How positive affect modulates proactive control: reduced usage of informative cues under positive affect with low arousal

Goal-directed remembering in older adults

Compared to younger adults, older adults show a reduced difference in memory between items they are directed to remember and items they are directed to forget. This effect may result from increased processing of goal-irrelevant information in aging. In contrast, healthy older adults are often able to selectively remember valuable information, suggesting preservation of goal-directed encoding in aging. Here, we examined how value may differentially affect directed-forgetting and memory for irrelevant details for younger and older adults in a value-directed remembering task. In Experiment 1, participants studied words paired with a directed-forgetting cue and a point-value they earned for later recognition. Participants' memory was then tested, either after an 8-min or 24-hr retention interval. In Experiment 2 words were presented in two colors and the recognition test assessed whether the participant could retrieve the incidentally-presented point value and the color of each recognized words. In both experiments, older and younger adults displayed a comparable ability to selectively encode valuable items. However, older adults showed a reduced directed-forgetting effect compared to younger adults that was maintained across the 24-hr retention interval. In Experiment 2, older adults showed both intact directed-forgetting and similar incidental detail retrieval compared to younger adults. These findings suggest that older adults maintained selectivity to value, demonstrating that aging does not impact the differential encoding of valuable information. Furthermore, younger and older adults may be similarly goal-directed in terms of item features to encode, but that instructions to forget presented items are less effective in older adults.

Sadness and fear, but not happiness, motivate inhibitory behaviour: the influence of discrete emotions on the executive function of inhibition

Inhibition, an executive function, is critical for achieving goals that require suppressing unwanted behaviours, thoughts, or distractions. One hypothesis of the emotion and goal compatibility theory is that emotions of sadness and fear enhance inhibitory control. Across Experiments 1-4, we tested this hypothesis by inducing a happy, sad, fearful, and neutral emotional state prior to completing an inhibition task that indexed a specific facet of inhibition (oculomotor, resisting interference, behavioural, and cognitive). In Experiment 4, we included an anger induction to examine whether valence or motivational-orientation best-predicted performance. We found support that fear and sadness enhanced inhibition except when inhibition required resisting interference. We argue that sadness and fear enhance inhibitory control aiding the detection and analysis of problems (i.e. sadness) or threats (i.e. fear) within one's environment. In sum, this work highlights the importance of identifying how negative emotions can be beneficial for and interact with specific executive functions influencing down-stream processing including attention, cognition, and memory.

Positive and negative action-effects improve task-switching performance

Anticipation of one's own actions' effects drives goal-directed behavior. In multitasking environments, the learning of stable action-effect associations seems particularly important, because establishing reliable response-effect associations for multiple competing tasks may help to differentiate between these tasks and thereby improve task-switching performance. Action-effects not only have cognitive, but also motivational aspects and often the consequences of our actions are hedonically marked. Thus, the anticipated hedonic quality of action-effects may also become part of the task representation, and positive and negative affect may distinctly modulate task-switching performance. We report a pre-registered experiment (N = 120) designed to examine how positive, negative, and neutral valence of action-effects impact performance in a cued task-switching paradigm. Pictures from the IAPS database were used to manipulate the action-effects' valence. Affective valence determined reaction times: participants who learned positive or negative action-effects responded faster than participants in the control condition. In particular, task-switch trials were faster in both conditions than in the control condition, while task-repetition trials were comparable across valence conditions. Our results further suggest that performance improvements in the positive and negative valence conditions occurred for different reasons. Negative action-effects expedited responses specifically for the task that produced the unpleasant outcome, while positive affect more generally promoted performance of both tasks. These findings point toward distinct roles of positive and negative valence of action-effects in regulating multitasking performance.

Revisiting positive affect and reward influences on cognitive control

Modulation of cognitive control by emotion and motivation has become a major topic in cognition research; however, characterizing the extent to which these influences may dissociate has proved challenging. Here, I examine recent advances in this literature, focusing on: (1) neuromodulator mechanisms underlying positive affect and reward motivation effects on cognitive control; (2) contingency and associative learning in interactions between affect/reward and cognitive control; (3) aspects of task design, unrelated to affect/reward, that may have acted as confounding influences on cognitive control in prior work. I suggest that positive affect and reward should not be considered singular in their effects on cognitive control, but instead varying on multiple parameters and interacting with task demands, to determine goal-directed, adaptive behavior.

How does positive mood modulate time-based event expectancy?

In the present study, we investigated how positive mood affects the formation of time-based event expectancies. After positive or neutral mood inductions, participants performed a binary choice response task in which two target stimuli (circle and square) and two pre-target intervals (800 and 1600 ms) appeared equally often. One of the targets was paired with the short interval and the other target with the long interval in 90% of the trials. We found that participants from the positive and neutral groups showed markedly different behavioral patterns of time-based expectancy. The time-based expectancy was restricted to shorter intervals for the positive group and to longer intervals for the neutral group. We propose that positive mood increases attentional prioritization of information that is temporally closer to us.

How Sequentially Changing Reward Prospect Modulates Meta-control: Increasing Reward Prospect Promotes Cognitive Flexibility

Meta-control is necessary to regulate the balance between cognitive stability and flexibility. Evidence from (voluntary) task switching studies suggests performance-contingent reward as one modulating factor. Depending on the immediate reward history, reward prospect seems to promote either cognitive stability or flexibility: Increasing reward prospect reduced switch costs and increased the voluntary switch rate, suggesting increased cognitive flexibility. In contrast, remaining high reward prospect increased switch costs and reduced the voluntary switch rate, suggesting increased cognitive stability. Recently we suggested that increasing reward prospect serves as a meta-control signal toward cognitive flexibility by lowering the updating threshold in working memory. However, in task switching paradigms with two tasks only, this could alternatively be explained by facilitated switching to the other of two tasks. To address this issue, a series of task switching experiments with uncued task switching between three univalent tasks was conducted. Results showed a reduction in reaction time (RT) switch costs to a nonsignificant difference and a high voluntary switch rate when reward prospect increased, whereas repetition RTs were faster, switch RTs slower, and voluntary switch rate was reduced when reward prospect remained high. That is, increasing reward prospect put participants in a state of equal readiness to respond to any target stimulus-be it a task repetition or a switch to one of the other two tasks. The study thus provides further evidence for the assumption that increasing reward prospect serves as a meta-control signal to increase cognitive flexibility, presumably by lowering the updating threshold in working memory.

Proactive engagement of cognitive control modulates implicit approach-avoidance bias

Implicit social-affective biases-reflected in a propensity to approach positive and avoid negative stimuli-have been documented in humans with paradigms, such as the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT). However, the degree to which preemptively engaging cognitive control can help to down-regulate those behavioral tendencies remains poorly understood. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 24 healthy participants completed a cued version of the AAT, in which they responded to pictures of happy or angry faces by pulling a joystick toward themselves (approach) or pushing the joystick away (avoidance) based on the color of the stimulus frame. On some trials, they were cued to reverse the frame color/joystick action instructions. Before stimulus onset, a reverse cue was associated with deactivation of a visuo-spatial and motor planning network and subsequent slowing down in response to stimuli. During the stimulus phase, a reverse cue was associated with a) activation of cognitive control areas, including the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and right inferior parietal lobule (IPL); and b) reduced right precentral gyrus activation when having to push (avoid) a happy face. Overall, these results suggest that proactively engaging cognitive control can help fine-tune behavioral and neural adjustment to emotionally incongruent behavioral conditions.

The Effect of Emotional Arousal on Inhibition of Return Among Youth With Depressive Tendency

The occurrence and development of depressive symptoms were thought to be closely related to excessive attention to negative information. However, the evidences among researchers were inconsistent on whether negative emotional information could induce attention bias in depressed individuals. One possible hypothesis is that the arousal level of stimuli regulates the attention bias of depressed individuals to negative emotional stimuli. In the current study, we directly assessed the attentional inhibition of depression-tendency individuals to different arousal levels of negative emotional faces. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) was used to distinguish the depression-tendency group from the health group. Thirty-three participants in each group completed a simpler cue-target task that comprised four kinds of experimental conditions, in which group was an inter-subject variable, while cue validity, arousal level, and stimulus onset asynchrony were internal variables. By subtracting the reaction time under the valid cue from the reaction time under the invalid cue, we got the magnitudes of inhibition of return (IOR), which reflected the effective suppression of previously noticed irrelevant information. We found that, in health group, the IOR effect was smaller at high arousal level than at low arousal level. This means that even in the normal population, higher arousal level of negative emotional information could weaken the individual's attention inhibition ability. While in the depression-tendency group, the IOR effect only appeared at low arousal level condition, but in the high cue condition it showed the reversal pattern, that was, the cue effect. These results indicated for the first time that the attention bias of depressive individuals to negative emotional stimuli was influenced by the arousal level of stimuli, and the negative stimuli with high arousal level were more difficult to suppress.

The Impact of Facebook Use and Facebook Intrusion on Cognitive Control: Effect in Proactive and Reactive Control

More and more people are using social networking sites, with Facebook being one of the most popular. So far, most of the research on using Facebook has focused on emotional, social, and personality-related factors and few studies have investigated the phenomenon from a cognitive perspective. The aim of our study was, therefore, to identify relationships between cognitive control and Facebook intrusion, with regard to proactive and reactive modes of cognitive control. The study was also designed to investigate the effects of neutral and Facebook-related context. The subjects (N = 80 young adults, M_age = 21.13 years; SD = 1.60) were divided into two groups based on their level of Facebook intrusion. The Facebook Intrusion Scale was used for selection. Using the AX-continuous performance task, we found that subjects with high Facebook intrusion showed more reactive control than their low Facebook intrusion peers. We also demonstrated that all subjects showed less proactive control in a Facebook-related context than in a neutral context. The results were interpreted in the light of the dual mechanism of cognitive control model.

On How to Be Flexible (or Not): Modulation of the Stability-Flexibility Balance

Goal-directed behavior in a constantly changing environment requires a dynamic balance between two antagonistic modes of control: On the one hand, goals need to be maintained and shielded from distraction (stability), and on the other hand, goals need to be relaxed and flexibly updated whenever significant changes occur (flexibility). A dysregulation of this stability-flexibility balance can result in overly rigid or overly distractible behavior, and it is therefore important to understand how this balance is regulated in a context-sensitive, adaptive manner. In the present article, we review recent evidence on how positive affect, reward prospect, and task context modulate the stability-flexibility balance. Two distinct underlying cognitive mechanisms will be discussed: Flexibility may result either from lowering the updating threshold in working memory or from keeping multiple tasks active in working memory. Critically, these two mechanisms allow different (testable) predictions: Whereas lowering the updating threshold should ease the access of new information in working memory and thereby increase flexibility in general, concurrent task activation should only increase flexibility between the respective tasks.

The volatile nature of positive affect effects: opposite effects of positive affect and time on task on proactive control

There is growing evidence suggesting that positive affect promotes cognitive flexibility at the cost of increased distractibility and decreased proactive control. Regarding the latter effect, some studies revealed inconsistent or even diverging findings casting doubt on the reliability of this observation. Recently, it has been shown that motivation can counteract positive affect effects. Here, the authors provide evidence for another factor that opposes positive affect effects, namely time on and experience with a task. To this end, the well proven AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT) was used. Three groups of participants received three blocks of the AX-CPT with a positive affect manipulation (positive group) or neutral affect manipulation (neutral group) or alternating affect blocks (mixed group: pos-neut-pos). Results confirmed the positive affect effect associated with decreased proactive control in the positive and mixed group as compared to the neutral group. Most importantly, all groups showed an increase in proactive control with increasing time on task supporting our prediction that time on task is another factor opposing the positive affect effect. The results thus reveal the sensitivity of the positive affect effect to strategic influences developed with increasing experience with the given task. Implications for future research on the interplay of mild positive affect and cognitive control will be discussed.

The Effects of Arousal and Approach Motivated Positive Affect on Cognitive Control. An ERP Study

A growing body of research has demonstrated that affect modulates cognitive control modes such as proactive and reactive control. Several studies have suggested that positive affect decreases proactive control compared to neutral affect. However, these studies only focused on the valence of affect and often omitted two of its components: arousal and approach motivation. Therefore, we designed the present study to test the hypothesis that cognitive control modes would differ as a function of arousal and approach motivated positive affect. In our study, we used an AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT), commonly used to examine shifts in proactive and reactive control. We also measured P3b, contingent negative variation (CNV), N2 and P3a components of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) as indicators of the use of cognitive control modes. The findings of the present study demonstrated that approach motivated positive affect modified only the P3b and the CNV without effects on the N2 and P3a components. However, arousal induced by pictures modified P3b, CNV and N2 amplitudes. Specifically, the P3b amplitude was larger, and CNV amplitude was less negative in the high than in the low-approach motivated affect. In contrast, the P3b amplitude was larger and both the CNV and N2 amplitudes more negative in low- compared with high-arousal conditions. These ERP results suggest that approach motivated positive affect enhanced proactive control with no effect on reactive control. However, arousal influenced both proactive and reactive control. High arousal decreased proactive control and increased reactive control compared to low arousal. The present study provides novel insights into the relationship between affect, specifically, arousal and approach motivated positive affect and cognitive control modes. In addition, our results help to explain discrepancies found in previous research.

Altered attentional control strategies but spared executive functioning in chronic cannabis users

BACKGROUND

Cannabis use has increased rapidly in recent decades. The increase in cannabis use makes it important to understand the potential influence of chronic use on attentional control and other executive functions (EFs). Because cannabis is often used to reduce stress, and because stress can constrain attentional control and EFs, the primary goal of this study was to determine the joint effect of acute stress and chronic cannabis use on specific EFs.

METHODS

Thirty-nine cannabis users and 40 non-users were assigned to either a stress or no stress version of the Maastricht Acute Stress Test. Participants then completed two cognitive tasks that involve EFs: (1) task switching, and (2) a novel Flexible Attentional Control Task. These two tasks provided assessments of vigilant attention, inhibitory control, top-down attentional control, and cognitive flexibility. Salivary cortisol was assessed throughout the study.

RESULTS

Reaction time indices showed an interaction between stress and cannabis use on top-down attentional control (p=0.036, n_p²=0.059). Follow-up tests showed that cannabis users relied less on top-down attentional control than did non-users in the no stress version. Despite not relying on top-down control, the cannabis users showed no overall performance deficits on the tasks.

CONCLUSIONS

Chronic cannabis users performed cognitive tasks involving EFs as well as non-users while not employing cognitive control processes that are typical for such tasks. These results indicate alterations in cognitive processing in cannabis users, but such alterations do not necessarily lead to global performance deficits.

Positive emotion impedes emotional but not cognitive conflict processing

Cognitive control enables successful goal-directed behavior by resolving a conflict between opposing action tendencies, while emotional control arises as a consequence of emotional conflict processing such as in irony. While negative emotion facilitates both cognitive and emotional conflict processing, it is unclear how emotional conflict processing is affected by positive emotion (e.g., humor). In 2 EEG experiments, we investigated the role of positive audiovisual target stimuli in cognitive and emotional conflict processing. Participants categorized either spoken vowels (cognitive task) or their emotional valence (emotional task) and ignored the visual stimulus dimension. Behaviorally, a positive target showed no influence on cognitive conflict processing, but impeded emotional conflict processing. In the emotional task, response time conflict costs were higher for positive than for neutral targets. In the EEG, we observed an interaction of emotion by congruence in the P200 and N200 ERP components in emotional but not in cognitive conflict processing. In the emotional conflict task, the P200 and N200 conflict effect was larger for emotional than neutral targets. Thus, our results show that emotion affects conflict processing differently as a function of conflict type and emotional valence. This suggests that there are conflict- and valence-specific mechanisms modulating executive control.

Differentiating Motivational from Affective Influence of Performance-contingent Reward on Cognitive Control: The Wanting Component Enhances Both Proactive and Reactive Control

Positive affect strongly modulates goal-directed behaviors and cognitive control mechanisms. It often results from the presence of a pleasant stimulus in the environment, whether that stimulus appears unpredictably or as a consequence of a particular behavior. The influence of positive affect linked to a random pleasant stimulus differs from the influence of positive affect resulting from performance-contingent pleasant stimuli. However, the mechanisms by which the performance contingency of pleasant stimuli modulates the influence of positive affect on cognitive control mechanisms have not been elucidated. Here, we tested the hypothesis that these differentiated effects are the consequence of the activation of the motivational "wanting" component specifically under performance contingency conditions. To that end, we directly compared the effects on cognitive control of pleasant stimuli (a monetary reward) attributed in a performance contingent manner, and of random pleasant stimuli (positive picture) not related to performance, during an AX-CPT task. Both proactive and reactive modes of control were increased specifically by performance contingency, as reflected by faster reaction times and larger amplitude of the CNV and P3a components. Our findings advance our understanding of the respective effects of affect and motivation, which is of special interest regarding alterations of emotion-motivation interaction found in several psychopathological disorders.

Benefits of a hungry mind: When hungry, exposure to food facilitates proactive interference resolution

Hunger is an everyday motivational state, which biases cognition to detect food. Although evidence exists on how hunger affects basic attentional and mnemonic processes, less is known about how motivational drive for food modulates higher cognition. We aimed to investigate the effects of food deprivation on proactive interference resolution, in the presence and absence of food. Normal-weight participants performed a recency probes paradigm providing an experimental block with food and object stimuli as well as a control block with object stimuli only, in a fasted and a sated state. Results showed that the interaction of shifts in nutritional state with the perception of food cues evoked an altered resolution of proactive interference. Satiety led to impaired performance, whereas a hungry state resulted in strengthened resistance to proactive interference and lying in between, the control block presenting neutral objects remained unaffected by nutritional state manipulation. Additionally, a further increase in proactive interference resolution occurred when the conflicting probe depicted food compared to non-food objects. We conclude that when exposed to food, hunger initiates biased competition of active memory representations in favor of prioritized source information at cost of familiar, but irrelevant information. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of an arousal-biased competition in working memory.

How performance (non-)contingent reward modulates cognitive control

Reward has repeatedly been shown to influence cognitive control. More precisely, performance contingent reward is known to increase preparatory, proactive control. In comparison, performance non-contingent reward, that is, reward that is not dependent on a pre-specified performance criterion but is given unconditional for any response, even errors, is a rather understudied topic. Recently, Fröber and Dreisbach (2014) compared performance contingent and non-contingent reward in a single experiment. They found that non-contingent reward seems to modulate cognitive control in an oppositional way than contingent reward, namely by reducing proactive control. In the present paper, the authors further investigate this dissociation in two experiments with a reward manipulation that facilitated adaptations to changes in reward availability: reward - with performance contingency varying between subjects - was manipulated not trial-by-trial but in mini-blocks of 20 consecutive trials in an AX-Continuous Performance Task. Performance contingent reward significantly increased proactive control. The repeated experience of non-contingent reward even for errors did not result in increased error rates, but instead was indicative of stable compliance with task rules over time and with less reliance on proactive control.

What is in the feedback? Effect of induced happiness vs. sadness on probabilistic learning with vs. without exploration

According to dominant neuropsychological theories of affect, emotions signal salience of events and in turn facilitate a wide spectrum of response options or action tendencies. Valence of an emotional experience is pivotal here, as it alters reward and punishment processing, as well as the balance between safety and risk taking, which can be translated into changes in the exploration-exploitation trade-off during reinforcement learning (RL). To test this idea, we compared the behavioral performance of three groups of participants that all completed a variant of a standard probabilistic learning task, but who differed regarding which mood state was actually induced and maintained (happy, sad or neutral). To foster a change from an exploration to an exploitation-based mode, we removed feedback information once learning was reliably established. Although changes in mood were successful, learning performance was balanced between the three groups. Critically, when focusing on exploitation-driven learning only, they did not differ either. Moreover, mood valence did not alter the learning rate or exploration per se, when titrated using complementing computational modeling. By comparing systematically these results to our previous study (Bakic et al., 2014), we found that arousal levels did differ between studies, which might account for limited modulatory effects of (positive) mood on RL in the present case. These results challenge the assumption that mood valence alone is enough to create strong shifts in the way exploitation or exploration is eventually carried out during (probabilistic) learning. In this context, we discuss the possibility that both valence and arousal are actually necessary components of the emotional mood state to yield changes in the use and exploration of incentives cues during RL.

Dissociable influences of reward motivation and positive emotion on cognitive control

It is becoming increasingly appreciated that affective and/or motivational influences contribute strongly to goal-oriented cognition and behavior. An unresolved question is whether emotional manipulations (i.e., direct induction of affectively valenced subjective experience) and motivational manipulations (e.g., delivery of performance-contingent rewards and punishments) have similar or distinct effects on cognitive control. Prior work has suggested that reward motivation can reliably enhance a proactive mode of cognitive control, whereas other evidence is suggestive that positive emotion improves cognitive flexibility, but reduces proactive control. However, a limitation of the prior research is that reward motivation and positive emotion have largely been studied independently. Here, we directly compared the effects of positive emotion and reward motivation on cognitive control with a tightly matched, within-subjects design, using the AX-continuous performance task paradigm, which allows for relative measurement of proactive versus reactive cognitive control. High-resolution pupillometry was employed as a secondary measure of cognitive dynamics during task performance. Robust increases in behavioral and pupillometric indices of proactive control were observed with reward motivation. The effects of positive emotion were much weaker, but if anything, also reflected enhancement of proactive control, a pattern that diverges from some prior findings. These results indicate that reward motivation has robust influences on cognitive control, while also highlighting the complexity and heterogeneity of positive-emotion effects. The findings are discussed in terms of potential neurobiological mechanisms.

The differential influences of positive affect, random reward, and performance-contingent reward on cognitive control

Growing evidence suggests that positive affect and reward have differential effects on cognitive control. So far, however, these effects have never been studied together. Here, the authors present one behavioral study investigating the influences of positive affect and reward (contingent and noncontingent) on proactive control. A modified version of the AX-continuous performance task, which has repeatedly been shown to be sensitive to reward and affect manipulations, was used. In a first phase, two experimental groups received either neutral or positive affective pictures before every trial. In a second phase, the two halves of a given affect group additionally received, respectively, performance-contingent or random rewards. The results replicated the typical affect effect, in terms of reduced proactive control under positive as compared to neutral affect. Also, the typical reward effects associated with increased proactive control were replicated. Most interestingly, performance-contingent reward counteracted the positive affect effect, whereas random reward mirrored that effect. In sum, this study provides first evidence that performance-contingent reward, on the one hand, and positive affect and performance-noncontingent reward, on the other hand, have oppositional effects on cognitive control: Only performance-contingent reward showed a motivational effect in terms of a strategy shift toward increased proactive control, whereas positive affect alone and performance-noncontingent reward reduced proactive control. Moreover, the integrative design of this study revealed the vulnerability of positive affect effects to motivational manipulations. The results are discussed with respect to current neuroscientific theories of the effects of dopamine on affect, reward, and cognitive control.

Banishing the Control Homunculi in Studies of Action Control and Behavior Change

For centuries, human self-control has fascinated scientists and nonscientists alike. Current theories often attribute it to an executive control system. But even though executive control receives a great deal of attention across disciplines, most aspects of it are still poorly understood. Many theories rely on an ill-defined set of "homunculi" doing jobs like "response inhibition" or "updating" without explaining how they do so. Furthermore, it is not always appreciated that control takes place across different timescales. These two issues hamper major advances. Here we focus on the mechanistic basis for the executive control of actions. We propose that at the most basic level, action control depends on three cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. These processes are modulated via error-correction or outcome-evaluation mechanisms, preparation, and task rules maintained in working and long-term memory. We also consider how executive control of actions becomes automatized with practice and how people develop a control network. Finally, we discuss how the application of this unified framework in clinical domains can increase our understanding of control deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the development of novel behavioral change interventions.

Attentional flexibility during approach and avoidance motivational states: the role of context in shifts of attentional breadth

In the present studies, we aimed to understand how approach and avoidance states affect attentional flexibility by examining attentional shifts on a trial-by-trial basis. We also examined how a novel construct in this area, task context, might interact with motivation to influence attentional flexibility. Participants completed a modified composite letter task in which the ratio of global to local targets was varied by block, making different levels of attentional focus beneficial to performance on different blocks. Study 1 demonstrated that, in the absence of a motivation manipulation, switch costs were lowest on blocks with an even ratio of global and local trials and were higher on blocks with an uneven ratio. Other participants completed the task while viewing pictures (Studies 2 and 3) and assuming arm positions (Studies 2 and 4) to induce approach, avoidance, and neutral motivational states. Avoidance motivation reduced switch costs in evenly proportioned contexts, whereas approach motivation reduced switch costs in mostly global contexts. Additionally, approach motivation imparted a similar switch cost magnitude across different contexts, whereas avoidance and neutral states led to variable switch costs depending on the context. Subsequent analyses revealed that these effects were driven largely by faster switching to local targets on mostly global blocks in the approach condition. These findings suggest that avoidance facilitates attentional shifts when switches are frequent, whereas approach facilitates responding to rare or unexpected local stimuli. The main implication of these results is that motivation has different effects on attentional shifts depending on the context.

Temporal dynamics of motivation-cognitive control interactions revealed by high-resolution pupillometry

Motivational manipulations, such as the presence of performance-contingent reward incentives, can have substantial influences on cognitive control. Previous evidence suggests that reward incentives may enhance cognitive performance specifically through increased preparatory, or proactive, control processes. The present study examined reward influences on cognitive control dynamics in the AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), using high-resolution pupillometry. In the AX-CPT, contextual cues must be actively maintained over a delay in order to appropriately respond to ambiguous target probes. A key feature of the task is that it permits dissociable characterization of preparatory, proactive control processes (i.e., utilization of context) and reactive control processes (i.e., target-evoked interference resolution). Task performance profiles suggested that reward incentives enhanced proactive control (context utilization). Critically, pupil dilation was also increased on reward incentive trials during context maintenance periods, suggesting trial-specific shifts in proactive control, particularly when context cues indicated the need to overcome the dominant target response bias. Reward incentives had both transient (i.e., trial-by-trial) and sustained (i.e., block-based) effects on pupil dilation, which may reflect distinct underlying processes. The transient pupillary effects were present even when comparing against trials matched in task performance, suggesting a unique motivational influence of reward incentives. These results suggest that pupillometry may be a useful technique for investigating reward motivational signals and their dynamic influence on cognitive control.