What about False Insights? Deconstructing the Aha! Experience along Its Multiple Dimensions for Correct and Incorrect Solutions Separately

Exploring How Generating Metaphor Via Insight Versus Analysis Affects Metaphor Quality and Learning Outcomes

Metaphor generation is both a creative act and a means of learning. When learning a new concept, people often create a metaphor to connect the new concept to existing knowledge. Does the manner in which people generate a metaphor, via sudden insight (Aha! moment) or deliberate analysis, influence the quality of generation and subsequent learning outcomes? According to some research, deliberate processing enhances knowledge retention; hence, generation via analysis likely leads to better concept learning. However, other research has shown that solutions generated via insight are better remembered. In the current study, participants were presented with science concepts and descriptions, then generated metaphors for the concepts. They also indicated how they generated each metaphor and rated their metaphor for novelty and aptness. We assessed participants' learning outcomes with a memory test and evaluated the creative quality of the metaphors based on self- and crowd-sourced ratings. Consistent with the deliberate processing benefit, participants became more familiar with the target science concept if they previously generated a metaphor for the concept via analysis compared to via insight. We also found that metaphors generated via analysis did not differ from metaphors generated via insight in quality (aptness or novelty) nor in how well they were remembered. However, participants' self-evaluations of metaphors generated via insight showed more agreement with independent raters, suggesting the role of insight in modulating the creative ideation process. These preliminary findings have implications for understanding the nature of insight during idea generation and its impact on learning.

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind

Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

Grounding Cognition in Perceptual Experience

The aim of this Special Issue was to put forward a multifaceted reflection on the relevance of perceptual experience in affecting and modeling various aspects of cognitive performance [...].

The lack of Aha! experience can be dependent on the problem difficulty

Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.

Insight and non-insight problem solving: A heart rate variability study

Occasionally, problems are solved with a sudden Aha! moment (insight), while the mundane approach to solving problems is analytical (non-insight). At first glance, non-insight appears to depend on the availability and taxation of cognitive resources to execute the step-by-step approach, whereas insight does not, or to a lesser extent. However, this remains debated. To investigate the reliance of both solution types on cognitive resources, we assessed the involvement of the prefrontal cortex using vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) as an index. Participants (N = 68) solved 70 compound remote associates word puzzles solvable with insight and non-insight. Before, during, and after solving the word puzzles, we measured the vmHRV. Our results showed that resting-state vmHRV (trait) showed a negative association with behavioural performance for both solution types. This might reflect inter-individual differences in inhibitory control. As the solution search requires one to think of remote associations, inhibitory control might hamper rather than aid this process. Furthermore, we observed, for both solution types, a vmHRV increase from resting-state to solution search (state), lingering on in the post-task recovery period. This could mark the increase of prefrontal resources to promote an open-minded stance, essential for divergent thinking, which arguably is crucial for this task. Our findings suggest that, at a general level, both solution types share common aspects. However, a closer analysis of early and late solutions and puzzle difficulty suggested that metacognitive differentiation between insight and non-insight improved with higher trait vmHRV, and that a unique association between trait vmHRV and puzzle difficulty was present for each solution type.

Surprise!-Clarifying the link between insight and prediction error

The AHA experience, a moment of deep understanding during insightful problem-solving involving feelings of certainty, pleasure, and surprise, has captivated psychologists for more than a century. Recently, a new theoretical framework has proposed a link between the AHA experience and prediction error (PE), a popular concept in decision-making and reinforcement learning. This framework suggests that participants maintain a meta-cognitive prediction about the time it takes to solve a problem and the AHA experience arises when the problem is solved earlier than expected, resulting in a meta-cognitive PE. In our preregistered online study, we delved deeper into this idea, investigating whether prediction errors also pertain to participants' predictions regarding the solvability of the problem itself, and which dimension of the AHA experience aligns with the meta-cognitive PE. Utilizing verbal insight problems, we found a positive association between the AHA experience and the meta-cognitive PE, specifically in regards to problem solvability. Specifically, the element of surprise, a critical AHA dimension, emerged as a key indicator of the meta-cognitive PE, while other dimensions-such as pleasure, certainty, and suddenness-showed no signs for similar relationships, with suddenness exhibiting a negative correlation with meta-cognitive PE. This new finding provides further evidence that aspects of the AHA experience, surprise in particular, correspond to a meta-cognitive PE. The finding also underscores the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, linking insights with learning theories and enhancing our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon.

The involvement of decomposition and composition processes in restructuring during problem solving

Decomposition of chunks has been widely accepted as a critical proxy of restructuring, but the role of composition in forming new representations has been largely neglected. This study aims to investigate the roles of both decomposition and composition processes in chunk restructuring, as well as their relationships with "aha" experiences during problem-solving. Participants were asked to move a part of a character to another character to create two new characters. Across three experiments, the characters to be decomposed or composed were varied in terms of tight or loose chunks. The results showed that decomposition or composition of tight chunks led to lower success rates, longer response times, and significantly stronger "Aha!" emotional experiences (mainly in terms of surprise and suddenness). This study provides evidence for the contribution of both decomposition and composition processes to restructuring in creative insight.

"Now I Get It!": Eureka Experiences During the Acquisition of Mathematical Concepts

Many famous scientists have reported anecdotes where a new understanding occurred to them suddenly, in an unexpected flash. Do people generally experience such "Eureka" moments when learning science concepts? And if so, do these episodes truly vehicle sudden insights, or is this impression illusory? To address these questions, we developed a paradigm where participants were taught the mathematical concept of geodesic, which generalizes the common notion of straight line to straight trajectories drawn on curved surfaces. After studying lessons introducing this concept on the sphere, participants (N = 56) were tested on their understanding of geodesics on the sphere and on other surfaces. Our findings indicate that Eureka experiences are common when learning mathematics, with reports by 34 (61%) participants. Moreover, Eureka experiences proved an accurate description of participants' learning, in two respects. First, Eureka experiences were associated with learning and generalization: the participants who reported experiencing Eurekas performed better at identifying counterintuitive geodesics on new surfaces. Second, and in line with the firstperson experience of a sudden insight, our findings suggest that the learning mechanisms responsible for Eureka experiences are inaccessible to reflective introspection. Specifically, reports of Eureka experiences and of participants' confidence in their own understanding were associated with different profiles of performance, indicating that the mechanisms bringing about Eureka experiences and those informing reflective confidence were at least partially dissociated. Learning mathematical concepts thus appears to involve mechanisms that operate unconsciously, except when a key computational step is reached and a sudden insight breaks into consciousness.

The Aha! experience is associated with a drop in the perceived difficulty of the problem

The study investigated the correlation between the intensity of the Aha! experience and participants' subjective difficulty ratings of problems before and after finding their solutions. We assumed that the Aha! experience arises from a shift in processing fluency triggered by changing from an initially incoherent problem representation to a coherent one, which ultimately leads to the retrieval of a solution with unexpected ease and speed. First, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would indicate more sudden solutions, manifesting in a reduced correlation between the initial difficulty ratings and solution times. Second, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would correspond to a greater shift in the subjective difficulty ratings between the initial and retrospective assessments. To test our hypotheses, we developed a novel set of rebus puzzles. A total of 160 participants solved rebuses and provided initial (within 5 s of problem presentation) and retrospective difficulty ratings (following the generation or presentation of a correct solution). They also rated their Aha! experience (after solution generation or presentation), confidence in solutions, and the likability of each rebus. Our findings revealed that the initial ratings of the problem's subjective difficulty were positively correlated with the solution time and that this correlation decreased in the case of a stronger Aha! experience. Aha! experience ratings were positively correlated with the differences between initial and retrospective difficulty ratings, confidence, solution accuracy, and rebus likability. We interpreted our results to be in line with the processing fluency and metacognitive prediction error accounts.

Gestalt's Perspective on Insight: A Recap Based on Recent Behavioral and Neuroscientific Evidence

The Gestalt psychologists' theory of insight problem-solving was based on a direct parallelism between perceptual experience and higher-order forms of cognition (e.g., problem-solving). Similarly, albeit not exclusively, to the sudden recognition of bistable figures, these psychologists contended that problem-solving involves a restructuring of one's initial representation of the problem's elements, leading to a sudden leap of understanding phenomenologically indexed by the "Aha!" feeling. Over the last century, different scholars have discussed the validity of the Gestalt psychologists' perspective, foremost using the behavioral measures available at the time. However, in the last two decades, scientists have gained a deeper understanding of insight problem-solving due to the advancements in cognitive neuroscience. This review aims to provide a retrospective reading of Gestalt theory based on the knowledge accrued by adopting novel paradigms of research and investigating their neurophysiological correlates. Among several key points that the Gestalt psychologists underscored, we focus specifically on the role of the visual system in marking a discrete switch of knowledge into awareness, as well as the perceptual experience and holistic standpoints. While the main goal of this paper is to read the previous theory in light of new evidence, we also hope to initiate an academic discussion and encourage further research about the points we raise.

The influence of insight on risky decision making and nucleus accumbens activation

During insightful problem solving, the solution appears unexpectedly and is accompanied by the feeling of an AHA!. Research suggests that this affective component of insight can have consequences beyond the solution itself by motivating future behavior, such as risky (high reward and high uncertainty) decision making. Here, we investigate the behavioral and neural support for the motivational role of AHA in decision making involving monetary choices. The positive affect of the AHA! experience has been linked to internal reward. Reward in turn has been linked to dopaminergic signal transmission in the Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) and risky decision making. Therefore, we hypothesized that insight activates reward-related brain areas, modulating risky decision making. We tested this hypothesis in two studies. First, in a pre-registered online study (Study 1), we demonstrated the behavioral effect of insight-related increase in risky decision making using a visual Mooney identification paradigm. Participants were more likely to choose the riskier monetary payout when they had previously solved the Mooney image with high compared to low accompanied AHA!. Second, in an fMRI study (Study 2), we measured the effects of insight on NAcc activity using a similar Mooney identification paradigm to the one of Study 1. Greater NAcc activity was found when participants solved the Mooney image with high vs low AHA!. Taken together, our results link insight to enhanced NAcc activity and a preference for high but uncertain rewards, suggesting that insight enhances reward-related brain areas possibly via dopaminergic signal transmission, promoting risky decision making.

Protecting against mental impasses: Evidence of selective retrieval mitigating the impact of fixation in creative problem solving

A common issue in creative problem solving is the unintended fixation on strongly associated, yet inappropriate solutions. In two experiments, we investigated whether lowering their accessibility by means of selective retrieval can positively affect subsequent problem-solving performance in a Compound Remote Associate test. Misleading associates were strengthened by letting participants memorize them alongside with neutral words. Half of the participants then selectively retrieved the neutral words in a cued recall test, temporarily weakening the activation level of induced fixation. In both experiments, this resulted in less impairment of subsequent performance for fixated CRA problems in early problem-solving stages (0-30 s). Additional results further revealed that participants who had engaged in prior selective retrieval perceived an increased feeling of having had immediate access to target solutions. These findings correspond to the assumption of inhibitory processes being a critical factor in both retrieval-induced forgetting and overcoming fixation in creative problem solving or preventing it from occurring in the first place. Also, they provide important insight into how strongly problem solving success is influenced by fixation.

Insight and the selection of ideas

Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.

A Critical Perspective on Neural Mechanisms in Cognitive Neuroscience: Towards Unification

A central pursuit of cognitive neuroscience is to find neural mechanisms of cognition, with research programs favoring different strategies to look for them. But what is a neural mechanism, and how do we know we have captured them? Here I answer these questions through a framework that integrates Marr's levels with philosophical work on mechanism. From this, the following goal emerges: What needs to be explained are the computations of cognition, with explanation itself given by mechanism-composed of algorithms and parts of the brain that realize them. This reveals a delineation within cognitive neuroscience research. In the premechanism stage, the computations of cognition are linked to phenomena in the brain, narrowing down where and when mechanisms are situated in space and time. In the mechanism stage, it is established how computation emerges from organized interactions between parts-filling the premechanistic mold. I explain why a shift toward mechanistic modeling helps us meet our aims while outlining a road map for doing so. Finally, I argue that the explanatory scope of neural mechanisms can be approximated by effect sizes collected across studies, not just conceptual analysis. Together, these points synthesize a mechanistic agenda that allows subfields to connect at the level of theory.

Visual Cognition and the Science of Magic

A number of authors have argued that the art of conjuring can assist the development of theories and knowledge in visual cognition and psychology more broadly. A central assumption of the so-called science of magic is that magicians possess particular insight into human cognition. In a series of experiments, we tested the Insight hypothesis by assessing three factors that magicians argue are important for a popular illusion. Participants viewed videos of a magician performing the French Drop sleight whilst gaze, motion, and muscular tension were manipulated across experiments. Contrary to what the community of conjurers state, results showed that none of these influenced the perceived success of the effect. We also found that a visual priming technique, one suggested of many and used by an eminent magician, does not influence participant responses. Overall, these findings fail to support the Insight hypothesis. We suggest that scientists of magic have erroneously imbued magicians with insights they do not possess.

Does Thinking in Opposites in Order to Think Differently Improve Creativity?

In this paper, we focus on the link between thinking in opposites and creativity. Thinking in opposites requires an intuitive, productive strategy, which may enhance creativity. Given the importance of creativity for the well-being of individuals and society, finding new ways to enhance it represents a valuable goal in both professional and personal contexts. We discuss the body of evidence that exists concerning the importance of the first representation of the structure of a problem to be solved, which determines the baseline representation and sets limits on the area within which a problem solver will explore. We then review a variety of interventions described in the literature on creativity and insight problem solving that were designed to overcome fixedness and encourage people to move away from stereotypical solutions. Special attention is paid to the research carried out in the context of problem solving, which provides evidence that prompting people to "think in opposites" is beneficial. We suggest that an extended investigation of the effects of this strategy in various types of tasks related to creativity is an interesting line of research to follow. We discuss the rationale supporting this claim and identify specific questions, both theoretical and methodological, for future research to address.

Restructuring insight: An integrative review of insight in problem-solving, meditation, psychotherapy, delusions and psychedelics

Occasionally, a solution or idea arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered an "extra" ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is central in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being commonly studied in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy and meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics. In each case, we discuss the event of insight and its prerequisites and consequences. We review evidence for the commonalities and differences between the fields and discuss their relevance for capturing the essence of the insight phenomenon. The goal of this integrative review is to bridge the gap between the different views and inspire interdisciplinary research efforts for understanding this central process of human cognition.

Assessing creativity independently of language: A language-independent remote associate task (LI-RAT)

Most creativity measures are either complex or language-dependent, hindering cross-cultural creativity assessment. We have therefore developed and tested a simple, language-independent insight task based on pictures in the style of the widely used verbal remote associate task (RAT). We demonstrate that the language-independent RAT (LI-RAT) allows assessment of different aspects of insight across large samples with different languages. It also correlates with other creativity and general problem-solving tasks. The entire stimulus set, including its preliminary normative data, is made freely available. This information can be used to select items based on accuracy, mean solution time, likelihood to produce an insight, or conceptual and perceptual similarity between the pictures per item.

Search and insight processes in card sorting games

Insight problems are particularly interesting, because problems which require restructuring allow researchers to investigate the underpinnings of the Aha-experience, creativity and out of the box thinking. There is a need for new insight tasks to probe and extend the limits of existing theories and cognitive frameworks. To shed more light on this fascinating issue, we addressed the question: Is it possible to convey a well-known card sorting game into an insight task? We introduced different conditions and tested them via two online experiments (N = 546). Between the conditions we systematically varied the available perceptual features, and the existence of non-obvious rules. We found that our card sorting game elicited insight experience. In the first experiment, our data revealed that solution strategies and insight experience varied by the availability and saliency of perceptual features. The discovery of a non-obvious rule, which is not hinted at by perceptual features, was most difficult. With our new paradigm, we were able to construe ambiguous problems which allowed participants to find more than one solution strategy. Interestingly, we realized interindividual preferences for different strategies. The same problem drove strategies which either relied on feature integration or on more deliberate strategies. The second experiment varied the degree of independence of a sorting rule from the standard rules which were in accordance with prior knowledge. It was shown that the more independent the hidden rule was, the more difficult the task became. In sum, we demonstrated a new insight task which extended the available task domains and shed light on sequential and multi-step rule learning problems. Finally, we provided a first sketch of a cognitive model that should help to integrate the data within the existing literature on cognitive models and speculated about the generalizability of the interplay of prior knowledge modification and variation for problem solving.

Where Does Eureka Come From? The Effect of Unreportable Hints on the Phenomenology of Insight

Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on "Eureka!" moments.

Surprise! Why Insightful Solution Is Pleasurable

Insight problems-as a type of ill-defined problems-are often solved without an articulate plan, and finding their solution is accompanied by the Aha! experience (positive feeling from suddenly finding a solution). However, the solution of such problems can also be guided, for example, by expectations in terms of criteria for achieving the goal. We hypothesize that adjusting the expectation accuracy based on the reward prediction error (discrepancy between the reward and its prediction) affects the strength of affective components of the Aha! experience (pleasure and surprise), allowing to learn how to solve similar problems. We manipulated expectation accuracy by varying the similarity in problem solution principle and structure in a short learning set. Each set was followed by a critical problem where both the structure and solution principle were changed (except for control set). Subjective feelings, solution time, and expectation were measured after each problem. The results revealed that problems with similarities become more expected at the end of the set and their solution time is decreased. However, the critical problem featured a rapid increase in pleasure and surprise and decrease in expectedness only in the condition where both the solution principle and structure were expected, suggesting that problem structure is a key feature determining expectedness in insight problem solving. The Aha! experience is not an epiphenomenon; it plays a role in learning of problem solving through adjusting expectations.

Thinking style and psychosis proneness do not predict false insights

The FIAT paradigm (Grimmer et al., 2021) is a novel method of eliciting 'Aha' moments for incorrect solutions to anagrams in the laboratory, i.e. false insights. There exist many documented reports of psychotic symptoms accompanying strong feelings of 'Aha!' (Feyaerts, Henriksen, Vanheule, Myin-Germeys, & Sass, 2021; Mishara, 2010; Tulver, Kaup, Laukkonen, & Aru, 2021), suggesting that the newly developed FIAT could reveal whether people who have more false insights are more prone to psychosis and delusional belief. To test this possibility, we recruited 200 participants to take an adapted version of the FIAT and complete measures of thinking style and psychosis proneness. We found no association between experimentally induced false insights and measures of Schizotypy, Need for Cognition, Jumping to Conclusions, Aberrant Salience, Faith in Intuition, or the Cognitive Reflection Task. We conclude that experiencing false insights might not be constrained to any particular type of person, but rather, may arise for anyone under the right circumstances.

How Difficult Was It? Metacognitive Judgments About Problems and Their Solutions After the Aha Moment

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.

Utterances as Signals for Sharing Tacit Images in Collective Interaction

In ball games, individuals collaborate to enhance their team's performance by sharing images and ideas that have not been verbalized. One of a coach's roles is to ascertain whether players share a common understanding of their team's images so as to devise tactics. Accordingly, this study aimed to verify the hypothesis that sharing images such as tacit knowledge that has not been verbalized occurs in collective interaction when utterances increase substantially during problem-solving. The participants were 13 male university handball players whose teams were championship contenders in Japan. A mixed methods research design was employed. Scenes in which two groups engaged in problem-solving were recorded and data of each participant's utterances were obtained. The utterances were analyzed quantitatively by employing Smirnoff-Grubbs and the time periods including those with a substantial number of utterances were identified. What happened during the identified time periods verified as outliers including the high frequency utterances were analyzed qualitatively by employing consensual qualitative analysis. Finally, the results of the consensual qualitative analysis were used to examine statistically to determine whether specific events occurred during times of extreme high frequency utterances. The exact binomial test was used to determine the 95% confidence interval of the population ratio and the effect size (g) of the mother ratio (0.05) to determine whether non-verbalized images such as tacit knowledge were being shared among members. Of the 26 time periods, 22 were supported the hypothesis. Of the time periods with extremely high utterances, the population ratio of the time periods supporting the hypothesis was 0.846 (CI = 0.681-1.00, g = 0.80). The results revealed that tacit image sharing occurred when there were a substantial number of utterances. This study demonstrated the possibility that sharing images that have not been verbalized occurs in collective interaction when there is a hotspot of utterances.

Irrelevant insights make worldviews ring true

Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction about them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldview beliefs such as "people's core qualities are fixed" and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3000, which included a direct replication), participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and also experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1564) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for this 'insight misattribution' effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldview beliefs seem truer, possibly because humans partially rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea's veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.

Eliciting false insights with semantic priming

The insight experience (or ‘Aha moment’) generally evokes strong feelings of certainty and confidence. An ‘Aha’ experience for a false idea could underlie many false beliefs and delusions. However, for as long as insight experiences have been studied, false insights have remained difficult to elicit experimentally. That difficulty, in turn, highlights the fact that we know little about what causes people to experience a false insight. Across two experiments (total N = 300), we developed and tested a new paradigm to elicit false insights. In Experiment 1 we used a combination of semantic priming and visual similarity to elicit feelings of insight for incorrect solutions to anagrams. These false insights were relatively common but were experienced as weaker than correct ones. In Experiment 2 we replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and found that semantic priming and visual similarity interacted to produce false insights. These studies highlight the importance of misleading semantic processing and the feasibility of the solution in the generation of false insights.

Between automatic and control processes: How relationships between problem elements interact to facilitate or impede insight

Solving a problem requires relating the pieces of information available to each other and to the solution. We investigated how the strength of these relationships determines the likelihood of solving insight tasks based on remote associates. In these tasks, the solver is provided with several cues (e.g., drop, coat, summer) and has to find the solution that matches those cues (e.g., rain). We measured the semantic similarity between the cues and the solution (cue-solution similarity) as well as between cues (cue-cue similarity). We assume those relationships modulate two basic processes underlying insight problem-solving. First, there is an automatic activation process whereby conceptual activation spreads across a semantic network from each cue node to their associated nodes, potentially reaching the node of the solution. Thus, in general, the higher cue-solution similarity, the more likely the solution will be found (Prediction 1). Second, there is a controlled search process focused on an area in semantic space whose radius depends on competing cue-cue similarity. High cue-cue similarity will bias a search for the solution close to the provided cues because the associated nodes shared by both cues are highly coactivated. Therefore, high cue-cue similarity will have a beneficial effect when the cue-solution similarity is high but a detrimental effect when cue-solution similarity is low (Prediction 2). Our two predictions were confirmed using both verbal and pictorial remote association tasks, supporting the view that insight is dependent on an interaction of meaningful relationships between cues and solutions, and clarify the mechanisms of insight problem solving in remote associates.

Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load

The Aha! moment- the sudden insight sometimes reached when solving a vexing problem- entails a different problem-solving experience than solution retrieval reached by an analytical, multistep strategy (i.e., non-insight). To date, the (un)conscious nature of insight remains debated. We addressed this by studying insight under cognitive load. If insight and non-insight problem solving rely on conscious, effortful processes, they should both be influenced by a concurrent cognitive load. However, if unconscious processes characterize insight, cognitive load might not affect it at all. Using a dual-task paradigm, young, healthy adults (N = 106) solved 70 word puzzles under different cognitive loads. We confirmed that insight solutions were more often correct and received higher solution confidence. Importantly, as cognitive load increased, non-insight solutions became less frequent and required more solution time, whereas insightful ones remained mostly unaffected. This implies that insight problem solving did not compete for limited cognitive resources.

Cognitive and Neural State Dynamics of Narrative Comprehension

Narrative comprehension involves a constant interplay of the accumulation of incoming events and their integration into a coherent structure. This study characterizes cognitive states during narrative comprehension and the network-level reconfiguration occurring dynamically in the functional brain. We presented movie clips of temporally scrambled sequences to human participants (male and female), eliciting fluctuations in the subjective feeling of comprehension. Comprehension occurred when processing events that were highly causally related to the previous events, suggesting that comprehension entails the integration of narratives into a causally coherent structure. The functional neuroimaging results demonstrated that the integrated and efficient brain state emerged during the moments of narrative integration with the increased level of activation and across-modular connections in the default mode network. Underlying brain states were synchronized across individuals when comprehending novel narratives, with increased occurrences of the default mode network state, integrated with sensory processing network, during narrative integration. A model based on time-resolved functional brain connectivity predicted changing cognitive states related to comprehension that are general across narratives. Together, these results support adaptive reconfiguration and interaction of the functional brain networks on causal integration of the narratives.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The human brain can integrate temporally disconnected pieces of information into coherent narratives. However, the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms of how the brain builds a narrative representation remain largely unknown. We showed that comprehension occurs as the causally related events are integrated to form a coherent situational model. Using fMRI, we revealed that the large-scale brain states and interaction between brain regions dynamically reconfigure as comprehension evolves, with the default mode network playing a central role during moments of narrative integration. Overall, the study demonstrates that narrative comprehension occurs through a dynamic process of information accumulation and causal integration, supported by the time-varying reconfiguration and brain network interaction.

Learning by Insight-Like Sudden Comprehension as a Potential Strategy to Improve Memory Encoding in Older Adults

Several cognitive functions show a decline with advanced age, most prominently episodic memory. Problem-solving by insight represents a special associative form of problem-solving that has previously been shown to facilitate long-term memory formation. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the encoding network involved in insight-based memory formation is largely hippocampus-independent. This may represent a potential advantage in older adults, as the hippocampus is one of the earliest brain structures to show age-related volume loss and functional impairment. Here, we investigated the potential beneficial effects of learning by insight in healthy older (60-79 years) compared to young adults (19-28 years). To this end, we compared later memory performance for verbal riddles encoded incidentally via induced insight-like sudden comprehension in both age groups. We employed a variant of the Compound Remote Associate Task (CRAT) for incidental encoding, during which participants were instructed to judge the solvability of items. In a 24-h delayed surprise memory test, participants attempted to solve previously encountered items and additionally performed a recognition memory test. During this test, older adults correctly solved an equal proportion of new CRA items compared to young adults and both age groups reported a similar frequency of Aha! experiences. While overall memory performance was better in young participants (higher proportion of correctly solved and correctly recognized old CRA items), older participants exhibited a stronger beneficial effect of insight-like sudden comprehension on later recognition memory for CRA items. Our results suggest that learning via insight might constitute a promising approach to improve memory function in old age.

The coping insights involved in strengthening resilience: The Self-Reflection and Coping Insight Framework

BACKGROUND

Recent theoretical work suggests that self-reflection on daily stressors and the efficacy of coping strategies and resources is beneficial for the enhancement of resilient capacities. However, coping insights emerging from self-reflection, and their relationship to resilient capacities, is an existing gap in our understanding.

OBJECTIVES

Given that insights come in many forms, the objective of this paper is to delineate exemplar coping insights that strengthen the capacity for resilience.

METHODS

After providing an overview of self-reflection and insight, we extend the Systematic Self-Reflection model of resilience strengthening by introducing the Self-Reflection and Coping Insight Framework to articulate how the emergence of coping insights may mediate the relationship between five self-reflective practices and the enhancement of resilient capacities.

RESULTS

We explore the potential for coping insights to convey complex ideas about the self in the context of stressor exposure, an awareness of response patterns to stressors, and principles about the nature of stress and coping across time and contexts.

CONCLUSIONS

This framework adds to existing scholarship by providing a characterization of how coping insight may strengthen resilient capacities, allowing for a guided exploration of coping insight during future research.

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.

The Effect of Dopaminergic Replacement Therapy on Creative Thinking and Insight Problem-Solving in Parkinson's Disease Patients

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo. Here, we tested a group of PD patients when “on” and “off” dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving (Alternative Uses Task, Compound Remote Associates, Rebus Puzzles), and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients “on” medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall (by making more errors) than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were “on” medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while “on” medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity (i.e., an art-bias).

Left-hemispheric predominance on appropriateness evaluation of restructuring during chunk decomposition problem solving

Restructuring refers to achieving satisfactory solutions by breaking obstacles or forming novel associations in problem-solving. One critical question arises regarding how an appropriate solution is processed in our brain during the restructuring of problem representations. This study aims to explore the electrophysiological correlates of appropriateness evaluation of restructuring by employing a chunk decomposition task. During loose or tight chunk decomposition, participants needed to assess whether they could get a valid solution after probe removal from a source character chunk. As reflected by the late positive complex, the processing of appropriateness exhibited the greatest effect (appropriate vs. inappropriate) in left parietal regions for tight chunk decomposition, but exhibited insignificant differences across most brain regions for loose chunk decomposition. This study provides the first primary electrophysiological evidence that both hemispheres contribute to and the left hemisphere plays a predominant role in evaluating the appropriateness of restructuring in problem solving.

Brain Activations and Functional Connectivity Patterns Associated with Insight-Based and Analytical Anagram Solving

Insight is one of the most mysterious problem-solving phenomena involving the sudden emergence of a solution, often preceded by long unproductive attempts to find it. This seemingly unexplainable generation of the answer, together with the role attributed to insight in the advancement of science, technology and culture, stimulate active research interest in discovering its neuronal underpinnings. The present study employs functional Magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to probe and compare the brain activations occurring in the course of solving anagrams by insight or analytically, as judged by the subjects. A number of regions were activated in both strategies, including the left premotor cortex, left claustrum, and bilateral clusters in the precuneus and middle temporal gyrus. The activated areas span the majority of the clusters reported in a recent meta-analysis of insight-related fMRI studies. At the same time, the activation patterns were very similar between the insight and analytical solutions, with the only difference in the right sensorimotor region probably explainable by subject motion related to the study design. Additionally, we applied resting-state fMRI to study functional connectivity patterns correlated with the individual frequency of insight anagram solutions. Significant correlations were found for the seed-based connectivity of areas in the left premotor cortex, left claustrum, and left frontal eye field. The results stress the need for optimizing insight paradigms with respect to the accuracy and reliability of the subjective insight/analytical solution classification. Furthermore, the short-lived nature of the insight phenomenon makes it difficult to capture the associated neural events with the current experimental techniques and motivates complementing such studies by the investigation of the structural and functional brain features related to the individual differences in the frequency of insight-based decisions.

Oculometric signature of switch into awareness? Pupil size predicts sudden insight whereas microsaccades predict problem-solving via analysis

According to the Gestalt theorists, restructuring is an essential component of insight problem-solving, contributes to the "Aha!" experience, and is similar to the perceptual switch experienced when reinterpreting ambiguous figures. Previous research has demonstrated that pupil diameter increases during the perceptual switch of ambiguous figures, and indexes norepeinephrine functioning mediated by the locus coeruleus. In this study, we investigated if pupil diameter similarly predicts the switch into awareness people experience when solving a problem via insight. Additionally, we explored eye movement dynamics during the same task to investigate if the problem-solving strategies used are linked to specific oculomotor behaviors. In 38 participants, pupil diameter increased about 500 msec prior to solution only in trials for which subjects report having an insight. In contrast, participants increased their microsaccade rate only prior to non-insight solutions. Pupil dilation and microsaccades were not reliably related, but both appear to be robust markers of how people solve problems (with or without insight). The pupil size change seen when people have an "Aha!" moment represents an indicator of the switch into awareness of unconscious processes humans depend upon for insight, and suggests important involvement of norepinephrine, via the locus coeruleus, in sudden insight.

What causes the insight memory advantage?

Prior research indicates that solutions accompanied by an Aha! experience are remembered better than those missing this feeling of epiphany. The question for the present studies was whether this insight memory advantage for problem solutions is modulated by the affective component of insight (the strong feelings that typically accompany the Aha! experience), or by the cognitive component (the restructuring or representational change that occurs during insightful problem solving). In both studies, participants viewed a set of magic trick videos to generate solutions for how each trick was done, and memory for the generated solutions was tested after a week delay. They also indicated the extent to which they experienced an Aha! moment at solution along with other perceptions of their experience. In the second study, they additionally rated the relevance of five action verbs for each trick (including one that implied the correct solution) multiple times during solution as a measure of restructuring the problem representation. The explanation for the insight memory advantage that was best supported by the results is that it is the joint consequence of finding correct solutions, the subjective feeling that one has found a correct solution (certainty), and experiencing an emotional pleasurable reaction during the problem solving process that all contribute to better memory for the solution. However, it did not seem to rely on having reached the solution via a sudden restructuring process.