Thinking Preferences and Conspiracy Belief: Intuitive Thinking and the Jumping to Conclusions-Bias as a Basis for the Belief in Conspiracy Theories

Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind

Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theory beliefs in the adolescent population: A systematic review

INTRODUCTION

While the study of conspiracy theory beliefs is a relatively new research area, there has been a rise in academic interest in recent years. The literature provides evidence of relationships between conspiracy theory beliefs and a range of factors, but the vast majority of studies are limited to adult samples, and it is unclear how such beliefs present in adolescence.

METHODS

The systematic review was conducted according to the PRISMA-S format. Relevant databases were searched up to February 23, 2023, for quantitative studies related to adolescent conspiracy theory beliefs.

RESULTS

The six included articles show that conspiracy theory beliefs are present from the start of adolescence, and stable from age 14 upwards, with correlations reported for mistrust and paranoid thinking. Negative relationships were reported for cognitive factors such as ontological confusion, cognitive ability, and actively open-minded thinking. Health-related beliefs correlated with adverse childhood experiences, peer problems, conduct, and sociodemographic factors. Right-wing authoritarianism and anxiety positively correlated with intergroup conspiracy theory beliefs.

CONCLUSION

While some factors from adult studies are replicated in the review, there are differences between age groups. The age at which conspiracy theory beliefs begin to form indicate developmental aspects of adolescence, and possibly childhood, that require further examination. Cognitive factors show promise for interventions and should be explored further. However, the lack of studies using adolescent populations is an issue that must be resolved for a greater understanding of conspiracy theory beliefs and a move toward effective interventions.

Conspiracy beliefs and perceptual inference in times of political uncertainty

Sociopolitical crises causing uncertainty have accumulated in recent years, providing fertile ground for the emergence of conspiracy ideations. Computational models constitute valuable tools for understanding the mechanisms at play in the formation and rigidification of these unshakeable beliefs. Here, the Circular Inference model was used to capture associations between changes in perceptual inference and the dynamics of conspiracy ideations in times of uncertainty. A bistable perception task and conspiracy belief assessment focused on major sociopolitical events were administered to large populations from three polarized countries. We show that when uncertainty peaks, an overweighting of sensory information is associated with conspiracy ideations. Progressively, this exploration strategy gives way to an exploitation strategy in which increased adherence to conspiracy theories is associated with the amplification of prior information. Overall, the Circular Inference model sheds new light on the possible mechanisms underlying the progressive strengthening of conspiracy theories when individuals face highly uncertain situations.

Conspiracy Theory as Individual and Group Behavior: Observations from the Flat Earth International Conference

Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes.

Psychiatric and non-psychiatric patients during the midst of Covid-19: Pandemic distress, psychosis and the belief in conspiracy theories

BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic was associated with increased levels of psychological distress in the general population, at the same time providing a perfect breeding ground for conspiracy beliefs. Psychiatric patients are considered as a population with an increased vulnerability for stressful events, and conspiracy beliefs show overlaps with paranoid ideations. The aim of the present study was to investigate if psychiatric patients experienced higher levels of pandemic distress than non-psychiatric patients, if they were more prone to conspiracy beliefs and if pandemic distress as well as other mental health variables were associated with believing in conspiracy theories.

METHODS

Indicators for mental health (pandemic distress, depressive symptoms, general anxiety symptoms, perceived stress) and indicators for believing in conspiracy theories were assessed within psychiatric (n = 73) and non-psychiatric patients (n = 29) during the midst of the pandemic.

RESULTS

Psychiatric patients reported higher levels of pandemic distress than non-psychiatric patients. Conspiracy measurements correlated positively with pandemic distress, but not with anxiety and depression. No differences were found between psychiatric patients with or without psychotic disorder and non-psychiatric patients in regard to conspiracy measurements.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest a higher susceptibility of psychiatric patients to pandemic distress, but not an increased level of believing in conspiracy theories. The common notion that people suffering from psychosis are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories was not supported. Furthermore, distress caused by a specific event and not anxiety per se seems to be related to the degree of conspiracy beliefs.

Intermediate levels of scientific knowledge are associated with overconfidence and negative attitudes towards science

Overconfidence is a prevalent problem and it is particularly consequential in its relation with scientific knowledge: being unaware of one's own ignorance can affect behaviours and threaten public policies and health. However, it is not clear how confidence varies with knowledge. Here, we examine four large surveys, spanning 30 years in Europe and the United States and propose a new confidence metric. This metric does not rely on self-reporting or peer comparison, operationalizing (over)confidence as the tendency to give incorrect answers rather than 'don't know' responses to questions on scientific facts. We find a nonlinear relationship between knowledge and confidence, with overconfidence (the confidence gap) peaking at intermediate levels of actual scientific knowledge. These high-confidence/intermediate-knowledge groups also display the least positive attitudes towards science. These results differ from current models and, by identifying specific audiences, can help inform science communication strategies.

Does Considering the Consequences of Selective Exposure Help Reduce Selective Exposure Behaviors?

Selective exposure (the tendency to avoid information one disagrees with) is particularly easy to do and leads to problematic outcomes. This study investigated if personally relevant message frames would increase participant engagement and agreement when reading a counterattitudinal message. Participants (N = 180) were randomly assigned into one of three message frames: the idea attack frame asked participants to recall a time their ideas were attacked or summarily dismissed; the unable to defend position frame asked participants to recall a time they were vulnerable due to a lack of knowledge; and an irrelevant-frame control. Participants then read a counterattitudinal message about increasing internet service taxes. Next, participants rated their message agreement, and self-perceived engagement level. Although the messages did not influence agreement, the unable to defend position and the idea attack frames influenced participants to be more engaged with the message. This suggests that people are motivated to engage more with a counterattitudinal message when they are reminded of a time in which they were vulnerable due to a lack of knowledge or when others were summarily dismissive of their own ideas. Overall, both frames showed some promise and should be explored further.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

Background

The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers' interest in this issue.

Methods

Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants' characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research.

Results

Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism).

Conclusion and limitations

The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

Can Conspiracy Beliefs Be Beneficial? Longitudinal Linkages Between Conspiracy Beliefs, Anxiety, Uncertainty Aversion, and Existential Threat

Research suggests that conspiracy beliefs are adopted because they promise to reduce anxiety, uncertainty, and threat. However, little research has investigated whether conspiracy beliefs actually fulfill these promises. We conducted two longitudinal studies (N_{Study 1} = 405, N_{Study 2} = 1,012) to examine how conspiracy beliefs result from, and in turn influence, anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat. Random intercept cross-lagged panel analyses indicate that people who were, on average, more anxious, uncertainty averse, and existentially threatened held stronger conspiracy beliefs. Increases in conspiracy beliefs were either unrelated to changes in anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat (Study 2), or even predicted increases in these variables (Study 1). In both studies, increases in conspiracy beliefs predicted subsequent increases in conspiracy beliefs, suggesting a self-reinforcing circle. We conclude that conspiracy beliefs likely do not have beneficial consequences, but may even reinforce the negative experience of anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat.

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.

Exploring vaccine hesitancy: the twofold role of critical thinking

With the progress of the vaccination campaign against the SARS-COV-2, we are ever closer to reaching that part of the population that refuses or is hesitant about vaccination. This study investigated the association between critical thinking motivation factors (i.e., intrinsic value of critical thinking and expectancy of one's critical thinking ability), conspiracy mentality, intolerance of uncertainty and hesitancy toward vaccination. A sample of 390 participants completed an online survey during April 2021. Across participants, results indicate that conspiracy mentality and expectancy about personal ability as a critical thinker positively predict vaccine hesitancy. On the contrary, the intrinsic value attributed to critical thinking, intolerance of uncertainty, and education are negatively associated with hesitancy. While the findings confirm existing evidence, particularly on the detrimental role of conspiracy mentality on vaccine acceptance, they also shed light on the double-faced role exercised by critical thinking. Practical implications and future directions are discussed.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-04165-w.

Why do people believe health misinformation and who is at risk? A systematic review of individual differences in susceptibility to health misinformation

RATIONALE

Health misinformation poses a significant threat to public health. Understanding why people believe health misinformation and who is at risk is crucial for developing effective interventions to reduce the harmful impact of misinformation.

APPROACH

We conducted a systematic review of published empirical research that examined individual differences in susceptibility to health misinformation, focusing on the psychological, demographic, and behavioral correlates of health misinformation susceptibility. To guide our review on psychological correlates, we developed an integrative psychological model of susceptibility to health misinformation based on one's ability and motivation to reason.

RESULTS

We identified 47 publications (61 empirical studies) that met our criteria. Our review suggests that subject knowledge, literacy and numeracy, analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking), and trust in science confer strong resistance to health misinformation, whereas conspiracy thinking, religiosity, conservative ideology, and conservative party identification are associated with more susceptibility to health misinformation. Demographically, older age and higher educational attainment predict less susceptibility to health misinformation, whereas racial minority status is associated with greater susceptibility. Behaviorally, relying on health professionals or scientists as information sources predicts less susceptibility to health misinformation, whereas social media use is associated with greater susceptibility.

CONCLUSIONS

Susceptibility to health misinformation is driven by multiple psychological processes. Interventions for reducing the spread and impact of health misinformation should be tailored to the psychological mechanism underlying susceptibility to health misinformation. Limited resources should be used to support interventions targeted at individuals at risk.

Whodunit - A novel video-based task for the measurement of jumping to conclusions in the schizophrenia spectrum

Jumping to conclusions (JTC) is implicated in the formation and maintenance of the positive symptoms of psychosis and over the years has become a prominent treatment target. Yet, measures designed to detect JTC are compromised by a number of limitations. We aimed to address some of these shortcomings with a new video-based "Whodunit task" among participants scoring high and low on the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE). We recruited a large sample (N = 979) from the general population who were divided into subgroups high vs. low on psychotic-like experiences (PLE), matched for depression and background characteristics. In the Whodunit task, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that one out of six suspects was the perpetrator of a crime (deliberately ambiguous with no clear clues until the end). The primary measure was the number of sequences-to-decision (STD). In line with the hypothesis, participants scoring high on the CAPE positive subscale displayed significantly lower STD and a higher rate of JTC. Response confidence in the assessments was elevated in the PLE-High group. The number of overall decisions was also significantly elevated for the PLE-High group. No group differences were found when comparing those scoring high versus low on depression. The STD index correlated significantly with a corresponding index from another JTC task. The study presents a new paradigm for the measurement of data gathering in the schizophrenia spectrum. Speaking to its validity, the Whodunit task was correlated with another JTC measure. Future research should test abbreviated versions of the paradigm, preferably using multiple trials with differing topics/emotional themes.

Psychotic-like experiences in the lonely predict conspiratorial beliefs and are associated with the diet during COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the occurrence of conspiracy theories. It has been suggested that a greater endorsement of these theories may be associated with psychotic-like experiences (PLEs), as well as with social isolation. In this preregistered study, we investigated whether both PLEs and measures of social isolation (e.g., loneliness) can predict conspiratorial beliefs and, if so, which of these variables can mediate the association with conspiratorial beliefs. Furthermore, based on previous studies on schizophrenia, we explored whether the diet is associated with PLEs and conspiratorial beliefs. Participants (N = 142) completed online questionnaires measuring PLEs, social isolation, mental well-being, and conspiratorial beliefs. They also submitted their daily food intake for a week using a smartphone app. We found that loneliness predicted the endorsement of conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 lockdown. Strikingly, the proneness to experience subclinical psychotic symptoms played an underlying mediating role. In addition, these subclinical symptoms were associated with lower fruit, carbohydrate, and iron intakes, as well as with higher fat intake. Our results add insights into how conspiratorial beliefs can affect individuals’ mental health and relationships. Moreover, these results open the avenue for potential novel intervention strategies to optimize food intake in individuals with PLEs.

Théories du complot et COVID-19 : comment naissent les croyances complotistes ?

La pandémie COVID-19 causée par le nouveau coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 a provoqué une crise mondiale sans précédent, associée à une prolifération de théories du complot. La prévalence de ces croyances complotistes a participé à affaiblir la crédibilité des mesures gouvernementales de santé publique, limiter l'accès des citoyens aux sources d’information fiables, et perturber la réponse des systèmes de santé face à la crise sanitaire. Plusieurs hypothèses ont été proposées en psychologie et en sciences sociales pour comprendre la genèse de ces croyances dans des contextes épidémiques, associant l’implication conjointe de facteurs psychologiques (comme la volonté de préserver sa sécurité, de maintenir une image de soi positive, ou encore de renforcer son rôle social) et sociodémographiques (comme les caractéristiques générationnelles, socioculturelles et politiques des individus). Toutefois, les découvertes récentes en sciences cognitives à propos des mécanismes élémentaires de traitement de l'information offrent un nouvel éclairage sur la génération des croyances conspirationnistes à travers les époques et les cultures. Dans cet article, nous proposons une définition de la théorie du complot et une classification des croyances complotistes pendant la pandémie de COVID-19. Nous montrons comment les mécanismes de génération et de mise à jour des croyances permettent d'expliquer la genèse des théories du complot, et nous proposons plusieurs hypothèses étayées par les recherches contemporaines en sciences cognitives et en sciences sociales à propos des théories du complot.

Divergent thinking in Italian elementary school children: the key role of probabilistic reasoning style

Divergent thinking is widely recognised as an individual creative potential and an essential factor in fostering creativity since the early stages of life. Albeit previous research revealed that creativity could be pursued through controlled mental processes (e.g. reasoning), the debate about the impact of children's reasoning on divergent thinking and, ultimately, creativity is still open. The present study sought to deepen the relationships between probabilistic reasoning and divergent thinking in a sample of 106 Italian children (mean_age = 8.64, SD_age = 1.34; 58 F). The Beads Task was used to evaluate probabilistic reasoning, whereas the Alternative Uses Task was administered to assess divergent thinking. Results revealed that analytical, slow, and effortful forms of thought underpinned by high probabilistic competencies predict children's divergent production. These findings suggest that a higher score for divergence of thinking depends on a high involvement of reasoning style, which in this study relies on the ability to make probabilistic decisions in ambiguous situations. Future research directions were discussed.

Reflective thinking predicts lower conspiracy beliefs: A meta-analysis

One of the many established predictors of conspiracy beliefs is reflective thinking, but no meta-analysis so far has examined this relationship. In the current meta-analysis of published and unpublished correlational data (145 samples, 181 effect sizes), we found a significant negative association between reflective thinking and conspiracy beliefs with a medium-level effect size (r = –.189) . Similar levels of correlations were found across different types of measures (self-report vs. performance-based) and conspiracy beliefs (generic vs. specific). Further, no evidence suggested publication bias in this body of work. Suggestions for future research are discussed.

Verschwörungstheorien und paranoider Wahn: Lassen sich Aspekte kognitionspsychologischer Modelle zu Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von paranoiden Wahnüberzeugungen auf Verschwörungstheorien übertragen?

Der vorliegende narrative Übersichtsartikel stellt zunächst verschiedene Definitionen von Verschwörungstheorien und Verschwörungsmentalität vor und präsentiert Studien zu Zusammenhängen zwischen Persönlichkeitseigenschaften, Symptomen psychischer Störungen und Verschwörungstheorien. Anschließend werden die Kontinuumshypothese des Wahns sowie neuere Konzeptualisierungen von allgemeinem und paranoiden Wahn diskutiert, des Weiteren werden typische kognitionspsychologische Modelle präsentiert, die die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Wahnüberzeugungen durch eine Interaktion von biologischen Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren, psychologischen Faktoren und sozialen Faktoren erklären. In diesen Modellen mediieren sowohl kognitive Verarbeitungsstile („cognitive biases“) als auch emotionale Prozesse die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Wahn, beispielsweise die Tendenz, voreilige Schlussfolgerungen zu treffen („jumping to conclusions bias“), sowie externale Kontrollüberzeugungen und ein externalisierender personalisierender Kausalattributionsstil. Anschließend wird diskutiert, ob Menschen, die Verschwörungstheorien zugeneigt sind, ebenfalls ähnliche kognitive Verarbeitungsstile aufweisen, die auch bei Personen zu finden sind, die paranoiden Wahnüberzeugungen zustimmen und unter psychotischen Störungen leiden. Parallelen bestehen zwischen beiden Personengruppen beispielsweise im Hinblick auf eine Neigung zu externalen Kontrollüberzeugungen und einen external personalisierenden Kausalattributionsstil. Auch bestehen Ähnlichkeiten in der Neigung, voreilige Schlussfolgerungen zu treffen. Fragen nach Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden zwischen beiden Phänomenen sollten in weiteren präregistrierten experimentellen Studien quer- sowie längsschnittlich untersucht werden. Möglicherweise könnten moderne niedrigschwellige Interventionsmethoden der kognitiven Verhaltenstherapie von Psychosen (CBTp) in die Beratung oder Prävention von Verschwörungstheorien implementiert werden.

Willingness to vaccinate against SARS-CoV-2: The role of reasoning biases and conspiracist ideation

BACKGR1OUND: Widespread vaccine hesitancy and refusal complicate containment of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Extant research indicates that biased reasoning and conspiracist ideation discourage vaccination. However, causal pathways from these constructs to vaccine hesitancy and refusal remain underspecified, impeding efforts to intervene and increase vaccine uptake.

METHOD

554 participants who denied prior SARS-CoV-2 vaccination completed self-report measures of SARS-CoV-2 vaccine intentions, conspiracist ideation, and constructs from the Health Belief Model of medical decision-making (such as perceived vaccine dangerousness) along with tasks measuring reasoning biases (such as those concerning data gathering behavior). Cutting-edge machine learning algorithms (Greedy Fast Causal Inference) and psychometric network analysis were used to elucidate causal pathways to (and from) vaccine intentions.

RESULTS

Results indicated that a bias toward reduced data gathering during reasoning may cause paranoia, increasing the perceived dangerousness of vaccines and thereby reducing willingness to vaccinate. Existing interventions that target data gathering and paranoia therefore hold promise for encouraging vaccination. Additionally, reduced willingness to vaccinate was identified as a likely cause of belief in conspiracy theories, subverting the common assumption that the opposite causal relation exists. Finally, perceived severity of SARS-CoV-2 infection and perceived vaccine dangerousness (but not effectiveness) were potential direct causes of willingness to vaccinate, providing partial support for the Health Belief Model's applicability to SARS-CoV-2 vaccine decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

These insights significantly advance our understanding of the underpinnings of vaccine intentions and should scaffold efforts to prepare more effective interventions on hesitancy for deployment during future pandemics.

Risk-Perception Change Associated with COVID-19 Vaccine's Side Effects: The Role of Individual Differences

The COVID-19 vaccine appears to be a crucial requirement to fight the pandemic. However, a part of the population possesses negative attitudes towards the vaccine. The spread of conspiracy theories and contradictory information about the pandemic have altered the population’s perception of risk. The risk-perception of the vaccine’s side effects may be affected by individual differences. The complex relationship between risk-perception and individual differences is relevant when people have to make decisions based on ambiguous and constantly changing information, as in the early phases of the Italian vaccination campaign. The present study aimed at measuring the effect of individual differences in risk-perception associated with the COVID-19 vaccine’s side effects in a context characterized by information ambiguity. An online survey was conducted to classify a sample of Italian pro-vaccine people into cognitive/behavioral style groups. Furthermore, changes in vaccine risk-perception after inconsistent communications regarding the vaccine’s side effects were compared between groups. The results showed that “analytical” individuals did not change their perception regarding the probability of vaccine side effects but changed their perception regarding the severity of side effects; “open” and “polarized” individuals neither changed their perception regarding the probability nor of the severity of side effects, showing a different kind of information processing, which could interfere with an informed decision-making process.

"I feel it in my gut:" Epistemic Motivations, Political Beliefs, and Misperceptions of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election

This project examines the intersection of political constructs and epistemic motivations as they relate to belief in misinformation. How we value the origins of knowledge - through feelings and intuition or evidence and data - has important implications for our susceptibility to misinformation. This project explores how these epistemic motivations correlate with political ideology, party identification, and favorability towards President Trump, and how epistemic and political constructs predict belief in misinformation about COVID and the 2020 election. Results from a US national survey from Nov-Dec 2020 illustrate that Republicans, conservatives, and those favorable towards President Trump held greater misperceptions about COVID and the 2020 election. Additionally, epistemic motivations were associated with political preferences; Republicans and conservatives were more likely to reject evidence, and Trump supporters more likely to value feelings and intuition. Mediation analyses support the proposition that Trump favorability, Republicanism, and conservatism may help account for the relationships between epistemic motivations and misperceptions. Results are discussed in terms of the messaging strategies of right-wing populist movements, and the implications for democracy and public health.

Of tinfoil hats and thinking caps: Reasoning is more strongly related to implausible than plausible conspiracy beliefs

People who strongly endorse conspiracy theories typically exhibit biases in domain-general reasoning. We describe an overfitting hypothesis, according to which (a) such theories overfit conspiracy-related data at the expense of wider generalisability, and (b) reasoning biases reflect, at least in part, the need to reduce the resulting dissonance between the conspiracy theory and wider data. This hypothesis implies that reasoning biases should be more closely associated with belief in implausible conspiracy theories (e.g., the moon landing was faked) than with more plausible ones (e.g., the Russian Federation orchestrated the attack on Sergei Skripal). In two pre-registered studies, we found that endorsement of implausible conspiracy theories, but not plausible ones, was associated with reduced information sampling in an information-foraging task and with less reflective reasoning. Thus, the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and reasoning is not homogeneous, and reasoning is not linked specifically to the "conspiracy" aspect of conspiracy theories. Instead, it may reflect an adaptive response to the tension between implausible theories and other beliefs and data.

Soaring seas, forest fires and deadly drought: climate change conspiracies and mental health

There is scientific consensus that anthropogenic climate change is real and that it provides an existential threat to humanity and the planet. In this article, we focus on climate change conspiracy theories and the impact of such beliefs on mental health. We discuss the psychiatric disorders that might be relevant to conspiracy belief endorsement and we present the underlying psychological mechanisms. We note that there is little to no literature to associate beliefs about climate change with serious mental health conditions. However, we anticipate that such beliefs may manifest pathologically in psychiatric presentations as climate change becomes increasingly at the forefront of the global agenda.

Are COVID-19 conspiracies a threat to public health? Psychological characteristics and health protective behaviours of believers

We tested the link between COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and health protective behaviours in three studies: one at the onset of the pandemic in the United Kingdom (UK), a second just before the first national lockdown, and a third during that lockdown (N = 302, 404 and 399). We focused on conspiracy theories that did not deny the existence of COVID‐19 and evaluated the extent to which they predicted a range of health protective behaviours, before and after controlling for psychological and sociodemographic characteristics associated with conspiracy theory belief. COVID‐19 conspiracy beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in other unrelated conspiracies and a general conspiracy mind‐set, and negatively correlated with trust in government and a tendency towards analytical thinking (vs. intuitive thinking). Unexpectedly, COVID‐19 conspiracy believers adhered to basic health guidelines and advanced health protective measures as strictly as non‐believers. Conspiracy believers were, however, less willing to install the contact‐tracing app, get tested for and vaccinated against COVID‐19, and were more likely to share COVID‐19 misinformation—all of which might undermine public health initiatives. Study 3 showed conspiracy theory believers were less willing to undertake health protective behaviours that were outside of their personal control, perceiving these as having a negative balance of risks and benefits. We discuss models explaining conspiracy beliefs and health protective behaviours, and suggest practical recommendations for public health initiatives.

The usual suspects: How psychological motives and thinking styles predict the endorsement of well-known and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs

Research on belief in conspiracy theories identified many predictors but often failed to investigate them together. In the present study, we tested how the most important predictors of beliefs in conspiracy theories explain endorsing COVID‐19 and non‐COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality. Apart from these three measures of conspiratorial thinking, participants (N = 354) completed several measures of epistemic, existential, and social psychological motives, as well as cognitive processing variables. While many predictors had significant correlations, only three consistently explained conspiratorial beliefs when included in one model: higher spirituality (specifically eco‐awareness factor), higher narcissism, and lower analytical thinking. Compared to the other two conspiratorial measures, predictors less explained belief in COVID‐19 conspiracy theories, but this depended on items' content. We conclude that the same predictors apply to belief in both COVID and non‐COVID conspiracies and identify New Age spirituality as an important contributor to such beliefs.

Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs in the German-speaking general population: endorsement rates and links to reasoning biases and paranoia

BACKGROUND

Coronavirus-related conspiracy theories (CT) have been found to be associated with fewer pandemic containment-focused behaviors. It is therefore important to evaluate associated cognitive factors. We aimed to obtain first endorsement rate estimates of coronavirus-related conspiracy beliefs in a German-speaking general population sample and investigate whether delusion-related reasoning biases and paranoid ideation are associated with such beliefs.

METHODS

We conducted a cross-sectional non-probability online study, quota-sampled for age and gender, with 1684 adults from Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. We assessed general and specific coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, reasoning biases [jumping-to-conclusions bias (JTC), liberal acceptance bias (LA), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), possibility of being mistaken (PM)], and paranoid ideation, using established experimental paradigms and self-report questionnaires.

RESULTS

Around 10% of our sample endorsed coronavirus-related CT beliefs at least strongly, and another 20% to some degree. Overall endorsement was similar to levels observed in a UK-based study (Freeman et al., 2020b). Higher levels of conspiracy belief endorsement were associated with greater JTC, greater LA, greater BADE, higher PM, and greater paranoid ideation. Associations were mostly small to moderate and best described by non-linear relationships.

CONCLUSIONS

A noticeable proportion of our sample recruited in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland endorsed coronavirus conspiracy beliefs strongly or to some degree. These beliefs are associated with reasoning biases studied in delusion research. The non-probability sampling approach limits the generalizability of findings. Future longitudinal and experimental studies investigating conspiracy beliefs along the lines of reasoning are encouraged to validate reasoning aberrations as risk factors.