Bias in the brain: a diffusion model analysis of prior probability and potential payoff

Empathy incites a stable prosocial decision bias

Empathy toward suffering individuals serves as potent driver for prosocial behavior. However, it remains unclear whether prosociality induced by empathy for another person's pain persists once that person's suffering diminishes. To test this, participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing a binary social decision task that involved allocation of points to themselves and another person. In block one, participants completed the task after witnessing frequent painful stimulation of the other person, and in block two, after observing low frequency of painful stimulation. Drift-diffusion modeling revealed an increased initial bias toward making prosocial decisions in the first block compared with baseline that persisted in the second block. These results were replicated in an independent behavioral study. An additional control study showed that this effect may be specific to empathy as stability was not evident when prosocial decisions were driven by a social norm such as reciprocity. Increased neural activation in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was linked to empathic concern after witnessing frequent pain and to a general prosocial decision bias after witnessing rare pain. Altogether, our findings show that empathy for pain elicits a stable inclination toward making prosocial decisions even as their suffering diminishes.

Valuations of target items are drawn towards unavailable decoy items due to prior expectations

When people make choices, the items they consider are often embedded in a context (of other items). How this context affects the valuation of the specific item is an important question. High-value context might make items appear less attractive because of contrast-the tendency to normalize perception of an object relative to its background-or more attractive because of assimilation-the tendency to group objects together. Alternatively, a high-value context might increase prior expectations about the item's value. Here, we investigated these possibilities. We examined how unavailable context items affect choices between two target items, as well as the willingness-to-pay for single targets. Participants viewed sets of three items for several seconds before the target(s) were highlighted. In both tasks, we found a significant assimilation-like effect where participants were more likely to choose or place a higher value on a target when it was surrounded by higher-value context. However, these context effects were only significant for participants' fastest choices. Using variants of a drift-diffusion model, we established that the unavailable context shifted participants' prior expectations towards the average values of the sets but had an inconclusive effect on their evaluations of the targets during the decision (i.e. drift rates). In summary, we find that people use context to inform their initial valuations. This can improve efficiency by allowing people to get a head start on their decision. However, it also means that the valuation of an item can change depending on the context.

Proactive response preparation contributes to contingency learning: novel evidence from force-sensitive keyboards

Contingency learning can involve learning that the identity of one stimulus in a sequence predicts the identity of the next stimulus. It remains unclear, however, whether such learning speeds responses to the next stimulus only by reducing the threshold for triggering the expected response after stimulus onset or also by preparing the expected response before stimulus onset. To distinguish between these competing accounts, we manipulated the probabilities with which each of two prime arrows (Left and Right) were followed by each of two probe arrows (Up and Down) in a prime-probe task while using force-sensitive keyboards to monitor sub-threshold finger force. Consistent with the response preparation account, two experiments revealed greater force just before probe onset on the response key corresponding to the direction in which the probe was more (versus less) likely to point (e.g., Up vs. Down). Furthermore, mirroring sequential contingency effects in behavior, this pre-probe force effect vanished after a single low-probability trial. These findings favor the response preparation account over the threshold only account. They also suggest the possibility that contingency learning in our tasks indexes trial-by-trial expectations regarding the utility of the prime for predicting the upcoming probe.

Prior probability cues bias sensory encoding with increasing task exposure

When observers have prior knowledge about the likely outcome of their perceptual decisions, they exhibit robust behavioural biases in reaction time and choice accuracy. Computational modelling typically attributes these effects to strategic adjustments in the criterion amount of evidence required to commit to a choice alternative - usually implemented by a starting point shift - but recent work suggests that expectations may also fundamentally bias the encoding of the sensory evidence itself. Here, we recorded neural activity with EEG while participants performed a contrast discrimination task with valid, invalid, or neutral probabilistic cues across multiple testing sessions. We measured sensory evidence encoding via contrast-dependent steady-state visual-evoked potentials (SSVEP), while a read-out of criterion adjustments was provided by effector-selective mu-beta band activity over motor cortex. In keeping with prior modelling and neural recording studies, cues evoked substantial biases in motor preparation consistent with criterion adjustments, but we additionally found that the cues produced a significant modulation of the SSVEP during evidence presentation. While motor preparation adjustments were observed in the earliest trials, the sensory-level effects only emerged with extended task exposure. Our results suggest that, in addition to strategic adjustments to the decision process, probabilistic information can also induce subtle biases in the encoding of the evidence itself.

Impairment in recognition memory may be associated with near-term risk for suicide attempt in a high-risk sample

INTRODUCTION

Prior work has implicated several neurocognitive domains, including memory, in patients with a history of prior suicide attempt. The current study evaluated whether a delayed recognition test could enhance prospective prediction of near-term suicide outcomes in a sample of patients at high-risk for suicide.

METHODS

132 Veterans at high-risk for suicide completed a computer-based recognition memory test including semantically-related and -unrelated words. Outcomes were coded as actual suicide attempt (ASA), other suicide-related event (OtherSE) such as aborted/interrupted attempt or preparatory behavior, or neither (noSE), within 90 days after testing.

RESULTS

Reduced performance was a significant predictor of upcoming ASA, but not OtherSE, after controlling for standard clinical variables such as current suicidal ideation and history of prior suicide attempt. However, compared to the noSE reference group, the OtherSE group showed a reduction in the expected benefit of semantic relatedness in recognizing familiar words. A computational model, the drift diffusion model (DDM), to explore latent cognitive processes, revealed the OtherSE group had decreased decisional efficiency for semantically-related compared to semantically-unrelated familiar words.

LIMITATIONS

This study was a secondary analysis of an existing dataset, involving participants in a treatment trial, and requires replication; ~10 % of the sample was excluded from analysis due to failure to master the practice tasks and/or apparent noncompliance.

CONCLUSION

Impairments in recognition memory may be associated with near-term risk for suicide attempt, and may provide a tool to improve prediction of when at-risk individuals may be transitioning into a period of heightened risk for suicide attempt.

Kurvers RHJ. A Cognitive Computational Approach to Social and Collective Decision-Making

Collective dynamics play a key role in everyday decision-making. Whether social influence promotes the spread of accurate information and ultimately results in adaptive behavior or leads to false information cascades and maladaptive social contagion strongly depends on the cognitive mechanisms underlying social interactions. Here we argue that cognitive modeling, in tandem with experiments that allow collective dynamics to emerge, can mechanistically link cognitive processes at the individual and collective levels. We illustrate the strength of this cognitive computational approach with two highly successful cognitive models that have been applied to interactive group experiments: evidence-accumulation and reinforcement-learning models. We show how these approaches make it possible to simultaneously study (a) how individual cognition drives social systems, (b) how social systems drive individual cognition, and (c) the dynamic feedback processes between the two layers.

Affective valence does not reflect progress prediction errors in perceptual decisions

Affective valence and intensity form the core of our emotional experiences. It has been proposed that affect reflects the prediction error between expected and actual states, such that better/worse-than-expected discrepancies result in positive/negative affect. However, whether the same principle applies to progress prediction errors remains unclear. We empirically and computationally evaluate the hypothesis that affect reflects the difference between expected and actual progress in forming a perceptual decision. We model affect within an evidence accumulation framework where actual progress is mapped onto the drift-rate parameter and expected progress onto an expected drift-rate parameter. Affect is computed as the difference between the expected and actual amount of accumulated evidence. We find that expected and actual progress both influence affect, but in an additive manner that does not align with a prediction error account. Our computational model reproduces both task behavior and affective ratings, suggesting that sequential sampling models provide a promising framework to model progress appraisals. These results show that although affect is sensitive to both expected and actual progress, it does not reflect the computation of a progress prediction error.

Trial-history biases in evidence accumulation can give rise to apparent lapses in decision-making

Trial history biases and lapses are two of the most common suboptimalities observed during perceptual decision-making. These suboptimalities are routinely assumed to arise from distinct processes. However, previous work has suggested that they covary in their prevalence and that their proposed neural substrates overlap. Here we demonstrate that during decision-making, history biases and apparent lapses can both arise from a common cognitive process that is optimal under mistaken beliefs that the world is changing i.e. nonstationary. This corresponds to an accumulation-to-bound model with history-dependent updates to the initial state of the accumulator. We test our model's predictions about the relative prevalence of history biases and lapses, and show that they are robustly borne out in two distinct decision-making datasets of male rats, including data from a novel reaction time task. Our model improves the ability to precisely predict decision-making dynamics within and across trials, by positing a process through which agents can generate quasi-stochastic choices.

Fast decisions reflect biases, slow decisions do not

Decisions are often made by heterogeneous groups of individuals, each with distinct initial biases and access to information of different quality. We show that in large groups of independent agents who accumulate evidence the first to decide are those with the strongest initial biases. Their decisions align with their initial bias, regardless of the underlying truth. In contrast, agents who decide last make decisions as if they were initially unbiased, and hence make better choices. We obtain asymptotic expressions in the large population limit that quantify how agents' initial inclinations shape early decisions. Our analysis shows how bias, information quality, and decision order interact in non-trivial ways to determine the reliability of decisions in a group.

The representation of priors and decisions in the human parietal cortex

Animals actively sample their environment through orienting actions such as saccadic eye movements. Saccadic targets are selected based both on sensory evidence immediately preceding the saccade, and a "salience map" or prior built-up over multiple saccades. In the primate cortex, the selection of each individual saccade depends on competition between target-selective cells that ramp up their firing rate to saccade release. However, it is less clear how a cross-saccade prior might be implemented, either in neural firing or through an activity-silent mechanism such as modification of synaptic weights on sensory inputs. Here, we present evidence from magnetoencephalography for 2 distinct processes underlying the selection of the current saccade, and the representation of the prior, in human parietal cortex. While the classic ramping decision process for each saccade was reflected in neural firing rates (measured in the event-related field), a prior built-up over multiple saccades was implemented via modulation of the gain on sensory inputs from the preferred target, as evidenced by rapid frequency tagging. A cascade of computations over time (initial representation of the prior, followed by evidence accumulation and then an integration of prior and evidence) provides a mechanism by which a salience map may be built up across saccades in parietal cortex. It also provides insight into the apparent contradiction that inactivation of parietal cortex has been shown not to affect performance on single-trials, despite the presence of clear evidence accumulation signals in this region.

Knowledge of Threat Biases Perceptual Decision Making in Anxiety: Evidence From Signal Detection Theory and Drift Diffusion Modeling

Background

Threat biases are considered key factors in the development and maintenance of anxiety. However, these biases are poorly operationalized and remain unquantified. Furthermore, it is unclear whether and how prior knowledge of threat and its uncertainty induce these biases and how they manifest in anxiety.

Method

Participants (n = 55) used prestimulus cues to decide whether the subsequently presented stimuli were threatening or neutral. The cues either provided no information about the probability (high uncertainty) or indicated high probability (low uncertainty) of encountering threatening or neutral targets. We used signal detection theory and hierarchical drift diffusion modeling to quantify bias.

Results

High-uncertainty threat cues improved discrimination of subsequent threatening and neutral stimuli more than neutral cues. However, anxiety was associated with worse discrimination of threatening versus neutral stimuli following high-uncertainty threat cues. Using hierarchical drift diffusion modeling, we found that threat cues biased decision making not only by shifting the starting point of evidence accumulation toward the threat decision but also by increasing the efficiency with which sensory evidence was accumulated for both threat-related and neutral decisions. However, higher anxiety was associated with a greater shift of starting point toward the threat decision but not with the efficiency of evidence accumulation.

Conclusions

Using computational modeling, these results highlight the biases by which knowledge regarding uncertain threat improves perceptual decision making but impairs it in case of anxiety.

Social norms shape visual appearance: Taking a closer look at the link between social norm learning and perceptual decision-making

One of the most fundamental questions in social psychology is whether norms can change individuals' minds by shaping the visual appearance of stimuli. This question was first raised by Muzafer Sherif (1935). Drawing on the extended social reinforcement account (Germar and Mojzisch, 2019), we aimed to provide a rigorous test of the hypothesis that norm learning leads to a persistent perceptual bias and, hence, to a change in the visual appearance of stimuli. From a methodological perspective, we used both a diffusion model approach and the method of adjustment, a well-established technique from psychophysics and vision research. The results of Experiments 1-3 show that norm effects on perceptual decision-making are robustly replicable, and are due to genuine social influence, that is, they cannot be explained by non-social priming, contingency learning effects (Experiments 1 and 2) or anchoring effects (Experiment 3). Most importantly, by using a psychophysical approach, Experiment 4 shows, for the first time, that social norm learning alters individuals' point of subjective equality and, hence, the visual appearance of stimuli.

A Distinct Neural Code Supports Prospection of Future Probabilities During Instrumental Information-Seeking

To make adaptive decisions, we must actively demand information, but relatively little is known about the mechanisms of active information gathering. An open question is how the brain estimates expected information gains (EIG) when comparing the current decision uncertainty with the uncertainty that is expected after gathering information. We examined this question using fMRI in a task in which people placed bids to obtain information in conditions that varied independently by prior decision uncertainty, information diagnosticity, and the penalty for an erroneous choice. Consistent with value of information theory, bids were sensitive to EIG and its components of prior certainty and expected posterior certainty. Expected posterior certainty was decoded above chance from multivoxel activation patterns in the posterior parietal and extrastriate cortices. This representation was independent of instrumental rewards and overlapped with distinct representations of EIG and prior certainty. Thus, posterior parietal and extrastriate cortices are candidates for mediating the prospection of posterior probabilities as a key step to estimate EIG during active information gathering.

Learning about me and you: Only deterministic stimulus associations elicit self-prioritization

Self-relevant material has been shown to be prioritized over stimuli relating to others (e.g., friend, stranger), generating benefits in attention, memory, and decision-making. What is not yet understood, however, is whether the conditions under which self-related knowledge is acquired impacts the emergence of self-bias. To address this matter, here we used an associative-learning paradigm in combination with a stimulus-classification task to explore the effects of different learning experiences (i.e., deterministic vs. probabilistic) on self-prioritization. The results revealed an effect of prior learning on task performance, with self-prioritization only emerging when participants acquired target-related associations (i.e., self vs. friend) under conditions of certainty (vs. uncertainty). A further computational (i.e., drift diffusion model) analysis indicated that differences in the efficiency of stimulus processing (i.e., rate of information uptake) underpinned this self-prioritization effect. The implications of these findings for accounts of self-function are considered.

Accumulating evidence for myriad alternatives: Modeling the generation of free association

The associative manner by which thoughts follow one another has intrigued scholars for decades. The process by which an association is generated in response to a cue can be explained by classic models of semantic processing through distinct computational mechanisms. Distributed attractor networks implement rich-get-richer dynamics and assume that stronger associations can be reached with fewer steps. Conversely, spreading activation models assume that a cue distributes its activation, in parallel, to all associations at a constant rate. Despite these models' huge influence, their intractability together with the unconstrained nature of free association have restricted their few previous uses to qualitative predictions. To test these computational mechanisms quantitatively, we conceptualize free association as the product of internal evidence accumulation and generate predictions concerning the speed and strength of people's associations. To this end, we first develop a novel approach to mapping the personalized space of words from which an individual chooses an association to a given cue. We then use state-of-the-art evidence accumulation models to demonstrate the function of rich-get-richer dynamics on the one hand and of stochasticity in the rate of spreading activation on the other hand, in preventing an exceedingly slow resolution of the competition among myriad potential associations. Furthermore, whereas our results uniformly indicate that stronger associations require less evidence, only in combination with rich-get-richer dynamics does this explain why weak associations are slow yet prevalent. We discuss implications for models of semantic processing and evidence accumulation and offer recommendations for practical applications and individual-differences research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Modelling decision-making biases

Biases are a fundamental aspect of everyday life decision-making. A variety of modelling approaches have been suggested to capture decision-making biases. Statistical models are a means to describe the data, but the results are usually interpreted according to a verbal theory. This can lead to an ambiguous interpretation of the data. Mathematical cognitive models of decision-making outline the structure of the decision process with formal assumptions, providing advantages in terms of prediction, simulation, and interpretability compared to statistical models. We compare studies that used both signal detection theory and evidence accumulation models as models of decision-making biases, concluding that the latter provides a more comprehensive account of the decision-making phenomena by including response time behavior. We conclude by reviewing recent studies investigating attention and expectation biases with evidence accumulation models. Previous findings, reporting an exclusive influence of attention on the speed of evidence accumulation and prior probability on starting point, are challenged by novel results suggesting an additional effect of attention on non-decision time and prior probability on drift rate.

Stimulus expectations do not modulate visual event-related potentials in probabilistic cueing designs

Humans and other animals can learn and exploit repeating patterns that occur within their environments. These learned patterns can be used to form expectations about future sensory events. Several influential predictive coding models have been proposed to explain how learned expectations influence the activity of stimulus-selective neurons in the visual system. These models specify reductions in neural response measures when expectations are fulfilled (termed expectation suppression) and increases following surprising sensory events. However, there is currently scant evidence for expectation suppression in the visual system when confounding factors are taken into account. Effects of surprise have been observed in blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signals, but not when using electrophysiological measures. To provide a strong test for expectation suppression and surprise effects we performed a predictive cueing experiment while recording electroencephalographic (EEG) data. Participants (n=48) learned cue-face associations during a training session and were then exposed to these cue-face pairs in a subsequent experiment. Using univariate analyses of face-evoked event-related potentials (ERPs) we did not observe any differences across expected (90% probability), neutral (50%) and surprising (10%) face conditions. Across these comparisons, Bayes factors consistently favoured the null hypothesis throughout the time-course of the stimulus-evoked response. When using multivariate pattern analysis we did not observe above-chance classification of expected and surprising face-evoked ERPs. By contrast, we found robust within- and across-trial stimulus repetition effects. Our findings do not support predictive coding-based accounts that specify reduced prediction error signalling when perceptual expectations are fulfilled. They instead highlight the utility of other types of predictive processing models that describe expectation-related phenomena in the visual system without recourse to prediction error signalling.

Drift-diffusion modeling reveals that masked faces are preconceived as unfriendly

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of face masks has become a daily routine. Studies have shown that face masks increase the ambiguity of facial expressions which not only affects (the development of) emotion recognition, but also interferes with social interaction and judgement. To disambiguate facial expressions, we rely on perceptual (stimulus-driven) as well as preconceptual (top-down) processes. However, it is unknown which of these two mechanisms accounts for the misinterpretation of masked expressions. To investigate this, we asked participants (N = 136) to decide whether ambiguous (morphed) facial expressions, with or without a mask, were perceived as friendly or unfriendly. To test for the independent effects of perceptual and preconceptual biases we fitted a drift-diffusion model (DDM) to the behavioral data of each participant. Results show that face masks induce a clear loss of information leading to a slight perceptual bias towards friendly choices, but also a clear preconceptual bias towards unfriendly choices for masked faces. These results suggest that, although face masks can increase the perceptual friendliness of faces, people have the prior preconception to interpret masked faces as unfriendly.

Dissecting the chain of information processing and its interplay with neurochemicals and fluid intelligence across development

Previous research has highlighted the role of glutamate and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) in perceptual, cognitive, and motor tasks. However, the exact involvement of these neurochemical mechanisms in the chain of information processing, and across human development, is unclear. In a cross-sectional longitudinal design, we used a computational approach to dissociate cognitive, decision, and visuomotor processing in 293 individuals spanning early childhood to adulthood. We found that glutamate and GABA within the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) explained unique variance in visuomotor processing, with higher glutamate predicting poorer visuomotor processing in younger participants but better visuomotor processing in mature participants, while GABA showed the opposite pattern. These findings, which were neurochemically, neuroanatomically and functionally specific, were replicated ~21 mo later and were generalized in two further different behavioral tasks. Using resting functional MRI, we revealed that the relationship between IPS neurochemicals and visuomotor processing is mediated by functional connectivity in the visuomotor network. We then extended our findings to high-level cognitive behavior by predicting fluid intelligence performance. We present evidence that fluid intelligence performance is explained by IPS GABA and glutamate and is mediated by visuomotor processing. However, this evidence was obtained using an uncorrected alpha and needs to be replicated in future studies. These results provide an integrative biological and psychological mechanistic explanation that links cognitive processes and neurotransmitters across human development and establishes their potential involvement in intelligent behavior.

Contributions of the Basal Ganglia to Visual Perceptual Decisions

The basal ganglia (BG) make up a prominent nexus between visual and motor-related brain regions. In contrast to the BG's well-established roles in movement control and value-based decision making, their contributions to the transformation of visual input into an action remain unclear, especially in the context of perceptual decisions based on uncertain visual evidence. This article reviews recent progress in our understanding of the BG's contributions to the formation, evaluation, and adjustment of such decisions. From theoretical and experimental perspectives, the review focuses on four key stations in the BG network, namely, the striatum, pallidum, subthalamic nucleus, and midbrain dopamine neurons, which can have different roles and together support the decision process.

What mechanisms mediate prior probability effects on rapid-choice decision-making?

Rapid-choice decision-making is biased by prior probability of response alternatives. Conventionally, prior probability effects are assumed to selectively affect, response threshold, which determines the amount of evidence required to trigger a decision. However, there may also be effects on the rate at which evidence is accumulated and the time required for non-decision processes (e.g., response production). Healthy young (n = 21) and older (n = 20) adults completed a choice response-time task requiring left- or right-hand responses to imperative stimuli. Prior probability was manipulated using a warning stimulus that informed participants that a particular response was 70% likely (i.e., the imperative stimulus was either congruent or incongruent with the warning stimulus). In addition, prior probability was either fixed for blocks of trials (block-wise bias) or varied from trial-to-trial (trial-wise bias). Response time and accuracy data were analysed using the racing diffusion evidence-accumulation model to test the selective influence assumption. Response times for correct responses were slower on incongruent than congruent trials, and older adults' responses were slower, but more accurate, than young adults. Evidence-accumulation modelling favoured an effect of prior probability on both response thresholds and nondecision time. Overall, the current results cast doubt on the selective threshold influence assumption in the racing diffusion model.

Multiple timescales of learning indicated by changes in evidence-accumulation processes during perceptual decision-making

Evidence accumulation models have enabled strong advances in our understanding of decision-making, yet their application to examining learning has not been common. Using data from participants completing a dynamic random dot-motion direction discrimination task across four days, we characterized alterations in two components of perceptual decision-making (Drift Diffusion Model drift rate and response boundary). Continuous-time learning models were applied to characterize trajectories of performance change, with different models allowing for varying dynamics. The best-fitting model included drift rate changing as a continuous, exponential function of cumulative trial number. In contrast, response boundary changed within each daily session, but in an independent manner across daily sessions. Our results highlight two different processes underlying the pattern of behavior observed across the entire learning trajectory, one involving a continuous tuning of perceptual sensitivity, and another more variable process describing participants' threshold of when enough evidence is present to act.

Reward prospect affects strategic adjustments in stop signal task

Interaction with the environment requires us to predict the potential reward that will follow our choices. Rewards could change depending on the context and our behavior adapts accordingly. Previous studies have shown that, depending on reward regimes, actions can be facilitated (i.e., increasing the reward for response) or interfered (i.e., increasing the reward for suppression). Here we studied how the change in reward perspective can influence subjects’ adaptation strategy. Students were asked to perform a modified version of the Stop-Signal task. Specifically, at the beginning of each trial, a Cue Signal informed subjects of the value of the reward they would receive; in one condition, Go Trials were rewarded more than Stop Trials, in another, Stop Trials were rewarded more than Go Trials, and in the last, both trials were rewarded equally. Subjects participated in a virtual competition, and the reward consisted of points to be earned to climb the leaderboard and win (as in a video game contest). The sum of points earned was updated with each trial. After a learning phase in which the three conditions were presented separately, each subject performed 600 trials testing phase in which the three conditions were randomly mixed. Based on the previous studies, we hypothesized that subjects could employ different strategies to perform the task, including modulating inhibition efficiency, adjusting response speed, or employing a constant behavior across contexts. We found that to perform the task, subjects preferentially employed a strategy-related speed of response adjustment, while the duration of the inhibition process did not change significantly across the conditions. The investigation of strategic motor adjustments to reward’s prospect is relevant not only to understanding how action control is typically regulated, but also to work on various groups of patients who exhibit cognitive control deficits, suggesting that the ability to inhibit can be modulated by employing reward prospects as motivational factors.

Early neural activity changes associated with stimulus detection during visual conscious perception

The earliest cortical neural signals following consciously perceived visual stimuli in humans are poorly understood. Using intracranial electroencephalography, we investigated neural activity changes associated with the earliest stages of stimulus detection during visual conscious perception. Participants (N = 10; 1,693 electrode contacts) completed a continuous performance task where subjects were asked to press a button when they saw a target letter among a series of nontargets. Broadband gamma power (40-115 Hz) was analyzed as marker of cortical population neural activity. Regardless of target or nontarget letter type, we observed early gamma power changes within 30-180 ms from stimulus onset in a network including increases in bilateral occipital, fusiform, frontal (including frontal eye fields), and medial temporal cortex; increases in left lateral parietal-temporal cortex; and decreases in the right anterior medial occipital cortex. No significant differences were observed between target and nontarget stimuli until >180 ms post-stimulus, when we saw greater gamma power increases in left motor and premotor areas, suggesting a possible role in perceptual decision-making and/or motor responses with the right hand. The early gamma power findings support a broadly distributed cortical visual detection network that is engaged at early times tens of milliseconds after signal transduction from the retina.

What Do We Know About Threat-Related Perceptual Decision Making?

The ability to make rapid and precise decisions regarding the presence or absence of threats in our environment is critical for our survival. While threatening stimuli may be detected more accurately and faster due to the "bottom-up" salience of their features, in the real-world, these stimuli are often encountered in familiar environments in which "top-down" cues signal their arrival. There has been significant progress in our understanding of the mechanisms by which we make perceptual decisions regarding relatively routine stimuli; however, the mechanisms of threat-related perceptual decision-making remain unclear. In this paper, we discuss the psychological, computational, and neural mechanisms by which information from threatening stimuli is integrated with our prior knowledge from cues and surrounding contexts to guide perceptual decision-making.

Stimulus-response congruency effects depend on quality of perceptual evidence: A diffusion model account

Individuals often need to make quick decisions based on incomplete or "noisy" information. This requires the coordination of attentional, perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral mechanisms. This poses a challenge for isolating the unique effects of each subprocess from behavioral data, which reflect the summation of all subprocesses combined. Sequential sampling models offer a more detailed examination of behavioral data, enabling us to separate decisional and non-decisional processes at play in a task. Participants were required to identify briefly presented shapes while perceptual (duration, size, location) and response features (location-congruent/-incongruent/-neutral) of the task were manipulated. The diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) was used to dissociate decisional and executive processes in the task. In Experiment 1, stimuli were presented for either 20 or 80 ms to the left or right of a central fixation while response keys were positioned horizontally. In Experiment 2, stimulus size was manipulated rather than duration. In Experiment 3, response keys were positioned vertically. Results showed a duration x response mapping interaction. Participants displayed stimulus-response (S-R) congruency biases only on short-duration trials. This effect was observed for both horizontal and vertical response key mappings. Stimulus size affected participant response speed, but did not elicit S-R congruency biases. The present findings show that when perceptual quality of evidence is poor, individuals rely more heavily on spatial-motor mechanisms when making speeded choice decisions. Furthermore, positioning response keys vertically is insufficient to eliminate S-R congruency effects. Diffusion model parameters are presented and implications of the model are discussed.

Trial-history biases in evidence accumulation can give rise to apparent lapses

Trial history biases and lapses are two of the most common suboptimalities observed during perceptual decision-making. These suboptimalities are routinely assumed to arise from distinct processes. However, several hints in the literature suggest that they covary in their prevalence and that their proposed neural substrates overlap - what could underlie these links? Here we demonstrate that history biases and apparent lapses can both arise from a common cognitive process that is normative under misbeliefs about non-stationarity in the world. This corresponds to an accumulation-to-bound model with history-dependent updates to the initial state of the accumulator. We test our model's predictions about the relative prevalence of history biases and lapses, and show that they are robustly borne out in two distinct rat decision-making datasets, including data from a novel reaction time task. Our model improves the ability to precisely predict decision-making dynamics within and across trials, by positing a process through which agents can generate quasi-stochastic choices.

Multiphasic value biases in fast-paced decisions

Perceptual decisions are biased toward higher-value options when overall gains can be improved. When stimuli demand immediate reactions, the neurophysiological decision process dynamically evolves through distinct phases of growing anticipation, detection, and discrimination, but how value biases are exerted through these phases remains unknown. Here, by parsing motor preparation dynamics in human electrophysiology, we uncovered a multiphasic pattern of countervailing biases operating in speeded decisions. Anticipatory preparation of higher-value actions began earlier, conferring a 'starting point' advantage at stimulus onset, but the delayed preparation of lower-value actions was steeper, conferring a value-opposed buildup-rate bias. This, in turn, was countered by a transient deflection toward the higher-value action evoked by stimulus detection. A neurally-constrained process model featuring anticipatory urgency, biased detection, and accumulation of growing stimulus-discriminating evidence, successfully captured both behavior and motor preparation dynamics. Thus, an intricate interplay of distinct biasing mechanisms serves to prioritise time-constrained perceptual decisions.

Computational underpinnings of partisan information processing biases and associations with depth of cognitive reasoning

Despite unprecedented access to information, partisans increasingly disagree about basic facts that are backed by data, posing a serious threat to a democracy that relies on finding common ground based on objective truths. We examine the underpinnings of this phenomenon using drift diffusion modeling (DDM). Partisans (N = 148) completed a sequential sampling task where they evaluated the honesty of Democrat or Republican politicians during a debate based on fact-check scores. We found that partisans required less and weaker evidence to correctly categorize the ingroup as more honest, and were more accurate on trials when the ingroup candidate was more honest, compared to the outgroup. DDM revealed that such tendencies arise from both a prior preference for categorizing the ingroup as more honest (i.e., biased starting point) and more precise accumulation of information favoring the ingroup candidate compared to the outgroup (i.e., biased drift rate). Moreover, individual differences in cognitive reasoning moderated task performance for the most devoted partisans and maintained divergent associations with the DDM parameters. This suggests that partisans may reach biased conclusions via different pathways depending on their depth of cognitive reasoning. These findings provide key insights into the mechanisms driving partisan divides in polarized environments, and can inform interventions that reduce impasse and conflict.

A practical introduction to using the drift diffusion model of decision-making in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and health sciences

Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the number of studies using evidence-accumulation models (such as the drift diffusion model, DDM) in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. These models go beyond observed behavior to extract descriptions of latent cognitive processes that have been linked to different brain substrates. Accordingly, it is important for psychology and neuroscience researchers to be able to understand published findings based on these models. However, many articles using (and explaining) these models assume that the reader already has a fairly deep understanding of (and interest in) the computational and mathematical underpinnings, which may limit many readers' ability to understand the results and appreciate the implications. The goal of this article is therefore to provide a practical introduction to the DDM and its application to behavioral data - without requiring a deep background in mathematics or computational modeling. The article discusses the basic ideas underpinning the DDM, and explains the way that DDM results are normally presented and evaluated. It also provides a step-by-step example of how the DDM is implemented and used on an example dataset, and discusses methods for model validation and for presenting (and evaluating) model results. Supplementary material provides R code for all examples, along with the sample dataset described in the text, to allow interested readers to replicate the examples themselves. The article is primarily targeted at psychologists, neuroscientists, and health professionals with a background in experimental cognitive psychology and/or cognitive neuroscience, who are interested in understanding how DDMs are used in the literature, as well as some who may to go on to apply these approaches in their own work.

Valence framing induces cognitive bias

Valence framing effects refer to inconsistent choice preferences in response to positive versus negative formulation of mathematically equivalent outcomes. Here, we manipulate valence framing in a two-alternative forced choice dictator game using gains and losses as frames to investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying valence framing. We applied a Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM) to examine whether gain (i.e., “take” money) and loss (i.e., “give” money) frames evoke a cognitive bias as previous research did not consistently reveal framing effects using reaction times and response frequency as dependent variables. DDMs allow decomposing the decision process into separate cognitive mechanisms, whereby a cognitive bias was repeatedly associated with a shift in the starting point of the model. Conducting both a laboratory (N = 62) and an online study (N = 109), female participants allocated money between themselves and another person in a prosocial or selfish way. In each study, one group was instructed to give money (give frame), the other to take money (take frame). Consistent with previous studies, no differences were found in response times and response frequencies. However, in both studies, substantial bias towards the selfish option was found in the take frame groups, captured by the starting point of the DDM. Thus, our results suggest that valence framing induces a cognitive bias in decision processing in women, even when no behavioral differences are present.

Framing cognitive offloading in terms of gains or losses: achieving a more optimal use of reminders

Nowadays individuals can readily set reminders to offload intentions onto external resources, such as smartphone alerts, rather than using internal memory. Individuals tend to be biased, setting more reminders than would be optimal. We address the question whether the reminder bias depends on offloading scenarios being framed as either gains or losses, both between-participants (Experiment 1) and within-participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, framing of reminders in terms of gains resulted in participants employing a risk-averse strategy and using more reminders than would be optimal. Importantly, however, participants used reminders more optimally and were more willing to choose the risk-seeking option of remembering internally when reminders implied a loss. Based on metacognitive measures in Experiment 2, the reminder bias increased the more underconfident participants were about their memory abilities in both framing scenarios. Framing did not alter this relationship between erroneous metacognitive underconfidence and reminder bias but provides an additional influence. We conclude that emphasizing the losses (costs) associated with external reminders helps in achieving more optimal decisions in offloading situations, and that in addition to cognitive effort and metacognitive judgments, framing needs to be considered in improving individuals’ offloading behavior.

Trial-by-trial fluctuations in amygdala activity track motivational enhancement of desirable sensory evidence during perceptual decision-making

People are biased toward seeing outcomes that they are motivated to see. For example, wanting their favored team to prevail biases sports fans to perceive an ambiguous foul in a manner that is favorable to the team they support. Here, we test the hypothesis that such motivational biases in perceptual decision-making are associated with amygdala activity. We used monetary incentives to experimentally manipulate participants to want to see one percept over another while they performed a categorization task involving ambiguous images. Participants were more likely to categorize an image as the category we motivated them to see, suggesting that wanting to see a particular percept biased their perceptual decisions. Heightened amygdala activity was associated with motivation consistent categorizations and tracked trial-by-trial enhancement of neural activity in sensory cortices encoding the desirable category. Analyses using a drift diffusion model further suggest that trial-by-trial amygdala activity was specifically associated with biases in the accumulation of sensory evidence. In contrast, frontoparietal regions commonly associated with biases in perceptual decision-making were not associated with motivational bias. Altogether, our results suggest that wanting to see an outcome biases perceptual decisions via distinct mechanisms and may depend on dynamic fluctuations in amygdala activity.

Allocation of Visuospatial Attention Indexes Evidence Accumulation for Reach Decisions

Visuospatial attention is a prerequisite for the performance of visually guided movements: perceptual discrimination is regularly enhanced at target locations before movement initiation. It is known that this attentional prioritization evolves over the time of movement preparation; however, it is not clear whether this build-up simply reflects a time requirement of attention formation or whether, instead, attention build-up reflects the emergence of the movement decision. To address this question, we combined behavioral experiments, psychophysics, and computational decision-making models to characterize the time course of attention build-up during motor preparation. Participants (n = 46, 29 female) executed center-out reaches to one of two potential target locations and reported the identity of a visual discrimination target (DT) that occurred concurrently at one of various time-points during movement preparation and execution. Visual discrimination increased simultaneously at the two potential target locations but was modulated by the experiment-wide probability that a given location would become the final goal. Attention increased further for the location that was then designated as the final goal location, with a time course closely related to movement initiation. A sequential sampling model of decision-making faithfully predicted key temporal characteristics of attentional allocation. Together, these findings provide evidence that visuospatial attentional prioritization during motor preparation does not simply reflect that a spatial location has been selected as movement goal, but rather indexes the time-extended, cumulative decision that leads to the selection, hence constituting a link between perceptual and motor aspects of sensorimotor decisions.

Motivation by reward jointly improves speed and accuracy, whereas task-relevance and meaningful images do not

Visual selection is characterized by a trade-off between speed and accuracy. Speed or accuracy of the selection process can be affected by higher level factors—for example, expecting a reward, obtaining task-relevant information, or seeing an intrinsically relevant target. Recently, motivation by reward has been shown to simultaneously increase speed and accuracy, thus going beyond the speed–accuracy-trade-off. Here, we compared the motivating abilities of monetary reward, task-relevance, and image content to simultaneously increase speed and accuracy. We used a saccadic distraction task that required suppressing a distractor and selecting a target. Across different blocks successful target selection was followed either by (i) a monetary reward, (ii) obtaining task-relevant information, or (iii) seeing the face of a famous person. Each block additionally contained the same number of irrelevant trials lacking these consequences, and participants were informed about the upcoming trial type. We found that postsaccadic vision of a face affected neither speed nor accuracy, suggesting that image content does not affect visual selection via motivational mechanisms. Task relevance increased speed but decreased selection accuracy, an observation compatible with a classical speed–accuracy trade-off. Motivation by reward, however, simultaneously increased response speed and accuracy. Saccades in all conditions deviated away from the distractor, suggesting that the distractor was suppressed, and this deviation was strongest in the reward block. Drift-diffusion modelling revealed that task-relevance affected behavior by affecting decision thresholds, whereas motivation by reward additionally increased the rate of information uptake. The present findings thus show that the three consequences differ in their motivational abilities.

Rule-based and stimulus-based cues bias auditory decisions via different computational and physiological mechanisms

Expectations, such as those arising from either learned rules or recent stimulus regularities, can bias subsequent auditory perception in diverse ways. However, it is not well understood if and how these diverse effects depend on the source of the expectations. Further, it is unknown whether different sources of bias use the same or different computational and physiological mechanisms. We examined how rule-based and stimulus-based expectations influenced behavior and pupil-linked arousal, a marker of certain forms of expectation-based processing, of human subjects performing an auditory frequency-discrimination task. Rule-based cues consistently biased choices and response times (RTs) toward the more-probable stimulus. In contrast, stimulus-based cues had a complex combination of effects, including choice and RT biases toward and away from the frequency of recently presented stimuli. These different behavioral patterns also had: 1) distinct computational signatures, including different modulations of key components of a novel form of a drift-diffusion decision model and 2) distinct physiological signatures, including substantial bias-dependent modulations of pupil size in response to rule-based but not stimulus-based cues. These results imply that different sources of expectations can modulate auditory processing via distinct mechanisms: one that uses arousal-linked, rule-based information and another that uses arousal-independent, stimulus-based information to bias the speed and accuracy of auditory perceptual decisions.

Prior information about upcoming stimuli can bias our perception of those stimuli. Whether different sources of prior information bias perception in similar or distinct ways is not well understood. We compared the influence of two kinds of prior information on tone-frequency discrimination: rule-based cues, in the form of explicit information about the most-likely identity of the upcoming tone; and stimulus-based cues, in the form of sequences of tones presented before the to-be-discriminated tone. Although both types of prior information biased auditory decision-making, they demonstrated distinct behavioral, computational, and physiological signatures. Our results suggest that the brain processes prior information in a form-specific manner rather than utilizing a general-purpose prior. Such form-specific processing has implications for understanding decision biases real-world contexts, in which prior information comes from many different sources and modalities.

Financial incentives facilitate stronger neural computation of prosocial decisions in lower empathic adult females

Financial incentives are commonly used to motivate behaviors. However, there is also evidence that incentives can impede the behavior they are supposed to foster, for example, documented by a decrease in blood donations if a financial incentive is offered. Based on these findings, previous studies assumed that prosocial motivation is shaped by incentives. However, so far, there is no direct evidence showing an interaction between financial incentives and a specific prosocial motive. Combining drift-diffusion modeling and fMRI, we investigated the effect of financial incentives on empathy, i.e., one of the key motives driving prosocial decisions. In the empathy-alone condition, participants made prosocial decisions based on empathy. In the empathy-bonus condition, they were offered a financial bonus for prosocial decisions, in addition to empathy induction. On average, the bonus enhanced the information accumulation in empathy-based decisions. On the neural level, this enhancement was related to the anterior insula, the same region that also correlated with empathy ratings. Moreover, the effect of the financial incentive on anterior insula activation was stronger the lower a person scored on empathy. These findings show that financial incentives enhance prosocial motivation in the absence of empathy.

Avoiding costly mistakes in groups: The evolution of error management in collective decision making

Individuals continuously have to balance the error costs of alternative decisions. A wealth of research has studied how single individuals navigate this, showing that individuals develop response biases to avoid the more costly error. We, however, know little about the dynamics in groups facing asymmetrical error costs and when social influence amplifies either safe or risky behavior. Here, we investigate this by modeling the decision process and information flow with a drift–diffusion model extended to the social domain. In the model individuals first gather independent personal information; they then enter a social phase in which they can either decide early based on personal information, or wait for additional social information. We combined the model with an evolutionary algorithm to derive adaptive behavior. We find that under asymmetric costs, individuals in large cooperative groups do not develop response biases because such biases amplify at the collective level, triggering false information cascades. Selfish individuals, however, undermine the group’s performance for their own benefit by developing higher response biases and waiting for more information. Our results have implications for our understanding of the social dynamics in groups facing asymmetrical errors costs, such as animal groups evading predation or police officers holding a suspect at gunpoint.

Suboptimal human inference can invert the bias-variance trade-off for decisions with asymmetric evidence

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between: 1) bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies, and 2) variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to forms of inference based on suboptimal strategies. We examined inference problems applied to rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that varied in form and complexity. In general, subjects using more complex strategies tended to have lower bias and variance, but with a dependence on the form of strategy that reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but higher bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but lower, near-normative bias. Our results help define new principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that can be sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality, of the inference process.

People use diverse strategies to make inferences about the world around them, often based on limited evidence. Such inference strategies may be simple but prone to systematic errors or more complex and accurate, but such trends need not always be the rule. We modeled and measured how human participants made rare-event decisions in a preregistered, online study. The participants tended to use suboptimal decision strategies that reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: some used complex, nearly normative strategies with mistuned evidence weights that corresponded to relatively high choice biases but lower choice variance, whereas others used simpler heuristic strategies that corresponded to lower biases but higher variance. These relationships illustrate structure in suboptimality that can be used to identify systematic sources of human errors.

Non-invasive vagus nerve stimulation in epilepsy patients enhances cooperative behavior in the prisoner's dilemma task

The vagus nerve constitutes a key link between the autonomic and the central nervous system. Previous studies provide evidence for the impact of vagal activity on distinct cognitive processes including functions related to social cognition. Recent studies in animals and humans show that vagus nerve stimulation is associated with enhanced reward-seeking and dopamine-release in the brain. Social interaction recruits similar brain circuits to reward processing. We hypothesize that vagus nerve stimulation (VNS) boosts rewarding aspects of social behavior and compare the impact of transcutaneous VNS (tVNS) and sham stimulation on social interaction in 19 epilepsy patients in a double-blind pseudo-randomized study with cross-over design. Using a well-established paradigm, i.e., the prisoner’s dilemma, we investigate effects of stimulation on cooperative behavior, as well as interactions of stimulation effects with patient characteristics. A repeated-measures ANOVA and a linear mixed-effects model provide converging evidence that tVNS boosts cooperation. Post-hoc correlations reveal that this effect varies as a function of neuroticism, a personality trait linked to the dopaminergic system. Behavioral modeling indicates that tVNS induces a behavioral starting bias towards cooperation, which is independent of the decision process. This study provides evidence for the causal influence of vagus nerve activity on social interaction.

Temporal dynamics of decision making: A synthesis of computational and neurophysiological approaches

As interest in the temporal dynamics of decision-making has grown, researchers have increasingly turned to computational approaches such as the drift diffusion model (DDM) to identify how cognitive processes unfold during choice. At the same time, technological advances in noninvasive neurophysiological methods such as electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography now allow researchers to map the neural time course of decision making with millisecond precision. Combining these approaches can potentially yield important new insights into how choices emerge over time. Here we review recent research on the computational and neurophysiological correlates of perceptual and value-based decision making, from DDM parameters to scalp potentials and oscillatory neural activity. Starting with motor response preparation, the most well-understood aspect of the decision process, we discuss evidence that urgency signals and shifts in baseline activation, rather than shifts in the physiological value of the choice-triggering response threshold, are responsible for adjusting response times under speeded choice scenarios. Research on the neural correlates of starting point bias suggests that prestimulus activity can predict biases in motor choice behavior. Finally, studies examining the time dynamics of evidence construction and evidence accumulation have identified signals at frontocentral and centroparietal electrodes associated respectively with these processes, emerging 300-500 ms after stimulus onset. These findings can inform psychological theories of decision-making, providing empirical support for attribute weighting in value-based choice while suggesting theoretical alternatives to dual-process accounts. Further research combining computational and neurophysiological approaches holds promise for providing greater insight into the moment-by-moment evolution of the decision process. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition Economics > Individual Decision-Making.

Cortico-Brainstem Mechanisms of Biased Perceptual Decision-Making in the Context of Pain

Prior expectations can bias how we perceive pain. Using a drift diffusion model, we recently showed that this influence is primarily based on changes in perceptual decision-making (indexed as shift in starting point). Only during unexpected application of high-intensity noxious stimuli, altered information processing (indexed as increase in drift rate) explained the expectancy effect on pain processing. Here, we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural basis of both these processes in healthy volunteers. On each trial, visual cues induced the expectation of high- or low-intensity noxious stimulation or signaled equal probability for both intensities. Participants categorized a subsequently applied electrical stimulus as either low- or high-intensity pain. A shift in starting point towards high pain correlated negatively with right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity during cue presentation underscoring its proposed role of "keeping pain out of mind". This anticipatory right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex signal increase was positively correlated with periaqueductal gray (PAG) activity when the expected high-intensity stimulation was applied. A drift rate increase during unexpected high-intensity pain was reflected in amygdala engagement and increased functional connectivity between amygdala and PAG. Our findings suggest involvement of the PAG in both decision-making bias and altered information processing to implement expectancy effects on pain. PERSPECTIVE: Modulation of pain through expectations has been linked to changes in perceptual decision-making and altered processing of afferent information. Our results suggest involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and periaqueductal gray in these processes.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

Oculomotor freezing indicates conscious detection free of decision bias

The appearance of a salient stimulus rapidly and automatically inhibits saccadic eye movements. Curiously, this "oculomotor freezing" response is triggered only by stimuli that the observer reports seeing. It remains unknown, however, whether oculomotor freezing is linked to the observer's sensory experience or their decision that a stimulus was present. To dissociate between these possibilities, we manipulated decision criterion via monetary payoffs and stimulus probability in a detection task. These manipulations greatly shifted observers' decision criteria but did not affect the degree to which microsaccades were inhibited by stimulus presence. Moreover, the link between oculomotor freezing and explicit reports of stimulus presence was stronger when the criterion was conservative rather than liberal. We conclude that the sensory threshold for oculomotor freezing is independent of decision bias. Provided that conscious experience is also unaffected by such bias, oculomotor freezing is an implicit indicator of sensory awareness.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Sometimes a visual stimulus reaches awareness, and sometimes it does not. To understand why, we need objective, bias-free measures of awareness. We discovered that a reflexive freezing of small eye movements indicates when an observer detects a stimulus. Furthermore, when we biased observers' decisions to report seeing the stimulus, the oculomotor response was unaltered. This suggests that the threshold for conscious perception is independent of the decision criterion and is revealed by oculomotor freezing.