in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Hospital Performance in Hospital Compare in the First Year of the Program

IMPORTANCE

The scientific validity of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) quality score as a measure of hospital-level patient outcomes is unknown.

OBJECTIVE

To examine whether better physician performance on the MIPS quality score is associated with better hospital outcomes.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

This cross-sectional study of 38 830 physicians used data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Physician Compare (2017) merged with CMS Hospital Compare data. Data analysis was conducted from September to November 2020.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Linear regression was used to examine the association between physician MIPS quality scores aggregated at the hospital level and hospitalwide measures of (1) postoperative complications, (2) failure to rescue, (3) individual postoperative complications, and (4) readmissions.

RESULTS

The study cohort of 38 830 clinicians (5198 [14.6%] women; 12 103 [31.6%] with 11-20 years in practice) included 6580 (17.2%) general surgeons, 8978 (23.4%) orthopedic surgeons, 1617 (4.2%) vascular surgeons, 582 (1.5%) cardiac surgeons, 904 (2.4%) thoracic surgeons, 18 149 (47.4%) anesthesiologists, and 1520 (4.0%) intensivists at 3055 hospitals. The MIPS quality score was not associated with the hospital composite rate of postoperative complications. MIPS quality scores for vascular surgeons in the 11th to 25th percentile, compared with those in the 51st to 100th percentile, were associated with a 0.55-percentage point higher hospital rate of failure to rescue (95% CI, 0.06-1.04 percentage points; P = .03). MIPS quality scores for cardiac surgeons in the 1st to 10th percentile, compared with those in the 51st to 100th percentile, were associated with a 0.41-percentage point higher hospital coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) mortality rate (95% CI, 0.10-0.71 percentage points; P = .01). MIPS quality scores for cardiac surgeons in the 1st to 10th percentile and 11th to 25th percentile, compared with those in the 51st to 100th percentile, were associated with 0.65-percentage point (95% CI, 0.013-1.16 percentage points; P = .02) and 0.48-percentage point (95% CI, 0.07-0.90 percentage points; P = .02) higher hospital CABG readmission rates, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

In this study, better performance on the physician MIPS quality score was associated with better hospital surgical outcomes for some physician specialties during the first year of MIPS.

Adjusting Quality Measures For Social Risk Factors Can Promote Equity In Health Care

Risk adjustment of quality measures using clinical risk factors is widely accepted; risk adjustment using social risk factors remains controversial. We argue here that social risk adjustment is appropriate and necessary in defined circumstances and that social risk adjustment should be the default option when there are valid empirical arguments for and against adjustment for a given measure. Social risk adjustment is an important way to avoid exacerbating inequity in the health care system.

Association of Clinician Minority Patient Caseload With Performance in the 2019 Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System

This study assesses the association between US clinicians’ caseload of minority patients and their 2019 Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System performance score.