On measuring the perceived onsets of spontaneous actions

Association of abnormal explicit sense of agency with cerebellar impairment in myoclonus-dystonia

Non-motor aspects in dystonia are now well recognized. The sense of agency, which refers to the experience of controlling one's own actions, has been scarcely studied in dystonia, even though its disturbances can contribute to movement disorders. Among various brain structures, the cerebral cortex, the cerebellum, and the basal ganglia are involved in shaping the sense of agency. In myoclonus dystonia, resulting from a dysfunction of the motor network, an altered sense of agency may contribute to the clinical phenotype of the condition. In this study, we compared the explicit and implicit sense of agency in patients with myoclonus dystonia caused by a pathogenic variant of SGCE (DYT-SGCE) and control participants. We utilized behavioural tasks to assess the sense of agency and performed neuroimaging analyses, including structural, resting-state functional connectivity, and dynamic causal modelling, to explore the relevant brain regions involved in the sense of agency. Additionally, we examined the relationship between behavioural performance, symptom severity, and neuroimaging findings. We compared 19 patients with DYT-SGCE and 24 healthy volunteers. Our findings revealed that patients with myoclonus-dystonia exhibited a specific impairment in explicit sense of agency, particularly when implicit motor learning was involved. However, their implicit sense of agency remained intact. These patients also displayed grey-matter abnormalities in the motor cerebellum, as well as increased functional connectivity between the cerebellum and pre-supplementary motor area. Dynamic causal modelling analysis further identified reduced inhibitory effects of the cerebellum on the pre-supplementary motor area, decreased excitatory effects of the pre-supplementary motor area on the cerebellum, and increased self-inhibition within the pre-supplementary motor area. Importantly, both cerebellar grey-matter alterations and functional connectivity abnormalities between the cerebellum and pre-supplementary motor area were found to correlate with explicit sense of agency impairment. Increased self-inhibition within the pre-supplementary motor area was associated with less severe myoclonus symptoms. These findings highlight the disruption of higher-level cognitive processes in patients with myoclonus-dystonia, further expanding the spectrum of neurological and psychiatric dysfunction already identified in this disorder.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

Motor awareness: a model based on neurological syndromes

Motor awareness is a complex, multifaceted construct involving the awareness of both (i) one's motor state while executing a movement or remaining still and (ii) one's motor abilities. The analysis of neurological syndromes associated with motor disorders suggests the existence of various different components which are, however, integrated into a model of motor awareness. These components are: (i) motor intention, namely, a conscious desire to perform an action; (ii) motor monitoring and error recognition, that is, the capacity to check the execution of the action and identify motor errors; and (iii) a general awareness of one's own motor abilities and deficits, that is, the capacity to recognize the general state of one's motor abilities about the performance of specific actions and the potential consequences of motor impairment. Neuroanatomical correlates involving the parietal and insular cortices, the medial and lateral frontal regions, and subcortical structures (basal ganglia and limbic system) support this multi-component model. Specific damage (or disconnections) to these structures results in a number of different disorders in motor awareness, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia and apraxia, and a number of symptoms which are specific to motor intention disorders (e.g., the Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Tourette's Syndrome) or motor monitoring (e.g., Parkinson's and Huntington's diseases). All of these clinical conditions are discussed in the light of a motor awareness model.

A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments

In the seminal Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983), unconscious brain activity preceded the self-reported, conscious intention to move. This was repeatedly interpreted as challenging the view that (conscious) mental states cause behavior and, prominently, as challenging the existence of free will. Extensive discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and jurisprudence followed, but further empirical findings were heterogeneous. However, a quantitative review of the literature summarizing the evidence of Libet-style experiments is lacking. The present meta-analysis fills this gap. The results revealed a temporal pattern that is largely consistent with the one found by Libet and colleagues. Remarkably, there were only k = 6 studies for the time difference between unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move - the most crucial time difference regarding implications about conscious causation and free will. Additionally, there was a high degree of uncertainty associated with this meta-analytic effect. We conclude that some of Libet et al.'s findings appear more fragile than anticipated in light of the substantial scientific work that built on them.

Apolipoprotein E4 effects on topological brain network organization in mild cognitive impairment

The Apolipoprotein E isoform E4 (ApoE4) is consistently associated with an elevated risk of developing late-onset Alzheimer's Disease (AD); however, less is known about the potential genetic modulation of the brain networks organization during prodromal stages like Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). To investigate this issue during this critical stage, we used a dataset with a cross-sectional sample of 253 MCI patients divided into ApoE4-positive (‛Carriers') and ApoE4-negative ('non-Carriers'). We estimated the cortical thickness (CT) from high-resolution T1-weighted structural magnetic images to calculate the correlation among anatomical regions across subjects and build the CT covariance networks (CT-Nets). The topological properties of CT-Nets were described through the graph theory approach. Specifically, our results showed a significant decrease in characteristic path length, clustering-index, local efficiency, global connectivity, modularity, and increased global efficiency for Carriers compared to non-Carriers. Overall, we found that ApoE4 in MCI shaped the topological organization of CT-Nets. Our results suggest that in the MCI stage, the ApoE4 disrupting the CT correlation between regions may be due to adaptive mechanisms to sustain the information transmission across distant brain regions to maintain the cognitive and behavioral abilities before the occurrence of the most severe symptoms.

When robots tell you what to do: Sense of agency in human- and robot-guided actions

The present study investigated the sense of agency (SoA) when actions were determined by another human vs. a humanoid robot as compared to when freely selected. Additionally, perceived robot-autonomy was manipulated via autonomous vs. non-autonomous descriptions of the robot. SoA was assessed by judgment of control ratings and intentional binding (i.e., perceived temporal attraction between voluntary actions and their outcomes). Participants performed free and instructed key presses that produced an auditory tone (Experiment-1) and visual stimuli conveying neutral, positive, or negative valence (Experiment-2). Binding and control ratings were greater in free compared to instructed actions, and comparable between human- and robot-instructed actions. Control ratings were higher for positive compared to neutral and negative outcomes, and positively correlated with ratings of how human-like the robot appeared. These results highlight the role of endogenous processing of action selection and provide preliminary insight into the SoA when actions are guided by artificial agents.

Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action

Here we challenge and present evidence that expands the what, when, and whether anatomical model of intentional action, which states that internally driven decisions about the content and timing of our actions and about whether to act at all depend on separable neural systems, anatomically segregated along the medial wall of the frontal lobe. In our fMRI event-related paradigm, subjects acted following conditional cues or following their intentions. The content of the actions, their timing, or their very occurrence were the variables investigated, together with the modulating factor of intentionality. Besides a shared activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for all components and the SMA proper for the when component, we found specific activations beyond the mesial prefrontal wall involving the parietal cortex for the what component or subcortical gray structures for the when component. Moreover, we found behavioral, functional, anatomical, and brain connectivity evidence that the self-driven decisions on whether to act require a higher interhemispheric cooperation: This was indexed by a specific activation of the corpus callosum whereby the less the callosal activation, the greater was the decision cost at the time of the action in the whether trials. Furthermore, tractography confirmed that the fibers passing through the callosal focus of activation connect the two sides of the frontal lobes involved in intentional trials. This is evidence of non-unitary neural foundations for the processes involved in intentional actions with the pre-SMA/ACC operating as an intentional hub. These findings may guide the exploration of specific instances of disturbed intentionality.

The Agent Brain: A Review of Non-invasive Brain Stimulation Studies on Sensing Agency

According to philosophy of mind and neuroscientific models, the sense of agency can be defined as the sense that I am the one that is generating an action and causing its effects. Such ability to sense ourselves as causal agents is critical for the definition of intentional behavior and is a primary root for human interaction skills. The present mini-review aims at discussing evidences from non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) studies targeting functional correlates of different aspects of agency and evidences on the way stimulation techniques affect such core feature of human subjective experience. Clinical and brain imaging studies helped in defining a neural network mediating agency-related processes, which includes the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the cingulate cortex (CC), the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas (SMA and pre-SMA), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and its inferior regions and the cerebellum. However, while the plurality of those structures mirrors the complexity of the phenomenon, their actual roles with respect to different components of the experience of agency have been primarily explored via correlational techniques, without a clear evidence about their causal significance with respect to the integration of sensorimotor information, intentionalization, and action monitoring processes. Therefore, insights into the specific causal role of different cortical structures can be specified by using NIBS techniques, in order to provide improved understanding into the bases of our ability vs. inability to properly act in complex social contexts.

Tracking the will to attend: Cortical activity indexes self-generated, voluntary shifts of attention

The neural substrates of volition have long tantalized philosophers and scientists. Over the past few decades, researchers have employed increasingly sophisticated technology to investigate this issue, but many studies have been limited considerably by their reliance on intrusive experimental procedures (e.g., abrupt instructional cues), measures of brain activity contaminated by overt behavior, or introspective self-report techniques of questionable validity. Here, we used multivoxel pattern time-course analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging data to index voluntary, covert perceptual acts-shifts of visuospatial attention-in the absence of instructional cues, overt behavioral indices, and self-report. We found that these self-generated, voluntary attention shifts were time-locked to activity in the medial superior parietal lobule, supporting the hypothesis that this brain region is engaged in voluntary attentional reconfiguration. Self-generated attention shifts were also time-locked to activity in the basal ganglia, a novel finding that motivates further research into the role of the basal ganglia in acts of volition. Remarkably, prior to self-generated shifts of attention, we observed early and selective increases in the activation of medial frontal (dorsal anterior cingulate) and lateral prefrontal (right middle frontal gyrus) cortex-activity that likely reflects processing related to the intention or preparation to reorient attention. These findings, which extend recent evidence on freely chosen motor movements, suggest that dorsal anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortices play key roles in both overt and covert acts of volition, and may constitute core components of a brain network underlying the will to attend.

The effects of freedom of choice in action selection on perceived mental effort and the sense of agency

Previous research showed that increasing the number of action alternatives enhances the sense of agency (SoA). Here, we investigated whether choice space could affect subjective judgments of mental effort experienced during action selection and examined the link between subjective effort and the SoA. Participants performed freely selected (among two, three, or four options) and instructed actions that produced pleasant or unpleasant tones. We obtained action-effect interval estimates to quantify intentional binding - the perceived interval compression between actions and outcomes and feeling of control (FoC) ratings. Additionally, participants reported the degree of mental effort they experienced during action selection. We found that both binding and FoC were systematically enhanced with increasing choice-level. Outcome valence did not influence binding, while FoC was stronger for pleasant than unpleasant outcomes. Finally, freely chosen actions were associated with low subjective effort and slow responses (i.e., higher reaction times), and instructed actions were associated with high effort and fast responses. Although the conditions that yielded the greatest and least subjective effort also yielded the greatest and least binding and FoC, there was no significant correlation between subjective effort and SoA measures. Overall, our results raise interesting questions about how agency may be influenced by response selection demands (i.e., indexed by speed of responding) and subjective mental effort. Our work also highlights the importance of understanding how subjective mental effort and response speed are related to popular notions of fluency in response selection.

Piercing of Consciousness as a Threshold-Crossing Operation

Many decisions arise through an accumulation of evidence to a terminating threshold. The process, termed bounded evidence accumulation (or drift diffusion), provides a unified account of decision speed and accuracy, and it is supported by neurophysiology in human and animal models. In many situations, a decision maker may not communicate a decision immediately and yet feel that at some point she had made up her mind. We hypothesized that this occurs when an accumulation of evidence reaches a termination threshold, registered, subjectively, as an “aha” moment. We asked human participants to make perceptual decisions about the net direction of dynamic random dot motion. The difficulty and viewing duration were controlled by the experimenter. After indicating their choice, participants adjusted the setting of a clock to the moment they felt they had reached a decision. The subjective decision times (t_SDs) were faster on trials with stronger (easier) motion, and they were well fit by a bounded drift-diffusion model. The fits to the t_SDs alone furnished parameters that fully predicted the choices (accuracy) of four of the five participants. The quality of the prediction provides compelling evidence that these subjective reports correspond to the terminating process of a decision rather than a post hoc inference or arbitrary report. Thus, conscious awareness of having reached a decision appears to arise when the brain’s representation of accumulated evidence reaches a threshold or bound. We propose that such a mechanism might play a more widespread role in the “piercing of consciousness” by non-conscious thought processes.

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Perceptual decisions can arise through an accumulation of evidence to a threshold

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After a stimulus, participants set a clock to the moment they had reached a decision

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An evidence accumulation model fit to these times allowed predictions of accuracy

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The sense of having decided is mediated by a threshold on accumulated evidence

The What, the When, and the Whether of Intentional Action in the Brain: A Meta-Analytical Review

In their attempt to define discrete subcomponents of intentionality, Brass and Haggard (2008) proposed their What, When, and Whether model (www-model) which postulates that the content, the timing and the possibility of generating an action can be partially independent both at the cognitive level and at the level of their neural implementation. The original proposal was based on a limited number of studies, which were reviewed with a discursive approach. To assess whether the model stands in front of the more recently published data, we performed a systematic review of the literature with a meta-analytic method based on a hierarchical clustering (HC) algorithm. We identified 15 PET/fMRI studies well-suited for this quest. HC revealed the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the medial prefrontal cortex, with the more anterior regions (the anterior cingulum) involved in more abstract decisions of whether to execute an action and the more posterior ones (the middle cingulum or the SMA) recruited in specifying the content and the timing components of actions. However, in contrast with the original www-model, this dissociation involves also brain regions well outside the median wall of the frontal lobe, in a component specific manner: the supramarginal gyrus for the what component, the pallidum and the thalamus for the when component, the putamen and the insula for the whether component. We then calculated co-activation maps on the three component-specific www clusters of the medial wall of the frontal/limbic lobe: to this end, we used the activation likelihood approach that we applied on the imaging studies on action contained in the BrainMap.org database. This analysis confirmed the main findings of the HC analyses. However, the BrainMap.org data analyses also showed that the aforementioned segregations are generated by paradigms in which subjects act in response to conditional stimuli rather than while driven by their own intentions. We conclude that the available data confirm that the neural underpinnings of intentionality can be fractionated in discrete components that are partially independent. We also suggest that intentionality manifests itself in discrete components through the boosting of general purpose action-related regions specialized for different aspects of action selection and inhibition.

Microdream neurophenomenology

Nightly transitions into sleep are usually uneventful and transpire in the blink of an eye. But in the laboratory these transitions afford a unique view of how experience is transformed from the perceptually grounded consciousness of wakefulness to the hallucinatory simulations of dreaming. The present review considers imagery in the sleep-onset transition-"microdreams" in particular-as an alternative object of study to dreaming as traditionally studied in the sleep lab. A focus on microdream phenomenology has thus far proven fruitful in preliminary efforts to (i) develop a classification for dreaming's core phenomenology (the "oneiragogic spectrum"), (ii) establish a structure for assessing dreaming's multiple memory inputs ("multi-temporal memory sources"), (iii) further Silberer's project for classifying sleep-onset images in relation to waking cognition by revealing two new imagery types ("autosensory imagery," "exosensory imagery"), and (iv) embed a potential understanding of microdreaming processes in a larger explanatory framework ("multisensory integration approach"). Such efforts may help resolve outstanding questions about dream neurophysiology and dreaming's role in memory consolidation during sleep but may also advance discovery in the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly.

Deliberation period during easy and difficult decisions: re-examining Libet's "veto" window in a more ecologically valid framework

Whether consciousness plays a causal role in cognitive processing remains debated. According to Benjamin Libet, consciousness is needed to deliberate and veto an action that is initiated unconsciously. Libet offered that the deliberation window takes place between the time of conscious intent (W) and action (MR). We further examined this deliberation-veto hypothesis by measuring the length of the temporal window (W-MR) when making easy and difficult choices. If Libet were correct that the W-MR is intended for evaluation and cancelation, we should expect a shorter W-MR for an easy decision since less deliberation is presumably needed. Instead, we observed a less intuitive effect: The W-MR window in the easy trials was longer than the W-MR window in the difficult ones. Our results suggest several interpretations including the idea that consciousness may play a causal role in decision making but not in a straightforward manner as assumed by Libet's veto hypothesis.

Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It

The concept of free will is hard to define, but crucial to both individual and social life. For centuries people have wondered how freedom is possible in a world ruled by physical determinism; however, reflections on free will have been confined to philosophy until half a century ago, when the topic was also addressed by neuroscience. The first relevant, and now well-known, strand of research on the brain correlates of free will was that pioneered by Libet et al. (1983), which focused on the allegedly unconscious intentions taking place in decisions regarded as free and voluntary. Libet’s interpretation of the so-called readiness potential (RP) seems to favor a sort of deflation of freedom (Soon et al., 2008). However, recent studies seem to point to a different interpretation of the RP, namely that the apparent build-up of the brain activity preceding subjectively spontaneous voluntary movements (SVM) may reflect the ebb and flow of the background neuronal noise, which is triggered by many factors (Schurger et al., 2016). This interpretation seems to bridge the gap between the neuroscientific perspective on free will and the intuitive, commonsensical view of it (Roskies, 2010b), but many problems remain to be solved and other theoretical paths can be hypothesized. The article therefore, proposes to start from an operationalizable concept of free will (Lavazza and Inglese, 2015) to find a connection between higher order descriptions (useful for practical life) and neural bases. This new way to conceptualize free will should be linked to the idea of “capacity”: that is, the availability of a repertoire of general skills that can be manifested and used without moment by moment conscious control. The capacity index, which is also able to take into account the differences of time scales in decisions, includes reasons-responsiveness and is related to internal control, understood as the agent’s ownership of the mechanisms that trigger the relevant behavior. Cognitive abilities, needed for one to have capacity, might be firstly operationalized as a set of neuropsychological tests, which can be used to operationalize and measure specific executive functions, as they are strongly linked to the concept of control. Subsequently, a free will index would allow for the search of the underlying neural correlates of the capacity exhibited by people and the limits in capacity exhibited by each individual.

"Free will": are we all equal? A dynamical perspective of the conscious intention to move

In their seminal (1983) study, Libet and colleagues suggested that awareness of one's intention to act has a postdictive character in that it occurs long after cerebral activity leading to action has been initiated. Crucially, Libet et al. further suggested that the time window (±200 ms) between the conscious experience of the intention to act and the action itself offers people the possibility of "vetoing" the unfolding action. This raises the question of whether there are individual differences in the duration of this "veto window" and which components of the readiness potential (RP) and the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) explain this variability. It has been reported that some psychiatric diseases lead to shorter intervals between conscious intentions and actions. However, it is unclear whether such patients suffer from impairment of the sense of volition, thus experiencing voluntary movements as involuntary, or whether voluntary inhibition of action is actually reduced, since conscious intention occurs later. We had two aims in the present paper. First, we aimed at clarifying the role of consciousness in voluntary actions by examining the relation between the duration of the veto window and impulsivity. Second, we sought to examine different components of the RP and LRP waveforms so as to attempt to explain observed variability in W judgments. Our results indicate (1) that impulsive people exhibit a shorter delay between their intention and the action than non-impulsive people, and (2) that this difference can hardly be attributed to a difference in time perception. Electroencephalography indicated that the rate of growth of the RP is relevant to explain differences in W judgments, since we observed that the RP at the moment of conscious intention is lower for people with late conscious intention than for people with early conscious intention. The onset and the intercept of these waveforms were less interpretable. These results bring new light on the role that consciousness plays in voluntary action.

Modulating conscious movement intention by noninvasive brain stimulation and the underlying neural mechanisms

Conscious intention is a fundamental aspect of the human experience. Despite long-standing interest in the basis and implications of intention, its underlying neurobiological mechanisms remain poorly understood. Using high-definition transcranial DC stimulation (tDCS), we observed that enhancing spontaneous neuronal excitability in both the angular gyrus and the primary motor cortex caused the reported time of conscious movement intention to be ∼60-70 ms earlier. Slow brain waves recorded ∼2-3 s before movement onset, as well as hundreds of milliseconds after movement onset, independently correlated with the modulation of conscious intention by brain stimulation. These brain activities together accounted for 81% of interindividual variability in the modulation of movement intention by brain stimulation. A computational model using coupled leaky integrator units with biophysically plausible assumptions about the effect of tDCS captured the effects of stimulation on both neural activity and behavior. These results reveal a temporally extended brain process underlying conscious movement intention that spans seconds around movement commencement.

Anticipating conflict: Neural correlates of a Bayesian belief and its motor consequence

Previous studies have examined the neural correlates of proactive control using a variety of behavioral paradigms; however, the neural network relating the control process to its behavioral consequence remains unclear. Here, we applied a dynamic Bayesian model to a large fMRI data set of the stop signal task to address this issue. By estimating the probability of the stop signal - p(Stop) - trial by trial, we showed that higher p(Stop) is associated with prolonged go trial reaction time (RT), indicating proactive control of motor response. In modeling fMRI signals at trial and target onsets, we distinguished activities of proactive control, prediction error, and RT slowing. We showed that the anterior pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) responds specifically to increased stop signal likelihood, and its activity is correlated with activations of the posterior pre-SMA and bilateral anterior insula during prolonged response times. This directional link is also supported by Granger causality analysis. Furthermore, proactive control, prediction error, and time-on-task are each mapped to distinct areas in the medial prefrontal cortex. Together, these findings dissect regional functions of the medial prefrontal cortex in cognitive control and provide system level evidence associating conflict anticipation with its motor consequence.

Loss of agency in apraxia

The feeling of acting voluntarily is a fundamental component of human behavior and social life and is usually accompanied by a sense of agency. However, this ability can be impaired in a number of diseases and disorders. An important example is apraxia, a disturbance traditionally defined as a disorder of voluntary skillful movements that often results from frontal-parietal brain damage. The first part of this article focuses on direct evidence of some core symptoms of apraxia, emphasizing those with connections to agency and free will. The loss of agency in apraxia is reflected in the monitoring of internally driven action, in the perception of specifically self-intended movements and in the neural intention to act. The second part presents an outline of the evidences supporting the functional and anatomical link between apraxia and agency. The available structural and functional results converge to reveal that the frontal-parietal network contributes to the sense of agency and its impairment in disorders such as apraxia. The current knowledge on the generation of motor intentions and action monitoring could potentially be applied to develop therapeutic strategies for the clinical rehabilitation of voluntary action.

Beyond the "urge to move": objective measures for the study of agency in the post-Libet era

The investigation of human volition is a longstanding endeavor from both philosophers and researchers. Yet because of the major challenges associated with capturing voluntary movements in an ecologically relevant state in the research environment, it is only in recent years that human agency has grown as a field of cognitive neuroscience. In particular, the seminal work of Libet et al. (1983) paved the way for a neuroscientific approach to agency. Over the past decade, new objective paradigms have been developed to study agency, drawing upon emerging concepts from cognitive and computational neuroscience. These include the chronometric approach of Libet's study which is embedded in the "intentional binding" paradigm, optimal motor control theory and most recent insights from active inference theory. Here we review these principal methods and their application to the study of agency in health and the insights gained from their application to neurological and psychiatric disorders. We show that the neuropsychological paradigms that are based upon these new approaches have key advantages over traditional experimental designs. We propose that these advantages, coupled with advances in neuroimaging, create a powerful set of tools for understanding human agency and its neurobiological basis.

Possibilities and limits of mind-reading: a neurophilosophical perspective

Access to other minds once presupposed other individuals' expressions and narrations. Today, several methods have been developed which can measure brain states relevant for assessments of mental states without 1st person overt external behavior or speech. Functional magnetic resonance imaging and trace conditioning are used clinically to identify patterns of activity in the brain that suggest the presence of consciousness in people suffering from severe consciousness disorders and methods to communicate cerebrally with patients who are motorically unable to communicate. The techniques are also used non-clinically to access subjective awareness in adults and infants. In this article we inspect technical and theoretical limits on brain-machine interface access to other minds. We argue that these techniques hold promises of important medical breakthroughs, open up new vistas of communication, and of understanding the infant mind. Yet they also give rise to ethical concerns, notably misuse as a consequence of hypes and misinterpretations.

Predicting free choices for abstract intentions

Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to precede and potentially even influence subsequent free decisions. However, to date, such findings have been mostly restricted to simple motor choices, and despite considerable debate, there is no evidence that the outcome of more complex free decisions can be predicted from prior brain signals. Here, we show that the outcome of a free decision to either add or subtract numbers can already be decoded from neural activity in medial prefrontal and parietal cortex 4 s before the participant reports they are consciously making their choice. These choice-predictive signals co-occurred with the so-called default mode brain activity pattern that was still dominant at the time when the choice-predictive signals occurred. Our results suggest that unconscious preparation of free choices is not restricted to motor preparation. Instead, decisions at multiple scales of abstraction evolve from the dynamics of preceding brain activity.

Reinforcement learning signals in the anterior cingulate cortex code for others' false beliefs

The ability to recognise that another's belief is false is a hallmark of our capacity to understand others' mental states. It has been suggested that the computational and neural mechanisms that underpin learning about others' mental states may be similar to those that underpin first-person Reinforcement Learning (RL). In RL, unexpected decision-making outcomes constitute prediction errors (PE), which are coded for by neurons in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). Does the ACC signal the PEs (false beliefs) of others about the outcomes of their decisions? We scanned subjects using fMRI while they monitored a third-person's decisions and similar responses made by a computer. The outcomes of the trials were manipulated, such that the actual outcome was unexpectedly different from the predicted outcome on 1/3 of trials. We examined activity time-locked to privileged information which indicated the actual outcomes only to subjects. Activity in the gyral ACC was found when the outcomes of the third-person's decisions were unexpectedly positive. Activity in the sulcal ACC was found when the third-person's or computer's outcomes were unexpectedly positive. We suggest that a property of the ACC is that it codes PEs, with a portion of the gyral ACC specialised for processing the PEs of others.

Willed action, free will, and the stochastic neurodynamics of decision-making

It is shown that the randomness of the firing times of neurons in decision-making attractor neuronal networks that is present before the decision cues are applied can cause statistical fluctuations that influence the decision that will be taken. In this rigorous sense, it is possible to partially predict decisions before they are made. This raises issues about free will and determinism. There are many decision-making networks in the brain. Some decision systems operate to choose between gene-specified rewards such as taste, touch, and beauty (in for example the peacock's tail). Other processes capable of planning ahead with multiple steps held in working memory may require correction by higher order thoughts that may involve explicit, conscious, processing. The explicit system can allow the gene-specified rewards not to be selected or deferred. The decisions between the selfish gene-specified rewards, and the explicitly calculated rewards that are in the interests of the individual, the phenotype, may themselves be influenced by noise in the brain. When the explicit planning system does take the decision, it can report on its decision-making, and can provide a causal account rather than a confabulation about the decision process. We might use the terms "willed action" and "free will" to refer to the operation of the planning system that can think ahead over several steps held in working memory with which it can take explicit decisions. Reduced connectivity in some of the default mode cortical regions including the precuneus that are active during self-initiated action appears to be related to the reduction in the sense of self and agency, of causing willed actions, that can be present in schizophrenia.

An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement

A gradual buildup of neuronal activity known as the "readiness potential" reliably precedes voluntary self-initiated movements, in the average time locked to movement onset. This buildup is presumed to reflect the final stages of planning and preparation for movement. Here we present a different interpretation of the premovement buildup. We used a leaky stochastic accumulator to model the neural decision of "when" to move in a task where there is no specific temporal cue, but only a general imperative to produce a movement after an unspecified delay on the order of several seconds. According to our model, when the imperative to produce a movement is weak, the precise moment at which the decision threshold is crossed leading to movement is largely determined by spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations in neuronal activity. Time locking to movement onset ensures that these fluctuations appear in the average as a gradual exponential-looking increase in neuronal activity. Our model accounts for the behavioral and electroencephalography data recorded from human subjects performing the task and also makes a specific prediction that we confirmed in a second electroencephalography experiment: Fast responses to temporally unpredictable interruptions should be preceded by a slow negative-going voltage deflection beginning well before the interruption itself, even when the subject was not preparing to move at that particular moment.

The motor system and its disorders

The motor system has been intensively studied using the emerging neuroimaging technologies over the last twenty years. These include early applications of positron emission tomography of brain perfusion, metabolic rate and receptor function, as well as functional magnetic resonance imaging, tractography from diffusion weighted imaging, and transcranial magnetic stimulation. Motor system research has the advantage of the existence of extensive electrophysiological and anatomical information from comparative studies which enables cross-validation of new methods. We review the impact of neuroimaging on the understanding of diverse motor functions, including motor learning, decision making, inhibition and the mirror neuron system. In addition, we show how imaging of the motor system has supported a powerful platform for bidirectional translational neuroscience. In one direction, it has provided the opportunity to study safely the processes of neuroplasticity, neural networks and neuropharmacology in stroke and movement disorders and offers a sensitive tool to assess novel therapeutics. In the reverse direction, imaging of clinical populations has promoted innovations in cognitive theory, experimental design and analysis. We highlight recent developments in the analysis of structural and functional connectivity in the motor system; the advantages of integration of multiple methodologies; and new approaches to experimental design using formal models of cognitive-motor processes.

The anterior cingulate cortex: monitoring the outcomes of others' decisions

The ability to attribute mental states to others and understand the basis of their decisions is essential for human social interaction. A controversial theory states that this is achieved by simulating another's information processing in one's own neural circuits. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is known to play an important role in the registration of discrepancies between the predicted and actual outcomes of decisions (prediction errors).When positive and negative feedback fails altogether, the failure may also signal errors in the prediction that the outcome of that decision would be informative and guide future decisions. Does the ACC signal that an outcome is unexpectedly uninformative? When an outcome directed to others is uninformative, do we understand their mental states by simulating them in the circuits of the ACC in our own brain? The aim of our study was to test for these two possibilities in the human brain with event-related fMRI. We tested whether the ACC processes errors in the prediction of informative feedback and whether the ACC is also activated when scanned subjects process the same outcomes of another's decisions. We show that each is processed by a separate subregion of the ACC.

Modular networks involving the medial frontal cortex: towards the development of neuropsychiatry

OBJECTIVES

The pathophysiology of mental disorders is largely unresolved. We propose that the identification of abnormalities in brain modular networks will provide a promising approach for the understanding of mental disorders.

METHODS

We review the current discussion on the neuroscientific basis of psychiatric diseases and review recent studies in functional neuroimaging and systems physiology on mental functions of the human brain.

RESULTS

We propose that brain functional units are organized in modular networks. Modular networks allow for flexibility within the modular processing units and across interconnected modules affording optimization of task performance and deficit compensation in disease. As an example it will be shown that differentiated modules in medial frontal cortex play a critical role for the control of behaviour. This will be contrasted to recent studies in neurological and psychiatric patients revealing behavioural abnormalities due to lesions or reversibly deprived functions in the medial frontal cortex.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings are conceptualized as starting points for a neuroscience based diagnosis and treatment of brain diseases at the border of psychiatry and neurology.

The neural basis of event-time introspection

We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for introspection of different event types, e.g., the bilateral angular gyrus for introspection of intention. Our results suggest that event-time introspection engages specific neural networks to assess the contents of consciousness. Subjective event times should therefore be interpreted as the result of complex interactions between introspection and experience networks, rather than as direct reproduction of the individual's conscious state or as a mere post hoc interpretation.

Prediction of Decisions from Noise in the Brain before the Evidence is Provided

Can decisions be predicted from brain activity? It is frequently difficult in neuroimaging studies to determine this, because it is not easy to establish when the decision has been taken. In a rigorous approach to this issue, we show that in a neurally plausible integrate-and-fire attractor-based model of decision-making, the noise generated by the randomness in the spiking times of neurons can be used to predict a decision for 0.5 s or more before the decision cues are applied. The ongoing noise at the time the decision cues are applied influences which decision will be taken. It is possible to predict on a single trial to more than 68% correct which of two decisions will be taken. The prediction is made from the spontaneous firing before the decision cues are applied in the two populations of neurons that represent the decisions. Thus decisions can be partly predicted even before the decision cues are applied, due to noise in the decision-making process. This analysis has interesting implications for decision-making and free will, for it shows that random neuronal firing times can influence a decision before the evidence for the decision has been provided.

How does neuroscience affect our conception of volition?

Although there is no clear concept of volition or the will, we do have intuitive ideas that characterize the will, agency, and voluntary behavior. Here I review results from a number of strands of neuroscientific research that bear upon our intuitive notions of the will. These neuroscientific results provide some insight into the neural circuits mediating behaviors that we identify as related to will and volition. Although some researchers contend that neuroscience will undermine our views about free will, to date no results have succeeded in fundamentally disrupting our common sense beliefs. Still, the picture emerging from neuroscience does raise new questions, and ultimately may put pressure on some intuitive notions about what is necessary for free will.

Effects of Clock Monitoring on Electroencephalographic Activity

Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded while participants waited to make spontaneous key-press movements (Experiment 1) or waited for tones in a pitch judgment task (Experiment 2). In one condition of each experiment, participants also had to report the position of a spot traveling on a clock at the crucial time point (i.e., when they decided to move or when the tone was presented), mimicking a procedure used to assess the time of conscious awareness of an event of interest. In a second condition, there was no clock or temporal judgment. Average EEG activity preceding key presses was substantially different when participants had to monitor the clock than when they did not. Smaller clock-related differences in average EEG activity were also present preceding tone onsets. The effects of clock monitoring on EEG activity could be responsible for previous reports that movement-related brain activity begins before participants have consciously decided to move (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983).

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple

The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed.

Priming for self-esteem influences the monitoring of one's own performance

Social cues have subtle effects on a person, often without them being aware. One explanation for this influence involves implicit priming of trait associations. To study this effect, we activated implicit associations in participants of ‘being Clever’ or ‘being Stupid’ that were task relevant, and studied its behavioural impact on an independent cognitive task (the n-back task). Activating a representation of ‘Clever’ caused participants to slow their reaction times after errors on the working memory task, while the reverse pattern was seen for associations to ‘Stupid’. Critically, these behavioural effects were absent in control conditions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that the neural basis of this effect involves the anterior paracingulate cortex (area 32) where activity tracked the observed behavioural pattern, increasing its activity during error monitoring in the ‘Clever’ condition and decreasing in the ‘Stupid’ condition. The data provide a quantitative demonstration of how implicit cues, which specifically target a person’s self-concept, influences the way we react to our own behaviour and point to the anterior paracingulate cortex as a critical cortical locus for mediating these self-concept related behavioural regulations.

Action selection: a race model for selected and non-selected actions distinguishes the contribution of premotor and prefrontal areas

Race models have been used to explain perceptual, motor and oculomotor decisions. Here we developed a race model to explain how human subjects select actions when there are no overt rewards and no external cues to specify which action to make. Critically, we were able to estimate the cumulative activity of neuronal decision-units for selected and non-selected actions. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test for regional brain activity that correlated with the predictions of this race model. Activity in the pre-SMA, cingulate motor and premotor areas correlated with prospective selection between responses according to the race model. Activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex did not correlate with the race model, even though this area was active during action selection. This activity related to the degree to which individuals switched between alternative actions. Crucially, a follow-up experiment showed that it was not present on the first trial. Taken together, these results suggest that the lateral prefrontal cortex is not the source for the generation of action. It is more likely that it is involved in switching to alternatives or monitoring previous actions. Thus, our experiment shows the power of the race model in distinguishing the contribution of different areas in the selection of action.

Medial frontal cortex: from self-generated action to reflection on one's own performance

It was suggested over 20 years ago that the supplementary motor cortex is involved in self-generated behaviour. Since then, there have been many studies using electrophysiology and brain imaging of the role of the supplementary motor cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. In light of the findings, the proposal that these regions are crucial for self-generated action has recently been challenged. Here, we review the recent literature and argue that the proposal survives the findings. We further argue that it can be generalised to cover reflection on mental states. Finally, we suggest that the pattern of anatomical connections is consistent with the proposal that the medial frontal cortex is crucially involved in self-generated action and self-reflection.

Value judgments and self-control of action: the role of the medial frontal cortex

Humans generate actions in relation to perceived events in the environment. Events are valuated in terms of subjective (personal) relevance or meaning, i.e. "what does this mean to me?". Similarly, making sense or gaining meaning from sensations (i.e., "perception") from one's own body and of mental images, such as memories or intentions, involves valuation from a subjective perspective. Here, we review recent findings in neurophysiology and neuroimaging suggesting that the medial frontal cortex comprises cortical relay nodes that afford the attribution of self-relevant, immediate and intuitive (implicit) meaning. In addition, we describe recent data that suggest that the medial frontal cortex participates also in the explicit appraisal of certain stimuli, namely, emotional face expressions, occurring as early as 150 ms following the stimulus. We propose that the medial frontal cortex subserves egocentric "value" judgments (both implicit and explicit), which are critical for self-control of action.

The "sense of agency" and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms

The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of one's own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.

High-frequency oscillations in distributed neural networks reveal the dynamics of human decision making

We examine the relative timing of numerous brain regions involved in human decisions that are based on external criteria, learned information, personal preferences, or unconstrained internal considerations. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) and advanced signal analysis techniques, we were able to non-invasively reconstruct oscillations of distributed neural networks in the high-gamma frequency band (60–150 Hz). The time course of the observed neural activity suggested that two-alternative forced choice tasks are processed in four overlapping stages: processing of sensory input, option evaluation, intention formation, and action execution. Visual areas are activated first, and show recurring activations throughout the entire decision process. The temporo-occipital junction and the intraparietal sulcus are active during evaluation of external values of the options, 250–500 ms after stimulus presentation. Simultaneously, personal preference is mediated by cortical midline structures. Subsequently, the posterior parietal and superior occipital cortices appear to encode intention, with different subregions being responsible for different types of choice. The cerebellum and inferior parietal cortex are recruited for internal generation of decisions and actions, when all options have the same value. Action execution was accompanied by activation peaks in the contralateral motor cortex. These results suggest that high-gamma oscillations as recorded by MEG allow a reliable reconstruction of decision processes with excellent spatiotemporal resolution.