Isolating neural correlates of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception

Registered Report Stage II: Decoding the category information from evoked potentials to visible and invisible visual objects

Previous studies that use decoding methods and EEG to investigate the neural representation of the category information of visual objects focused mainly on consciously processed visual objects. It remains unclear whether the category information of unconsciously processed visual objects can be decoded and whether the decoding performance is different for consciously and unconsciously processed visual objects. The present study compared the neural decoding of the animacy category of visible and invisible visual objects via EEG and decoding methods. The results revealed that the animacy of visible visual objects could be decoded above the chance level by the P200, N300, and N400, but not by the early N/P100. However, the animacy of invisible visual objects could not be decoded above the chance level by neither early nor late ERP components. The decoding accuracy was greater for visible visual objects than that for invisible visual objects for the P200, N300 and N400. These results suggested that access to animacy category information for visual objects requires conscious processing.

Examining the lateralization of electrophysiological correlates of auditory awareness

The neurological basis for perceptual awareness remains unclear, and theories disagree as to whether sensory cortices per se generate awareness. Critically, neural activity in the sensory cortices is only a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) if it closely matches the contents of perceptual awareness. Research in vision and touch suggest that contralateral activity in sensory cortices is an NCC. Similarly, research in hearing with two sound sources (left and right) presented over headphones also suggests that a candidate NCC called the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) matches perceived location of sound. The current study used 13 different sound sources presented over loudspeakers for natural localization cues and measured event-related potentials to a threshold stimulus in a sound localization task. Preregistered Bayesian mixed models provided moderate evidence against an overall AAN and very strong evidence against its lateralization. Because of issues regarding data quantity and quality, exploratory analyses with aggregated data from multiple loudspeakers were conducted. Results provided moderate evidence for an overall AAN and strong evidence against its lateralization. Nonetheless, the interpretations of these results remain inconclusive. Therefore, future research should reduce the number of conditions and/or test over several sessions to procure a sufficient amount of data. Taken at face value, the results may suggest issues with AAN as an NCC of auditory awareness, as it does not laterally map onto experiences in a free-field auditory environment, in contrast to the NCCs of vision and touch.

Event-related potentials of stimuli inhibition and access in cross-modal distractor-induced blindness

Distractor-induced blindness (DIB) describes a reduced access to a cued visual target-if multiple target-like distractors have been presented beforehand. Previous ERP data suggest a cumulative frontal inhibition triggered by distractors, which affects the updating process of the upcoming target. In the present study, we examine whether the modality of the cue-formerly defined in the visual domain-affects the expression of these neural signatures. 27 subjects were tested in a cross-modal DIB task: Distractors and targets were defined by a transient change of stimuli shape in a random-dot kinematogram. The onset of the target was announced by a rise in amplitude of a sinusoidal tone. Behavioral results confirmed that detection of the target relies on the number of preceding distractor episodes. Replicating previous unimodal results, ERP responses to distractors were characterized by a frontal negativity starting at 100 ms, which increases with an increasing number of distractor episodes. However, the processing-and detection-of the target was not characterized by a more-expressed P3 response, but by an occipital negativity. The current data confirm that the neural signatures of target awareness depend on the experimental setup used: In case of the DIB, the cross-modal setting might lead to a reduction of attentional resources in the visual domain.

Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.

The influence of feature-based attention and response requirements on ERP correlates of auditory awareness

In search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), it is important to isolate the true NCCs from their prerequisites, consequences, and co-occurring processes. To date, little is known about how attention affects the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of auditory awareness and there is contradictory evidence on whether one of them, the late positivity (LP), is affected by response requirements. By implementing a GO-NOGO design with target and nontarget stimuli, we controlled for feature-based attention and response requirements in the same experiment, while participants rated their awareness using a perceptual awareness scale. The results showed a prolonged auditory awareness negativity (AAN) for aware trials, which was influenced neither by attention nor by response requirement. The LP was affected by both attention and response requirements. Consistent with the levels of processing hypothesis, the LP was related to consciousness as a correlate of the processing of higher-level stimulus features, likely requiring access to a "global workspace." Our findings further suggest that AAN is a proper ERP correlate of auditory consciousness and thus a true NCC in the auditory modality.

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn't the content NCC

Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the 'content NCC' for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine 'what' it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this "upper-deck" form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which "ensemble statistics" are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I'll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.

Late Positivity Correlates with Subjective Reports: Evidence from the Low-frequency and High-frequency Reporting Tasks

Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is an important way to understand the fundamental nature of consciousness. By recording event-related potentials (ERPs) using EEG, researchers have found three potential electrophysiological NCCs: early positive correlate of consciousness (enhanced P1), visual awareness negativity (VAN), and late positivity (LP). However, LP may reflect post-perceptual processing associated with subjective reports rather than consciousness per se. The present experiment investigated the relationship between LP and subjective reports. We adopted two subjective reporting tasks that differed in the requirement for subjective reports. In the low-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in 25% of trials, whereas in the high-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in each trial. Behavioral results showed that the hit rates were lower and false alarm rates were higher on reporting trials in low-frequency reporting tasks than on reporting trials in high-frequency reporting tasks. Unexpectedly, VAN was larger on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task. Importantly, our ERP results showed that LP was larger on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task. Thus, our findings indicated that when the frequency of reports was increased, the task relevance of the stimuli increased, which led to larger LP amplitudes. These findings suggest that LP correlates with subjective reports.

Electrophysiological correlates of sustained conscious perception

Previous research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in visual perception revealed an early event-related potential (ERP), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), to be associated with stimulus awareness. However, due to the use of brief stimulus presentations in previous studies, it remains unclear whether awareness-related negativities represent a transient onset-related response or correspond to the duration of a conscious percept. Studies are required that allow prolonged stimulus presentation under aware and unaware conditions. The present ERP study aimed to tackle this challenge by using a novel stimulation design. Male and female human participants (n = 62) performed a visual task while task-irrelevant line stimuli were presented in the background for either 500 or 1000 ms. The line stimuli sometimes contained a face, which needed so-called visual one-shot learning to be seen. Half of the participants were informed about the presence of the face, resulting in faces being perceived by the informed but not by the uninformed participants. Comparing ERPs between the informed and uninformed group revealed an enhanced negativity over occipitotemporal electrodes that persisted for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. Our results suggest that sustained visual awareness negativities (SVAN) are associated with the duration of stimulus presentation.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation effects support an oscillatory model of ERP genesis

Whether prestimulus oscillatory brain activity contributes to the generation of post-stimulus-evoked neural responses has long been debated, but findings remain inconclusive. We first investigated the hypothesized relationship via EEG recordings during a perceptual task with this correlational evidence causally probed subsequently by means of online rhythmic transcranial magnetic stimulation. Both approaches revealed a close link between prestimulus individual alpha frequency (IAF) and P1 latency, with faster IAF being related to shorter latencies, best explained via phase-reset mechanisms. Moreover, prestimulus alpha amplitude predicted P3 size, best explained via additive (correlational and causal evidence) and baseline shift mechanisms (correlational evidence), each with distinct prestimulus alpha contributors. Finally, in terms of performance, faster prestimulus IAF and shorter P1 latencies were both associated with higher task accuracy, while lower prestimulus alpha amplitudes and higher P3 amplitudes were associated with higher confidence ratings. Our results are in favor of the oscillatory model of ERP genesis and modulation, shedding new light on the mechanistic relationship between prestimulus oscillations and functionally relevant evoked components.

Distrust before first sight? Examining knowledge- and appearance-based effects of trustworthiness on the visual consciousness of faces

The present EEG study with 32 healthy participants investigated whether affective knowledge about a person influences the visual awareness of their face, additionally considering the impact of facial appearance. Faces differing in perceived trustworthiness based on appearance were associated with negative or neutral social information and shown as target stimuli in an attentional blink task. As expected, participants showed enhanced awareness of faces associated with negative compared to neutral social information. On the neurophysiological level, this effect was connected to differences in the time range of the early posterior negativity (EPN)-a component associated with enhanced attention and facilitated processing of emotional stimuli. The findings indicate that the social-affective relevance of a face based on emotional knowledge is accessed during a phase of attentional enhancement for conscious perception and can affect prioritization for awareness. In contrast, no clear evidence for influences of facial trustworthiness during the attentional blink was found.

Multimodal acoustic-electric trigeminal nerve stimulation modulates conscious perception

Multimodal stimulation can reverse pathological neural activity and improve symptoms in neuropsychiatric diseases. Recent research shows that multimodal acoustic-electric trigeminal-nerve stimulation (TNS) (i.e., musical stimulation synchronized to electrical stimulation of the trigeminal nerve) can improve consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness. However, the reliability and mechanism of this novel approach remain largely unknown. We explored the effects of multimodal acoustic-electric TNS in healthy human participants by assessing conscious perception before and after stimulation using behavioral and neural measures in tactile and auditory target-detection tasks. To explore the mechanisms underlying the putative effects of acoustic-electric stimulation, we fitted a biologically plausible neural network model to the neural data using dynamic causal modeling. We observed that (1) acoustic-electric stimulation improves conscious tactile perception without a concomitant change in auditory perception, (2) this improvement is caused by the interplay of the acoustic and electric stimulation rather than any of the unimodal stimulation alone, and (3) the effect of acoustic-electric stimulation on conscious perception correlates with inter-regional connection changes in a recurrent neural processing model. These results provide evidence that acoustic-electric TNS can promote conscious perception. Alterations in inter-regional cortical connections might be the mechanism by which acoustic-electric TNS achieves its consciousness benefits.

Stimulus awareness is associated with secondary somatosensory cortex activation in an inattentional numbness paradigm

While inattentional blindness and deafness studies have revealed neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) without the confound of task relevance in the visual and auditory modality, comparable studies for the somatosensory modality are lacking. Here, we investigated NCC using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in an inattentional numbness paradigm. Participants (N = 44) received weak electrical stimulation on the left hand while solving a demanding visual task. Half of the participants were informed that task-irrelevant weak tactile stimuli above the detection threshold would be applied during the experiment, while the other half expected stimuli below the detection threshold. Unexpected awareness assessments after the experiment revealed that altogether 10 participants did not consciously perceive the somatosensory stimuli during the visual task. Awareness was not significantly modulated by prior information. The fMRI data show that awareness of stimuli led to increased activation in the contralateral secondary somatosensory cortex. We found no significant effects of stimulus awareness in the primary somatosensory cortex or frontoparietal areas. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that somatosensory stimulus awareness is mainly based on activation in higher areas of the somatosensory cortex and does not require strong activation in extended anterior or posterior networks, which is usually seen when perceived stimuli are task-relevant.

EEG spectral slope: A reliable indicator for continuous evaluation of consciousness levels during propofol anesthesia

The level of consciousness undergoes continuous alterations during anesthesia. Prior to the onset of propofol-induced complete unconsciousness, degraded levels of behavioral responsiveness can be observed. However, a reliable index to monitor altered consciousness levels during anesthesia has not been sufficiently investigated. In this study, we obtained 60-channel EEG data from 24 healthy participants during an ultra-slow propofol infusion protocol starting with an initial concentration of 1 μg/ml and a stepwise increase of 0.2 μg/ml in concentration. Consecutive auditory stimuli were delivered every 5 to 6 s, and the response time to the stimuli was used to assess the responsiveness levels. We calculated the spectral slope in a time-resolved manner by extracting 5-second EEG segments at each auditory stimulus and estimated their correlation with the corresponding response time. Our results demonstrated that during slow propofol infusion, the response time to external stimuli increased, while the EEG spectral slope, fitted at 15-45 Hz, became steeper, and a significant negative correlation was observed between them. Moreover, the spectral slope further steepened at deeper anesthetic levels and became flatter during anesthesia recovery. We verified these findings using an external dataset. Additionally, we found that the spectral slope of frontal electrodes over the prefrontal lobe had the best performance in predicting the response time. Overall, this study used a time-resolved analysis to suggest that the EEG spectral slope could reliably track continuously altered consciousness levels during propofol anesthesia. Furthermore, the frontal spectral slope may be a promising index for clinical monitoring of anesthesia depth.

Catecholaminergic neuromodulation and selective attention jointly shape perceptual decision-making

Perceptual decisions about sensory input are influenced by fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, most prominently driven by attention and neuromodulator systems. It is currently unknown if neuromodulator activity and attention differentially modulate perceptual decision-making and/or whether neuromodulatory systems in fact control attentional processes. To investigate the effects of two distinct neuromodulatory systems and spatial attention on perceptual decisions, we pharmacologically elevated cholinergic (through donepezil) and catecholaminergic (through atomoxetine) levels in humans performing a visuo-spatial attention task, while we measured electroencephalography (EEG). Both attention and catecholaminergic enhancement improved decision-making at the behavioral and algorithmic level, as reflected in increased perceptual sensitivity and the modulation of the drift rate parameter derived from drift diffusion modeling. Univariate analyses of EEG data time-locked to the attentional cue, the target stimulus, and the motor response further revealed that attention and catecholaminergic enhancement both modulated pre-stimulus cortical excitability, cue- and stimulus-evoked sensory activity, as well as parietal evidence accumulation signals. Interestingly, we observed both similar, unique, and interactive effects of attention and catecholaminergic neuromodulation on these behavioral, algorithmic, and neural markers of the decision-making process. Thereby, this study reveals an intricate relationship between attentional and catecholaminergic systems and advances our understanding about how these systems jointly shape various stages of perceptual decision-making.

When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions

In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built.

Neural electrophysiological correlates of detection and identification awareness

Humans have conscious experiences of the events in their environment. Previous research from electroencephalography (EEG) has shown visual awareness negativity (VAN) at about 200 ms to be a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). However, when considering VAN as an NCC, it is important to explore which particular experiences are associated with VAN. Recent research proposes that VAN is an NCC of lower-level experiences (detection) rather than higher-level experiences (identification). However, previous results are mixed and have several limitations. In the present study, the stimulus was a ring with a Gabor patch tilting either left or right. On each trial, subjects rated their awareness on a three-level perceptual awareness scale that captured both detection (something vs. nothing) and identification (identification vs. something). Separate staircases were used to adjust stimulus opacity to the detection threshold and the identification threshold. Bayesian linear mixed models provided extreme evidence (BF10 = 131) that VAN was stronger at the detection threshold than at the identification threshold. Mean VAN decreased from [Formula: see text]2.12 microV [[Formula: see text]2.86, [Formula: see text]1.42] at detection to [Formula: see text]0.46 microV [[Formula: see text]0.79, [Formula: see text]0.11] at identification. These results strongly support the claim that VAN is an NCC of lower-level experiences of seeing something rather than of higher-level experiences of specific properties of the stimuli. Thus, results are consistent with recurrent processing theory in that phenomenal visual consciousness is reflected by VAN. Further, results emphasize that it is important to consider the level of experience when searching for NCC.

Distinct ventral stream and prefrontal cortex representational dynamics during sustained conscious visual perception

Instances of sustained stationary sensory input are ubiquitous. However, previous work focused almost exclusively on transient onset responses. This presents a critical challenge for neural theories of consciousness, which should account for the full temporal extent of experience. To address this question, we use intracranial recordings from ten human patients with epilepsy to view diverse images of multiple durations. We reveal that, in sensory regions, despite dramatic changes in activation magnitude, the distributed representation of categories and exemplars remains sustained and stable. In contrast, in frontoparietal regions, we find transient content representation at stimulus onset. Our results highlight the connection between the anatomical and temporal correlates of experience. To the extent perception is sustained, it may rely on sensory representations and to the extent perception is discrete, centered on perceptual updating, it may rely on frontoparietal representations.

Fixation-related electrical potentials during a free visual search task reveal the timing of visual awareness

It has been repeatedly claimed that emotional faces readily capture attention, and that they may be processed without awareness. Yet some observations cast doubt on these assertions. Part of the problem may lie in the experimental paradigms employed. Here, we used a free viewing visual search task during electroencephalographic recordings, where participants searched for either fearful or neutral facial expressions among distractor expressions. Fixation-related potentials were computed for fearful and neutral targets and the response compared for stimuli consciously reported or not. We showed that awareness was associated with an electrophysiological negativity starting at around 110 ms, while emotional expressions were distinguished on the N170 and early posterior negativity only when stimuli were consciously reported. These results suggest that during unconstrained visual search, the earliest electrical correlate of awareness may emerge as early as 110 ms, and fixating at an emotional face without reporting it may not produce any unconscious processing.

Information-Theoretic Approaches in EEG Correlates of Auditory Perceptual Awareness under Informational Masking

In informational masking paradigms, the successful segregation between the target and masker creates auditory perceptual awareness. The dynamics of the build-up of auditory perception is based on a set of interactions between bottom-up and top-down processes that generate neuronal modifications within the brain network activity. These neural changes are studied here using event-related potentials (ERPs), entropy, and integrated information, leading to several measures applied to electroencephalogram signals. The main findings show that the auditory perceptual awareness stimulated functional activation in the fronto-temporo-parietal brain network through (i) negative temporal and positive centro-parietal ERP components; (ii) an enhanced processing of multi-information in the temporal cortex; and (iii) an increase in informational content in the fronto-central cortex. These different results provide information-based experimental evidence about the functional activation of the fronto-temporo-parietal brain network during auditory perceptual awareness.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

The effects of visual working memory load on detection and neural processing of task-unrelated auditory stimuli

While perceptual load has been proposed to reduce the processing of task-unrelated stimuli, theoretical arguments and empirical findings for other forms of task load are inconclusive. Here, we systematically investigated the detection and neural processing of auditory stimuli varying in stimulus intensity during a stimuli-unrelated visual working memory task alternating between low and high load. We found, depending on stimulus strength, decreased stimulus detection and reduced P3, but unaffected N1 amplitudes of the event-related potential to auditory stimuli under high as compared to low load. In contrast, load independent awareness effects were observed during both early (N1) and late (P3) time windows. Findings suggest a late neural effect of visual working memory load on auditory stimuli leading to lower probability of reported awareness of these stimuli.

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Awareness: Detect, Pulse, Switch, and Wave

Consciousness is a fascinating field of neuroscience research where questions often outnumber the answers. We advocate an open and optimistic approach where converging mechanisms in neuroscience may eventually provide a satisfactory understanding of consciousness. We first review several characteristics of conscious neural activity, including the involvement of dedicated systems for content and levels of consciousness, the distinction and overlap of mechanisms contributing to conscious states and conscious awareness of transient events, nonlinear transitions and involvement of large-scale networks, and finally the temporal nexus where conscious awareness of discrete events occurs when mechanisms of attention and memory meet. These considerations and recent new experimental findings lead us to propose an inclusive hypothesis involving four phases initiated shortly after an external sensory stimulus: (1) Detect-primary and higher cortical and subcortical circuits detect the stimulus and select it for conscious perception. (2) Pulse-a transient and massive neuromodulatory surge in subcortical-cortical arousal and salience networks amplifies signals enabling conscious perception to proceed. (3) Switch-networks that may interfere with conscious processing are switched off. (4) Wave-sequential processing through hierarchical lower to higher cortical regions produces a fully formed percept, encoded in frontoparietal working memory and medial temporal episodic memory systems for subsequent report of experience. The framework hypothesized here is intended to be nonexclusive and encourages the addition of other mechanisms with further progress. Ultimately, just as many mechanisms in biology together distinguish living from nonliving things, many mechanisms in neuroscience synergistically may separate conscious from nonconscious neural activity.

Conscious interpretation: A distinct aspect for the neural markers of the contents of consciousness

Progress in the science of consciousness depends on the experimental paradigms and varieties of contrastive analysis available to researchers. Here we highlight paradigms where the object is represented in consciousness as a set of its features but the interpretation of this set alternates in consciousness. We group experimental paradigms with this property under the label "conscious interpretation". We compare the paradigms studying conscious interpretation of the already consciously perceived objects with other types of experimental paradigms. We review previous and recent studies investigating this interpretative aspect of consciousness and propose future directions. We put forward the hypothesis that there are types of stimuli with a hierarchy of interpretations for which the rule applies: conscious experience is drawn towards higher-level interpretation and reverting back to the lower level of interpretation is impossible. We discuss how theories of consciousness might incorporate knowledge and constraints arising from the characteristics of conscious interpretation.

Human visual consciousness involves large scale cortical and subcortical networks independent of task report and eye movement activity

The full neural circuits of conscious perception remain unknown. Using a visual perception task, we directly recorded a subcortical thalamic awareness potential (TAP). We also developed a unique paradigm to classify perceived versus not perceived stimuli using eye measurements to remove confounding signals related to reporting on conscious experiences. Using fMRI, we discovered three major brain networks driving conscious visual perception independent of report: first, increases in signal detection regions in visual, fusiform cortex, and frontal eye fields; and in arousal/salience networks involving midbrain, thalamus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula; second, increases in frontoparietal attention and executive control networks and in the cerebellum; finally, decreases in the default mode network. These results were largely maintained after excluding eye movement-based fMRI changes. Our findings provide evidence that the neurophysiology of consciousness is complex even without overt report, involving multiple cortical and subcortical networks overlapping in space and time.

Task requirements affect the neural correlates of consciousness

In the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, it is often assumed that there is a stable set within the relevant sensory modality. Within the visual modality, the debate has centred upon whether frontal or occipital activations are the best predictors of perceptual awareness. Although not accepted by all as definitive evidence, no-report and decoding studies have indicated that occipital activity is the most consistently correlated with perceptual awareness whereas frontal activity might be closely related to aspects of cognition typically related to reports. However, perception is rarely just passive perception of something, but more or less always perception for something. That is, the task at hand for the perceiver may influence what is being perceived. This suggests an alternative view: that consciousness is not one specific 'function' that can be localized consistently to one area or event-related component and that the specific attributes of the neural correlates of consciousness depend on the task at hand. To investigate whether and how tasks may influence the neural correlates of consciousness, we here contrasted two tasks, a perceptual task and a conceptual task, using identical stimuli in both tasks. Using magnetoencephalography, we found that the perceptual task recruited more occipital resources than the conceptual task. Furthermore, we found that between the two conditions, the amount of frontal resources recruited differed between different gradations of perceptual awareness partly in an unexpected manner. These findings support a view of task affecting the neural correlates of consciousness.

More than a feeling: Scalp EEG and eye signals in conscious tactile perception

Understanding the neural basis of consciousness is a fundamental goal of neuroscience, and sensory perception is often used as a proxy for consciousness in empirical studies. However, most studies rely on reported perception of visual stimuli. Here we present behavior, high density scalp EEG and eye metric recordings collected simultaneously during a novel tactile threshold perception task. We found significant N80, N140 and P300 event related potentials in perceived trials and in perceived versus not perceived trials. Significance was limited to a P100 and P300 in not perceived trials. We also found an increase in pupil diameter and blink rate and a decrease in microsaccade rate following perceived relative to not perceived tactile stimuli. These findings support the use of eye metrics as a measure of physiological arousal associated with conscious perception. Eye metrics may also represent a novel path toward the creation of tactile no-report tasks in the future.

Early and late electrophysiological correlates of gradual perceptual awareness in- and outside the Attentional Blink window

There is an ongoing debate on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the attentional blink (AB). Theoretical accounts propose that NCC during the attentional blink occur late in the processing hierarchy and that this quality is specific to the AB. We investigated this question by recording event-related potentials during an AB experiment with faces as T2. We analyzed ERPs to T2 stimuli inside (short lag) and outside (long lag) the AB window after carefully calibrating T2 stimuli to ensure equal visibility ratings across lags. We found that the N170, the visual awareness negativity (VAN), and the P3b showed an increased amplitude for seen compared to unseen face stimuli regardless of stimulus lag and that all these components scale linearly with subjective visibility. These findings suggest similar early and late mechanisms of graded perceptual awareness within and outside the AB across perceptual (N170, VAN) and post-perceptual (P3b) processing stages.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals - neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons' reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

The Effects of Spatial Attention Focus and Visual Awareness on the Processing of Fearful Faces: An ERP Study

Previous research on the relationship between attention and emotion processing have focused essentially on consciously-viewed, supraliminal stimuli, while the attention-emotion interplay remains unexplored in situations where visual awareness is restricted. Here, we presented participants with face pairs in a backward masking paradigm and examined the electrophysiological activity in response to fearful and neutral expressions under different conditions of attention (spatially attended vs. unattended) and stimulus visibility (subliminal vs. supraliminal). We found an enhanced N2 (visual awareness negativity -VAN-) and an enhanced P3 for supraliminal compared to subliminal faces. The VAN, indexing the early perceptual awareness, was enhanced when the faces were spatially attended compared to when they were unattended, showing that the VAN does not require spatial attention focus but can be enhanced by it. Fearful relative to neutral expressions enhanced the early neural activity (N2) regardless of spatial attention but only in the supraliminal viewing condition. However, fear-related enhancements on later neural activity (P3) were found when stimuli were both attended and presented supraliminally. These findings suggest that visual awareness is needed for emotion processing during both early and late stages. Spatial attention is required for emotion processing at the later stage but not at the early stage.

Electromagnetism's Bridge Across the Explanatory Gap: How a Neuroscience/Physics Collaboration Delivers Explanation Into All Theories of Consciousness

A productive, informative three decades of correlates of phenomenal consciousness (P-Consciousness) have delivered valuable knowledge while simultaneously locating us in a unique and unprecedented explanatory cul-de-sac. Observational correlates are demonstrated to be intrinsically very unlikely to explain or lead to a fundamental principle underlying the strongly emergent 1st-person-perspective (1PP) invisibly stowed away inside them. That lack is now solidly evidenced in practice. To escape our explanatory impasse, this article focuses on fundamental physics (the standard model of particle physics), which brings to light a foundational argument for how the brain is an essentially electromagnetic (EM) field object from the atomic level up. That is, our multitude of correlates of P-Consciousness are actually descriptions of specific EM field behaviors that are posed (hypothesized) as "the right" correlate by a particular theory of consciousness. Because of this, our 30 years of empirical progress can be reinterpreted as, in effect, the delivery of a large body of evidence that the standard model's EM quadrant can deliver a 1PP. That is, all theories of consciousness are, in the end, merely recipes that select a particular subset of the totality of EM field expression that is brain tissue. With a universal convergence on EM, the science of P-Consciousness becomes a collaborative effort between neuroscience and physics. The collaboration acts in pursuit of a unified explanation applicable to all theories of consciousness while remaining mindful that the process still contains no real explanation as to why or how EM fields deliver a 1PP. The apparent continued lack of explanation is, however, different: this time, the way forward is opened through its direct connection to fundamental physics. This is the first result (Part I). Part II posits, in general terms, a structural (epistemic) add-on/upgrade to the standard model that has the potential to deliver the missing route to an explanation of how subjectivity is delivered through EM fields. The revised standard model, under the neuroscience/physics collaboration, intimately integrates with the existing "correlates of-" paradigm, which acts as its source of empirical evidence. No existing theory of consciousness is lost or invalidated.

Spatial attention shifting to fearful faces depends on visual awareness in attentional blink: An ERP study

It remains unclear to date whether spatial attention towards emotional faces is contingent on, or independent of visual awareness. To investigate this question, a bilateral attentional blink paradigm was used in which lateralised fearful faces were presented at various levels of detectability. Twenty-six healthy participants were presented with two rapid serial streams of human faces, while they attempted to detect a pair of target faces (T2) displayed in close or distant succession of a first target pair (T1). Spatial attention shifting to the T2 fearful faces, indexed by the N2-posterior-contralateral component, was dependent on visual awareness and its magnitude covaried with the visual awareness negativity, a neural marker of awareness at the perceptual level. Additionally, information consolidation in working memory, indexed by the sustained posterior contralateral negativity, positively correlated with the level of visual awareness and spatial attention shifting. These findings demonstrate that spatial attention shifting to fearful faces depends on visual awareness, and these early processes are closely linked to information maintenance in working memory.

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Decoding internally generated transitions of conscious contents in the prefrontal cortex without subjective reports

A major debate about the neural correlates of conscious perception concerns its cortical organization, namely, whether it includes the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which mediates executive functions, or it is constrained within posterior cortices. It has been suggested that PFC activity during paradigms investigating conscious perception is conflated with post-perceptual processes associated with reporting the contents of consciousness or feedforward signals originating from exogenous stimulus manipulations and relayed via posterior cortical areas. We addressed this debate by simultaneously probing neuronal populations in the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta) PFC during a no-report paradigm, capable of instigating internally generated transitions in conscious perception, without changes in visual stimulation. We find that feature-selective prefrontal neurons are modulated concomitantly with subjective perception and perceptual suppression of their preferred stimulus during both externally induced and internally generated changes in conscious perception. Importantly, this enables reliable single-trial, population decoding of conscious contents. Control experiments confirm significant decoding of stimulus contents, even when oculomotor responses, used for inferring perception, are suppressed. These findings suggest that internally generated changes in the contents of conscious visual perception are reliably reflected within the activity of prefrontal populations in the absence of volitional reports or changes in sensory input.

The role of the prefrontal cortex in conscious perception is debated because of its involvement in task relevant behaviour, such as subjective perceptual reports. Here, the authors show that prefrontal activity in rhesus macaques correlates with subjective perception and the contents of consciousness can be decoded from prefrontal population activity even without reports.

Where's My Consciousness-Ometer? How to Test for the Presence and Complexity of Consciousness

Tools and tests for measuring the presence and complexity of consciousness are becoming available, but there is no established theoretical approach for what these tools are measuring. This article examines several categories of tests for making reasonable inferences about the presence and complexity of consciousness (defined as the capacity for phenomenal/subjective experience) and also suggests ways in which different theories of consciousness may be empirically distinguished. We label the various ways to measure consciousness the measurable correlates of consciousness (MCC) and include three subcategories in our taxonomy: (a) neural correlates of consciousness, (b) behavioral correlates of consciousness, and (c) creative correlates of consciousness. Finally, we reflect on how broader philosophical views about the nature of consciousness, such as materialism and panpsychism, may also be informed by the scientific process.

The neural hierarchy of consciousness

The chief undertaking in the studies of consciousness is that of unravelling "the minimal set of neural processes that are together sufficient for the conscious experience of a particular content - the neural correlates of consciousness". To this day, this crusade remains at an impasse, with a clash of two main theories: consciousness may arise either in a graded and cortically-localised fashion, or in an all-or-none and widespread one. In spite of the long-lasting theoretical debates, neurophysiological theories of consciousness have been mostly dissociated from them. Herein, a theoretical review will be put forth with the aim to change that. In its first half, we will cover the hard available evidence on the neurophysiology of consciousness, whereas in its second half we will weave a series of considerations on both theories and substantiate a novel take on conscious awareness: the levels of processing approach, partitioning the conscious architecture into lower- and higher-order, graded and nonlinear.

Modality-specific and modality-general electrophysiological correlates of visual and auditory awareness: Evidence from a bimodal ERP experiment

To date, most studies on the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of conscious perception have examined a single perceptual modality. We compared electrophysiological correlates of visual and auditory awareness in the same experiment to test whether there are modality-specific and modality-general correlates of conscious perception. We used near threshold stimulation and analyzed event-related potentials in response to aware and unaware trials in visual, auditory and bimodal conditions. The results showed modality-specific negative amplitude correlates of conscious perception between 200 and 300 ms after stimulus onset. A combination of these auditory and visual awareness negativities was observed in the bimodal condition. A later positive amplitude difference, whose early part was modality-specific, possibly reflecting access to global workspace, and later part shared modality-general features, possibly indicating higher level cognitive processing involving the decision making, was also observed.

Representational 'touch' and modulatory 'retouch'-two necessary neurobiological processes in thalamocortical interaction for conscious experience

Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

ERP signatures of auditory awareness in cross-modal distractor-induced deafness

Previous research showed that dual-task processes such as the attentional blink are not always transferable from unimodal to cross-modal settings. This study investigated whether such a transfer can be stated for a distractor-induced impairment of target detection established in vision (distractor-induced blindness, DIB) and recently observed in the auditory modality (distractor-induced deafness, DID). A cross-modal DID effect was confirmed: The detection of an auditory target indicated by a visual cue was impaired if multiple auditory distractors preceded the target. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to identify psychophysiological correlates of target detection. A frontal negativity about 200 ms succeeded by a sustained, widespread negativity was associated with auditory target awareness. In contrast to unimodal findings, P3 amplitude was not enhanced for hits. The results support the notion that early frontal attentional processes are linked to auditory awareness, whereas the P3 does not seem to be a reliable indicator of target access.

Involvement of Visual Mismatch Negativity in Access Processing to Visual Awareness

Psychophysiological studies with electroencephalography, focusing on the dynamical aspect of neural correlate of consciousness, reported that visual awareness negativity and P3 enhancement are observed at a latency, 200–300 ms after the visual stimulus onset, when the visual stimulus is consciously perceived. However, access processing to visual awareness (APVA) immediately before conscious perception still remains at the earlier stage of visual sensory processing, though there is little known regarding this subject. The present study hypothesized that visual mismatch negativity (vMMN), which reflects automatic change detection at a latency of 130–250 ms, might be involved in the APVA. In a previous study, vMMN was reported to be evoked by the deviant stimulus that is not consciously perceived in binocular rivalry. To clarify whether the visual change detection affects APVA, we conducted a modified experiment of oddball paradigm on binocular rivalry. The results showed a significant correlation between enhancement of vMMN amplitude and facilitation of perceptual alternation when the unconscious deviant was presented. This implies that vMMN is relevant to the APVA, which is a novel role of vMMN. In early visual processing, the attentional mechanism associated with vMMN is suggested to play an important role in unconscious neural processing at an earlier stage of visual awareness.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.

Local neuronal relational structures underlying the contents of human conscious experience

While most theories of consciousness posit some kind of dependence on global network activities, I consider here an alternative, localist perspective-in which localized cortical regions each underlie the emergence of a unique category of conscious experience. Under this perspective, the large-scale activation often found in the cortex is a consequence of the complexity of typical conscious experiences rather than an obligatory condition for the emergence of conscious awareness-which can flexibly shift, depending on the richness of its contents, from local to more global activation patterns. This perspective fits a massive body of human imaging, recordings, lesions and stimulation data but opens a fundamental problem: how can the information, defining each content, be derived locally in each cortical region. Here, I will discuss a solution echoing pioneering structuralist ideas in which the content of a conscious experience is defined by its relationship to all other contents within an experiential category. In neuronal terms, this relationship structure between contents is embodied by the local geometry of similarity distances between cortical activation patterns generated during each conscious experience, likely mediated via networks of local neuronal connections. Thus, in order for any conscious experience to appear in an individual's mind, two central conditions must be met. First, a specific configural pattern ("bar-code") of neuronal activity must appear within a local relational geometry, i.e. a cortical area. Second, the individual neurons underlying the activated pattern must be bound into a unified functional ensemble through a burst of recurrent neuronal firing: local "ignitions".